[dragonfly.git] / share / man / man7 / firewall.7

.\" Copyright (c) 2001 Matthew Dillon.  Terms and conditions are those of
.\" the BSD Copyright as specified in the file "/usr/src/COPYRIGHT" in
.\" the source tree.
.\"
.\" $FreeBSD: src/share/man/man7/firewall.7,v 1.1.2.8 2003/04/29 07:57:22 brueffer Exp $
.\"
.Dd May 26, 2001
.Dt FIREWALL 7
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm firewall
.Nd simple firewalls under DragonFly
.Sh FIREWALL BASICS
A Firewall is most commonly used to protect an internal network
from an outside network by preventing the outside network from
making arbitrary connections into the internal network.  Firewalls
are also used to prevent outside entities from spoofing internal
IP addresses and to isolate services such as NFS or SMBFS (Windows
file sharing) within LAN segments.
.Pp
The
.Dx
firewalling system also has the capability to limit bandwidth using
.Xr dummynet 4 .
This feature can be useful when you need to guarantee a certain
amount of bandwidth for a critical purpose.  For example, if you
are doing video conferencing over the Internet via your
office T1 (1.5 MBits/s), you may wish to bandwidth-limit all other
T1 traffic to 1 MBit/s in order to reserve at least 0.5 MBits
for your video conferencing connections.  Similarly if you are
running a popular web or ftp site from a colocation facility
you might want to limit bandwidth to prevent excessive bandwidth
charges from your provider.
.Pp
Finally,
.Dx
firewalls may be used to divert packets or change the next-hop
address for packets to help route them to the correct destination.
Packet diversion is most often used to support NAT (network
address translation), which allows an internal network using
a private IP space to make connections to the outside for browsing
or other purposes.
.Pp
Constructing a firewall may appear to be trivial, but most people
get them wrong.  The most common mistake is to create an exclusive
firewall rather than an inclusive firewall.  An exclusive firewall
allows all packets through except for those matching a set of rules.
An inclusive firewall allows only packets matching the ruleset
through.  Inclusive firewalls are much, much safer than exclusive
firewalls but a tad more difficult to build properly.  The
second most common mistake is to blackhole everything except the
particular port you want to let through.  TCP/IP needs to be able
to get certain types of ICMP errors to function properly - for
example, to implement MTU discovery.  Also, a number of common
system daemons make reverse connections to the
.Sy auth
service in an attempt to authenticate the user making a connection.
Auth is rather dangerous but the proper implementation is to return
a TCP reset for the connection attempt rather than simply blackholing
the packet.  We cover these and other quirks involved with constructing
a firewall in the sample firewall section below.
.Sh IPFW KERNEL CONFIGURATION
You do not need to create a customer kernel to use the IP firewalling features.
If you enable firewalling in your
.Pa /etc/rc.conf
(see below), the ipfw kernel module will be loaded automatically.  However,
if you are paranoid you can compile IPFW directly into the
.Dx
kernel by using the
.Sy IPFIREWALL
option set.  If compiled in the kernel defaults its firewall to deny all
packets by default, which means that if you do not load in
a permissive ruleset via
.Pa /etc/rc.conf ,
rebooting into your new kernel will take the network offline
and will prevent you from being able to access it if you
are not sitting at the console.  It is also quite common to
update a kernel to a new release and reboot before updating
the binaries.  This can result in an incompatibility between
the
.Xr ipfw 8
program and the kernel which prevents it from running in the
boot sequence, also resulting in an inaccessible machine.
Because of these problems the
.Sy IPFIREWALL_DEFAULT_TO_ACCEPT
kernel option is also available which changes the default firewall
to pass through all packets.  Note, however, that using this option
may open a small window of opportunity during booting where your
firewall passes all packets.  Still, it's a good option to use
while getting up to speed with
.Dx
firewalling.  Get rid of it once you understand how it all works
to close the loophole, though.  There is a third option called
.Sy IPDIVERT
which allows you to use the firewall to divert packets to a user program
and is necessary if you wish to use
.Xr natd 8
to give private internal networks access to the outside world.
If you want to be able to limit the bandwidth used by certain types of
traffic, the
.Sy DUMMYNET
option must be used to enable
.Em ipfw pipe
rules.
.Sh SAMPLE IPFW-BASED FIREWALL
Here is an example ipfw-based firewall taken from a machine with three
interface cards.  fxp0 is connected to the 'exposed' LAN.  Machines
on this LAN are dual-homed with both internal 10. IP addresses and
Internet-routed IP addresses.  In our example, 192.100.5.x represents
the Internet-routed IP block while 10.x.x.x represents the internal
networks.  While it isn't relevant to the example, 10.0.1.x is
assigned as the internal address block for the LAN on fxp0, 10.0.2.x
for the LAN on fxp1, and 10.0.3.x for the LAN on fxp2.
.Pp
In this example we want to isolate all three LANs from the Internet
as well as isolate them from each other, and we want to give all
internal addresses access to the Internet through a NAT gateway running
on this machine.  To make the NAT gateway work, the firewall machine
is given two Internet-exposed addresses on fxp0 in addition to an
internal 10. address on fxp0: one exposed address (not shown)
represents the machine's official address, and the second exposed
address (192.100.5.5 in our example) represents the NAT gateway
rendezvous IP.  We make the example more complex by giving the machines
on the exposed LAN internal 10.0.0.x addresses as well as exposed
addresses.  The idea here is that you can bind internal services
to internal addresses even on exposed machines and still protect
those services from the Internet.  The only services you run on
exposed IP addresses would be the ones you wish to expose to the
Internet.
.Pp
It is important to note that the 10.0.0.x network in our example
is not protected by our firewall.  You must make sure that your
Internet router protects this network from outside spoofing.
Also, in our example, we pretty much give the exposed hosts free
reign on our internal network when operating services through
internal IP addresses (10.0.0.x).   This is somewhat of security
risk... what if an exposed host is compromised?  To remove the
risk and force everything coming in via LAN0 to go through
the firewall, remove rules 01010 and 01011.
.Pp
Finally, note that the use of internal addresses represents a
big piece of our firewall protection mechanism.  With proper
spoofing safeguards in place, nothing outside can directly
access an internal (LAN1 or LAN2) host.
.Bd -literal
# /etc/rc.conf
#
firewall_enable="YES"
firewall_type="/etc/ipfw.conf"

# temporary port binding range let
# through the firewall.
#
# NOTE: heavily loaded services running through the firewall may require
# a larger port range for local-size binding.  4000-10000 or 4000-30000
# might be a better choice.
ip_portrange_first=4000
ip_portrange_last=5000
\&...
.Ed
.Bd -literal
# /etc/ipfw.conf
#
# FIREWALL: the firewall machine / nat gateway
# LAN0      10.0.0.X and 192.100.5.X (dual homed)
# LAN1      10.0.1.X
# LAN2      10.0.2.X
# sw:       ethernet switch (unmanaged)
#
# 192.100.5.x represents IP addresses exposed to the Internet
# (i.e. Internet routeable).  10.x.x.x represent internal IPs
# (not exposed)
#
#   [LAN1]
#      ^
#      |
#   FIREWALL -->[LAN2]
#      |
#   [LAN0]
#      |
#      +--> exposed host A
#      +--> exposed host B
#      +--> exposed host C
#      |
#   INTERNET (secondary firewall)
#    ROUTER
#      |
#    [Internet]
#
# NOT SHOWN:  The INTERNET ROUTER must contain rules to disallow
# all packets with source IP addresses in the 10. block in order
# to protect the dual-homed 10.0.0.x block.  Exposed hosts are
# not otherwise protected in this example - they should only bind
# exposed services to exposed IPs but can safely bind internal
# services to internal IPs.
#
# The NAT gateway works by taking packets sent from internal
# IP addresses to external IP addresses and routing them to natd, which
# is listening on port 8668.   This is handled by rule 00300.  Data coming
# back to natd from the outside world must also be routed to natd using
# rule 00301.  To make the example interesting, we note that we do
# NOT have to run internal requests to exposed hosts through natd
# (rule 00290) because those exposed hosts know about our
# 10. network.  This can reduce the load on natd.  Also note that we
# of course do not have to route internal<->internal traffic through
# natd since those hosts know how to route our 10. internal network.
# The natd command we run from /etc/rc.local is shown below.
#
#       natd -s -u -a 208.161.114.67
#
#
add 00290 skipto 1000 ip from 10.0.0.0/8 to 192.100.5.0/24
add 00300 divert 8668 ip from 10.0.0.0/8 to not 10.0.0.0/8
add 00301 divert 8668 ip from not 10.0.0.0/8 to 192.100.5.5

# Short cut the rules to avoid running high bandwidths through
# the entire rule set.  Allow established tcp connections through,
# and shortcut all outgoing packets under the assumption that
# we need only firewall incoming packets.
#
# Allowing established tcp connections through creates a small
# hole but may be necessary to avoid overloading your firewall.
# If you are worried, you can move the rule to after the spoof
# checks.
#
add 01000 allow tcp from any to any established
add 01001 allow all from any to any out via fxp0
add 01001 allow all from any to any out via fxp1
add 01001 allow all from any to any out via fxp2

# Spoof protection.  This depends on how well you trust your
# internal networks.  Packets received via fxp1 MUST come from
# 10.0.1.x.  Packets received via fxp2 MUST come from 10.0.2.x.
# Packets received via fxp0 cannot come from the LAN1 or LAN2
# blocks.  We can't protect 10.0.0.x here, the Internet router
# must do that for us.
#
add 01500 deny all from not 10.0.1.0/24 in via fxp1
add 01500 deny all from not 10.0.2.0/24 in via fxp2
add 01501 deny all from 10.0.1.0/24 in via fxp0
add 01501 deny all from 10.0.2.0/24 in via fxp0

# In this example rule set there are no restrictions between
# internal hosts, even those on the exposed LAN (as long as
# they use an internal IP address).  This represents a
# potential security hole (what if an exposed host is
# compromised?).  If you want full restrictions to apply
# between the three LANs, firewalling them off from each
# other for added security, remove these two rules.
#
# If you want to isolate LAN1 and LAN2, but still want
# to give exposed hosts free reign with each other, get
# rid of rule 01010 and keep rule 01011.
#
# (commented out, uncomment for less restrictive firewall)
#add 01010 allow all from 10.0.0.0/8 to 10.0.0.0/8
#add 01011 allow all from 192.100.5.0/24 to 192.100.5.0/24
#

# SPECIFIC SERVICES ALLOWED FROM SPECIFIC LANS
#
# If using a more restrictive firewall, allow specific LANs
# access to specific services running on the firewall itself.
# In this case we assume LAN1 needs access to filesharing running
# on the firewall.  If using a less restrictive firewall
# (allowing rule 01010), you don't need these rules.
#
add 01012 allow tcp from 10.0.1.0/8 to 10.0.1.1 139
add 01012 allow udp from 10.0.1.0/8 to 10.0.1.1 137,138

# GENERAL SERVICES ALLOWED TO CROSS INTERNAL AND EXPOSED LANS
#
# We allow specific UDP services through: DNS lookups, ntalk, and ntp.
# Note that internal services are protected by virtue of having
# spoof-proof internal IP addresses (10. net), so these rules
# really only apply to services bound to exposed IPs.  We have
# to allow UDP fragments or larger fragmented UDP packets will
# not survive the firewall.
#
# If we want to expose high-numbered temporary service ports
# for things like DNS lookup responses we can use a port range,
# in this example 4000-65535, and we set to /etc/rc.conf variables
# on all exposed machines to make sure they bind temporary ports
# to the exposed port range (see rc.conf example above)
#
add 02000 allow udp from any to any 4000-65535,domain,ntalk,ntp
add 02500 allow udp from any to any frag

# Allow similar services for TCP.  Again, these only apply to
# services bound to exposed addresses.  NOTE: we allow 'auth'
# through but do not actually run an identd server on any exposed
# port.  This allows the machine being authed to respond with a
# TCP RESET.  Throwing the packet away would result in delays
# when connecting to remote services that do reverse ident lookups.
#
# Note that we do not allow tcp fragments through, and that we do
# not allow fragments in general (except for UDP fragments).  We
# expect the TCP mtu discovery protocol to work properly so there
# should be no TCP fragments.
#
add 03000 allow tcp from any to any http,https
add 03000 allow tcp from any to any 4000-65535,ssh,smtp,domain,ntalk
add 03000 allow tcp from any to any auth,pop3,ftp,ftp-data

# It is important to allow certain ICMP types through, here is a list
# of general ICMP types.  Note that it is important to let ICMP type 3
# through.
#
#       0       Echo Reply
#       3       Destination Unreachable (used by TCP MTU discovery, aka
#                                       packet-too-big)
#       4       Source Quench (typically not allowed)
#       5       Redirect (typically not allowed - can be dangerous!)
#       8       Echo
#       11      Time Exceeded
#       12      Parameter Problem
#       13      Timestamp
#       14      Timestamp Reply
#
# Sometimes people need to allow ICMP REDIRECT packets, which is
# type 5, but if you allow it make sure that your Internet router
# disallows it.

add 04000 allow icmp from any to any icmptypes 0,3,8,11,12,13,14

# log any remaining fragments that get through.  Might be useful,
# otherwise don't bother.  Have a final deny rule as a safety to
# guarantee that your firewall is inclusive no matter how the kernel
# is configured.
#
add 05000 deny log ip from any to any frag
add 06000 deny all from any to any
.Ed
.Sh PORT BINDING INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SERVICES
We've mentioned multi-homing hosts and binding services to internal or
external addresses but we haven't really explained it.  When you have a
host with multiple IP addresses assigned to it, you can bind services run
on that host to specific IPs or interfaces rather than all IPs.  Take
the firewall machine for example:  With three interfaces
and two exposed IP addresses
on one of those interfaces, the firewall machine is known by 5 different
IP addresses (10.0.0.1, 10.0.1.1, 10.0.2.1, 192.100.5.5, and say
192.100.5.1).  If the firewall is providing file sharing services to the
windows LAN segment (say it is LAN1), you can use samba's 'bind interfaces'
directive to specifically bind it to just the LAN1 IP address.  That
way the file sharing services will not be made available to other LAN
segments.  The same goes for NFS.  If LAN2 has your UNIX engineering
workstations, you can tell nfsd to bind specifically to 10.0.2.1.  You
can specify how to bind virtually every service on the machine and you
can use a light
.Xr jail 8
to indirectly bind services that do not otherwise give you the option.
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr dummynet 4 ,
.Xr ipfw 4 ,
.Xr rc.conf 5 ,
.Xr smb.conf 5 Pq Pa pkgsrc/net/samba ,
.Xr samba 7 Pq Pa pkgsrc/net/samba ,
.Xr config 8 ,
.Xr ipfw 8 ,
.Xr jail 8 ,
.Xr natd 8 ,
.Xr nfsd 8
.Sh ADDITIONAL READING
.Xr pf 4 ,
.Xr pf.conf 5 ,
.Xr pfctl 8
.Sh HISTORY
The
.Nm
manual page was originally written by
.An Matthew Dillon
and first appeared
in
.Fx 4.3 ,
May 2001.