openssl: Fix CVE-2011-0014.
[dragonfly.git] / crypto / openssl / ssl / t1_lib.c
CommitLineData
56276539
SS
1/* ssl/t1_lib.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58
59#include <stdio.h>
60#include <openssl/objects.h>
e6bc27f5
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61#include <openssl/evp.h>
62#include <openssl/hmac.h>
2e6ca3d0 63#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
56276539
SS
64#include "ssl_locl.h"
65
e40c9513 66const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
56276539 67
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68#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
69static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
70 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
71 SSL_SESSION **psess);
72#endif
73
5bd86ce5 74SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
56276539
SS
75 tls1_enc,
76 tls1_mac,
77 tls1_setup_key_block,
78 tls1_generate_master_secret,
79 tls1_change_cipher_state,
80 tls1_final_finish_mac,
81 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
82 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
83 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
84 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
85 tls1_alert_code,
86 };
87
5bd86ce5 88long tls1_default_timeout(void)
56276539
SS
89 {
90 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
91 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
92 return(60*60*2);
93 }
94
5bd86ce5
SS
95IMPLEMENT_tls1_meth_func(tlsv1_base_method,
96 ssl_undefined_function,
97 ssl_undefined_function,
98 ssl_bad_method)
56276539
SS
99
100int tls1_new(SSL *s)
101 {
102 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
103 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
104 return(1);
105 }
106
107void tls1_free(SSL *s)
108 {
109 ssl3_free(s);
110 }
111
112void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
113 {
114 ssl3_clear(s);
115 s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
116 }
117
118#if 0
119long tls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, char *parg)
120 {
121 return(0);
122 }
123
124long tls1_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void *(*fp)())
125 {
126 return(0);
127 }
128#endif
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PA
129
130#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
131unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
132 {
133 int extdatalen=0;
134 unsigned char *ret = p;
135
5f042374
PA
136 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
137 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
138 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
139 return p;
140
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PA
141 ret+=2;
142
143 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
144
145 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
146 {
147 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
148 unsigned long size_str;
149 long lenmax;
150
151 /* check for enough space.
152 4 for the servername type and entension length
153 2 for servernamelist length
154 1 for the hostname type
155 2 for hostname length
156 + hostname length
157 */
158
159 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
160 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
161 return NULL;
162
163 /* extension type and length */
164 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
165 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
166
167 /* length of servername list */
168 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
169
170 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
171 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
172 s2n(size_str,ret);
173 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
174 ret+=size_str;
175
176 }
5f042374
PA
177
178 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
179 if (s->new_session)
180 {
181 int el;
182
183 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
184 {
185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
186 return NULL;
187 }
188
189 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
190
191 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
192 s2n(el,ret);
193
194 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
195 {
196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
197 return NULL;
198 }
199
200 ret += el;
201 }
202
203
e6bc27f5
PA
204 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
205 {
206 int ticklen;
5f042374 207 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
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PA
208 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
209 else
210 ticklen = 0;
211 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
212 * rest for ticket
213 */
214 if (limit - ret - 4 - ticklen < 0)
215 return NULL;
216 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
217 s2n(ticklen,ret);
218 if (ticklen)
219 {
220 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
221 ret += ticklen;
222 }
223 }
224
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PA
225 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
226 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2e6ca3d0
PA
227 {
228 int i;
229 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
230 OCSP_RESPID *id;
231
232 idlen = 0;
233 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
234 {
235 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
236 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
237 if (itmp <= 0)
238 return NULL;
239 idlen += itmp + 2;
240 }
241
242 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
243 {
244 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
245 if (extlen < 0)
246 return NULL;
247 }
248 else
249 extlen = 0;
250
251 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
252 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
253 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
254 return NULL;
255 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
256 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
257 s2n(idlen, ret);
258 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
259 {
260 /* save position of id len */
261 unsigned char *q = ret;
262 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
263 /* skip over id len */
264 ret += 2;
265 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
266 /* write id len */
267 s2n(itmp, q);
268 }
269 s2n(extlen, ret);
270 if (extlen > 0)
271 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
272 }
273
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PA
274 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
275 return p;
276
277 s2n(extdatalen,p);
278 return ret;
279 }
280
281unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
282 {
283 int extdatalen=0;
284 unsigned char *ret = p;
285
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PA
286 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
287 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
288 return p;
289
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PA
290 ret+=2;
291 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
292
293 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
294 {
295 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) return NULL;
296
297 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
298 s2n(0,ret);
299 }
5f042374
PA
300
301 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
302 {
303 int el;
304
305 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
306 {
307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
308 return NULL;
309 }
310
311 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
312
313 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
314 s2n(el,ret);
315
316 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
317 {
318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
319 return NULL;
320 }
321
322 ret += el;
323 }
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PA
324
325 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
326 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
327 {
328 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) return NULL;
329 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
330 s2n(0,ret);
331 }
2e6ca3d0
PA
332
333 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
334 {
335 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
336 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
337 s2n(0,ret);
338 }
339
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PA
340 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
341 return p;
342
343 s2n(extdatalen,p);
344 return ret;
345 }
346
347int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
348 {
349 unsigned short type;
350 unsigned short size;
351 unsigned short len;
352 unsigned char *data = *p;
5f042374
PA
353 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
354
e6bc27f5 355 s->servername_done = 0;
2e6ca3d0 356 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
e6bc27f5
PA
357
358 if (data >= (d+n-2))
5f042374
PA
359 goto ri_check;
360
e6bc27f5
PA
361 n2s(data,len);
362
363 if (data > (d+n-len))
5f042374 364 goto ri_check;
e6bc27f5
PA
365
366 while (data <= (d+n-4))
367 {
368 n2s(data,type);
369 n2s(data,size);
370
371 if (data+size > (d+n))
5f042374 372 goto ri_check;
e6bc27f5
PA
373
374 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
375 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
376 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
377/* The servername extension is treated as follows:
378
379 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
380 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
381 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
382 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
383 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
384 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
385 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
386 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
387 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
388 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
389 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
390 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
391 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
392 the value of the Host: field.
393 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
394 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
395 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
396 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
397
398*/
399
400 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
401 {
402 unsigned char *sdata;
403 int servname_type;
404 int dsize;
405
406 if (size < 2)
407 {
408 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
409 return 0;
410 }
411 n2s(data,dsize);
412 size -= 2;
413 if (dsize > size )
414 {
415 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
416 return 0;
417 }
418
419 sdata = data;
420 while (dsize > 3)
421 {
422 servname_type = *(sdata++);
423 n2s(sdata,len);
424 dsize -= 3;
425
426 if (len > dsize)
427 {
428 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
429 return 0;
430 }
431 if (s->servername_done == 0)
432 switch (servname_type)
433 {
434 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
435 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
436 {
437 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name ||
438 ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL))
439 {
440 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
441 return 0;
442 }
443 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
444 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
445 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
446 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2e6ca3d0 447 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
e6bc27f5
PA
448 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
449 return 0;
450 }
451 s->servername_done = 1;
452
453 }
454 else
455 s->servername_done = strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
456 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
457
458 break;
459
460 default:
461 break;
462 }
463
464 dsize -= len;
465 }
466 if (dsize != 0)
467 {
468 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
469 return 0;
470 }
471
472 }
5f042374
PA
473 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
474 {
475 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
476 return 0;
477 renegotiate_seen = 1;
478 }
479 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
480 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2e6ca3d0
PA
481 {
482
483 if (size < 5)
484 {
485 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
486 return 0;
487 }
488
489 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
490 size--;
491 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
492 {
493 const unsigned char *sdata;
494 int dsize;
495 /* Read in responder_id_list */
496 n2s(data,dsize);
497 size -= 2;
498 if (dsize > size )
499 {
500 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
501 return 0;
502 }
503 while (dsize > 0)
504 {
505 OCSP_RESPID *id;
506 int idsize;
507 if (dsize < 4)
508 {
509 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
510 return 0;
511 }
512 n2s(data, idsize);
513 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
143a7cbd 514 size -= 2 + idsize;
2e6ca3d0
PA
515 if (dsize < 0)
516 {
517 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
518 return 0;
519 }
520 sdata = data;
521 data += idsize;
522 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
523 &sdata, idsize);
524 if (!id)
525 {
526 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
527 return 0;
528 }
529 if (data != sdata)
530 {
531 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
532 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
533 return 0;
534 }
535 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
536 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
537 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
538 {
539 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
540 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
541 return 0;
542 }
543 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
544 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
545 {
546 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
547 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
548 return 0;
549 }
550 }
551
552 /* Read in request_extensions */
143a7cbd
PA
553 if (size < 2)
554 {
555 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
556 return 0;
557 }
2e6ca3d0
PA
558 n2s(data,dsize);
559 size -= 2;
143a7cbd 560 if (dsize != size)
2e6ca3d0
PA
561 {
562 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
563 return 0;
564 }
565 sdata = data;
566 if (dsize > 0)
567 {
568 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
569 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
570 &sdata, dsize);
571 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
572 || (data + dsize != sdata))
573 {
574 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
575 return 0;
576 }
577 }
578 }
579 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
580 * so ignore it.
581 */
582 else
583 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
584 }
5f042374 585
e6bc27f5
PA
586 /* session ticket processed earlier */
587
588 data+=size;
589 }
e6bc27f5 590 *p = data;
5f042374
PA
591
592 ri_check:
593
594 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
595
596 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->new_session &&
597 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
598 {
599 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
601 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
602 return 0;
603 }
604
e6bc27f5
PA
605 return 1;
606 }
607
608int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
609 {
610 unsigned short type;
611 unsigned short size;
612 unsigned short len;
613 unsigned char *data = *p;
e6bc27f5 614 int tlsext_servername = 0;
5f042374 615 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
e6bc27f5
PA
616
617 if (data >= (d+n-2))
5f042374 618 goto ri_check;
e6bc27f5
PA
619
620 n2s(data,len);
621
622 while(data <= (d+n-4))
623 {
624 n2s(data,type);
625 n2s(data,size);
626
627 if (data+size > (d+n))
5f042374 628 goto ri_check;
e6bc27f5
PA
629
630 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
631 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
632 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
633
634 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
635 {
636 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
637 {
638 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
639 return 0;
640 }
641 tlsext_servername = 1;
642 }
643 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
644 {
645 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
646 || (size > 0))
647 {
648 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
649 return 0;
650 }
651 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
652 }
5f042374
PA
653 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
654 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2e6ca3d0
PA
655 {
656 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
657 * a status request message.
658 */
659 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
660 {
661 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
662 return 0;
663 }
664 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
665 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
666 }
5f042374
PA
667 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
668 {
669 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
670 return 0;
671 renegotiate_seen = 1;
672 }
e6bc27f5
PA
673 data+=size;
674 }
675
676 if (data != d+n)
677 {
678 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
679 return 0;
680 }
681
682 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
683 {
684 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
685 {
686 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
687 {
688 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
689 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
690 {
691 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
692 return 0;
693 }
694 }
695 else
696 {
697 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
698 return 0;
699 }
700 }
701 }
702
703 *p = data;
5f042374
PA
704
705 ri_check:
706
707 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
708 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
709 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
710 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
711 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
712 * absence on initial connect only.
713 */
714 if (!renegotiate_seen
715 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
716 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
717 {
718 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
720 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
721 return 0;
722 }
723
e6bc27f5
PA
724 return 1;
725 }
726
727int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
728 {
729 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
730 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
731
732 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
733 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
734 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
735 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
736
2e6ca3d0
PA
737 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
738 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
739 * the certificate has changed.
740 */
741 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
742 {
743 int r;
744 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
745 switch (r)
746 {
747 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
748 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
749 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
750 break;
751 /* status request response should be sent */
752 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
753 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
754 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
755 else
756 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
757 break;
758 /* something bad happened */
759 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
760 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
761 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
762 goto err;
763 }
764 }
765 else
766 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
767 err:
e6bc27f5
PA
768 switch (ret)
769 {
770 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
771 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
772 return -1;
773
774 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
775 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
776 return 1;
777
778 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
779 s->servername_done=0;
780 default:
781 return 1;
782 }
783 }
784
785int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
786 {
787 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
788 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
789
790 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
791 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
792 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
793 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
794
2e6ca3d0
PA
795 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
796 * tell the callback
797 */
798 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
799 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
800 {
801 int r;
802 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
803 * there is no response.
804 */
805 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
806 {
807 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
808 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
809 }
810 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
811 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
812 if (r == 0)
813 {
814 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
815 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
816 }
817 if (r < 0)
818 {
819 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
820 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
821 }
822 }
823
e6bc27f5
PA
824 switch (ret)
825 {
826 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
827 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
828 return -1;
829
830 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
831 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
832 return 1;
833
834 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
835 s->servername_done=0;
836 default:
837 return 1;
838 }
839 }
840
841/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of client
842 * hello and other operations depend on the result we need to handle any TLS
843 * session ticket extension at the same time.
844 */
845
846int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
847 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
848 {
849 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
850 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
851 unsigned short i;
683caddb
PA
852
853 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
854 * to permit stateful resumption.
855 */
856 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
857 return 1;
858
e6bc27f5
PA
859 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
860 return 1;
861 if (p >= limit)
862 return -1;
5f042374
PA
863 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
864 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
865 {
866 i = *(p++);
867 p+= i;
868 if (p >= limit)
869 return -1;
870 }
e6bc27f5
PA
871 /* Skip past cipher list */
872 n2s(p, i);
873 p+= i;
874 if (p >= limit)
875 return -1;
876 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
877 i = *(p++);
878 p += i;
879 if (p > limit)
880 return -1;
881 /* Now at start of extensions */
882 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
883 return 1;
884 n2s(p, i);
885 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
886 {
887 unsigned short type, size;
888 n2s(p, type);
889 n2s(p, size);
890 if (p + size > limit)
891 return 1;
892 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
893 {
683caddb 894 /* If zero length note client will accept a ticket
e6bc27f5
PA
895 * and indicate cache miss to trigger full handshake
896 */
897 if (size == 0)
898 {
899 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
900 return 0; /* Cache miss */
901 }
902 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len,
903 ret);
904 }
905 p += size;
906 }
907 return 1;
908 }
909
910static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
911 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
912 SSL_SESSION **psess)
913 {
914 SSL_SESSION *sess;
915 unsigned char *sdec;
916 const unsigned char *p;
2e6ca3d0 917 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
e6bc27f5
PA
918 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
919 HMAC_CTX hctx;
920 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
5f042374 921 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2e6ca3d0
PA
922 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
923 if (eticklen < 48)
924 goto tickerr;
925 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
926 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
927 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
5f042374 928 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2e6ca3d0
PA
929 {
930 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
5f042374 931 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2e6ca3d0
PA
932 &ctx, &hctx, 0);
933 if (rv < 0)
934 return -1;
935 if (rv == 0)
936 goto tickerr;
937 if (rv == 2)
938 renew_ticket = 1;
939 }
940 else
941 {
942 /* Check key name matches */
5f042374 943 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
2e6ca3d0 944 goto tickerr;
5f042374 945 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2e6ca3d0
PA
946 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
947 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
5f042374 948 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
2e6ca3d0 949 }
e6bc27f5
PA
950 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
951 * integrity checks on ticket.
952 */
2e6ca3d0 953 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
e6bc27f5 954 eticklen -= mlen;
e6bc27f5 955 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
e6bc27f5
PA
956 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
957 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
958 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
959 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
960 goto tickerr;
e6bc27f5 961 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
e6bc27f5 962 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2e6ca3d0
PA
963 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
964 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
e6bc27f5
PA
965 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
966 if (!sdec)
967 {
968 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
969 return -1;
970 }
971 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
972 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
973 goto tickerr;
974 slen += mlen;
975 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
976 p = sdec;
977
978 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
979 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
980 if (sess)
981 {
982 /* The session ID if non-empty is used by some clients to
983 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
984 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
985 * as required by standard.
986 */
987 if (sesslen)
988 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
989 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
990 *psess = sess;
2e6ca3d0 991 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = renew_ticket;
e6bc27f5
PA
992 return 1;
993 }
994 /* If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to
995 * send a new ticket
996 */
997 tickerr:
998 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
999 return 0;
1000 }
1001
1002#endif