Import OpenSSL-1.0.1a.
[dragonfly.git] / crypto / openssl / ssl / s3_pkt.c
CommitLineData
56276539
SS
1/* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58/* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112#include <stdio.h>
113#include <errno.h>
114#define USE_SOCKETS
115#include "ssl_locl.h"
116#include <openssl/evp.h>
117#include <openssl/buffer.h>
672590bc 118#include <openssl/rand.h>
56276539
SS
119
120static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
121 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
122static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
123
124int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
125 {
126 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
127 * packet by another n bytes.
128 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
129 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
130 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
131 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
132 */
919b01cc
PA
133 int i,len,left;
134 long align=0;
135 unsigned char *pkt;
136 SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
137
138 if (n <= 0) return n;
139
140 rb = &(s->s3->rbuf);
141 if (rb->buf == NULL)
142 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
143 return -1;
144
145 left = rb->left;
146#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
147 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
148 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
149#endif
56276539
SS
150
151 if (!extend)
152 {
153 /* start with empty packet ... */
919b01cc
PA
154 if (left == 0)
155 rb->offset = align;
156 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
157 {
158 /* check if next packet length is large
159 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
160 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
161 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
162 && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
163 {
164 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
165 * and its length field is insane, we can
166 * only be led to wrong decision about
167 * whether memmove will occur or not.
168 * Header values has no effect on memmove
169 * arguments and therefore no buffer
170 * overrun can be triggered. */
171 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
172 rb->offset = align;
173 }
174 }
175 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
56276539
SS
176 s->packet_length = 0;
177 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
178 }
179
5f042374
PA
180 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
181 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
182 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
919b01cc 183 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
56276539 184 {
919b01cc
PA
185 if (left > 0 && n > left)
186 n = left;
56276539
SS
187 }
188
189 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
919b01cc 190 if (left >= n)
56276539
SS
191 {
192 s->packet_length+=n;
919b01cc
PA
193 rb->left=left-n;
194 rb->offset+=n;
56276539
SS
195 return(n);
196 }
197
198 /* else we need to read more data */
56276539 199
919b01cc
PA
200 len = s->packet_length;
201 pkt = rb->buf+align;
202 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
203 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
204 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
205 if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
206 {
207 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
208 s->packet = pkt;
209 rb->offset = len + align;
210 }
211
212 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
56276539
SS
213 {
214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
215 return -1;
216 }
217
919b01cc
PA
218 if (!s->read_ahead)
219 /* ignore max parameter */
220 max = n;
221 else
56276539 222 {
919b01cc
PA
223 if (max < n)
224 max = n;
225 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
226 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
56276539
SS
227 }
228
919b01cc 229 while (left < n)
56276539 230 {
919b01cc
PA
231 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
232 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
233 * len+max if possible) */
56276539
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234
235 clear_sys_error();
236 if (s->rbio != NULL)
237 {
238 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
919b01cc 239 i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
56276539
SS
240 }
241 else
242 {
243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
244 i = -1;
245 }
246
247 if (i <= 0)
248 {
919b01cc 249 rb->left = left;
22a79287
PA
250 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
251 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
919b01cc
PA
252 if (len+left == 0)
253 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
56276539
SS
254 return(i);
255 }
919b01cc 256 left+=i;
5f042374
PA
257 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
258 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
259 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
919b01cc 260 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
5f042374 261 {
919b01cc
PA
262 if (n > left)
263 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
5f042374 264 }
56276539
SS
265 }
266
267 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
919b01cc
PA
268 rb->offset += n;
269 rb->left = left - n;
56276539
SS
270 s->packet_length += n;
271 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
272 return(n);
273 }
274
275/* Call this to get a new input record.
276 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
277 * or non-blocking IO.
278 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
279 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
280 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
281 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
282 */
283/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
284static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
285 {
286 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
287 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
288 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
289 SSL_SESSION *sess;
290 unsigned char *p;
291 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
292 short version;
919b01cc 293 int mac_size;
56276539
SS
294 int clear=0;
295 size_t extra;
296 int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
297 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
298
299 rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
300 sess=s->session;
301
302 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
303 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
304 else
305 extra=0;
919b01cc 306 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
56276539 307 {
919b01cc 308 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
56276539
SS
309 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
311 return -1;
312 }
313
314again:
315 /* check if we have the header */
316 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
317 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
318 {
319 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
320 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
321 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
322
323 p=s->packet;
324
325 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
326 rr->type= *(p++);
327 ssl_major= *(p++);
328 ssl_minor= *(p++);
329 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
330 n2s(p,rr->length);
919b01cc
PA
331#if 0
332fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
333#endif
56276539
SS
334
335 /* Lets check version */
e40c9513 336 if (!s->first_packet)
56276539
SS
337 {
338 if (version != s->version)
339 {
340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
919b01cc
PA
341 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00))
342 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
343 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
56276539
SS
344 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
345 goto f_err;
346 }
347 }
348
349 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
350 {
351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
352 goto err;
353 }
354
919b01cc 355 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
56276539
SS
356 {
357 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
359 goto f_err;
360 }
361
362 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
363 }
364
365 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
366
367 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
368 {
369 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
370 i=rr->length;
371 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
372 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
373 /* now n == rr->length,
374 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
375 }
376
377 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
378
379 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
380 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
381 */
382 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
383
384 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
385 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
386 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
387 * the decryption or by the decompression
388 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
389 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
390
391 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
392 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
393
394 /* check is not needed I believe */
395 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
396 {
397 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
399 goto f_err;
400 }
401
402 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
403 rr->data=rr->input;
404
405 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
406 if (enc_err <= 0)
407 {
408 if (enc_err == 0)
409 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
410 goto err;
411
412 /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
413 * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
414 * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
415 * the MAC computation anyway. */
416 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
417 }
418
419#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
420printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
421{ unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
422printf("\n");
423#endif
424
425 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
426 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
427 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
919b01cc 428 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) == NULL))
56276539
SS
429 clear=1;
430
431 if (!clear)
432 {
919b01cc
PA
433 /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
434 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
435 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0);
56276539
SS
436
437 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
438 {
439#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
440 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
441 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
442 goto f_err;
443#else
444 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
445#endif
446 }
447 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
919b01cc 448 if (rr->length >= (unsigned int)mac_size)
56276539
SS
449 {
450 rr->length -= mac_size;
451 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
452 }
453 else
454 {
455 /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
456#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
457 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
459 goto f_err;
460#else
461 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
462 rr->length = 0;
463#endif
464 }
465 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
919b01cc 466 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
56276539
SS
467 {
468 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
469 }
470 }
471
472 if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
473 {
474 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
475 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
476 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
477 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
478 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
479 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
481 goto f_err;
482 }
483
484 /* r->length is now just compressed */
485 if (s->expand != NULL)
486 {
487 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
488 {
489 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
491 goto f_err;
492 }
493 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
494 {
495 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
497 goto f_err;
498 }
499 }
500
501 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
502 {
503 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
505 goto f_err;
506 }
507
508 rr->off=0;
509 /* So at this point the following is true
510 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
511 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
512 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
513 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
514 * after use :-).
515 */
516
517 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
518 s->packet_length=0;
519
520 /* just read a 0 length packet */
521 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
522
919b01cc
PA
523#if 0
524fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
525#endif
526
56276539
SS
527 return(1);
528
529f_err:
530 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
531err:
532 return(ret);
533 }
534
535int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
536 {
5bd86ce5 537#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
56276539
SS
538 int i;
539 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
540
541 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
542 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
543 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
544 if (i < 0)
545 return(0);
546 else
547 rr->length=i;
548 rr->data=rr->comp;
5bd86ce5 549#endif
56276539
SS
550 return(1);
551 }
552
553int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
554 {
5bd86ce5 555#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
56276539
SS
556 int i;
557 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
558
559 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
560 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
561 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
562 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
563 if (i < 0)
564 return(0);
565 else
566 wr->length=i;
567
568 wr->input=wr->data;
5bd86ce5 569#endif
56276539
SS
570 return(1);
571 }
572
573/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
574 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
575 */
576int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
577 {
578 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
579 unsigned int tot,n,nw;
580 int i;
581
582 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
583 tot=s->s3->wnum;
584 s->s3->wnum=0;
585
586 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
587 {
588 i=s->handshake_func(s);
589 if (i < 0) return(i);
590 if (i == 0)
591 {
592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
593 return -1;
594 }
595 }
596
597 n=(len-tot);
598 for (;;)
599 {
919b01cc
PA
600 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
601 nw=s->max_send_fragment;
56276539
SS
602 else
603 nw=n;
604
605 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
606 if (i <= 0)
607 {
608 s->s3->wnum=tot;
609 return i;
610 }
611
612 if ((i == (int)n) ||
613 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
614 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
615 {
616 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
617 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
618 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
619
620 return tot+i;
621 }
622
623 n-=i;
624 tot+=i;
625 }
626 }
627
628static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
629 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
630 {
631 unsigned char *p,*plen;
632 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
919b01cc 633 int prefix_len=0;
672590bc 634 int eivlen;
919b01cc 635 long align=0;
56276539 636 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
919b01cc 637 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
56276539
SS
638 SSL_SESSION *sess;
639
919b01cc
PA
640 if (wb->buf == NULL)
641 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
642 return -1;
643
56276539
SS
644 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
645 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
919b01cc 646 if (wb->left != 0)
56276539
SS
647 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
648
649 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
650 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
651 {
652 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
653 if (i <= 0)
654 return(i);
655 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
656 }
657
658 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
659 return 0;
660
661 wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
56276539
SS
662 sess=s->session;
663
664 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
665 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
919b01cc 666 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
503f6d4b
PA
667 {
668#if 1
669 clear=s->enc_write_ctx?0:1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
670#else
56276539 671 clear=1;
503f6d4b 672#endif
56276539 673 mac_size=0;
503f6d4b 674 }
56276539 675 else
919b01cc
PA
676 {
677 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
678 if (mac_size < 0)
679 goto err;
680 }
56276539
SS
681
682 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
683 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
684 {
685 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
686 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
687
688 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
689 {
690 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
691 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
692 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
693 * together with the actual payload) */
694 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
695 if (prefix_len <= 0)
696 goto err;
697
919b01cc
PA
698 if (prefix_len >
699 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
56276539
SS
700 {
701 /* insufficient space */
702 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
703 goto err;
704 }
705 }
706
707 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
708 }
709
919b01cc
PA
710 if (create_empty_fragment)
711 {
712#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
713 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
714 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
715 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
716 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
717 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
718 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
719#endif
720 p = wb->buf + align;
721 wb->offset = align;
722 }
723 else if (prefix_len)
724 {
725 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
726 }
727 else
728 {
729#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
730 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
731 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
732#endif
733 p = wb->buf + align;
734 wb->offset = align;
735 }
56276539
SS
736
737 /* write the header */
738
739 *(p++)=type&0xff;
740 wr->type=type;
741
742 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
503f6d4b
PA
743 /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256
744 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
745 */
746 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
747 && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
748 *(p++) = 0x1;
749 else
750 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
56276539
SS
751
752 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
753 plen=p;
754 p+=2;
672590bc
PA
755 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers and TLS version 1.1 or later */
756 if (s->enc_write_ctx && s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION)
757 {
758 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
759 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
760 {
761 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
762 if (eivlen <= 1)
763 eivlen = 0;
764 }
765 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
766 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
767 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
768 else
769 eivlen = 0;
770 }
771 else
772 eivlen = 0;
56276539
SS
773
774 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
672590bc 775 wr->data=p + eivlen;
56276539
SS
776 wr->length=(int)len;
777 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
778
779 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
780 * wr->data */
781
782 /* first we compress */
783 if (s->compress != NULL)
784 {
785 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
786 {
787 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
788 goto err;
789 }
790 }
791 else
792 {
793 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
794 wr->input=wr->data;
795 }
796
797 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
798 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
799 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
800
801 if (mac_size != 0)
802 {
672590bc 803 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)
919b01cc 804 goto err;
56276539 805 wr->length+=mac_size;
672590bc
PA
806 }
807
808 wr->input=p;
809 wr->data=p;
810
811 if (eivlen)
812 {
813 /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
814 goto err; */
815 wr->length += eivlen;
56276539
SS
816 }
817
818 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
819 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
820
821 /* record length after mac and block padding */
822 s2n(wr->length,plen);
823
824 /* we should now have
825 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
826 * wr->length long */
827 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
828 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
829
830 if (create_empty_fragment)
831 {
832 /* we are in a recursive call;
833 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
834 */
835 return wr->length;
836 }
837
838 /* now let's set up wb */
839 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
56276539
SS
840
841 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
842 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
843 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
844 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
845 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
846
847 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
848 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
849err:
850 return -1;
851 }
852
853/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
854int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
855 unsigned int len)
856 {
857 int i;
919b01cc 858 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
56276539
SS
859
860/* XXXX */
861 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
862 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
863 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
864 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
865 {
866 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
867 return(-1);
868 }
869
870 for (;;)
871 {
872 clear_sys_error();
873 if (s->wbio != NULL)
874 {
875 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
876 i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
919b01cc
PA
877 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
878 (unsigned int)wb->left);
56276539
SS
879 }
880 else
881 {
882 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
883 i= -1;
884 }
919b01cc 885 if (i == wb->left)
56276539 886 {
919b01cc
PA
887 wb->left=0;
888 wb->offset+=i;
22a79287
PA
889 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
890 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
919b01cc 891 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
56276539
SS
892 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
893 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
894 }
730b1645
PA
895 else if (i <= 0) {
896 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
897 s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
898 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
899 point in using a datagram service */
919b01cc 900 wb->left = 0;
730b1645 901 }
56276539 902 return(i);
730b1645 903 }
919b01cc
PA
904 wb->offset+=i;
905 wb->left-=i;
56276539
SS
906 }
907 }
908
909/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
910 * 'type' is one of the following:
911 *
912 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
913 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
914 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
915 *
916 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
917 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
918 *
919 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
920 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
921 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
922 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
923 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
924 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
925 * Change cipher spec protocol
926 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
927 * Alert protocol
928 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
929 * Handshake protocol
930 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
931 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
932 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
933 * Application data protocol
934 * none of our business
935 */
936int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
937 {
938 int al,i,j,ret;
939 unsigned int n;
940 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
941 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
942
943 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
919b01cc 944 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
56276539
SS
945 return(-1);
946
947 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
948 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
949 {
950 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
951 return -1;
952 }
953
954 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
955 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
956 {
957 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
958 unsigned char *dst = buf;
959 unsigned int k;
960
961 /* peek == 0 */
962 n = 0;
963 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
964 {
965 *dst++ = *src++;
966 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
967 n++;
968 }
969 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
970 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
971 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
972 return n;
973 }
974
975 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
976
977 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
978 {
979 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
980 i=s->handshake_func(s);
981 if (i < 0) return(i);
982 if (i == 0)
983 {
984 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
985 return(-1);
986 }
987 }
988start:
989 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
990
991 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
992 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
993 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
994 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
995 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
996
997 /* get new packet if necessary */
998 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
999 {
1000 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
1001 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
1002 }
1003
1004 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1005
1006 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1007 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1008 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
1009 {
1010 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1012 goto f_err;
1013 }
1014
1015 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
1016 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
1017 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
1018 {
1019 rr->length=0;
1020 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1021 return(0);
1022 }
1023
1024
1025 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1026 {
1027 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
1028 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
1029 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1030 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
1031 {
1032 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1034 goto f_err;
1035 }
1036
1037 if (len <= 0) return(len);
1038
1039 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1040 n = rr->length;
1041 else
1042 n = (unsigned int)len;
1043
1044 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
1045 if (!peek)
1046 {
1047 rr->length-=n;
1048 rr->off+=n;
1049 if (rr->length == 0)
1050 {
1051 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1052 rr->off=0;
919b01cc
PA
1053 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1054 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
56276539
SS
1055 }
1056 }
1057 return(n);
1058 }
1059
1060
1061 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1062 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1063
1064 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1065 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1066 */
1067 {
1068 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1069 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1070 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1071
1072 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1073 {
1074 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1075 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1076 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1077 }
1078 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1079 {
1080 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1081 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1082 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1083 }
672590bc
PA
1084#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1085 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT)
1086 {
1087 tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
1088
1089 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1090 rr->length = 0;
1091 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1092 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1093 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1094 return(-1);
1095 }
1096#endif
56276539
SS
1097
1098 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1099 {
1100 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1101 if (rr->length < n)
1102 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1103
1104 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1105 while (n-- > 0)
1106 {
1107 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1108 rr->length--;
1109 }
1110
1111 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1112 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1113 }
1114 }
1115
1116 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1117 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1118 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1119
1120 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1121 if ((!s->server) &&
1122 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1123 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1124 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1125 {
1126 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1127
1128 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1129 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1130 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1131 {
1132 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1134 goto f_err;
1135 }
1136
1137 if (s->msg_callback)
1138 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1139
1140 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1141 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1142 !s->s3->renegotiate)
1143 {
1144 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1145 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1146 {
1147 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1148 if (i < 0) return(i);
1149 if (i == 0)
1150 {
1151 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1152 return(-1);
1153 }
1154
1155 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1156 {
1157 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1158 {
1159 BIO *bio;
1160 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1161 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1162 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1163 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1164 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1165 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1166 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1167 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1168 return(-1);
1169 }
1170 }
1171 }
1172 }
1173 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1174 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1175 goto start;
1176 }
5f042374
PA
1177 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1178 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1179 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1180 */
1181 if (s->server &&
1182 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1183 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1184 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1185 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1186 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1187 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1188 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1189
1190 {
1191 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1192 rr->length = 0;
1193 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1194 goto start;
1195 }
56276539
SS
1196 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1197 {
1198 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1199 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1200
1201 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1202
1203 if (s->msg_callback)
1204 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1205
1206 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1207 cb=s->info_callback;
1208 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1209 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1210
1211 if (cb != NULL)
1212 {
1213 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1214 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1215 }
1216
1217 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1218 {
1219 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1220 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1221 {
1222 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1223 return(0);
1224 }
5f042374
PA
1225 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1226 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1227 * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1228 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1229 * expects it to succeed.
1230 *
1231 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1232 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1233 */
1234 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
1235 {
1236 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1238 goto f_err;
1239 }
672590bc
PA
1240#ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1241 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1242 return(0);
1243#endif
56276539
SS
1244 }
1245 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1246 {
1247 char tmp[16];
1248
1249 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1250 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1252 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1253 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1254 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1255 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1256 return(0);
1257 }
1258 else
1259 {
1260 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1262 goto f_err;
1263 }
1264
1265 goto start;
1266 }
1267
1268 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1269 {
1270 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1271 rr->length=0;
1272 return(0);
1273 }
1274
1275 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1276 {
1277 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1278 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1279 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1280 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1281 {
1282 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1284 goto f_err;
1285 }
1286
1287 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1288 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1289 {
1290 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1292 goto f_err;
1293 }
1294
1295 rr->length=0;
1296
1297 if (s->msg_callback)
1298 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1299
1300 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1301 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1302 goto err;
1303 else
1304 goto start;
1305 }
1306
1307 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1308 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1309 {
1310 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
5f042374 1311 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
56276539
SS
1312 {
1313#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1314 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1315 * protocol violations): */
1316 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1317 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
1318 :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1319#else
1320 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1321#endif
672590bc 1322 s->renegotiate=1;
56276539
SS
1323 s->new_session=1;
1324 }
1325 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1326 if (i < 0) return(i);
1327 if (i == 0)
1328 {
1329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1330 return(-1);
1331 }
1332
1333 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1334 {
1335 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1336 {
1337 BIO *bio;
1338 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1339 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1340 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1341 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1342 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1343 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1344 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1345 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1346 return(-1);
1347 }
1348 }
1349 goto start;
1350 }
1351
1352 switch (rr->type)
1353 {
1354 default:
1355#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
672590bc
PA
1356 /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:
1357 * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.
1358 */
1359 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION)
56276539
SS
1360 {
1361 rr->length = 0;
1362 goto start;
1363 }
1364#endif
1365 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1367 goto f_err;
1368 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1369 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1370 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1371 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1372 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1373 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1374 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1376 goto f_err;
1377 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1378 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1379 * but have application data. If the library was
1380 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1381 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1382 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1383 * we will indulge it.
1384 */
1385 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1386 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1387 ((
1388 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1389 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1390 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1391 ) || (
1392 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1393 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1394 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1395 )
1396 ))
1397 {
1398 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1399 return(-1);
1400 }
1401 else
1402 {
1403 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1404 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1405 goto f_err;
1406 }
1407 }
1408 /* not reached */
1409
1410f_err:
1411 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1412err:
1413 return(-1);
1414 }
1415
1416int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1417 {
1418 int i;
1419 const char *sender;
1420 int slen;
1421
1422 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1423 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1424 else
1425 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1426
1427 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1428 {
683caddb
PA
1429 if (s->session == NULL)
1430 {
1431 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1433 return (0);
1434 }
1435
56276539
SS
1436 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1437 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1438 }
1439
1440 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1441 return(0);
1442
1443 /* we have to record the message digest at
1444 * this point so we can get it before we read
1445 * the finished message */
1446 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1447 {
1448 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1449 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1450 }
1451 else
1452 {
1453 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1454 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1455 }
1456
1457 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
56276539
SS
1458 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1459
1460 return(1);
1461 }
1462
5f042374 1463int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
56276539
SS
1464 {
1465 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1466 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1467 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1468 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
5f042374 1469 if (desc < 0) return -1;
56276539
SS
1470 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1471 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1472 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1473
1474 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1475 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1476 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1477 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
5f042374 1478 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
56276539
SS
1479 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1480 * some time in the future */
5f042374 1481 return -1;
56276539
SS
1482 }
1483
1484int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1485 {
1486 int i,j;
1487 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1488
1489 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1490 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1491 if (i <= 0)
1492 {
1493 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1494 }
1495 else
1496 {
1497 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1498 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1499 * we will not worry too much. */
1500 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1501 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1502
1503 if (s->msg_callback)
1504 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1505
1506 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1507 cb=s->info_callback;
1508 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1509 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1510
1511 if (cb != NULL)
1512 {
1513 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1514 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1515 }
1516 }
1517 return(i);
1518 }