1 /* $FreeBSD: src/sys/netinet6/ah_input.c,v 1.1.2.6 2002/04/28 05:40:26 suz Exp $ */
2 /* $DragonFly: src/sys/netinet6/ah_input.c,v 1.7 2004/06/02 14:43:01 eirikn Exp $ */
3 /* $KAME: ah_input.c,v 1.67 2002/01/07 11:39:56 kjc Exp $ */
6 * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
12 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
13 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
14 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
15 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
16 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
17 * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors
18 * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
19 * without specific prior written permission.
21 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
22 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
23 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
24 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
25 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
26 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
27 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
28 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
29 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
30 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
35 * RFC1826/2402 authentication header.
39 #include "opt_inet6.h"
41 #include <sys/param.h>
42 #include <sys/systm.h>
43 #include <sys/malloc.h>
45 #include <sys/domain.h>
46 #include <sys/protosw.h>
47 #include <sys/socket.h>
48 #include <sys/errno.h>
50 #include <sys/syslog.h>
53 #include <net/route.h>
54 #include <net/netisr.h>
55 #include <machine/cpu.h>
57 #include <netinet/in.h>
58 #include <netinet/in_systm.h>
59 #include <netinet/in_var.h>
60 #include <netinet/ip.h>
61 #include <netinet/ip_var.h>
62 #include <netinet/ip_ecn.h>
64 #include <netinet6/ip6_ecn.h>
68 #include <netinet/ip6.h>
69 #include <netinet6/ip6_var.h>
70 #include <netinet6/in6_pcb.h>
71 #include <netinet/icmp6.h>
72 #include <netinet6/ip6protosw.h>
75 #include <netinet6/ipsec.h>
77 #include <netinet6/ipsec6.h>
79 #include <netinet6/ah.h>
81 #include <netinet6/ah6.h>
83 #include <netproto/key/key.h>
84 #include <netproto/key/keydb.h>
86 #include <netproto/key/key_debug.h>
88 #define KEYDEBUG(lev,arg)
91 #include <machine/stdarg.h>
93 #include <net/net_osdep.h>
98 #include <netinet/ipprotosw.h>
99 extern struct ipprotosw inetsw[];
102 ah4_input(struct mbuf *m, int off, int proto)
107 const struct ah_algorithm *algo;
111 struct secasvar *sav = NULL;
116 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST
117 if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(struct newah)) {
118 m = m_pullup(m, off + sizeof(struct newah));
120 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup;"
121 "dropping the packet for simplicity\n"));
122 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
127 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
128 ah = (struct ah *)(((caddr_t)ip) + off);
130 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
131 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct ah *, m, off, sizeof(struct newah));
133 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup;"
134 "dropping the packet for simplicity\n"));
135 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
141 hlen = IP_VHL_HL(ip->ip_vhl) << 2;
143 hlen = ip->ip_hl << 2;
146 /* find the sassoc. */
149 if ((sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET,
150 (caddr_t)&ip->ip_src, (caddr_t)&ip->ip_dst,
151 IPPROTO_AH, spi)) == 0) {
152 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
153 "IPv4 AH input: no key association found for spi %u\n",
154 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)));
158 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
159 printf("DP ah4_input called to allocate SA:%p\n", sav));
160 if (sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_MATURE
161 && sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_DYING) {
163 "IPv4 AH input: non-mature/dying SA found for spi %u\n",
164 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)));
165 ipsecstat.in_badspi++;
169 algo = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth);
171 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: "
172 "unsupported authentication algorithm for spi %u\n",
173 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)));
174 ipsecstat.in_badspi++;
178 siz = (*algo->sumsiz)(sav);
179 siz1 = ((siz + 3) & ~(4 - 1));
182 * sanity checks for header, 1.
187 sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4;
190 * Here, we do not do "siz1 == siz". This is because the way
191 * RFC240[34] section 2 is written. They do not require truncation
193 * For example, Microsoft IPsec stack attaches 160 bits of
194 * authentication data for both hmac-md5 and hmac-sha1. For hmac-sha1,
195 * 32 bits of padding is attached.
197 * There are two downsides to this specification.
198 * They have no real harm, however, they leave us fuzzy feeling.
199 * - if we attach more than 96 bits of authentication data onto AH,
200 * we will never notice about possible modification by rogue
201 * intermediate nodes.
202 * Since extra bits in AH checksum is never used, this constitutes
203 * no real issue, however, it is wacky.
204 * - even if the peer attaches big authentication data, we will never
205 * notice the difference, since longer authentication data will just
208 * We may need some clarification in the spec.
211 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length too short in IPv4 AH input "
212 "(%lu, should be at least %lu): %s\n",
213 (u_long)siz1, (u_long)siz,
214 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi)));
215 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
218 if ((ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff != siz1) {
219 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length mismatch in IPv4 AH input "
220 "(%d should be %lu): %s\n",
221 (ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff, (u_long)siz1,
222 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi)));
223 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
227 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST
228 if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1) {
229 m = m_pullup(m, off + sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1);
231 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup\n"));
232 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
236 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
237 ah = (struct ah *)(((caddr_t)ip) + off);
240 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct ah *, m, off,
241 sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1);
243 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup\n"));
244 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
251 * check for sequence number.
253 if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) {
254 if (ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav))
257 ipsecstat.in_ahreplay++;
258 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
259 "replay packet in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n",
260 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
266 * alright, it seems sane. now we are going to check the
267 * cryptographic checksum.
269 cksum = malloc(siz1, M_TEMP, M_NOWAIT);
271 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: "
272 "couldn't alloc temporary region for cksum\n"));
273 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
278 * some of IP header fields are flipped to the host endian.
279 * convert them back to network endian. VERY stupid.
281 ip->ip_len = htons(ip->ip_len + hlen);
282 ip->ip_off = htons(ip->ip_off);
283 if (ah4_calccksum(m, (caddr_t)cksum, siz1, algo, sav)) {
285 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
288 ipsecstat.in_ahhist[sav->alg_auth]++;
292 ip->ip_len = ntohs(ip->ip_len) - hlen;
293 ip->ip_off = ntohs(ip->ip_off);
296 caddr_t sumpos = NULL;
298 if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) {
300 sumpos = (caddr_t)(ah + 1);
303 sumpos = (caddr_t)(((struct newah *)ah) + 1);
306 if (bcmp(sumpos, cksum, siz) != 0) {
307 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
308 "checksum mismatch in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n",
309 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
311 ipsecstat.in_ahauthfail++;
318 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR;
319 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPDGM;
323 * looks okey, but we need more sanity check.
324 * XXX should elaborate.
326 if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPIP || ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IP) {
330 sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4;
332 if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1 + hlen) {
333 m = m_pullup(m, off + sizeof(struct ah)
334 + sizoff + siz1 + hlen);
337 "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup\n"));
338 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
343 nip = (struct ip *)((u_char *)(ah + 1) + sizoff + siz1);
344 if (nip->ip_src.s_addr != ip->ip_src.s_addr
345 || nip->ip_dst.s_addr != ip->ip_dst.s_addr) {
346 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
347 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
351 else if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPV6) {
352 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
353 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
358 if (m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPHDR
359 && m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPDGM) {
362 "IPv4 AH input: authentication succeess\n"));
364 ipsecstat.in_ahauthsucc++;
366 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
367 "authentication failed in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n",
368 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
369 ipsecstat.in_ahauthfail++;
374 * update sequence number.
376 if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) {
377 if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav)) {
378 ipsecstat.in_ahreplay++;
383 /* was it transmitted over the IPsec tunnel SA? */
384 if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) {
386 stripsiz = sizeof(struct ah) + siz1;
389 stripsiz = sizeof(struct newah) + siz1;
391 if (ipsec4_tunnel_validate(m, off + stripsiz, nxt, sav)) {
393 * strip off all the headers that precedes AH.
394 * IP xx AH IP' payload -> IP' payload
396 * XXX more sanity checks
397 * XXX relationship with gif?
402 m_adj(m, off + stripsiz);
403 if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip)) {
404 m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip));
406 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
410 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
411 /* ECN consideration. */
412 ip_ecn_egress(ip4_ipsec_ecn, &tos, &ip->ip_tos);
413 if (!key_checktunnelsanity(sav, AF_INET,
414 (caddr_t)&ip->ip_src, (caddr_t)&ip->ip_dst)) {
415 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "ipsec tunnel address mismatch "
416 "in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n",
417 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
418 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
424 * Should the inner packet be considered authentic?
425 * My current answer is: NO.
427 * host1 -- gw1 === gw2 -- host2
428 * In this case, gw2 can trust the authenticity of the
429 * outer packet, but NOT inner. Packet may be altered
430 * between host1 and gw1.
432 * host1 -- gw1 === host2
433 * This case falls into the same scenario as above.
436 * This case is the only case when we may be able to leave
437 * M_AUTHIPHDR and M_AUTHIPDGM set.
438 * However, if host1 is wrongly configured, and allows
439 * attacker to inject some packet with src=host1 and
440 * dst=host2, you are in risk.
442 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
443 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
446 key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m);
447 if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0 ||
448 ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_IPV4, 0) != 0) {
449 ipsecstat.in_nomem++;
453 if (netisr_queue(NETISR_IP, m)) {
454 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
465 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
466 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST
468 * We do deep-copy since KAME requires that
469 * the packet is placed in a single external mbuf.
471 ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip, (caddr_t)(((u_char *)ip) + stripsiz), off);
472 m->m_data += stripsiz;
473 m->m_len -= stripsiz;
474 m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz;
477 * even in m_pulldown case, we need to strip off AH so that
478 * we can compute checksum for multiple AH correctly.
480 if (m->m_len >= stripsiz + off) {
481 ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip, ((caddr_t)ip) + stripsiz, off);
482 m->m_data += stripsiz;
483 m->m_len -= stripsiz;
484 m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz;
487 * this comes with no copy if the boundary is on
492 n = m_split(m, off, MB_DONTWAIT);
494 /* m is retained by m_split */
499 /* m_cat does not update m_pkthdr.len */
500 m->m_pkthdr.len += n->m_pkthdr.len;
504 if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip)) {
505 m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip));
507 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
511 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
513 ip->ip_len = ip->ip_len - stripsiz;
515 ip->ip_len = htons(ntohs(ip->ip_len) - stripsiz);
518 /* forget about IP hdr checksum, the check has already been passed */
520 key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m);
521 if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0) {
522 ipsecstat.in_nomem++;
526 if (nxt != IPPROTO_DONE) {
527 if ((inetsw[ip_protox[nxt]].pr_flags & PR_LASTHDR) != 0 &&
528 ipsec4_in_reject(m, NULL)) {
529 ipsecstat.in_polvio++;
532 (*inetsw[ip_protox[nxt]].pr_input)(m, off, nxt);
539 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
540 printf("DP ah4_input call free SA:%p\n", sav));
543 ipsecstat.in_success++;
548 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
549 printf("DP ah4_input call free SA:%p\n", sav));
560 ah6_input(struct mbuf **mp, int *offp, int proto)
562 struct mbuf *m = *mp;
567 const struct ah_algorithm *algo;
571 struct secasvar *sav = NULL;
575 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST
576 IP6_EXTHDR_CHECK(m, off, sizeof(struct ah), IPPROTO_DONE);
577 ah = (struct ah *)(mtod(m, caddr_t) + off);
579 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct ah *, m, off, sizeof(struct newah));
581 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv6 AH input: can't pullup\n"));
582 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
586 ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
589 /* find the sassoc. */
592 if (ntohs(ip6->ip6_plen) == 0) {
593 ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "IPv6 AH input: "
594 "AH with IPv6 jumbogram is not supported.\n"));
595 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
599 if ((sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET6,
600 (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_src, (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_dst,
601 IPPROTO_AH, spi)) == 0) {
602 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
603 "IPv6 AH input: no key association found for spi %u\n",
604 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)));
605 ipsec6stat.in_nosa++;
608 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
609 printf("DP ah6_input called to allocate SA:%p\n", sav));
610 if (sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_MATURE
611 && sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_DYING) {
613 "IPv6 AH input: non-mature/dying SA found for spi %u; ",
614 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)));
615 ipsec6stat.in_badspi++;
619 algo = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth);
621 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv6 AH input: "
622 "unsupported authentication algorithm for spi %u\n",
623 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)));
624 ipsec6stat.in_badspi++;
628 siz = (*algo->sumsiz)(sav);
629 siz1 = ((siz + 3) & ~(4 - 1));
632 * sanity checks for header, 1.
637 sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4;
640 * Here, we do not do "siz1 == siz". See ah4_input() for complete
644 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length too short in IPv6 AH input "
645 "(%lu, should be at least %lu): %s\n",
646 (u_long)siz1, (u_long)siz,
647 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi)));
648 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
651 if ((ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff != siz1) {
652 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length mismatch in IPv6 AH input "
653 "(%d should be %lu): %s\n",
654 (ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff, (u_long)siz1,
655 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi)));
656 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
659 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST
660 IP6_EXTHDR_CHECK(m, off, sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1, IPPROTO_DONE);
662 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct ah *, m, off,
663 sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1);
665 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "couldn't pullup gather IPv6 AH checksum part"));
666 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
674 * check for sequence number.
676 if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) {
677 if (ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav))
680 ipsec6stat.in_ahreplay++;
681 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
682 "replay packet in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n",
683 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi),
684 ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
690 * alright, it seems sane. now we are going to check the
691 * cryptographic checksum.
693 cksum = malloc(siz1, M_TEMP, M_NOWAIT);
695 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv6 AH input: "
696 "couldn't alloc temporary region for cksum\n"));
697 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
701 if (ah6_calccksum(m, (caddr_t)cksum, siz1, algo, sav)) {
703 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
706 ipsec6stat.in_ahhist[sav->alg_auth]++;
709 caddr_t sumpos = NULL;
711 if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) {
713 sumpos = (caddr_t)(ah + 1);
716 sumpos = (caddr_t)(((struct newah *)ah) + 1);
719 if (bcmp(sumpos, cksum, siz) != 0) {
720 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
721 "checksum mismatch in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n",
722 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
724 ipsec6stat.in_ahauthfail++;
731 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR;
732 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPDGM;
736 * looks okey, but we need more sanity check.
737 * XXX should elaborate.
739 if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPV6) {
740 struct ip6_hdr *nip6;
743 sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4;
745 IP6_EXTHDR_CHECK(m, off, sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1
746 + sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), IPPROTO_DONE);
748 nip6 = (struct ip6_hdr *)((u_char *)(ah + 1) + sizoff + siz1);
749 if (!IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&nip6->ip6_src, &ip6->ip6_src)
750 || !IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&nip6->ip6_dst, &ip6->ip6_dst)) {
751 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
752 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
754 } else if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPIP) {
755 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
756 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
757 } else if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IP) {
758 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
759 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
763 if (m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPHDR
764 && m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPDGM) {
767 "IPv6 AH input: authentication succeess\n"));
769 ipsec6stat.in_ahauthsucc++;
771 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
772 "authentication failed in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n",
773 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
774 ipsec6stat.in_ahauthfail++;
779 * update sequence number.
781 if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) {
782 if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav)) {
783 ipsec6stat.in_ahreplay++;
788 /* was it transmitted over the IPsec tunnel SA? */
789 if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) {
791 stripsiz = sizeof(struct ah) + siz1;
794 stripsiz = sizeof(struct newah) + siz1;
796 if (ipsec6_tunnel_validate(m, off + stripsiz, nxt, sav)) {
798 * strip off all the headers that precedes AH.
799 * IP6 xx AH IP6' payload -> IP6' payload
801 * XXX more sanity checks
802 * XXX relationship with gif?
804 u_int32_t flowinfo; /* net endian */
806 flowinfo = ip6->ip6_flow;
807 m_adj(m, off + stripsiz);
808 if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip6)) {
810 * m_pullup is prohibited in KAME IPv6 input processing
811 * but there's no other way!
813 m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip6));
815 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
819 ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
820 /* ECN consideration. */
821 ip6_ecn_egress(ip6_ipsec_ecn, &flowinfo, &ip6->ip6_flow);
822 if (!key_checktunnelsanity(sav, AF_INET6,
823 (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_src, (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_dst)) {
824 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "ipsec tunnel address mismatch "
825 "in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n",
826 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi),
827 ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
828 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
834 * should the inner packet be considered authentic?
835 * see comment in ah4_input().
837 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
838 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
841 key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m);
842 if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0 ||
843 ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_IPV6, 0) != 0) {
844 ipsec6stat.in_nomem++;
848 if (netisr_queue(NETISR_IPV6, m)) {
849 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
862 * Copy the value of the next header field of AH to the
863 * next header field of the previous header.
864 * This is necessary because AH will be stripped off below.
866 prvnxtp = ip6_get_prevhdr(m, off); /* XXX */
869 ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
870 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST
872 * We do deep-copy since KAME requires that
873 * the packet is placed in a single mbuf.
875 ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip6, ((caddr_t)ip6) + stripsiz, off);
876 m->m_data += stripsiz;
877 m->m_len -= stripsiz;
878 m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz;
881 * even in m_pulldown case, we need to strip off AH so that
882 * we can compute checksum for multiple AH correctly.
884 if (m->m_len >= stripsiz + off) {
885 ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip6, ((caddr_t)ip6) + stripsiz, off);
886 m->m_data += stripsiz;
887 m->m_len -= stripsiz;
888 m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz;
891 * this comes with no copy if the boundary is on
896 n = m_split(m, off, MB_DONTWAIT);
898 /* m is retained by m_split */
903 /* m_cat does not update m_pkthdr.len */
904 m->m_pkthdr.len += n->m_pkthdr.len;
907 ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
909 ip6->ip6_plen = htons(ntohs(ip6->ip6_plen) - stripsiz);
911 key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m);
912 if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0) {
913 ipsec6stat.in_nomem++;
922 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
923 printf("DP ah6_input call free SA:%p\n", sav));
926 ipsec6stat.in_success++;
931 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
932 printf("DP ah6_input call free SA:%p\n", sav));
941 ah6_ctlinput(int cmd, struct sockaddr *sa, void *d)
943 const struct newah *ahp;
945 struct secasvar *sav;
948 struct ip6ctlparam *ip6cp = NULL;
950 struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6_src, *sa6_dst;
952 if (sa->sa_family != AF_INET6 ||
953 sa->sa_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
955 if ((unsigned)cmd >= PRC_NCMDS)
958 /* if the parameter is from icmp6, decode it. */
960 ip6cp = (struct ip6ctlparam *)d;
962 ip6 = ip6cp->ip6c_ip6;
963 off = ip6cp->ip6c_off;
967 off = 0; /* fix warning */
972 * XXX: We assume that when ip6 is non NULL,
973 * M and OFF are valid.
976 /* check if we can safely examine src and dst ports */
977 if (m->m_pkthdr.len < off + sizeof(ah))
980 if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(ah)) {
982 * this should be rare case,
983 * so we compromise on this copy...
985 m_copydata(m, off, sizeof(ah), (caddr_t)&ah);
988 ahp = (struct newah *)(mtod(m, caddr_t) + off);
990 if (cmd == PRC_MSGSIZE) {
994 * Check to see if we have a valid SA corresponding to
995 * the address in the ICMP message payload.
997 sa6_src = ip6cp->ip6c_src;
998 sa6_dst = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
999 sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET6,
1000 (caddr_t)&sa6_src->sin6_addr,
1001 (caddr_t)&sa6_dst->sin6_addr,
1002 IPPROTO_AH, ahp->ah_spi);
1004 if (sav->state == SADB_SASTATE_MATURE ||
1005 sav->state == SADB_SASTATE_DYING)
1010 /* XXX Further validation? */
1013 * Depending on the value of "valid" and routing table
1014 * size (mtudisc_{hi,lo}wat), we will:
1015 * - recalcurate the new MTU and create the
1016 * corresponding routing entry, or
1017 * - ignore the MTU change notification.
1019 icmp6_mtudisc_update((struct ip6ctlparam *)d, valid);
1022 /* we normally notify single pcb here */
1024 /* we normally notify any pcb here */