1 /* $OpenBSD: ssl_srvr.c,v 1.66 2019/03/25 17:21:18 jsing Exp $ */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
153 #include "ssl_locl.h"
155 #include <openssl/bn.h>
156 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
157 #include <openssl/curve25519.h>
158 #include <openssl/evp.h>
159 #include <openssl/dh.h>
160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
161 #include <openssl/gost.h>
163 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
164 #include <openssl/md5.h>
165 #include <openssl/objects.h>
166 #include <openssl/x509.h>
168 #include "bytestring.h"
169 #include "ssl_sigalgs.h"
170 #include "ssl_tlsext.h"
175 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
178 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
184 if (s->internal->info_callback != NULL)
185 cb = s->internal->info_callback;
186 else if (s->ctx->internal->info_callback != NULL)
187 cb = s->ctx->internal->info_callback;
190 listen = D1I(s)->listen;
192 /* init things to blank */
193 s->internal->in_handshake++;
194 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
198 D1I(s)->listen = listen;
201 state = S3I(s)->hs.state;
203 switch (S3I(s)->hs.state) {
204 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
205 s->internal->renegotiate = 1;
206 /* S3I(s)->hs.state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
210 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
211 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
214 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
216 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
217 if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00)) {
218 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
223 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
224 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
229 s->internal->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
231 if (!ssl3_setup_init_buffer(s)) {
235 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
240 s->internal->init_num = 0;
242 if (S3I(s)->hs.state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
244 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO
245 * so that the output is sent in a way that
248 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
253 if (!tls1_transcript_init(s)) {
258 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
259 s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept++;
260 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !S3I(s)->send_connection_binding) {
262 * Server attempting to renegotiate with
263 * client that doesn't support secure
266 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
267 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
268 SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
273 * S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
274 * we will just send a HelloRequest.
276 s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
277 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
281 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
282 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
283 s->internal->shutdown = 0;
284 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
285 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
286 dtls1_start_timer(s);
288 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
292 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
294 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
295 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
296 s->internal->init_num = 0;
298 if (!tls1_transcript_init(s)) {
304 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
305 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL_ST_OK;
308 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
309 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
310 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
311 s->internal->shutdown = 0;
312 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
313 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
319 (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
320 S3I(s)->hs.state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A;
322 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
324 s->internal->init_num = 0;
327 * Reflect ClientHello sequence to remain
328 * stateless while listening.
331 memcpy(S3I(s)->write_sequence,
332 S3I(s)->read_sequence,
333 sizeof(S3I(s)->write_sequence));
336 /* If we're just listening, stop here */
337 if (listen && S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
341 * Set expected sequence numbers to
342 * continue the handshake.
344 D1I(s)->handshake_read_seq = 2;
345 D1I(s)->handshake_write_seq = 1;
346 D1I(s)->next_handshake_write_seq = 1;
350 if (s->internal->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
351 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
356 s->internal->renegotiate = 2;
357 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
358 s->internal->init_num = 0;
362 case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A:
363 case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B:
364 ret = dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(s);
367 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
368 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
370 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC. */
371 tls1_transcript_reset(s);
374 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
375 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
376 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
377 s->internal->renegotiate = 2;
378 dtls1_start_timer(s);
380 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
383 if (s->internal->hit) {
384 if (s->internal->tlsext_ticket_expected)
385 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
387 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
389 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
391 s->internal->init_num = 0;
394 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
395 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
396 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH. */
397 if (!(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
400 dtls1_start_timer(s);
401 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
404 if (s->internal->tlsext_status_expected)
405 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
407 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
410 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
412 s->internal->init_num = 0;
415 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
416 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
417 alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
420 * Only send if using a DH key exchange.
422 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a ServerKeyExchange
423 * message only if the cipher suite is ECDHE. In other
424 * cases, the server certificate contains the server's
425 * public key for key exchange.
427 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE)) {
429 dtls1_start_timer(s);
430 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
436 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
437 s->internal->init_num = 0;
440 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
441 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
443 * Determine whether or not we need to request a
446 * Do not request a certificate if:
448 * - We did not ask for it (SSL_VERIFY_PEER is unset).
450 * - SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set and we are
453 * - We are using an anonymous ciphersuites
454 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
455 * and in RFC 2246) ... except when the application
456 * insists on verification (against the specs, but
457 * s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3).
459 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
460 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
461 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
462 ((S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
463 SSL_aNULL) && !(s->verify_mode &
464 SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))) {
465 /* No cert request. */
467 S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request = 0;
468 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
471 tls1_transcript_free(s);
473 S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request = 1;
475 dtls1_start_timer(s);
476 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
479 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
480 s->internal->init_num = 0;
484 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
485 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
487 dtls1_start_timer(s);
488 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
491 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
492 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
493 s->internal->init_num = 0;
496 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
498 * This code originally checked to see if
499 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
500 * and then flushed. This caused problems
501 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
502 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
503 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
504 * still exist. So instead we just flush
507 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
508 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
509 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
510 /* If the write error was fatal, stop trying. */
511 if (!BIO_should_retry(s->wbio)) {
512 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
513 S3I(s)->hs.state = S3I(s)->hs.next_state;
519 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
520 S3I(s)->hs.state = S3I(s)->hs.next_state;
523 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
524 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
525 if (S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request) {
526 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
530 s->internal->init_num = 0;
531 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
534 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
535 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
536 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
540 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
541 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
542 s->internal->init_num = 0;
545 alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
548 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when
549 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
550 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
551 * message is not sent.
552 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
553 * the client uses its key from the certificate
556 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
557 s->internal->init_num = 0;
558 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)) {
559 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
560 s->internal->init_num = 0;
561 if (!s->session->peer)
564 * Freeze the transcript for use during client
565 * certificate verification.
567 tls1_transcript_freeze(s);
569 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
570 s->internal->init_num = 0;
572 tls1_transcript_free(s);
575 * We need to get hashes here so if there is
576 * a client cert, it can be verified.
578 if (!tls1_transcript_hash_value(s,
579 S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md,
580 sizeof(S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md),
588 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
589 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
591 D1I(s)->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
593 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
595 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
596 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
599 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
600 s->internal->init_num = 0;
603 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
604 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
606 D1I(s)->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
608 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
609 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
610 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
615 if (s->internal->hit)
616 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL_ST_OK;
617 else if (s->internal->tlsext_ticket_expected)
618 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
620 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
621 s->internal->init_num = 0;
624 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
625 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
626 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
629 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
630 s->internal->init_num = 0;
633 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
634 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
635 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
638 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
639 s->internal->init_num = 0;
642 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
643 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
644 s->session->cipher = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher;
645 if (!tls1_setup_key_block(s)) {
650 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
651 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A, SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
654 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
655 s->internal->init_num = 0;
657 if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(s,
658 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
664 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
667 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
668 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
669 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
670 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
671 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
672 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE);
675 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
676 if (s->internal->hit) {
677 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
678 tls1_transcript_free(s);
680 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
681 s->internal->init_num = 0;
685 /* clean a few things up */
686 tls1_cleanup_key_block(s);
688 if (S3I(s)->handshake_transcript != NULL) {
689 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
694 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
695 BUF_MEM_free(s->internal->init_buf);
696 s->internal->init_buf = NULL;
699 /* remove buffering on output */
700 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
702 s->internal->init_num = 0;
704 /* Skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest. */
705 if (s->internal->renegotiate == 2) {
706 s->internal->renegotiate = 0;
707 s->internal->new_session = 0;
709 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
711 s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept_good++;
713 s->internal->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
716 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
721 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
722 /* Done handshaking, next message is client hello. */
723 D1I(s)->handshake_read_seq = 0;
724 /* Next message is server hello. */
725 D1I(s)->handshake_write_seq = 0;
726 D1I(s)->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
732 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
738 if (!S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
739 if (s->internal->debug) {
740 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
745 if ((cb != NULL) && (S3I(s)->hs.state != state)) {
746 new_state = S3I(s)->hs.state;
747 S3I(s)->hs.state = state;
748 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
749 S3I(s)->hs.state = new_state;
755 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
756 s->internal->in_handshake--;
758 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
764 ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
768 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
770 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
771 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &hello,
772 SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST))
774 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
777 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
780 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
781 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
790 ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
792 CBS cbs, client_random, session_id, cookie, cipher_suites;
793 CBS compression_methods;
794 uint16_t client_version;
797 int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1, cookie_valid = 0;
801 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
803 const SSL_METHOD *method;
804 uint16_t shared_version;
807 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
808 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
809 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
810 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
813 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
814 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
817 s->internal->first_packet = 1;
818 n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
819 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
820 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
823 s->internal->first_packet = 0;
828 CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n);
830 /* Parse client hello up until the extensions (if any). */
831 if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &client_version))
833 if (!CBS_get_bytes(&cbs, &client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE))
835 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &session_id))
837 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
838 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &cookie))
841 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &cipher_suites))
843 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &compression_methods))
847 * Use version from inside client hello, not from record header.
848 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
850 if (ssl_max_shared_version(s, client_version, &shared_version) != 1) {
851 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
852 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
853 !s->internal->enc_write_ctx && !s->internal->write_hash) {
855 * Similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote
858 s->version = s->client_version;
860 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
863 s->client_version = client_version;
864 s->version = shared_version;
866 if ((method = tls1_get_server_method(shared_version)) == NULL)
867 method = dtls1_get_server_method(shared_version);
868 if (method == NULL) {
869 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
875 * If we require cookies (DTLS) and this ClientHello does not contain
876 * one, just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
877 * So check cookie length...
879 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
880 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
881 if (CBS_len(&cookie) == 0)
886 if (!CBS_write_bytes(&client_random, s->s3->client_random,
887 sizeof(s->s3->client_random), NULL))
890 s->internal->hit = 0;
893 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
894 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
895 * ignore resumption requests with flag
896 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag
897 * rather than a change to default behavior so that applications
898 * relying on this for security won't even compile against older
901 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated()
902 * to request renegotiation but not a new session (s->internal->new_session
903 * remains unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
904 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
907 if ((s->internal->new_session && (s->internal->options &
908 SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
909 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
914 CBS_dup(&cbs, &ext_block);
916 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, CBS_data(&session_id),
917 CBS_len(&session_id), &ext_block);
918 if (i == 1) { /* previous session */
919 s->internal->hit = 1;
924 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
929 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
931 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the HelloVerify
932 * message has not been sent - make sure that it does not cause
935 if (CBS_len(&cookie) > sizeof(D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie)) {
936 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
937 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
941 /* Verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
942 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
943 CBS_len(&cookie) > 0) {
946 /* XXX - rcvd_cookie seems to only be used here... */
947 if (!CBS_write_bytes(&cookie, D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie,
948 sizeof(D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie), &cookie_len))
951 if (s->ctx->internal->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
952 if (s->ctx->internal->app_verify_cookie_cb(s,
953 D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie, cookie_len) == 0) {
954 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
955 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
958 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
959 /* XXX - can d1->cookie_len > sizeof(rcvd_cookie) ? */
960 } else if (timingsafe_memcmp(D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie,
961 D1I(s)->cookie, D1I(s)->cookie_len) != 0) {
962 /* default verification */
963 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
964 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
971 /* XXX - This logic seems wrong... */
972 if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) == 0 && CBS_len(&session_id) != 0) {
973 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
974 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
975 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
979 if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) {
980 if ((ciphers = ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,
981 &cipher_suites)) == NULL)
985 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
986 /* XXX - CBS_len(&cipher_suites) will always be zero here... */
987 if (s->internal->hit && CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) {
989 id = s->session->cipher->id;
991 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
992 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1000 * We need to have the cipher in the cipher
1001 * list if we are asked to reuse it
1003 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1004 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1010 while (CBS_len(&compression_methods) > 0) {
1011 if (!CBS_get_u8(&compression_methods, &comp_method))
1013 if (comp_method == 0)
1016 if (comp_null == 0) {
1017 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1018 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1022 if (!tlsext_server_parse(s, &cbs, &al, SSL_TLSEXT_MSG_CH)) {
1023 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1027 if (!S3I(s)->renegotiate_seen && s->internal->renegotiate) {
1028 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1029 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1033 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
1034 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1039 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1040 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1041 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1042 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation.
1044 arc4random_buf(s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1046 if (!s->internal->hit && s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1047 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1049 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1050 if (s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1051 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers, &pref_cipher,
1052 s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1053 s->internal->hit = 1;
1054 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1055 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1059 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1060 pref_cipher = pref_cipher ? pref_cipher :
1061 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
1062 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1063 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1064 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1065 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1069 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1071 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1072 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->internal->cipher_list_by_id);
1074 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1075 s->internal->cipher_list_by_id =
1076 sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1081 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1085 if (!s->internal->hit) {
1086 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1087 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1088 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1089 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1090 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1094 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
1095 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1098 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1099 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1102 S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher = c;
1104 S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1107 if (!tls1_transcript_hash_init(s))
1110 alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1111 if (!(SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)) ||
1112 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1113 tls1_transcript_free(s);
1116 * We now have the following setup.
1118 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1119 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1120 * compression - basically ignored right now
1121 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1122 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1123 * s->internal->hit - session reuse flag
1124 * s->hs.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1127 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1128 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1129 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1133 ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1;
1137 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1138 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1140 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1143 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1149 ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1151 CBB cbb, server_hello, session_id;
1154 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
1156 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1157 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &server_hello,
1158 SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO))
1161 if (!CBB_add_u16(&server_hello, s->version))
1163 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&server_hello, s->s3->server_random,
1164 sizeof(s->s3->server_random)))
1168 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1169 * back in the server hello:
1171 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1172 * we send back the old session ID.
1173 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1174 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1175 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1176 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1178 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1179 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1181 * s->internal->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1182 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1185 if (!(s->ctx->internal->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1186 && !s->internal->hit)
1187 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1189 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1190 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1191 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1194 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&server_hello, &session_id))
1196 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&session_id, s->session->session_id, sl))
1200 if (!CBB_add_u16(&server_hello,
1201 ssl3_cipher_get_value(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher)))
1204 /* Compression method (null). */
1205 if (!CBB_add_u8(&server_hello, 0))
1208 /* TLS extensions */
1209 if (!tlsext_server_build(s, &server_hello, SSL_TLSEXT_MSG_SH)) {
1210 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1214 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
1218 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1219 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
1228 ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1232 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
1234 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1235 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &done,
1236 SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE))
1238 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
1241 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1244 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1245 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
1254 ssl3_send_server_kex_dhe(SSL *s, CBB *cbb)
1256 CBB dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys;
1257 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1258 unsigned char *data;
1261 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 0) {
1262 if ((dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s)) == NULL) {
1263 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1264 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1268 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp;
1270 if (dhp == NULL && s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)
1271 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0,
1272 SSL_C_PKEYLENGTH(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher));
1275 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1276 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1280 if (S3I(s)->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1281 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1285 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 0) {
1287 } else if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1288 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1291 S3I(s)->tmp.dh = dh;
1292 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1293 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1298 * Serialize the DH parameters and public key.
1300 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_p))
1302 if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_p, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh->p)))
1304 BN_bn2bin(dh->p, data);
1306 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_g))
1308 if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_g, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh->g)))
1310 BN_bn2bin(dh->g, data);
1312 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_Ys))
1314 if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_Ys, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh->pub_key)))
1316 BN_bn2bin(dh->pub_key, data);
1318 if (!CBB_flush(cbb))
1324 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1330 ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecp(SSL *s, int nid, CBB *cbb)
1332 const EC_GROUP *group;
1333 const EC_POINT *pubkey;
1334 unsigned char *data;
1335 int encoded_len = 0;
1337 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1343 * Only named curves are supported in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1344 * For supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1346 if ((curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid)) == 0) {
1347 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1351 if (S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1352 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1356 if ((S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid)) == NULL) {
1357 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1358 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1361 ecdh = S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh;
1363 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1364 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1367 if ((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL ||
1368 (pubkey = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh)) == NULL ||
1369 EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) {
1370 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1375 * Encode the public key.
1377 encoded_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, pubkey,
1378 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
1379 if (encoded_len == 0) {
1380 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1383 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
1384 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1389 * Only named curves are supported in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1390 * In this case the ServerKeyExchange message has:
1391 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1392 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1393 * the actual encoded point itself.
1395 if (!CBB_add_u8(cbb, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE))
1397 if (!CBB_add_u16(cbb, curve_id))
1399 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &ecpoint))
1401 if (!CBB_add_space(&ecpoint, &data, encoded_len))
1403 if (EC_POINT_point2oct(group, pubkey, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1404 data, encoded_len, bn_ctx) == 0) {
1405 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1408 if (!CBB_flush(cbb))
1411 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1416 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1418 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1424 ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecx(SSL *s, int nid, CBB *cbb)
1426 uint8_t *public_key = NULL;
1431 /* Generate an X25519 key pair. */
1432 if (S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 != NULL) {
1433 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1436 if ((S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1438 if ((public_key = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1440 X25519_keypair(public_key, S3I(s)->tmp.x25519);
1442 /* Serialize public key. */
1443 if ((curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid)) == 0) {
1444 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1448 if (!CBB_add_u8(cbb, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE))
1450 if (!CBB_add_u16(cbb, curve_id))
1452 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &ecpoint))
1454 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ecpoint, public_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH))
1456 if (!CBB_flush(cbb))
1468 ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, CBB *cbb)
1472 nid = tls1_get_shared_curve(s);
1474 if (nid == NID_X25519)
1475 return ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecx(s, nid, cbb);
1477 return ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecp(s, nid, cbb);
1481 ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1483 CBB cbb, cbb_params, cbb_signature, server_kex;
1484 const struct ssl_sigalg *sigalg = NULL;
1485 unsigned char *signature = NULL;
1486 size_t signature_len = 0;
1487 unsigned char *params = NULL;
1489 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1496 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
1497 memset(&cbb_params, 0, sizeof(cbb_params));
1499 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1501 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1503 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &server_kex,
1504 SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE))
1507 if (!CBB_init(&cbb_params, 0))
1510 type = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1511 if (type & SSL_kDHE) {
1512 if (ssl3_send_server_kex_dhe(s, &cbb_params) != 1)
1514 } else if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
1515 if (ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe(s, &cbb_params) != 1)
1518 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1519 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1523 if (!CBB_finish(&cbb_params, ¶ms, ¶ms_len))
1526 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&server_kex, params, params_len))
1529 /* Add signature unless anonymous. */
1530 if (!(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) {
1531 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher,
1532 &md, &sigalg)) == NULL) {
1533 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1537 /* Send signature algorithm. */
1538 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1539 if (!CBB_add_u16(&server_kex, sigalg->value)) {
1540 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1541 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1546 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey)) {
1547 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1550 if ((sigalg->flags & SIGALG_FLAG_RSA_PSS) &&
1551 (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx,
1552 RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) ||
1553 !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1))) {
1554 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1557 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->client_random,
1558 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1559 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1562 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->server_random,
1563 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1564 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1567 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, params, params_len)) {
1568 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1571 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, NULL, &signature_len) ||
1573 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1576 if ((signature = calloc(1, signature_len)) == NULL) {
1577 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1580 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, signature, &signature_len)) {
1581 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1585 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&server_kex,
1588 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb_signature, signature,
1593 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
1596 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1599 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1603 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
1606 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1608 CBB_cleanup(&cbb_params);
1610 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1618 ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1620 CBB cbb, cert_request, cert_types, sigalgs, cert_auth, dn;
1621 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
1626 * Certificate Request - RFC 5246 section 7.4.4.
1629 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
1631 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
1632 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &cert_request,
1633 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST))
1636 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &cert_types))
1638 if (!ssl3_get_req_cert_types(s, &cert_types))
1641 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1642 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &sigalgs))
1644 if (!ssl_sigalgs_build(&sigalgs, tls12_sigalgs, tls12_sigalgs_len))
1648 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &cert_auth))
1651 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1652 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
1653 unsigned char *name_data;
1656 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
1657 name_len = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
1659 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_auth, &dn))
1661 if (!CBB_add_space(&dn, &name_data, name_len))
1663 if (i2d_X509_NAME(name, &name_data) != name_len)
1667 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
1670 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1673 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1674 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
1683 ssl3_get_client_kex_rsa(SSL *s, CBS *cbs)
1685 unsigned char fakekey[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
1686 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
1689 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1695 arc4random_buf(fakekey, sizeof(fakekey));
1696 fakekey[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1697 fakekey[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1699 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1700 if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1701 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
1702 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1703 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1706 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
1708 pms_len = RSA_size(rsa);
1709 if (pms_len < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1711 if ((pms = malloc(pms_len)) == NULL)
1715 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &enc_pms))
1717 if (CBS_len(cbs) != 0 || CBS_len(&enc_pms) != RSA_size(rsa)) {
1718 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1722 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(CBS_len(&enc_pms), CBS_data(&enc_pms),
1723 pms, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1727 if (decrypt_len != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
1728 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1729 /* SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1732 if ((al == -1) && !((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8)) &&
1733 (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
1735 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number
1736 * as the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
1737 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
1740 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1741 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1742 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1743 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1744 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except that
1745 * the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks, we should
1746 * treat this just like any other decryption error.
1748 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1749 /* SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1754 * Some decryption failure -- use random value instead
1755 * as countermeasure against Bleichenbacher's attack
1756 * on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
1762 s->session->master_key_length =
1763 tls1_generate_master_secret(s,
1764 s->session->master_key, p, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
1766 freezero(pms, pms_len);
1771 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1772 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1774 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1776 freezero(pms, pms_len);
1782 ssl3_get_client_kex_dhe(SSL *s, CBS *cbs)
1784 int key_size = 0, key_len, al;
1785 unsigned char *key = NULL;
1790 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &dh_Yc))
1792 if (CBS_len(cbs) != 0)
1795 if (S3I(s)->tmp.dh == NULL) {
1796 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1797 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1800 dh = S3I(s)->tmp.dh;
1802 if ((bn = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_Yc), CBS_len(&dh_Yc), NULL)) == NULL) {
1803 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1807 if ((key_size = DH_size(dh)) <= 0) {
1808 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1811 if ((key = malloc(key_size)) == NULL) {
1812 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1815 if ((key_len = DH_compute_key(key, bn, dh)) <= 0) {
1816 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1820 s->session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret(s,
1821 s->session->master_key, key, key_len);
1823 DH_free(S3I(s)->tmp.dh);
1824 S3I(s)->tmp.dh = NULL;
1826 freezero(key, key_size);
1832 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1833 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1835 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1837 freezero(key, key_size);
1844 ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecp(SSL *s, CBS *cbs)
1846 unsigned char *key = NULL;
1847 int key_size = 0, key_len;
1848 EC_POINT *point = NULL;
1849 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1850 const EC_GROUP *group;
1855 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(cbs, &public))
1857 if (CBS_len(cbs) != 0)
1861 * Use the ephemeral values we saved when generating the
1862 * ServerKeyExchange message.
1864 if ((ecdh = S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh) == NULL) {
1865 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1868 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
1871 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the ClientKeyExchange
1874 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
1875 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1878 if ((point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
1879 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1882 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, point, CBS_data(&public),
1883 CBS_len(&public), bn_ctx) == 0) {
1884 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1888 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
1889 if ((key_size = ECDH_size(ecdh)) <= 0) {
1890 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1893 if ((key = malloc(key_size)) == NULL) {
1894 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1897 if ((key_len = ECDH_compute_key(key, key_size, point, ecdh,
1899 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1903 /* Compute the master secret */
1904 s->session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret(s,
1905 s->session->master_key, key, key_len);
1907 EC_KEY_free(S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh);
1908 S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
1913 freezero(key, key_size);
1914 EC_POINT_free(point);
1915 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1921 ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecx(SSL *s, CBS *cbs)
1923 uint8_t *shared_key = NULL;
1927 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(cbs, &ecpoint))
1929 if (CBS_len(cbs) != 0)
1931 if (CBS_len(&ecpoint) != X25519_KEY_LENGTH)
1934 if ((shared_key = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1936 if (!X25519(shared_key, S3I(s)->tmp.x25519, CBS_data(&ecpoint)))
1939 freezero(S3I(s)->tmp.x25519, X25519_KEY_LENGTH);
1940 S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 = NULL;
1942 s->session->master_key_length =
1943 tls1_generate_master_secret(
1944 s, s->session->master_key, shared_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH);
1949 freezero(shared_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH);
1955 ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, CBS *cbs)
1957 if (S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 != NULL)
1958 return ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecx(s, cbs);
1960 return ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecp(s, cbs);
1964 ssl3_get_client_kex_gost(SSL *s, CBS *cbs)
1966 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
1967 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
1968 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
1969 unsigned long alg_a;
1975 /* Get our certificate private key*/
1976 alg_a = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1977 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
1978 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
1980 if ((pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL)) == NULL)
1982 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0)
1986 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type,
1987 * maybe use it for key exchange.
1988 * Don't mind errors from EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because
1989 * it is completely valid to use a client certificate for
1990 * authorization only.
1992 if ((client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) != NULL) {
1993 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx,
1994 client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
1998 /* Decrypt session key */
1999 if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &gostblob, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE))
2001 if (CBS_len(cbs) != 0)
2003 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen,
2004 CBS_data(&gostblob), CBS_len(&gostblob)) <= 0) {
2005 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2009 /* Generate master secret */
2010 s->session->master_key_length =
2011 tls1_generate_master_secret(
2012 s, s->session->master_key, premaster_secret, 32);
2014 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2015 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1,
2016 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2021 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2022 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2029 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2030 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
2031 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2037 ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2039 unsigned long alg_k;
2044 /* 2048 maxlen is a guess. How long a key does that permit? */
2045 n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2046 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2053 CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n);
2055 alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2057 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2058 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_rsa(s, &cbs) != 1)
2060 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
2061 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_dhe(s, &cbs) != 1)
2063 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
2064 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe(s, &cbs) != 1)
2066 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2067 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_gost(s, &cbs) != 1)
2070 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2071 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2075 if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
2076 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2077 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
2084 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2090 ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2093 const struct ssl_sigalg *sigalg = NULL;
2094 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2095 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2099 const unsigned char *hdata;
2105 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2107 n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2108 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
2115 CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n);
2117 if (s->session->peer != NULL) {
2118 peer = s->session->peer;
2119 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2120 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2123 if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
2124 S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
2126 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2127 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2135 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2136 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2140 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2141 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2142 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2146 if (S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec) {
2147 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2148 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2152 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2153 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &signature))
2155 if (CBS_len(&signature) > EVP_PKEY_size(pkey)) {
2156 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2157 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2160 if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
2161 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2162 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2167 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2169 uint16_t sigalg_value;
2171 if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &sigalg_value))
2173 if ((sigalg = ssl_sigalg(sigalg_value, tls12_sigalgs,
2174 tls12_sigalgs_len)) == NULL ||
2175 (md = sigalg->md()) == NULL) {
2176 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
2177 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2180 if (!ssl_sigalg_pkey_ok(sigalg, pkey, 0)) {
2181 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2182 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2186 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &signature))
2188 if (CBS_len(&signature) > EVP_PKEY_size(pkey)) {
2189 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2190 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2193 if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
2194 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2195 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2199 if (!tls1_transcript_data(s, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
2200 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2201 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2204 if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey)) {
2205 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2206 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2209 if ((sigalg->flags & SIGALG_FLAG_RSA_PSS) &&
2210 (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding
2211 (pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) ||
2212 !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1))) {
2213 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2216 if (!EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
2217 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2218 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2221 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&mctx, CBS_data(&signature),
2222 CBS_len(&signature)) <= 0) {
2223 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2224 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2227 } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
2228 verify = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2229 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, CBS_data(&signature),
2230 CBS_len(&signature), pkey->pkey.rsa);
2232 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2233 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2237 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2238 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2241 } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2242 verify = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2243 &(S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2244 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, CBS_data(&signature),
2245 CBS_len(&signature), pkey->pkey.ec);
2247 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2248 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2251 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2252 } else if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2253 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2254 unsigned char sigbuf[128];
2255 unsigned int siglen = sizeof(sigbuf);
2259 if (!tls1_transcript_data(s, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
2260 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2261 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2264 if (!EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &nid) ||
2265 !(md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid))) {
2266 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2267 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2270 if ((pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL)) == NULL) {
2271 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2272 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2275 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) ||
2276 !EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen) ||
2277 !EVP_DigestFinal(&mctx, sigbuf, &siglen) ||
2278 (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) ||
2279 (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, md) <= 0) ||
2280 (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY,
2281 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GOST_SIG_FORMAT,
2282 GOST_SIG_FORMAT_RS_LE, NULL) <= 0)) {
2283 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2284 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2285 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2288 if (EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, CBS_data(&signature),
2289 CBS_len(&signature), sigbuf, siglen) <= 0) {
2290 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2291 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2292 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2296 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2299 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2300 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2307 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2308 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
2310 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2313 tls1_transcript_free(s);
2315 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
2316 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2321 ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2323 CBS cbs, client_certs;
2324 int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
2327 const unsigned char *q;
2328 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
2330 n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
2331 -1, s->internal->max_cert_list, &ok);
2336 if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
2337 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2338 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
2339 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2340 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2344 * If tls asked for a client cert,
2345 * the client must return a 0 list.
2347 if (S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request) {
2348 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
2350 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2353 S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
2357 if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
2358 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2359 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2366 CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n);
2368 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
2369 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2373 if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cbs, &client_certs) ||
2377 while (CBS_len(&client_certs) > 0) {
2380 if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&client_certs, &cert)) {
2381 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2382 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2386 q = CBS_data(&cert);
2387 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, CBS_len(&cert));
2389 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2392 if (q != CBS_data(&cert) + CBS_len(&cert)) {
2393 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2394 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2397 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
2398 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2404 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
2406 * TLS does not mind 0 certs returned.
2407 * Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate.
2409 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2410 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
2411 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2412 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2415 /* No client certificate so free transcript. */
2416 tls1_transcript_free(s);
2418 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
2420 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2421 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2426 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2427 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
2428 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2431 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2432 * when we arrive here
2434 if (SSI(s)->sess_cert == NULL) {
2435 SSI(s)->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2436 if (SSI(s)->sess_cert == NULL) {
2437 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2441 sk_X509_pop_free(SSI(s)->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2442 SSI(s)->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
2445 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2446 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
2454 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2455 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
2457 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2461 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
2467 ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2469 CBB cbb, server_cert;
2473 * Server Certificate - RFC 5246, section 7.4.2.
2476 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
2478 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
2479 if ((cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s)) == NULL) {
2480 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2484 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &server_cert,
2485 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE))
2487 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, &server_cert, cpk))
2489 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
2492 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2495 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2496 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
2504 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
2506 ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
2508 CBB cbb, session_ticket, ticket;
2509 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2510 size_t enc_session_len, enc_session_max_len, hmac_len;
2511 size_t session_len = 0;
2512 unsigned char *enc_session = NULL, *session = NULL;
2513 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2514 unsigned char key_name[16];
2515 unsigned char *hmac;
2522 * New Session Ticket - RFC 5077, section 3.3.
2525 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2526 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2528 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
2530 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
2531 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &session_ticket,
2532 SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET))
2535 if (!SSL_SESSION_ticket(s->session, &session, &session_len))
2537 if (session_len > 0xffff)
2541 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback is present
2542 * it does all the work, otherwise use generated values from
2545 if (tctx->internal->tlsext_ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
2546 if (tctx->internal->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s,
2547 key_name, iv, &ctx, &hctx, 1) < 0) {
2548 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2552 arc4random_buf(iv, 16);
2553 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2554 tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
2555 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
2556 16, tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2557 memcpy(key_name, tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
2560 /* Encrypt the session state. */
2561 enc_session_max_len = session_len + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH;
2562 if ((enc_session = calloc(1, enc_session_max_len)) == NULL)
2564 enc_session_len = 0;
2565 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, enc_session, &len, session,
2568 enc_session_len += len;
2569 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, enc_session + enc_session_len,
2572 enc_session_len += len;
2574 if (enc_session_len > enc_session_max_len)
2577 /* Generate the HMAC. */
2578 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, key_name, sizeof(key_name)))
2580 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)))
2582 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, enc_session, enc_session_len))
2585 if ((hmac_len = HMAC_size(&hctx)) <= 0)
2589 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
2590 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session
2591 * (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for new
2592 * sessions will live as long as their sessions.
2594 if (!CBB_add_u32(&session_ticket,
2595 s->internal->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout))
2598 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&session_ticket, &ticket))
2600 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ticket, key_name, sizeof(key_name)))
2602 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ticket, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)))
2604 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ticket, enc_session, enc_session_len))
2606 if (!CBB_add_space(&ticket, &hmac, hmac_len))
2609 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, hmac, &hlen))
2611 if (hlen != hmac_len)
2614 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
2617 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
2620 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2621 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2622 freezero(session, session_len);
2625 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
2626 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
2630 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2631 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2632 freezero(session, session_len);
2639 ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
2641 CBB cbb, certstatus, ocspresp;
2643 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
2645 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
2646 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &certstatus,
2647 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS))
2649 if (!CBB_add_u8(&certstatus, s->tlsext_status_type))
2651 if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&certstatus, &ocspresp))
2653 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ocspresp, s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resp,
2654 s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
2656 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
2659 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
2662 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
2663 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));