1 /* $FreeBSD: src/sys/netinet6/ah_input.c,v 1.1.2.6 2002/04/28 05:40:26 suz Exp $ */
2 /* $DragonFly: src/sys/netinet6/ah_input.c,v 1.3 2003/07/23 02:30:22 dillon Exp $ */
3 /* $KAME: ah_input.c,v 1.67 2002/01/07 11:39:56 kjc Exp $ */
6 * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
12 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
13 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
14 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
15 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
16 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
17 * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors
18 * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
19 * without specific prior written permission.
21 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
22 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
23 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
24 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
25 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
26 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
27 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
28 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
29 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
30 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
35 * RFC1826/2402 authentication header.
39 #include "opt_inet6.h"
41 #include <sys/param.h>
42 #include <sys/systm.h>
43 #include <sys/malloc.h>
45 #include <sys/domain.h>
46 #include <sys/protosw.h>
47 #include <sys/socket.h>
48 #include <sys/errno.h>
50 #include <sys/syslog.h>
53 #include <net/route.h>
54 #include <net/netisr.h>
55 #include <machine/cpu.h>
57 #include <netinet/in.h>
58 #include <netinet/in_systm.h>
59 #include <netinet/in_var.h>
60 #include <netinet/ip.h>
61 #include <netinet/ip_var.h>
62 #include <netinet/ip_ecn.h>
64 #include <netinet6/ip6_ecn.h>
68 #include <netinet/ip6.h>
69 #include <netinet6/ip6_var.h>
70 #include <netinet6/in6_pcb.h>
71 #include <netinet/icmp6.h>
72 #include <netinet6/ip6protosw.h>
75 #include <netinet6/ipsec.h>
77 #include <netinet6/ipsec6.h>
79 #include <netinet6/ah.h>
81 #include <netinet6/ah6.h>
83 #include <netkey/key.h>
84 #include <netkey/keydb.h>
86 #include <netkey/key_debug.h>
88 #define KEYDEBUG(lev,arg)
91 #include <machine/stdarg.h>
93 #include <net/net_osdep.h>
98 #include <netinet/ipprotosw.h>
99 extern struct ipprotosw inetsw[];
102 ah4_input(struct mbuf *m, int off, int proto)
107 const struct ah_algorithm *algo;
111 struct secasvar *sav = NULL;
117 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST
118 if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(struct newah)) {
119 m = m_pullup(m, off + sizeof(struct newah));
121 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup;"
122 "dropping the packet for simplicity\n"));
123 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
128 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
129 ah = (struct ah *)(((caddr_t)ip) + off);
131 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
132 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct ah *, m, off, sizeof(struct newah));
134 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup;"
135 "dropping the packet for simplicity\n"));
136 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
142 hlen = IP_VHL_HL(ip->ip_vhl) << 2;
144 hlen = ip->ip_hl << 2;
147 /* find the sassoc. */
150 if ((sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET,
151 (caddr_t)&ip->ip_src, (caddr_t)&ip->ip_dst,
152 IPPROTO_AH, spi)) == 0) {
153 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
154 "IPv4 AH input: no key association found for spi %u\n",
155 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)));
159 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
160 printf("DP ah4_input called to allocate SA:%p\n", sav));
161 if (sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_MATURE
162 && sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_DYING) {
164 "IPv4 AH input: non-mature/dying SA found for spi %u\n",
165 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)));
166 ipsecstat.in_badspi++;
170 algo = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth);
172 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: "
173 "unsupported authentication algorithm for spi %u\n",
174 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)));
175 ipsecstat.in_badspi++;
179 siz = (*algo->sumsiz)(sav);
180 siz1 = ((siz + 3) & ~(4 - 1));
183 * sanity checks for header, 1.
188 sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4;
191 * Here, we do not do "siz1 == siz". This is because the way
192 * RFC240[34] section 2 is written. They do not require truncation
194 * For example, Microsoft IPsec stack attaches 160 bits of
195 * authentication data for both hmac-md5 and hmac-sha1. For hmac-sha1,
196 * 32 bits of padding is attached.
198 * There are two downsides to this specification.
199 * They have no real harm, however, they leave us fuzzy feeling.
200 * - if we attach more than 96 bits of authentication data onto AH,
201 * we will never notice about possible modification by rogue
202 * intermediate nodes.
203 * Since extra bits in AH checksum is never used, this constitutes
204 * no real issue, however, it is wacky.
205 * - even if the peer attaches big authentication data, we will never
206 * notice the difference, since longer authentication data will just
209 * We may need some clarification in the spec.
212 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length too short in IPv4 AH input "
213 "(%lu, should be at least %lu): %s\n",
214 (u_long)siz1, (u_long)siz,
215 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi)));
216 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
219 if ((ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff != siz1) {
220 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length mismatch in IPv4 AH input "
221 "(%d should be %lu): %s\n",
222 (ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff, (u_long)siz1,
223 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi)));
224 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
228 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST
229 if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1) {
230 m = m_pullup(m, off + sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1);
232 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup\n"));
233 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
237 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
238 ah = (struct ah *)(((caddr_t)ip) + off);
241 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct ah *, m, off,
242 sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1);
244 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup\n"));
245 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
252 * check for sequence number.
254 if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) {
255 if (ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav))
258 ipsecstat.in_ahreplay++;
259 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
260 "replay packet in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n",
261 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
267 * alright, it seems sane. now we are going to check the
268 * cryptographic checksum.
270 cksum = malloc(siz1, M_TEMP, M_NOWAIT);
272 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: "
273 "couldn't alloc temporary region for cksum\n"));
274 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
279 * some of IP header fields are flipped to the host endian.
280 * convert them back to network endian. VERY stupid.
282 ip->ip_len = htons(ip->ip_len + hlen);
283 ip->ip_off = htons(ip->ip_off);
284 if (ah4_calccksum(m, (caddr_t)cksum, siz1, algo, sav)) {
286 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
289 ipsecstat.in_ahhist[sav->alg_auth]++;
293 ip->ip_len = ntohs(ip->ip_len) - hlen;
294 ip->ip_off = ntohs(ip->ip_off);
297 caddr_t sumpos = NULL;
299 if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) {
301 sumpos = (caddr_t)(ah + 1);
304 sumpos = (caddr_t)(((struct newah *)ah) + 1);
307 if (bcmp(sumpos, cksum, siz) != 0) {
308 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
309 "checksum mismatch in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n",
310 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
312 ipsecstat.in_ahauthfail++;
319 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR;
320 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPDGM;
324 * looks okey, but we need more sanity check.
325 * XXX should elaborate.
327 if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPIP || ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IP) {
331 sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4;
333 if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1 + hlen) {
334 m = m_pullup(m, off + sizeof(struct ah)
335 + sizoff + siz1 + hlen);
338 "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup\n"));
339 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
344 nip = (struct ip *)((u_char *)(ah + 1) + sizoff + siz1);
345 if (nip->ip_src.s_addr != ip->ip_src.s_addr
346 || nip->ip_dst.s_addr != ip->ip_dst.s_addr) {
347 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
348 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
352 else if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPV6) {
353 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
354 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
359 if (m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPHDR
360 && m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPDGM) {
363 "IPv4 AH input: authentication succeess\n"));
365 ipsecstat.in_ahauthsucc++;
367 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
368 "authentication failed in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n",
369 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
370 ipsecstat.in_ahauthfail++;
375 * update sequence number.
377 if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) {
378 if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav)) {
379 ipsecstat.in_ahreplay++;
384 /* was it transmitted over the IPsec tunnel SA? */
385 if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) {
387 stripsiz = sizeof(struct ah) + siz1;
390 stripsiz = sizeof(struct newah) + siz1;
392 if (ipsec4_tunnel_validate(m, off + stripsiz, nxt, sav)) {
394 * strip off all the headers that precedes AH.
395 * IP xx AH IP' payload -> IP' payload
397 * XXX more sanity checks
398 * XXX relationship with gif?
403 m_adj(m, off + stripsiz);
404 if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip)) {
405 m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip));
407 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
411 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
412 /* ECN consideration. */
413 ip_ecn_egress(ip4_ipsec_ecn, &tos, &ip->ip_tos);
414 if (!key_checktunnelsanity(sav, AF_INET,
415 (caddr_t)&ip->ip_src, (caddr_t)&ip->ip_dst)) {
416 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "ipsec tunnel address mismatch "
417 "in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n",
418 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
419 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
425 * Should the inner packet be considered authentic?
426 * My current answer is: NO.
428 * host1 -- gw1 === gw2 -- host2
429 * In this case, gw2 can trust the authenticity of the
430 * outer packet, but NOT inner. Packet may be altered
431 * between host1 and gw1.
433 * host1 -- gw1 === host2
434 * This case falls into the same scenario as above.
437 * This case is the only case when we may be able to leave
438 * M_AUTHIPHDR and M_AUTHIPDGM set.
439 * However, if host1 is wrongly configured, and allows
440 * attacker to inject some packet with src=host1 and
441 * dst=host2, you are in risk.
443 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
444 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
447 key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m);
448 if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0 ||
449 ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_IPV4, 0) != 0) {
450 ipsecstat.in_nomem++;
455 if (IF_QFULL(&ipintrq)) {
456 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
460 IF_ENQUEUE(&ipintrq, m);
462 schednetisr(NETISR_IP); /* can be skipped but to make sure */
470 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
471 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST
473 * We do deep-copy since KAME requires that
474 * the packet is placed in a single external mbuf.
476 ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip, (caddr_t)(((u_char *)ip) + stripsiz), off);
477 m->m_data += stripsiz;
478 m->m_len -= stripsiz;
479 m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz;
482 * even in m_pulldown case, we need to strip off AH so that
483 * we can compute checksum for multiple AH correctly.
485 if (m->m_len >= stripsiz + off) {
486 ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip, ((caddr_t)ip) + stripsiz, off);
487 m->m_data += stripsiz;
488 m->m_len -= stripsiz;
489 m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz;
492 * this comes with no copy if the boundary is on
497 n = m_split(m, off, M_DONTWAIT);
499 /* m is retained by m_split */
504 /* m_cat does not update m_pkthdr.len */
505 m->m_pkthdr.len += n->m_pkthdr.len;
509 if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip)) {
510 m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip));
512 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
516 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
518 ip->ip_len = ip->ip_len - stripsiz;
520 ip->ip_len = htons(ntohs(ip->ip_len) - stripsiz);
523 /* forget about IP hdr checksum, the check has already been passed */
525 key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m);
526 if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0) {
527 ipsecstat.in_nomem++;
531 if (nxt != IPPROTO_DONE) {
532 if ((inetsw[ip_protox[nxt]].pr_flags & PR_LASTHDR) != 0 &&
533 ipsec4_in_reject(m, NULL)) {
534 ipsecstat.in_polvio++;
537 (*inetsw[ip_protox[nxt]].pr_input)(m, off, nxt);
544 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
545 printf("DP ah4_input call free SA:%p\n", sav));
548 ipsecstat.in_success++;
553 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
554 printf("DP ah4_input call free SA:%p\n", sav));
565 ah6_input(mp, offp, proto)
569 struct mbuf *m = *mp;
574 const struct ah_algorithm *algo;
578 struct secasvar *sav = NULL;
583 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST
584 IP6_EXTHDR_CHECK(m, off, sizeof(struct ah), IPPROTO_DONE);
585 ah = (struct ah *)(mtod(m, caddr_t) + off);
587 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct ah *, m, off, sizeof(struct newah));
589 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv6 AH input: can't pullup\n"));
590 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
594 ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
597 /* find the sassoc. */
600 if (ntohs(ip6->ip6_plen) == 0) {
601 ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "IPv6 AH input: "
602 "AH with IPv6 jumbogram is not supported.\n"));
603 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
607 if ((sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET6,
608 (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_src, (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_dst,
609 IPPROTO_AH, spi)) == 0) {
610 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
611 "IPv6 AH input: no key association found for spi %u\n",
612 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)));
613 ipsec6stat.in_nosa++;
616 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
617 printf("DP ah6_input called to allocate SA:%p\n", sav));
618 if (sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_MATURE
619 && sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_DYING) {
621 "IPv6 AH input: non-mature/dying SA found for spi %u; ",
622 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)));
623 ipsec6stat.in_badspi++;
627 algo = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth);
629 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv6 AH input: "
630 "unsupported authentication algorithm for spi %u\n",
631 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)));
632 ipsec6stat.in_badspi++;
636 siz = (*algo->sumsiz)(sav);
637 siz1 = ((siz + 3) & ~(4 - 1));
640 * sanity checks for header, 1.
645 sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4;
648 * Here, we do not do "siz1 == siz". See ah4_input() for complete
652 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length too short in IPv6 AH input "
653 "(%lu, should be at least %lu): %s\n",
654 (u_long)siz1, (u_long)siz,
655 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi)));
656 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
659 if ((ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff != siz1) {
660 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length mismatch in IPv6 AH input "
661 "(%d should be %lu): %s\n",
662 (ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff, (u_long)siz1,
663 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi)));
664 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
667 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST
668 IP6_EXTHDR_CHECK(m, off, sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1, IPPROTO_DONE);
670 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct ah *, m, off,
671 sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1);
673 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "couldn't pullup gather IPv6 AH checksum part"));
674 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
682 * check for sequence number.
684 if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) {
685 if (ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav))
688 ipsec6stat.in_ahreplay++;
689 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
690 "replay packet in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n",
691 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi),
692 ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
698 * alright, it seems sane. now we are going to check the
699 * cryptographic checksum.
701 cksum = malloc(siz1, M_TEMP, M_NOWAIT);
703 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv6 AH input: "
704 "couldn't alloc temporary region for cksum\n"));
705 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
709 if (ah6_calccksum(m, (caddr_t)cksum, siz1, algo, sav)) {
711 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
714 ipsec6stat.in_ahhist[sav->alg_auth]++;
717 caddr_t sumpos = NULL;
719 if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) {
721 sumpos = (caddr_t)(ah + 1);
724 sumpos = (caddr_t)(((struct newah *)ah) + 1);
727 if (bcmp(sumpos, cksum, siz) != 0) {
728 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
729 "checksum mismatch in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n",
730 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
732 ipsec6stat.in_ahauthfail++;
739 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR;
740 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPDGM;
744 * looks okey, but we need more sanity check.
745 * XXX should elaborate.
747 if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPV6) {
748 struct ip6_hdr *nip6;
751 sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4;
753 IP6_EXTHDR_CHECK(m, off, sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1
754 + sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), IPPROTO_DONE);
756 nip6 = (struct ip6_hdr *)((u_char *)(ah + 1) + sizoff + siz1);
757 if (!IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&nip6->ip6_src, &ip6->ip6_src)
758 || !IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&nip6->ip6_dst, &ip6->ip6_dst)) {
759 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
760 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
762 } else if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPIP) {
763 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
764 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
765 } else if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IP) {
766 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
767 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
771 if (m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPHDR
772 && m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPDGM) {
775 "IPv6 AH input: authentication succeess\n"));
777 ipsec6stat.in_ahauthsucc++;
779 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
780 "authentication failed in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n",
781 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
782 ipsec6stat.in_ahauthfail++;
787 * update sequence number.
789 if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) {
790 if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav)) {
791 ipsec6stat.in_ahreplay++;
796 /* was it transmitted over the IPsec tunnel SA? */
797 if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) {
799 stripsiz = sizeof(struct ah) + siz1;
802 stripsiz = sizeof(struct newah) + siz1;
804 if (ipsec6_tunnel_validate(m, off + stripsiz, nxt, sav)) {
806 * strip off all the headers that precedes AH.
807 * IP6 xx AH IP6' payload -> IP6' payload
809 * XXX more sanity checks
810 * XXX relationship with gif?
812 u_int32_t flowinfo; /* net endian */
814 flowinfo = ip6->ip6_flow;
815 m_adj(m, off + stripsiz);
816 if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip6)) {
818 * m_pullup is prohibited in KAME IPv6 input processing
819 * but there's no other way!
821 m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip6));
823 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
827 ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
828 /* ECN consideration. */
829 ip6_ecn_egress(ip6_ipsec_ecn, &flowinfo, &ip6->ip6_flow);
830 if (!key_checktunnelsanity(sav, AF_INET6,
831 (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_src, (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_dst)) {
832 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "ipsec tunnel address mismatch "
833 "in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n",
834 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi),
835 ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
836 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
842 * should the inner packet be considered authentic?
843 * see comment in ah4_input().
845 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
846 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
849 key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m);
850 if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0 ||
851 ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_IPV6, 0) != 0) {
852 ipsec6stat.in_nomem++;
857 if (IF_QFULL(&ip6intrq)) {
858 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
862 IF_ENQUEUE(&ip6intrq, m);
864 schednetisr(NETISR_IPV6); /* can be skipped but to make sure */
874 * Copy the value of the next header field of AH to the
875 * next header field of the previous header.
876 * This is necessary because AH will be stripped off below.
878 prvnxtp = ip6_get_prevhdr(m, off); /* XXX */
881 ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
882 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST
884 * We do deep-copy since KAME requires that
885 * the packet is placed in a single mbuf.
887 ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip6, ((caddr_t)ip6) + stripsiz, off);
888 m->m_data += stripsiz;
889 m->m_len -= stripsiz;
890 m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz;
893 * even in m_pulldown case, we need to strip off AH so that
894 * we can compute checksum for multiple AH correctly.
896 if (m->m_len >= stripsiz + off) {
897 ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip6, ((caddr_t)ip6) + stripsiz, off);
898 m->m_data += stripsiz;
899 m->m_len -= stripsiz;
900 m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz;
903 * this comes with no copy if the boundary is on
908 n = m_split(m, off, M_DONTWAIT);
910 /* m is retained by m_split */
915 /* m_cat does not update m_pkthdr.len */
916 m->m_pkthdr.len += n->m_pkthdr.len;
919 ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
921 ip6->ip6_plen = htons(ntohs(ip6->ip6_plen) - stripsiz);
923 key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m);
924 if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0) {
925 ipsec6stat.in_nomem++;
934 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
935 printf("DP ah6_input call free SA:%p\n", sav));
938 ipsec6stat.in_success++;
943 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
944 printf("DP ah6_input call free SA:%p\n", sav));
953 ah6_ctlinput(cmd, sa, d)
958 const struct newah *ahp;
960 struct secasvar *sav;
963 struct ip6ctlparam *ip6cp = NULL;
965 struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6_src, *sa6_dst;
967 if (sa->sa_family != AF_INET6 ||
968 sa->sa_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
970 if ((unsigned)cmd >= PRC_NCMDS)
973 /* if the parameter is from icmp6, decode it. */
975 ip6cp = (struct ip6ctlparam *)d;
977 ip6 = ip6cp->ip6c_ip6;
978 off = ip6cp->ip6c_off;
982 off = 0; /* fix warning */
987 * XXX: We assume that when ip6 is non NULL,
988 * M and OFF are valid.
991 /* check if we can safely examine src and dst ports */
992 if (m->m_pkthdr.len < off + sizeof(ah))
995 if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(ah)) {
997 * this should be rare case,
998 * so we compromise on this copy...
1000 m_copydata(m, off, sizeof(ah), (caddr_t)&ah);
1003 ahp = (struct newah *)(mtod(m, caddr_t) + off);
1005 if (cmd == PRC_MSGSIZE) {
1009 * Check to see if we have a valid SA corresponding to
1010 * the address in the ICMP message payload.
1012 sa6_src = ip6cp->ip6c_src;
1013 sa6_dst = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
1014 sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET6,
1015 (caddr_t)&sa6_src->sin6_addr,
1016 (caddr_t)&sa6_dst->sin6_addr,
1017 IPPROTO_AH, ahp->ah_spi);
1019 if (sav->state == SADB_SASTATE_MATURE ||
1020 sav->state == SADB_SASTATE_DYING)
1025 /* XXX Further validation? */
1028 * Depending on the value of "valid" and routing table
1029 * size (mtudisc_{hi,lo}wat), we will:
1030 * - recalcurate the new MTU and create the
1031 * corresponding routing entry, or
1032 * - ignore the MTU change notification.
1034 icmp6_mtudisc_update((struct ip6ctlparam *)d, valid);
1037 /* we normally notify single pcb here */
1039 /* we normally notify any pcb here */