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| 123 | .rm #[ #] #H #V #F C |
| 124 | .\" ======================================================================== |
| 125 | .\" |
| 126 | .IX Title "PKCS8 1" |
| 127 | .TH PKCS8 1 "2012-01-04" "1.0.0f" "OpenSSL" |
| 128 | .\" For nroff, turn off justification. Always turn off hyphenation; it makes |
| 129 | .\" way too many mistakes in technical documents. |
| 130 | .if n .ad l |
| 131 | .nh |
| 132 | .SH "NAME" |
| 133 | pkcs8 \- PKCS#8 format private key conversion tool |
| 134 | .SH "SYNOPSIS" |
| 135 | .IX Header "SYNOPSIS" |
| 136 | \&\fBopenssl\fR \fBpkcs8\fR |
| 137 | [\fB\-topk8\fR] |
| 138 | [\fB\-inform PEM|DER\fR] |
| 139 | [\fB\-outform PEM|DER\fR] |
| 140 | [\fB\-in filename\fR] |
| 141 | [\fB\-passin arg\fR] |
| 142 | [\fB\-out filename\fR] |
| 143 | [\fB\-passout arg\fR] |
| 144 | [\fB\-noiter\fR] |
| 145 | [\fB\-nocrypt\fR] |
| 146 | [\fB\-nooct\fR] |
| 147 | [\fB\-embed\fR] |
| 148 | [\fB\-nsdb\fR] |
| 149 | [\fB\-v2 alg\fR] |
| 150 | [\fB\-v1 alg\fR] |
| 151 | [\fB\-engine id\fR] |
| 152 | .SH "DESCRIPTION" |
| 153 | .IX Header "DESCRIPTION" |
| 154 | The \fBpkcs8\fR command processes private keys in PKCS#8 format. It can handle |
| 155 | both unencrypted PKCS#8 PrivateKeyInfo format and EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo |
| 156 | format with a variety of PKCS#5 (v1.5 and v2.0) and PKCS#12 algorithms. |
| 157 | .SH "COMMAND OPTIONS" |
| 158 | .IX Header "COMMAND OPTIONS" |
| 159 | .IP "\fB\-topk8\fR" 4 |
| 160 | .IX Item "-topk8" |
| 161 | Normally a PKCS#8 private key is expected on input and a traditional format |
| 162 | private key will be written. With the \fB\-topk8\fR option the situation is |
| 163 | reversed: it reads a traditional format private key and writes a PKCS#8 |
| 164 | format key. |
| 165 | .IP "\fB\-inform DER|PEM\fR" 4 |
| 166 | .IX Item "-inform DER|PEM" |
| 167 | This specifies the input format. If a PKCS#8 format key is expected on input |
| 168 | then either a \fB\s-1DER\s0\fR or \fB\s-1PEM\s0\fR encoded version of a PKCS#8 key will be |
| 169 | expected. Otherwise the \fB\s-1DER\s0\fR or \fB\s-1PEM\s0\fR format of the traditional format |
| 170 | private key is used. |
| 171 | .IP "\fB\-outform DER|PEM\fR" 4 |
| 172 | .IX Item "-outform DER|PEM" |
| 173 | This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the |
| 174 | \&\fB\-inform\fR option. |
| 175 | .IP "\fB\-in filename\fR" 4 |
| 176 | .IX Item "-in filename" |
| 177 | This specifies the input filename to read a key from or standard input if this |
| 178 | option is not specified. If the key is encrypted a pass phrase will be |
| 179 | prompted for. |
| 180 | .IP "\fB\-passin arg\fR" 4 |
| 181 | .IX Item "-passin arg" |
| 182 | the input file password source. For more information about the format of \fBarg\fR |
| 183 | see the \fB\s-1PASS\s0 \s-1PHRASE\s0 \s-1ARGUMENTS\s0\fR section in \fIopenssl\fR\|(1). |
| 184 | .IP "\fB\-out filename\fR" 4 |
| 185 | .IX Item "-out filename" |
| 186 | This specifies the output filename to write a key to or standard output by |
| 187 | default. If any encryption options are set then a pass phrase will be |
| 188 | prompted for. The output filename should \fBnot\fR be the same as the input |
| 189 | filename. |
| 190 | .IP "\fB\-passout arg\fR" 4 |
| 191 | .IX Item "-passout arg" |
| 192 | the output file password source. For more information about the format of \fBarg\fR |
| 193 | see the \fB\s-1PASS\s0 \s-1PHRASE\s0 \s-1ARGUMENTS\s0\fR section in \fIopenssl\fR\|(1). |
| 194 | .IP "\fB\-nocrypt\fR" 4 |
| 195 | .IX Item "-nocrypt" |
| 196 | PKCS#8 keys generated or input are normally PKCS#8 EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo |
| 197 | structures using an appropriate password based encryption algorithm. With |
| 198 | this option an unencrypted PrivateKeyInfo structure is expected or output. |
| 199 | This option does not encrypt private keys at all and should only be used |
| 200 | when absolutely necessary. Certain software such as some versions of Java |
| 201 | code signing software used unencrypted private keys. |
| 202 | .IP "\fB\-nooct\fR" 4 |
| 203 | .IX Item "-nooct" |
| 204 | This option generates \s-1RSA\s0 private keys in a broken format that some software |
| 205 | uses. Specifically the private key should be enclosed in a \s-1OCTET\s0 \s-1STRING\s0 |
| 206 | but some software just includes the structure itself without the |
| 207 | surrounding \s-1OCTET\s0 \s-1STRING\s0. |
| 208 | .IP "\fB\-embed\fR" 4 |
| 209 | .IX Item "-embed" |
| 210 | This option generates \s-1DSA\s0 keys in a broken format. The \s-1DSA\s0 parameters are |
| 211 | embedded inside the PrivateKey structure. In this form the \s-1OCTET\s0 \s-1STRING\s0 |
| 212 | contains an \s-1ASN1\s0 \s-1SEQUENCE\s0 consisting of two structures: a \s-1SEQUENCE\s0 containing |
| 213 | the parameters and an \s-1ASN1\s0 \s-1INTEGER\s0 containing the private key. |
| 214 | .IP "\fB\-nsdb\fR" 4 |
| 215 | .IX Item "-nsdb" |
| 216 | This option generates \s-1DSA\s0 keys in a broken format compatible with Netscape |
| 217 | private key databases. The PrivateKey contains a \s-1SEQUENCE\s0 consisting of |
| 218 | the public and private keys respectively. |
| 219 | .IP "\fB\-v2 alg\fR" 4 |
| 220 | .IX Item "-v2 alg" |
| 221 | This option enables the use of PKCS#5 v2.0 algorithms. Normally PKCS#8 |
| 222 | private keys are encrypted with the password based encryption algorithm |
| 223 | called \fBpbeWithMD5AndDES\-CBC\fR this uses 56 bit \s-1DES\s0 encryption but it |
| 224 | was the strongest encryption algorithm supported in PKCS#5 v1.5. Using |
| 225 | the \fB\-v2\fR option PKCS#5 v2.0 algorithms are used which can use any |
| 226 | encryption algorithm such as 168 bit triple \s-1DES\s0 or 128 bit \s-1RC2\s0 however |
| 227 | not many implementations support PKCS#5 v2.0 yet. If you are just using |
| 228 | private keys with OpenSSL then this doesn't matter. |
| 229 | .Sp |
| 230 | The \fBalg\fR argument is the encryption algorithm to use, valid values include |
| 231 | \&\fBdes\fR, \fBdes3\fR and \fBrc2\fR. It is recommended that \fBdes3\fR is used. |
| 232 | .IP "\fB\-v1 alg\fR" 4 |
| 233 | .IX Item "-v1 alg" |
| 234 | This option specifies a PKCS#5 v1.5 or PKCS#12 algorithm to use. A complete |
| 235 | list of possible algorithms is included below. |
| 236 | .IP "\fB\-engine id\fR" 4 |
| 237 | .IX Item "-engine id" |
| 238 | specifying an engine (by its unique \fBid\fR string) will cause \fBpkcs8\fR |
| 239 | to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, |
| 240 | thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default |
| 241 | for all available algorithms. |
| 242 | .SH "NOTES" |
| 243 | .IX Header "NOTES" |
| 244 | The encrypted form of a \s-1PEM\s0 encode PKCS#8 files uses the following |
| 245 | headers and footers: |
| 246 | .PP |
| 247 | .Vb 2 |
| 248 | \& \-\-\-\-\-BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY\-\-\-\-\- |
| 249 | \& \-\-\-\-\-END ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY\-\-\-\-\- |
| 250 | .Ve |
| 251 | .PP |
| 252 | The unencrypted form uses: |
| 253 | .PP |
| 254 | .Vb 2 |
| 255 | \& \-\-\-\-\-BEGIN PRIVATE KEY\-\-\-\-\- |
| 256 | \& \-\-\-\-\-END PRIVATE KEY\-\-\-\-\- |
| 257 | .Ve |
| 258 | .PP |
| 259 | Private keys encrypted using PKCS#5 v2.0 algorithms and high iteration |
| 260 | counts are more secure that those encrypted using the traditional |
| 261 | SSLeay compatible formats. So if additional security is considered |
| 262 | important the keys should be converted. |
| 263 | .PP |
| 264 | The default encryption is only 56 bits because this is the encryption |
| 265 | that most current implementations of PKCS#8 will support. |
| 266 | .PP |
| 267 | Some software may use PKCS#12 password based encryption algorithms |
| 268 | with PKCS#8 format private keys: these are handled automatically |
| 269 | but there is no option to produce them. |
| 270 | .PP |
| 271 | It is possible to write out \s-1DER\s0 encoded encrypted private keys in |
| 272 | PKCS#8 format because the encryption details are included at an \s-1ASN1\s0 |
| 273 | level whereas the traditional format includes them at a \s-1PEM\s0 level. |
| 274 | .SH "PKCS#5 v1.5 and PKCS#12 algorithms." |
| 275 | .IX Header "PKCS#5 v1.5 and PKCS#12 algorithms." |
| 276 | Various algorithms can be used with the \fB\-v1\fR command line option, |
| 277 | including PKCS#5 v1.5 and PKCS#12. These are described in more detail |
| 278 | below. |
| 279 | .IP "\fB\s-1PBE\-MD2\-DES\s0 \s-1PBE\-MD5\-DES\s0\fR" 4 |
| 280 | .IX Item "PBE-MD2-DES PBE-MD5-DES" |
| 281 | These algorithms were included in the original PKCS#5 v1.5 specification. |
| 282 | They only offer 56 bits of protection since they both use \s-1DES\s0. |
| 283 | .IP "\fB\s-1PBE\-SHA1\-RC2\-64\s0 \s-1PBE\-MD2\-RC2\-64\s0 \s-1PBE\-MD5\-RC2\-64\s0 \s-1PBE\-SHA1\-DES\s0\fR" 4 |
| 284 | .IX Item "PBE-SHA1-RC2-64 PBE-MD2-RC2-64 PBE-MD5-RC2-64 PBE-SHA1-DES" |
| 285 | These algorithms are not mentioned in the original PKCS#5 v1.5 specification |
| 286 | but they use the same key derivation algorithm and are supported by some |
| 287 | software. They are mentioned in PKCS#5 v2.0. They use either 64 bit \s-1RC2\s0 or |
| 288 | 56 bit \s-1DES\s0. |
| 289 | .IP "\fB\s-1PBE\-SHA1\-RC4\-128\s0 \s-1PBE\-SHA1\-RC4\-40\s0 \s-1PBE\-SHA1\-3DES\s0 \s-1PBE\-SHA1\-2DES\s0 \s-1PBE\-SHA1\-RC2\-128\s0 \s-1PBE\-SHA1\-RC2\-40\s0\fR" 4 |
| 290 | .IX Item "PBE-SHA1-RC4-128 PBE-SHA1-RC4-40 PBE-SHA1-3DES PBE-SHA1-2DES PBE-SHA1-RC2-128 PBE-SHA1-RC2-40" |
| 291 | These algorithms use the PKCS#12 password based encryption algorithm and |
| 292 | allow strong encryption algorithms like triple \s-1DES\s0 or 128 bit \s-1RC2\s0 to be used. |
| 293 | .SH "EXAMPLES" |
| 294 | .IX Header "EXAMPLES" |
| 295 | Convert a private from traditional to PKCS#5 v2.0 format using triple |
| 296 | \&\s-1DES:\s0 |
| 297 | .PP |
| 298 | .Vb 1 |
| 299 | \& openssl pkcs8 \-in key.pem \-topk8 \-v2 des3 \-out enckey.pem |
| 300 | .Ve |
| 301 | .PP |
| 302 | Convert a private key to PKCS#8 using a PKCS#5 1.5 compatible algorithm |
| 303 | (\s-1DES\s0): |
| 304 | .PP |
| 305 | .Vb 1 |
| 306 | \& openssl pkcs8 \-in key.pem \-topk8 \-out enckey.pem |
| 307 | .Ve |
| 308 | .PP |
| 309 | Convert a private key to PKCS#8 using a PKCS#12 compatible algorithm |
| 310 | (3DES): |
| 311 | .PP |
| 312 | .Vb 1 |
| 313 | \& openssl pkcs8 \-in key.pem \-topk8 \-out enckey.pem \-v1 PBE\-SHA1\-3DES |
| 314 | .Ve |
| 315 | .PP |
| 316 | Read a \s-1DER\s0 unencrypted PKCS#8 format private key: |
| 317 | .PP |
| 318 | .Vb 1 |
| 319 | \& openssl pkcs8 \-inform DER \-nocrypt \-in key.der \-out key.pem |
| 320 | .Ve |
| 321 | .PP |
| 322 | Convert a private key from any PKCS#8 format to traditional format: |
| 323 | .PP |
| 324 | .Vb 1 |
| 325 | \& openssl pkcs8 \-in pk8.pem \-out key.pem |
| 326 | .Ve |
| 327 | .SH "STANDARDS" |
| 328 | .IX Header "STANDARDS" |
| 329 | Test vectors from this PKCS#5 v2.0 implementation were posted to the |
| 330 | pkcs-tng mailing list using triple \s-1DES\s0, \s-1DES\s0 and \s-1RC2\s0 with high iteration |
| 331 | counts, several people confirmed that they could decrypt the private |
| 332 | keys produced and Therefore it can be assumed that the PKCS#5 v2.0 |
| 333 | implementation is reasonably accurate at least as far as these |
| 334 | algorithms are concerned. |
| 335 | .PP |
| 336 | The format of PKCS#8 \s-1DSA\s0 (and other) private keys is not well documented: |
| 337 | it is hidden away in PKCS#11 v2.01, section 11.9. OpenSSL's default \s-1DSA\s0 |
| 338 | PKCS#8 private key format complies with this standard. |
| 339 | .SH "BUGS" |
| 340 | .IX Header "BUGS" |
| 341 | There should be an option that prints out the encryption algorithm |
| 342 | in use and other details such as the iteration count. |
| 343 | .PP |
| 344 | PKCS#8 using triple \s-1DES\s0 and PKCS#5 v2.0 should be the default private |
| 345 | key format for OpenSSL: for compatibility several of the utilities use |
| 346 | the old format at present. |
| 347 | .SH "SEE ALSO" |
| 348 | .IX Header "SEE ALSO" |
| 349 | \&\fIdsa\fR\|(1), \fIrsa\fR\|(1), \fIgenrsa\fR\|(1), |
| 350 | \&\fIgendsa\fR\|(1) |