From: Joerg Sonnenberger <joerg@dragonflybsd.org>
Date: Tue, 6 Sep 2005 10:51:17 +0000 (+0000)
Subject: Welcome OpenSSH 4.2.
X-Git-Tag: v2.0.1~6052^2
X-Git-Url: https://gitweb.dragonflybsd.org/dragonfly.git/commitdiff_plain/cc4702a7c712454a934dceb99cd2ee838f37a2c2

Welcome OpenSSH 4.2.
---

diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/CREDITS b/crypto/openssh-4/CREDITS
index 2a77b8729e..82b9f22105 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/CREDITS
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/CREDITS
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> - Creator of SSH
 Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
 Theo de Raadt, and Dug Song - Creators of OpenSSH
 
+Ahsan Rashid <arms@sco.com> - UnixWare long passwords
 Alain St-Denis <Alain.St-Denis@ec.gc.ca> - Irix fix
 Alexandre Oliva <oliva@lsd.ic.unicamp.br> - AIX fixes
 Andre Lucas <andre@ae-35.com> - new login code, many fixes
@@ -32,6 +33,7 @@ David Del Piero <David.DelPiero@qed.qld.gov.au> - bug fixes
 David Hesprich <darkgrue@gue-tech.org> - Configure fixes
 David Rankin <drankin@bohemians.lexington.ky.us> - libwrap, AIX, NetBSD fixes
 Dag-Erling Smørgrav <des at freebsd.org> - Challenge-Response PAM code.
+Dhiraj Gulati <dgulati@sco.com> - UnixWare long passwords
 Ed Eden <ede370@stl.rural.usda.gov> - configure fixes
 Garrick James <garrick@james.net> - configure fixes
 Gary E. Miller <gem@rellim.com> - SCO support
@@ -98,5 +100,5 @@ Apologies to anyone I have missed.
 
 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
 
-$Id: CREDITS,v 1.79 2004/05/26 23:59:31 dtucker Exp $
+$Id: CREDITS,v 1.80 2005/08/26 20:15:20 tim Exp $
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/LICENCE b/crypto/openssh-4/LICENCE
index ae03eb3a7d..ac3634f221 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/LICENCE
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/LICENCE
@@ -204,6 +204,7 @@ OpenSSH contains no GPL code.
 	William Jones
 	Darren Tucker
 	Sun Microsystems
+	The SCO Group
 
      * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
      * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -255,6 +256,7 @@ OpenSSH contains no GPL code.
 	Damien Miller
 	Eric P. Allman
 	The Regents of the University of California
+	Constantin S. Svintsoff
 
 	* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 	* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/README b/crypto/openssh-4/README
index 93682c3cbb..51f0ca4fb1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/README
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/README
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-4.0 for the release notes.
+See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-4.2 for the release notes.
 
 - A Japanese translation of this document and of the OpenSSH FAQ is
 - available at http://www.unixuser.org/~haruyama/security/openssh/index.html
@@ -56,9 +56,10 @@ References -
 [2] http://www.aet.tu-cottbus.de/personen/jaenicke/postfix_tls/prngd.html
 [3] http://www.gzip.org/zlib/
 [4] http://www.openssl.org/
-[5] http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/ (PAM is standard on Solaris
-    and HP-UX 11)
+[5] http://www.openpam.org
+    http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/ 
+    (PAM also is standard on Solaris and HP-UX 11)
 [6] http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=style&sektion=9
 [7] http://www.openssh.com/faq.html
 
-$Id: README,v 1.57 2005/03/09 03:32:28 dtucker Exp $
+$Id: README,v 1.60 2005/08/31 14:05:57 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/acss.c b/crypto/openssh-4/acss.c
index 9364ba9fe3..99efde071d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/acss.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/acss.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$Id: acss.c,v 1.2 2004/02/06 04:22:43 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*	$Id: acss.c,v 1.3 2005/07/17 07:04:47 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenBSD project
  *
@@ -24,37 +24,37 @@
 
 /* decryption sbox */
 static unsigned char sboxdec[] = {
-	0x33, 0x73, 0x3b, 0x26, 0x63, 0x23, 0x6b, 0x76, 
-	0x3e, 0x7e, 0x36, 0x2b, 0x6e, 0x2e, 0x66, 0x7b, 
-	0xd3, 0x93, 0xdb, 0x06, 0x43, 0x03, 0x4b, 0x96, 
-	0xde, 0x9e, 0xd6, 0x0b, 0x4e, 0x0e, 0x46, 0x9b, 
-	0x57, 0x17, 0x5f, 0x82, 0xc7, 0x87, 0xcf, 0x12, 
-	0x5a, 0x1a, 0x52, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x8a, 0xc2, 0x1f, 
-	0xd9, 0x99, 0xd1, 0x00, 0x49, 0x09, 0x41, 0x90, 
-	0xd8, 0x98, 0xd0, 0x01, 0x48, 0x08, 0x40, 0x91, 
-	0x3d, 0x7d, 0x35, 0x24, 0x6d, 0x2d, 0x65, 0x74, 
-	0x3c, 0x7c, 0x34, 0x25, 0x6c, 0x2c, 0x64, 0x75, 
-	0xdd, 0x9d, 0xd5, 0x04, 0x4d, 0x0d, 0x45, 0x94, 
-	0xdc, 0x9c, 0xd4, 0x05, 0x4c, 0x0c, 0x44, 0x95, 
-	0x59, 0x19, 0x51, 0x80, 0xc9, 0x89, 0xc1, 0x10, 
-	0x58, 0x18, 0x50, 0x81, 0xc8, 0x88, 0xc0, 0x11, 
-	0xd7, 0x97, 0xdf, 0x02, 0x47, 0x07, 0x4f, 0x92, 
-	0xda, 0x9a, 0xd2, 0x0f, 0x4a, 0x0a, 0x42, 0x9f, 
-	0x53, 0x13, 0x5b, 0x86, 0xc3, 0x83, 0xcb, 0x16, 
-	0x5e, 0x1e, 0x56, 0x8b, 0xce, 0x8e, 0xc6, 0x1b, 
-	0xb3, 0xf3, 0xbb, 0xa6, 0xe3, 0xa3, 0xeb, 0xf6, 
-	0xbe, 0xfe, 0xb6, 0xab, 0xee, 0xae, 0xe6, 0xfb, 
-	0x37, 0x77, 0x3f, 0x22, 0x67, 0x27, 0x6f, 0x72, 
-	0x3a, 0x7a, 0x32, 0x2f, 0x6a, 0x2a, 0x62, 0x7f, 
-	0xb9, 0xf9, 0xb1, 0xa0, 0xe9, 0xa9, 0xe1, 0xf0, 
-	0xb8, 0xf8, 0xb0, 0xa1, 0xe8, 0xa8, 0xe0, 0xf1, 
-	0x5d, 0x1d, 0x55, 0x84, 0xcd, 0x8d, 0xc5, 0x14, 
-	0x5c, 0x1c, 0x54, 0x85, 0xcc, 0x8c, 0xc4, 0x15, 
-	0xbd, 0xfd, 0xb5, 0xa4, 0xed, 0xad, 0xe5, 0xf4, 
-	0xbc, 0xfc, 0xb4, 0xa5, 0xec, 0xac, 0xe4, 0xf5, 
-	0x39, 0x79, 0x31, 0x20, 0x69, 0x29, 0x61, 0x70, 
-	0x38, 0x78, 0x30, 0x21, 0x68, 0x28, 0x60, 0x71, 
-	0xb7, 0xf7, 0xbf, 0xa2, 0xe7, 0xa7, 0xef, 0xf2, 
+	0x33, 0x73, 0x3b, 0x26, 0x63, 0x23, 0x6b, 0x76,
+	0x3e, 0x7e, 0x36, 0x2b, 0x6e, 0x2e, 0x66, 0x7b,
+	0xd3, 0x93, 0xdb, 0x06, 0x43, 0x03, 0x4b, 0x96,
+	0xde, 0x9e, 0xd6, 0x0b, 0x4e, 0x0e, 0x46, 0x9b,
+	0x57, 0x17, 0x5f, 0x82, 0xc7, 0x87, 0xcf, 0x12,
+	0x5a, 0x1a, 0x52, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x8a, 0xc2, 0x1f,
+	0xd9, 0x99, 0xd1, 0x00, 0x49, 0x09, 0x41, 0x90,
+	0xd8, 0x98, 0xd0, 0x01, 0x48, 0x08, 0x40, 0x91,
+	0x3d, 0x7d, 0x35, 0x24, 0x6d, 0x2d, 0x65, 0x74,
+	0x3c, 0x7c, 0x34, 0x25, 0x6c, 0x2c, 0x64, 0x75,
+	0xdd, 0x9d, 0xd5, 0x04, 0x4d, 0x0d, 0x45, 0x94,
+	0xdc, 0x9c, 0xd4, 0x05, 0x4c, 0x0c, 0x44, 0x95,
+	0x59, 0x19, 0x51, 0x80, 0xc9, 0x89, 0xc1, 0x10,
+	0x58, 0x18, 0x50, 0x81, 0xc8, 0x88, 0xc0, 0x11,
+	0xd7, 0x97, 0xdf, 0x02, 0x47, 0x07, 0x4f, 0x92,
+	0xda, 0x9a, 0xd2, 0x0f, 0x4a, 0x0a, 0x42, 0x9f,
+	0x53, 0x13, 0x5b, 0x86, 0xc3, 0x83, 0xcb, 0x16,
+	0x5e, 0x1e, 0x56, 0x8b, 0xce, 0x8e, 0xc6, 0x1b,
+	0xb3, 0xf3, 0xbb, 0xa6, 0xe3, 0xa3, 0xeb, 0xf6,
+	0xbe, 0xfe, 0xb6, 0xab, 0xee, 0xae, 0xe6, 0xfb,
+	0x37, 0x77, 0x3f, 0x22, 0x67, 0x27, 0x6f, 0x72,
+	0x3a, 0x7a, 0x32, 0x2f, 0x6a, 0x2a, 0x62, 0x7f,
+	0xb9, 0xf9, 0xb1, 0xa0, 0xe9, 0xa9, 0xe1, 0xf0,
+	0xb8, 0xf8, 0xb0, 0xa1, 0xe8, 0xa8, 0xe0, 0xf1,
+	0x5d, 0x1d, 0x55, 0x84, 0xcd, 0x8d, 0xc5, 0x14,
+	0x5c, 0x1c, 0x54, 0x85, 0xcc, 0x8c, 0xc4, 0x15,
+	0xbd, 0xfd, 0xb5, 0xa4, 0xed, 0xad, 0xe5, 0xf4,
+	0xbc, 0xfc, 0xb4, 0xa5, 0xec, 0xac, 0xe4, 0xf5,
+	0x39, 0x79, 0x31, 0x20, 0x69, 0x29, 0x61, 0x70,
+	0x38, 0x78, 0x30, 0x21, 0x68, 0x28, 0x60, 0x71,
+	0xb7, 0xf7, 0xbf, 0xa2, 0xe7, 0xa7, 0xef, 0xf2,
 	0xba, 0xfa, 0xb2, 0xaf, 0xea, 0xaa, 0xe2, 0xff
 };
 
@@ -95,38 +95,38 @@ static unsigned char sboxenc[] = {
 };
 
 static unsigned char reverse[] = {
-	0x00, 0x80, 0x40, 0xc0, 0x20, 0xa0, 0x60, 0xe0, 
-	0x10, 0x90, 0x50, 0xd0, 0x30, 0xb0, 0x70, 0xf0, 
-	0x08, 0x88, 0x48, 0xc8, 0x28, 0xa8, 0x68, 0xe8, 
-	0x18, 0x98, 0x58, 0xd8, 0x38, 0xb8, 0x78, 0xf8, 
-	0x04, 0x84, 0x44, 0xc4, 0x24, 0xa4, 0x64, 0xe4, 
-	0x14, 0x94, 0x54, 0xd4, 0x34, 0xb4, 0x74, 0xf4, 
-	0x0c, 0x8c, 0x4c, 0xcc, 0x2c, 0xac, 0x6c, 0xec, 
-	0x1c, 0x9c, 0x5c, 0xdc, 0x3c, 0xbc, 0x7c, 0xfc, 
-	0x02, 0x82, 0x42, 0xc2, 0x22, 0xa2, 0x62, 0xe2, 
-	0x12, 0x92, 0x52, 0xd2, 0x32, 0xb2, 0x72, 0xf2, 
-	0x0a, 0x8a, 0x4a, 0xca, 0x2a, 0xaa, 0x6a, 0xea, 
-	0x1a, 0x9a, 0x5a, 0xda, 0x3a, 0xba, 0x7a, 0xfa, 
-	0x06, 0x86, 0x46, 0xc6, 0x26, 0xa6, 0x66, 0xe6, 
-	0x16, 0x96, 0x56, 0xd6, 0x36, 0xb6, 0x76, 0xf6, 
-	0x0e, 0x8e, 0x4e, 0xce, 0x2e, 0xae, 0x6e, 0xee, 
-	0x1e, 0x9e, 0x5e, 0xde, 0x3e, 0xbe, 0x7e, 0xfe, 
-	0x01, 0x81, 0x41, 0xc1, 0x21, 0xa1, 0x61, 0xe1, 
-	0x11, 0x91, 0x51, 0xd1, 0x31, 0xb1, 0x71, 0xf1, 
-	0x09, 0x89, 0x49, 0xc9, 0x29, 0xa9, 0x69, 0xe9, 
-	0x19, 0x99, 0x59, 0xd9, 0x39, 0xb9, 0x79, 0xf9, 
-	0x05, 0x85, 0x45, 0xc5, 0x25, 0xa5, 0x65, 0xe5, 
-	0x15, 0x95, 0x55, 0xd5, 0x35, 0xb5, 0x75, 0xf5, 
-	0x0d, 0x8d, 0x4d, 0xcd, 0x2d, 0xad, 0x6d, 0xed, 
-	0x1d, 0x9d, 0x5d, 0xdd, 0x3d, 0xbd, 0x7d, 0xfd, 
-	0x03, 0x83, 0x43, 0xc3, 0x23, 0xa3, 0x63, 0xe3, 
-	0x13, 0x93, 0x53, 0xd3, 0x33, 0xb3, 0x73, 0xf3, 
-	0x0b, 0x8b, 0x4b, 0xcb, 0x2b, 0xab, 0x6b, 0xeb, 
-	0x1b, 0x9b, 0x5b, 0xdb, 0x3b, 0xbb, 0x7b, 0xfb, 
-	0x07, 0x87, 0x47, 0xc7, 0x27, 0xa7, 0x67, 0xe7, 
-	0x17, 0x97, 0x57, 0xd7, 0x37, 0xb7, 0x77, 0xf7, 
-	0x0f, 0x8f, 0x4f, 0xcf, 0x2f, 0xaf, 0x6f, 0xef, 
-	0x1f, 0x9f, 0x5f, 0xdf, 0x3f, 0xbf, 0x7f, 0xff 
+	0x00, 0x80, 0x40, 0xc0, 0x20, 0xa0, 0x60, 0xe0,
+	0x10, 0x90, 0x50, 0xd0, 0x30, 0xb0, 0x70, 0xf0,
+	0x08, 0x88, 0x48, 0xc8, 0x28, 0xa8, 0x68, 0xe8,
+	0x18, 0x98, 0x58, 0xd8, 0x38, 0xb8, 0x78, 0xf8,
+	0x04, 0x84, 0x44, 0xc4, 0x24, 0xa4, 0x64, 0xe4,
+	0x14, 0x94, 0x54, 0xd4, 0x34, 0xb4, 0x74, 0xf4,
+	0x0c, 0x8c, 0x4c, 0xcc, 0x2c, 0xac, 0x6c, 0xec,
+	0x1c, 0x9c, 0x5c, 0xdc, 0x3c, 0xbc, 0x7c, 0xfc,
+	0x02, 0x82, 0x42, 0xc2, 0x22, 0xa2, 0x62, 0xe2,
+	0x12, 0x92, 0x52, 0xd2, 0x32, 0xb2, 0x72, 0xf2,
+	0x0a, 0x8a, 0x4a, 0xca, 0x2a, 0xaa, 0x6a, 0xea,
+	0x1a, 0x9a, 0x5a, 0xda, 0x3a, 0xba, 0x7a, 0xfa,
+	0x06, 0x86, 0x46, 0xc6, 0x26, 0xa6, 0x66, 0xe6,
+	0x16, 0x96, 0x56, 0xd6, 0x36, 0xb6, 0x76, 0xf6,
+	0x0e, 0x8e, 0x4e, 0xce, 0x2e, 0xae, 0x6e, 0xee,
+	0x1e, 0x9e, 0x5e, 0xde, 0x3e, 0xbe, 0x7e, 0xfe,
+	0x01, 0x81, 0x41, 0xc1, 0x21, 0xa1, 0x61, 0xe1,
+	0x11, 0x91, 0x51, 0xd1, 0x31, 0xb1, 0x71, 0xf1,
+	0x09, 0x89, 0x49, 0xc9, 0x29, 0xa9, 0x69, 0xe9,
+	0x19, 0x99, 0x59, 0xd9, 0x39, 0xb9, 0x79, 0xf9,
+	0x05, 0x85, 0x45, 0xc5, 0x25, 0xa5, 0x65, 0xe5,
+	0x15, 0x95, 0x55, 0xd5, 0x35, 0xb5, 0x75, 0xf5,
+	0x0d, 0x8d, 0x4d, 0xcd, 0x2d, 0xad, 0x6d, 0xed,
+	0x1d, 0x9d, 0x5d, 0xdd, 0x3d, 0xbd, 0x7d, 0xfd,
+	0x03, 0x83, 0x43, 0xc3, 0x23, 0xa3, 0x63, 0xe3,
+	0x13, 0x93, 0x53, 0xd3, 0x33, 0xb3, 0x73, 0xf3,
+	0x0b, 0x8b, 0x4b, 0xcb, 0x2b, 0xab, 0x6b, 0xeb,
+	0x1b, 0x9b, 0x5b, 0xdb, 0x3b, 0xbb, 0x7b, 0xfb,
+	0x07, 0x87, 0x47, 0xc7, 0x27, 0xa7, 0x67, 0xe7,
+	0x17, 0x97, 0x57, 0xd7, 0x37, 0xb7, 0x77, 0xf7,
+	0x0f, 0x8f, 0x4f, 0xcf, 0x2f, 0xaf, 0x6f, 0xef,
+	0x1f, 0x9f, 0x5f, 0xdf, 0x3f, 0xbf, 0x7f, 0xff
 };
 
 /*
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/atomicio.c b/crypto/openssh-4/atomicio.c
index 7637e16719..12abbda16b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/atomicio.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/atomicio.c
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 /*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Anil Madhavapeddy. All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 1995,1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
  * All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -24,14 +25,14 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: atomicio.c,v 1.12 2003/07/31 15:50:16 avsm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: atomicio.c,v 1.13 2005/05/24 17:32:43 avsm Exp $");
 
 #include "atomicio.h"
 
 /*
  * ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==read || f==vwrite
  */
-ssize_t
+size_t
 atomicio(f, fd, _s, n)
 	ssize_t (*f) (int, void *, size_t);
 	int fd;
@@ -39,7 +40,8 @@ atomicio(f, fd, _s, n)
 	size_t n;
 {
 	char *s = _s;
-	ssize_t res, pos = 0;
+	size_t pos = 0;
+	ssize_t res;
 
 	while (n > pos) {
 		res = (f) (fd, s + pos, n - pos);
@@ -51,10 +53,12 @@ atomicio(f, fd, _s, n)
 			if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
 #endif
 				continue;
+			return 0;
 		case 0:
-			return (res);
+			errno = EPIPE;
+			return pos;
 		default:
-			pos += res;
+			pos += (u_int)res;
 		}
 	}
 	return (pos);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/atomicio.h b/crypto/openssh-4/atomicio.h
index 5c0f392eff..7eccf206b3 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/atomicio.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/atomicio.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: atomicio.h,v 1.5 2003/06/28 16:23:06 deraadt Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: atomicio.h,v 1.6 2005/05/24 17:32:43 avsm Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1995,1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
@@ -28,6 +28,6 @@
 /*
  * Ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==read || f==vwrite
  */
-ssize_t	atomicio(ssize_t (*)(int, void *, size_t), int, void *, size_t);
+size_t	atomicio(ssize_t (*)(int, void *, size_t), int, void *, size_t);
 
 #define vwrite (ssize_t (*)(int, void *, size_t))write
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/audit.c b/crypto/openssh-4/audit.c
index 18fc410472..c77d0c0128 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/audit.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/audit.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: audit.c,v 1.2 2005/02/08 10:52:48 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: audit.c,v 1.3 2005/07/17 07:26:44 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ void
 audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
 {
 	debug("audit connection from %s port %d euid %d", host, port,
-	   (int)geteuid());
+	    (int)geteuid());
 }
 
 /*
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ audit_session_open(const char *ttyn)
 	const char *t = ttyn ? ttyn : "(no tty)";
 
 	debug("audit session open euid %d user %s tty name %s", geteuid(),
-	     audit_username(), t);
+	    audit_username(), t);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ audit_session_close(const char *ttyn)
 	const char *t = ttyn ? ttyn : "(no tty)";
 
 	debug("audit session close euid %d user %s tty name %s", geteuid(),
-	     audit_username(), t);
+	    audit_username(), t);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/auth-krb5.c b/crypto/openssh-4/auth-krb5.c
index 2f742534aa..c7367b49a2 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/auth-krb5.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/auth-krb5.c
@@ -54,9 +54,6 @@ krb5_init(void *context)
 		problem = krb5_init_context(&authctxt->krb5_ctx);
 		if (problem)
 			return (problem);
-#ifdef KRB5_INIT_ETS
-		krb5_init_ets(authctxt->krb5_ctx);
-#endif
 	}
 	return (0);
 }
@@ -67,9 +64,6 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 #ifndef HEIMDAL
 	krb5_creds creds;
 	krb5_principal server;
-	char ccname[40];
-	int tmpfd;
-	mode_t old_umask;
 #endif
 	krb5_error_code problem;
 	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
@@ -146,26 +140,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	snprintf(ccname,sizeof(ccname),"FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXX",geteuid());
-
-	old_umask = umask(0177);
-	tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
-	umask(old_umask);
-	if (tmpfd == -1) {
-		logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(errno));
-		problem = errno;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
-		logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(errno));
-		close(tmpfd);
-		problem = errno;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	close(tmpfd);
-
-	problem = krb5_cc_resolve(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccname, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
 	if (problem)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -234,4 +209,34 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	}
 }
 
+#ifndef HEIMDAL
+krb5_error_code
+ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+	int tmpfd, ret;
+	char ccname[40];
+	mode_t old_umask;
+
+	ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
+	    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
+	if (ret == -1 || ret >= sizeof(ccname))
+		return ENOMEM;
+
+	old_umask = umask(0177);
+	tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+	umask(old_umask);
+	if (tmpfd == -1) {
+		logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		return errno;
+	}
+
+	if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
+		logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		close(tmpfd);
+		return errno;
+	}
+	close(tmpfd);
+
+	return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
+}
+#endif /* !HEIMDAL */
 #endif /* KRB5 */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/auth-pam.c b/crypto/openssh-4/auth-pam.c
index a8d372aace..0446cd5595 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/auth-pam.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/auth-pam.c
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@
 
 /* Based on $FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam-freebsd.c,v 1.11 2003/03/31 13:48:18 des Exp $ */
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$Id: auth-pam.c,v 1.122 2005/05/25 06:18:10 dtucker Exp $");
+RCSID("$Id: auth-pam.c,v 1.126 2005/07/17 07:18:50 djm Exp $");
 
 #ifdef USE_PAM
 #if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H)
@@ -56,6 +56,13 @@ RCSID("$Id: auth-pam.c,v 1.122 2005/05/25 06:18:10 dtucker Exp $");
 #include <pam/pam_appl.h>
 #endif
 
+/* OpenGroup RFC86.0 and XSSO specify no "const" on arguments */
+#ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE
+# define sshpam_const		/* Solaris, HP-UX, AIX */
+#else
+# define sshpam_const	const	/* LinuxPAM, OpenPAM */
+#endif
+
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "auth-pam.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
@@ -116,14 +123,14 @@ static struct pam_ctxt *cleanup_ctxt;
 static int sshpam_thread_status = -1;
 static mysig_t sshpam_oldsig;
 
-static void 
+static void
 sshpam_sigchld_handler(int sig)
 {
 	signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
 	if (cleanup_ctxt == NULL)
 		return;	/* handler called after PAM cleanup, shouldn't happen */
 	if (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, &sshpam_thread_status, WNOHANG)
-	     <= 0) {
+	    <= 0) {
 		/* PAM thread has not exitted, privsep slave must have */
 		kill(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, SIGTERM);
 		if (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, &sshpam_thread_status, 0)
@@ -150,6 +157,7 @@ pthread_create(sp_pthread_t *thread, const void *attr __unused,
     void *(*thread_start)(void *), void *arg)
 {
 	pid_t pid;
+	struct pam_ctxt *ctx = arg;
 
 	sshpam_thread_status = -1;
 	switch ((pid = fork())) {
@@ -157,10 +165,14 @@ pthread_create(sp_pthread_t *thread, const void *attr __unused,
 		error("fork(): %s", strerror(errno));
 		return (-1);
 	case 0:
+		close(ctx->pam_psock);
+		ctx->pam_psock = -1;
 		thread_start(arg);
 		_exit(1);
 	default:
 		*thread = pid;
+		close(ctx->pam_csock);
+		ctx->pam_csock = -1;
 		sshpam_oldsig = signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_sigchld_handler);
 		return (0);
 	}
@@ -300,7 +312,7 @@ import_environments(Buffer *b)
  * Conversation function for authentication thread.
  */
 static int
-sshpam_thread_conv(int n, struct pam_message **msg,
+sshpam_thread_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
     struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
 {
 	Buffer buffer;
@@ -399,8 +411,10 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
 	char **env_from_pam;
 	u_int i;
 	const char *pam_user;
+	const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user;
 
-	pam_get_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_USER, (void **)&pam_user);
+	pam_get_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_USER,
+	    (sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user);
 	environ[0] = NULL;
 
 	if (sshpam_authctxt != NULL) {
@@ -492,7 +506,7 @@ sshpam_thread_cleanup(void)
 }
 
 static int
-sshpam_null_conv(int n, struct pam_message **msg,
+sshpam_null_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
     struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
 {
 	debug3("PAM: %s entering, %d messages", __func__, n);
@@ -502,7 +516,7 @@ sshpam_null_conv(int n, struct pam_message **msg,
 static struct pam_conv null_conv = { sshpam_null_conv, NULL };
 
 static int
-sshpam_store_conv(int n, struct pam_message **msg,
+sshpam_store_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
     struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
 {
 	struct pam_response *reply;
@@ -571,11 +585,12 @@ sshpam_init(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
 	extern char *__progname;
 	const char *pam_rhost, *pam_user, *user = authctxt->user;
+	const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user;
 
 	if (sshpam_handle != NULL) {
 		/* We already have a PAM context; check if the user matches */
 		sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle,
-		    PAM_USER, (void **)&pam_user);
+		    PAM_USER, (sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user);
 		if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && strcmp(user, pam_user) == 0)
 			return (0);
 		pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
@@ -765,7 +780,7 @@ sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
 	buffer_init(&buffer);
 	if (sshpam_authctxt->valid &&
 	    (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid != 0 ||
-	     options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_YES))
+	    options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_YES))
 		buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, *resp);
 	else
 		buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, badpw);
@@ -838,7 +853,7 @@ do_pam_account(void)
 	sshpam_err = pam_acct_mgmt(sshpam_handle, 0);
 	debug3("PAM: %s pam_acct_mgmt = %d (%s)", __func__, sshpam_err,
 	    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
-	
+
 	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS && sshpam_err != PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) {
 		sshpam_account_status = 0;
 		return (sshpam_account_status);
@@ -891,7 +906,7 @@ do_pam_setcred(int init)
 }
 
 static int
-sshpam_tty_conv(int n, struct pam_message **msg,
+sshpam_tty_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
     struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
 {
 	char input[PAM_MAX_MSG_SIZE];
@@ -1050,7 +1065,7 @@ free_pam_environment(char **env)
  * display.
  */
 static int
-sshpam_passwd_conv(int n, struct pam_message **msg,
+sshpam_passwd_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
     struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
 {
 	struct pam_response *reply;
@@ -1096,7 +1111,7 @@ sshpam_passwd_conv(int n, struct pam_message **msg,
 	*resp = reply;
 	return (PAM_SUCCESS);
 
- fail: 
+ fail:
 	for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
 		if (reply[i].resp != NULL)
 			xfree(reply[i].resp);
@@ -1129,7 +1144,7 @@ sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 	 * information via timing (eg if the PAM config has a delay on fail).
 	 */
 	if (!authctxt->valid || (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
-	     options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
+	    options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
 		sshpam_password = badpw;
 
 	sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
@@ -1143,7 +1158,7 @@ sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 	if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && authctxt->valid) {
 		debug("PAM: password authentication accepted for %.100s",
 		    authctxt->user);
-               return 1;
+		return 1;
 	} else {
 		debug("PAM: password authentication failed for %.100s: %s",
 		    authctxt->valid ? authctxt->user : "an illegal user",
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/auth-passwd.c b/crypto/openssh-4/auth-passwd.c
index 654e0b8213..6e6d0d76a1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/auth-passwd.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/auth-passwd.c
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.33 2005/01/24 11:47:13 dtucker Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.34 2005/07/19 15:32:26 otto Exp $");
 
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
@@ -163,6 +163,8 @@ sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 
 	as = auth_usercheck(pw->pw_name, authctxt->style, "auth-ssh",
 	    (char *)password);
+	if (as == NULL)
+		return (0);
 	if (auth_getstate(as) & AUTH_PWEXPIRED) {
 		auth_close(as);
 		disable_forwarding();
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/auth-rh-rsa.c b/crypto/openssh-4/auth-rh-rsa.c
index 29eb538ec9..c31f2b97b6 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/auth-rh-rsa.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/auth-rh-rsa.c
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rh-rsa.c,v 1.37 2003/11/04 08:54:09 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rh-rsa.c,v 1.38 2005/07/17 07:17:54 djm Exp $");
 
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "uidswap.h"
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ auth_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, char *cuser, Key *client_host_key)
 	 */
 
 	verbose("Rhosts with RSA host authentication accepted for %.100s, %.100s on %.700s.",
-	   pw->pw_name, cuser, chost);
+	    pw->pw_name, cuser, chost);
 	packet_send_debug("Rhosts with RSA host authentication accepted.");
 	return 1;
 }
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/auth-rhosts.c b/crypto/openssh-4/auth-rhosts.c
index 585246e822..aaba8557e2 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/auth-rhosts.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/auth-rhosts.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.32 2003/11/04 08:54:09 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.33 2005/07/17 07:17:54 djm Exp $");
 
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "uidswap.h"
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ check_rhosts_file(const char *filename, const char *hostname,
 		/* If the entry was negated, deny access. */
 		if (negated) {
 			auth_debug_add("Matched negative entry in %.100s.",
-			     filename);
+			    filename);
 			return 0;
 		}
 		/* Accept authentication. */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/auth-rsa.c b/crypto/openssh-4/auth-rsa.c
index 4378008d36..d9c9652dc7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/auth-rsa.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/auth-rsa.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.62 2004/12/11 01:48:56 dtucker Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.63 2005/06/17 02:44:32 djm Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
 	while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
 		char *cp;
 		char *key_options;
+		int keybits;
 
 		/* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
 		for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
@@ -243,7 +244,8 @@ auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
 			continue;
 
 		/* check the real bits  */
-		if (bits != BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))
+		keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
+		if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits)
 			logit("Warning: %s, line %lu: keysize mismatch: "
 			    "actual %d vs. announced %d.",
 			    file, linenum, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/auth-skey.c b/crypto/openssh-4/auth-skey.c
index ac1af69ed9..f676dbec95 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/auth-skey.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/auth-skey.c
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ skey_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
 	int len;
 	struct skey skey;
 
-	if (_compat_skeychallenge(&skey, authctxt->user, challenge, 
+	if (_compat_skeychallenge(&skey, authctxt->user, challenge,
 	    sizeof(challenge)) == -1)
 		return -1;
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/auth.c b/crypto/openssh-4/auth.c
index 46b0131375..2dc5c2be62 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/auth.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/auth.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.58 2005/03/14 11:44:42 dtucker Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.60 2005/06/17 02:44:32 djm Exp $");
 
 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
 #include <login.h>
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
 	struct stat st;
 	const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL;
 	char *shell;
-	int i;
+	u_int i;
 #ifdef USE_SHADOW
 	struct spwd *spw = NULL;
 #endif
@@ -97,7 +97,11 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
 	/* grab passwd field for locked account check */
 #ifdef USE_SHADOW
 	if (spw != NULL)
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF)  &&  !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF)
+		passwd = get_iaf_password(pw);
+#else
 		passwd = spw->sp_pwdp;
+#endif /* HAVE_LIBIAF  && !BROKEN_LIBIAF */
 #else
 	passwd = pw->pw_passwd;
 #endif
@@ -119,6 +123,9 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
 		if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR))
 			locked = 1;
 #endif
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF)  &&  !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF)
+		free(passwd);
+#endif /* HAVE_LIBIAF  && !BROKEN_LIBIAF */
 		if (locked) {
 			logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked",
 			    pw->pw_name);
@@ -326,64 +333,41 @@ auth_root_allowed(char *method)
  *
  * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
  */
-char *
-expand_filename(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
+static char *
+expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
 {
-	Buffer buffer;
-	char *file;
-	const char *cp;
+	char *file, *ret;
 
-	/*
-	 * Build the filename string in the buffer by making the appropriate
-	 * substitutions to the given file name.
-	 */
-	buffer_init(&buffer);
-	for (cp = filename; *cp; cp++) {
-		if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == '%') {
-			buffer_append(&buffer, "%", 1);
-			cp++;
-			continue;
-		}
-		if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'h') {
-			buffer_append(&buffer, pw->pw_dir, strlen(pw->pw_dir));
-			cp++;
-			continue;
-		}
-		if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'u') {
-			buffer_append(&buffer, pw->pw_name,
-			    strlen(pw->pw_name));
-			cp++;
-			continue;
-		}
-		buffer_append(&buffer, cp, 1);
-	}
-	buffer_append(&buffer, "\0", 1);
+	file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir,
+	    "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
 
 	/*
 	 * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
 	 * compatible and prepend the '%h/'
 	 */
-	file = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
-	cp = buffer_ptr(&buffer);
-	if (*cp != '/')
-		snprintf(file, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, cp);
-	else
-		strlcpy(file, cp, MAXPATHLEN);
+	if (*file == '/')
+		return (file);
+
+	ret = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
+	if (strlcpy(ret, pw->pw_dir, MAXPATHLEN) >= MAXPATHLEN ||
+	    strlcat(ret, "/", MAXPATHLEN) >= MAXPATHLEN ||
+	    strlcat(ret, file, MAXPATHLEN) >= MAXPATHLEN)
+		fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long");
 
-	buffer_free(&buffer);
-	return file;
+	xfree(file);
+	return (ret);
 }
 
 char *
 authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *pw)
 {
-	return expand_filename(options.authorized_keys_file, pw);
+	return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_keys_file, pw);
 }
 
 char *
 authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *pw)
 {
-	return expand_filename(options.authorized_keys_file2, pw);
+	return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_keys_file2, pw);
 }
 
 /* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/auth.h b/crypto/openssh-4/auth.h
index 471404e4e5..8b814ba6a0 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/auth.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/auth.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.50 2004/05/23 23:59:53 dtucker Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.51 2005/06/06 11:20:36 djm Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -163,7 +163,6 @@ char	*get_challenge(Authctxt *);
 int	verify_response(Authctxt *, const char *);
 void	abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt *);
 
-char	*expand_filename(const char *, struct passwd *);
 char	*authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *);
 char	*authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *);
 
@@ -192,4 +191,9 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
 #define AUTH_FAIL_MSG "Too many authentication failures for %.100s"
 
 #define SKEY_PROMPT "\nS/Key Password: "
+
+#if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
+#include <krb5.h>
+krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
+#endif
 #endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/auth1.c b/crypto/openssh-4/auth1.c
index d08928455c..4bc2bf76d6 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/auth1.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/auth1.c
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.59 2004/07/28 09:40:29 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.62 2005/07/16 01:35:24 djm Exp $");
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "rsa.h"
@@ -31,28 +31,182 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.59 2004/07/28 09:40:29 markus Exp $");
 extern ServerOptions options;
 extern Buffer loginmsg;
 
-/*
- * convert ssh auth msg type into description
- */
+static int auth1_process_password(Authctxt *, char *, size_t);
+static int auth1_process_rsa(Authctxt *, char *, size_t);
+static int auth1_process_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *, char *, size_t);
+static int auth1_process_tis_challenge(Authctxt *, char *, size_t);
+static int auth1_process_tis_response(Authctxt *, char *, size_t);
+
+static char *client_user = NULL;    /* Used to fill in remote user for PAM */
+
+struct AuthMethod1 {
+	int type;
+	char *name;
+	int *enabled;
+	int (*method)(Authctxt *, char *, size_t);
+};
+
+const struct AuthMethod1 auth1_methods[] = {
+	{
+		SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD, "password",
+		&options.password_authentication, auth1_process_password
+	},
+	{
+		SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA, "rsa",
+		&options.rsa_authentication, auth1_process_rsa
+	},
+	{
+		SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA, "rhosts-rsa",
+		&options.rhosts_rsa_authentication, auth1_process_rhosts_rsa
+	},
+	{
+		SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS, "challenge-response",
+		&options.challenge_response_authentication,
+		auth1_process_tis_challenge
+	},
+	{
+		SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE, "challenge-response",
+		&options.challenge_response_authentication,
+		auth1_process_tis_response
+	},
+	{ -1, NULL, NULL, NULL}
+};
+
+static const struct AuthMethod1
+*lookup_authmethod1(int type)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for(i = 0; auth1_methods[i].name != NULL; i++)
+		if (auth1_methods[i].type == type)
+			return (&(auth1_methods[i]));
+
+	return (NULL);
+}
+
 static char *
 get_authname(int type)
 {
-	static char buf[1024];
-	switch (type) {
-	case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD:
-		return "password";
-	case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA:
-		return "rsa";
-	case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA:
-		return "rhosts-rsa";
-	case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS:
-		return "rhosts";
-	case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS:
-	case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE:
-		return "challenge-response";
+	const struct AuthMethod1 *a;
+	static char buf[64];
+
+	if ((a = lookup_authmethod1(type)) != NULL)
+		return (a->name);
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "bad-auth-msg-%d", type);
+	return (buf);
+}
+
+static int
+auth1_process_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *info, size_t infolen)
+{
+	int authenticated = 0;
+	char *password;
+	u_int dlen;
+
+	/*
+	 * Read user password.  It is in plain text, but was
+	 * transmitted over the encrypted channel so it is
+	 * not visible to an outside observer.
+	 */
+	password = packet_get_string(&dlen);
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	/* Try authentication with the password. */
+	authenticated = PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, password));
+
+	memset(password, 0, dlen);
+	xfree(password);
+
+	return (authenticated);
+}
+
+static int
+auth1_process_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, char *info, size_t infolen)
+{
+	int authenticated = 0;
+	BIGNUM *n;
+
+	/* RSA authentication requested. */
+	if ((n = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("do_authloop: BN_new failed");
+	packet_get_bignum(n);
+	packet_check_eom();
+	authenticated = auth_rsa(authctxt, n);
+	BN_clear_free(n);
+
+	return (authenticated);
+}
+
+static int
+auth1_process_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, char *info, size_t infolen)
+{
+	int keybits, authenticated = 0;
+	u_int bits;
+	Key *client_host_key;
+	u_int ulen;
+
+	/*
+	 * Get client user name.  Note that we just have to
+	 * trust the client; root on the client machine can
+	 * claim to be any user.
+	 */
+	client_user = packet_get_string(&ulen);
+
+	/* Get the client host key. */
+	client_host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+	bits = packet_get_int();
+	packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->rsa->e);
+	packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->rsa->n);
+
+	keybits = BN_num_bits(client_host_key->rsa->n);
+	if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits) {
+		verbose("Warning: keysize mismatch for client_host_key: "
+		    "actual %d, announced %d",
+		    BN_num_bits(client_host_key->rsa->n), bits);
 	}
-	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "bad-auth-msg-%d", type);
-	return buf;
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	authenticated = auth_rhosts_rsa(authctxt, client_user,
+	    client_host_key);
+	key_free(client_host_key);
+
+	snprintf(info, infolen, " ruser %.100s", client_user);
+
+	return (authenticated);
+}
+
+static int
+auth1_process_tis_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt, char *info, size_t infolen)
+{
+	char *challenge;
+
+	if ((challenge = get_challenge(authctxt)) == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	debug("sending challenge '%s'", challenge);
+	packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
+	packet_put_cstring(challenge);
+	xfree(challenge);
+	packet_send();
+	packet_write_wait();
+
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+static int
+auth1_process_tis_response(Authctxt *authctxt, char *info, size_t infolen)
+{
+	int authenticated = 0;
+	char *response;
+	u_int dlen;
+
+	response = packet_get_string(&dlen);
+	packet_check_eom();
+	authenticated = verify_response(authctxt, response);
+	memset(response, 'r', dlen);
+	xfree(response);
+
+	return (authenticated);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -63,14 +217,9 @@ static void
 do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
 	int authenticated = 0;
-	u_int bits;
-	Key *client_host_key;
-	BIGNUM *n;
-	char *client_user, *password;
 	char info[1024];
-	u_int dlen;
-	u_int ulen;
-	int prev, type = 0;
+	int prev = 0, type = 0;
+	const struct AuthMethod1 *meth;
 
 	debug("Attempting authentication for %s%.100s.",
 	    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", authctxt->user);
@@ -95,8 +244,6 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	packet_send();
 	packet_write_wait();
 
-	client_user = NULL;
-
 	for (;;) {
 		/* default to fail */
 		authenticated = 0;
@@ -118,107 +265,21 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		    type != SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE)
 			abandon_challenge_response(authctxt);
 
-		/* Process the packet. */
-		switch (type) {
-		case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA:
-			if (!options.rhosts_rsa_authentication) {
-				verbose("Rhosts with RSA authentication disabled.");
-				break;
-			}
-			/*
-			 * Get client user name.  Note that we just have to
-			 * trust the client; root on the client machine can
-			 * claim to be any user.
-			 */
-			client_user = packet_get_string(&ulen);
-
-			/* Get the client host key. */
-			client_host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
-			bits = packet_get_int();
-			packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->rsa->e);
-			packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->rsa->n);
-
-			if (bits != BN_num_bits(client_host_key->rsa->n))
-				verbose("Warning: keysize mismatch for client_host_key: "
-				    "actual %d, announced %d",
-				    BN_num_bits(client_host_key->rsa->n), bits);
-			packet_check_eom();
-
-			authenticated = auth_rhosts_rsa(authctxt, client_user,
-			    client_host_key);
-			key_free(client_host_key);
-
-			snprintf(info, sizeof info, " ruser %.100s", client_user);
-			break;
-
-		case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA:
-			if (!options.rsa_authentication) {
-				verbose("RSA authentication disabled.");
-				break;
-			}
-			/* RSA authentication requested. */
-			if ((n = BN_new()) == NULL)
-				fatal("do_authloop: BN_new failed");
-			packet_get_bignum(n);
-			packet_check_eom();
-			authenticated = auth_rsa(authctxt, n);
-			BN_clear_free(n);
-			break;
-
-		case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD:
-			if (!options.password_authentication) {
-				verbose("Password authentication disabled.");
-				break;
-			}
-			/*
-			 * Read user password.  It is in plain text, but was
-			 * transmitted over the encrypted channel so it is
-			 * not visible to an outside observer.
-			 */
-			password = packet_get_string(&dlen);
-			packet_check_eom();
-
-			/* Try authentication with the password. */
-			authenticated = PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, password));
-
-			memset(password, 0, strlen(password));
-			xfree(password);
-			break;
-
-		case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS:
-			debug("rcvd SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS");
-			if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1) {
-				char *challenge = get_challenge(authctxt);
-				if (challenge != NULL) {
-					debug("sending challenge '%s'", challenge);
-					packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
-					packet_put_cstring(challenge);
-					xfree(challenge);
-					packet_send();
-					packet_write_wait();
-					continue;
-				}
-			}
-			break;
-		case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE:
-			debug("rcvd SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE");
-			if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1) {
-				char *response = packet_get_string(&dlen);
-				packet_check_eom();
-				authenticated = verify_response(authctxt, response);
-				memset(response, 'r', dlen);
-				xfree(response);
-			}
-			break;
-
-		default:
-			/*
-			 * Any unknown messages will be ignored (and failure
-			 * returned) during authentication.
-			 */
-			logit("Unknown message during authentication: type %d", type);
-			break;
+		if ((meth = lookup_authmethod1(type)) == NULL) {
+			logit("Unknown message during authentication: "
+			    "type %d", type);
+			goto skip;
+		}
+
+		if (!*(meth->enabled)) {
+			verbose("%s authentication disabled.", meth->name);
+			goto skip;
 		}
+
+		authenticated = meth->method(authctxt, info, sizeof(info));
+		if (authenticated == -1)
+			continue; /* "postponed" */
+
 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
 		if (authctxt->as) {
 			auth_close(authctxt->as);
@@ -238,7 +299,7 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
 		if (authenticated &&
-		    !check_nt_auth(type == SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD, 
+		    !check_nt_auth(type == SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD,
 		    authctxt->pw)) {
 			packet_disconnect("Authentication rejected for uid %d.",
 			    authctxt->pw == NULL ? -1 : authctxt->pw->pw_uid);
@@ -247,8 +308,8 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 #else
 		/* Special handling for root */
 		if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
-		    !auth_root_allowed(get_authname(type))) {
-			authenticated = 0;
+		    !auth_root_allowed(meth->name)) {
+ 			authenticated = 0;
 # ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 			PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
 # endif
@@ -262,7 +323,7 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 			size_t len;
 
 			error("Access denied for user %s by PAM account "
-			   "configuration", authctxt->user);
+			    "configuration", authctxt->user);
 			len = buffer_len(&loginmsg);
 			buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\0", 1);
 			msg = buffer_ptr(&loginmsg);
@@ -276,6 +337,7 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		}
 #endif
 
+ skip:
 		/* Log before sending the reply */
 		auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, get_authname(type), info);
 
@@ -341,7 +403,7 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
 
 	/*
 	 * If we are not running as root, the user must have the same uid as
-	 * the server. (Unless you are running Windows)
+	 * the server.
 	 */
 #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
 	if (!use_privsep && getuid() != 0 && authctxt->pw &&
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/auth2-chall.c b/crypto/openssh-4/auth2-chall.c
index 384a543ee4..b147cadf37 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/auth2-chall.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/auth2-chall.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.22 2005/01/19 13:11:47 dtucker Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.24 2005/07/17 07:17:54 djm Exp $");
 
 #include "ssh2.h"
 #include "auth.h"
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ kbdint_next_device(KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
 		kbdintctxt->devices = t[len] ? xstrdup(t+len+1) : NULL;
 		xfree(t);
 		debug2("kbdint_next_device: devices %s", kbdintctxt->devices ?
-		   kbdintctxt->devices : "<empty>");
+		    kbdintctxt->devices : "<empty>");
 	} while (kbdintctxt->devices && !kbdintctxt->device);
 
 	return kbdintctxt->device ? 1 : 0;
@@ -239,8 +239,7 @@ send_userauth_info_request(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
 	KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
 	char *name, *instr, **prompts;
-	int i;
-	u_int *echo_on;
+	u_int i, *echo_on;
 
 	kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt;
 	if (kbdintctxt->device->query(kbdintctxt->ctxt,
@@ -273,8 +272,8 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
 	KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
-	int i, authenticated = 0, res, len;
-	u_int nresp;
+	int authenticated = 0, res, len;
+	u_int i, nresp;
 	char **response = NULL, *method;
 
 	if (authctxt == NULL)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/auth2-gss.c b/crypto/openssh-4/auth2-gss.c
index 3289ba18ee..4d468a0e8b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/auth2-gss.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/auth2-gss.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.8 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.10 2005/07/17 07:17:54 djm Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	int present;
 	OM_uint32 ms;
 	u_int len;
-	char *doid = NULL;
+	u_char *doid = NULL;
 
 	if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL)
 		return (0);
@@ -82,9 +82,8 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		present = 0;
 		doid = packet_get_string(&len);
 
-		if (len > 2 &&
-		   doid[0] == SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE &&
-		   doid[1] == len - 2) {
+		if (len > 2 && doid[0] == SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE &&
+		    doid[1] == len - 2) {
 			goid.elements = doid + 2;
 			goid.length   = len - 2;
 			gss_test_oid_set_member(&ms, &goid, supported,
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/auth2.c b/crypto/openssh-4/auth2.c
index 2265d311ec..613b0e2bc9 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/auth2.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/auth2.c
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
 				packet_write_wait();
 			}
 			fatal("Access denied for user %s by PAM account "
-			   "configuration", authctxt->user);
+			    "configuration", authctxt->user);
 		}
 	}
 #endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/authfd.c b/crypto/openssh-4/authfd.c
index 662350cef7..8976616b4f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/authfd.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/authfd.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.64 2004/08/11 21:44:31 avsm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.66 2005/06/17 02:44:32 djm Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 
@@ -114,8 +114,7 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket(void)
 static int
 ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply)
 {
-	int l;
-	u_int len;
+	u_int l, len;
 	char buf[1024];
 
 	/* Get the length of the message, and format it in the buffer. */
@@ -149,8 +148,7 @@ ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply
 		l = len;
 		if (l > sizeof(buf))
 			l = sizeof(buf);
-		l = atomicio(read, auth->fd, buf, l);
-		if (l <= 0) {
+		if (atomicio(read, auth->fd, buf, l) != l) {
 			error("Error reading response from authentication socket.");
 			return 0;
 		}
@@ -303,6 +301,7 @@ ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int versi
 Key *
 ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version)
 {
+	int keybits;
 	u_int bits;
 	u_char *blob;
 	u_int blen;
@@ -323,7 +322,8 @@ ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int versio
 		buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->e);
 		buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->n);
 		*comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
-		if (bits != BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))
+		keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
+		if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits)
 			logit("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u",
 			    BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
 		break;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/authfile.c b/crypto/openssh-4/authfile.c
index 6a04cd7a95..420813f37f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/authfile.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/authfile.c
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.60 2004/12/11 01:48:56 dtucker Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.61 2005/06/17 02:44:32 djm Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.60 2004/12/11 01:48:56 dtucker Exp $");
 #include "authfile.h"
 #include "rsa.h"
 #include "misc.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
 
 /* Version identification string for SSH v1 identity files. */
 static const char authfile_id_string[] =
@@ -147,8 +148,8 @@ key_save_private_rsa1(Key *key, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
 		buffer_free(&encrypted);
 		return 0;
 	}
-	if (write(fd, buffer_ptr(&encrypted), buffer_len(&encrypted)) !=
-	    buffer_len(&encrypted)) {
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buffer_ptr(&encrypted),
+	    buffer_len(&encrypted)) != buffer_len(&encrypted)) {
 		error("write to key file %s failed: %s", filename,
 		    strerror(errno));
 		buffer_free(&encrypted);
@@ -236,7 +237,7 @@ key_load_public_rsa1(int fd, const char *filename, char **commentp)
 	Key *pub;
 	struct stat st;
 	char *cp;
-	int i;
+	u_int i;
 	size_t len;
 
 	if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
@@ -253,7 +254,7 @@ key_load_public_rsa1(int fd, const char *filename, char **commentp)
 	buffer_init(&buffer);
 	cp = buffer_append_space(&buffer, len);
 
-	if (read(fd, cp, (size_t) len) != (size_t) len) {
+	if (atomicio(read, fd, cp, len) != len) {
 		debug("Read from key file %.200s failed: %.100s", filename,
 		    strerror(errno));
 		buffer_free(&buffer);
@@ -322,7 +323,8 @@ static Key *
 key_load_private_rsa1(int fd, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
     char **commentp)
 {
-	int i, check1, check2, cipher_type;
+	u_int i;
+	int check1, check2, cipher_type;
 	size_t len;
 	Buffer buffer, decrypted;
 	u_char *cp;
@@ -347,7 +349,7 @@ key_load_private_rsa1(int fd, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
 	buffer_init(&buffer);
 	cp = buffer_append_space(&buffer, len);
 
-	if (read(fd, cp, (size_t) len) != (size_t) len) {
+	if (atomicio(read, fd, cp, len) != len) {
 		debug("Read from key file %.200s failed: %.100s", filename,
 		    strerror(errno));
 		buffer_free(&buffer);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/bufaux.c b/crypto/openssh-4/bufaux.c
index 5dbf2b770a..8d096a0563 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/bufaux.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/bufaux.c
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.35 2005/03/10 22:01:05 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.36 2005/06/17 02:44:32 djm Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include "bufaux.h"
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ buffer_put_bignum2_ret(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
 	buf[0] = 0x00;
 	/* Get the value of in binary */
 	oi = BN_bn2bin(value, buf+1);
-	if (oi != bytes-1) {
+	if (oi < 0 || (u_int)oi != bytes - 1) {
 		error("buffer_put_bignum2_ret: BN_bn2bin() failed: "
 		    "oi %d != bin_size %d", oi, bytes);
 		xfree(buf);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/canohost.c b/crypto/openssh-4/canohost.c
index 94d666432f..c27086bfdc 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/canohost.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/canohost.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.42 2005/02/18 03:05:53 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.44 2005/06/17 02:44:32 djm Exp $");
 
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -143,7 +143,8 @@ check_ip_options(int sock, char *ipaddr)
 	u_char options[200];
 	char text[sizeof(options) * 3 + 1];
 	socklen_t option_size;
-	int i, ipproto;
+	u_int i;
+	int ipproto;
 	struct protoent *ip;
 
 	if ((ip = getprotobyname("ip")) != NULL)
@@ -173,7 +174,7 @@ ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *addr, socklen_t *len)
 	struct in_addr inaddr;
 	u_int16_t port;
 
-	if (addr->ss_family != AF_INET6 || 
+	if (addr->ss_family != AF_INET6 ||
 	    !IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&a6->sin6_addr))
 		return;
 
@@ -346,7 +347,7 @@ get_sock_port(int sock, int local)
 	} else {
 		if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
 			debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-			cleanup_exit(255);
+			return -1;
 		}
 	}
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/channels.c b/crypto/openssh-4/channels.c
index 3f6db60c6f..8c7b2b3690 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/channels.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/channels.c
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.214 2005/03/14 11:46:56 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.223 2005/07/17 07:17:54 djm Exp $");
 
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "ssh1.h"
@@ -111,6 +111,9 @@ static int all_opens_permitted = 0;
 /* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
 #define MAX_DISPLAYS  1000
 
+/* Saved X11 local (client) display. */
+static char *x11_saved_display = NULL;
+
 /* Saved X11 authentication protocol name. */
 static char *x11_saved_proto = NULL;
 
@@ -727,8 +730,8 @@ channel_pre_open(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 			FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset);
 		} else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
 			if (CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c))
-			       debug2("channel %d: obuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%d)",
-				   c->self, c->efd, buffer_len(&c->extended));
+				debug2("channel %d: obuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%d)",
+				    c->self, c->efd, buffer_len(&c->extended));
 			else
 				chan_obuf_empty(c);
 		}
@@ -894,7 +897,7 @@ static int
 channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 {
 	char *p, *host;
-	int len, have, i, found;
+	u_int len, have, i, found;
 	char username[256];
 	struct {
 		u_int8_t version;
@@ -979,7 +982,7 @@ channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 	} s5_req, s5_rsp;
 	u_int16_t dest_port;
 	u_char *p, dest_addr[255+1];
-	int i, have, found, nmethods, addrlen, af;
+	u_int have, i, found, nmethods, addrlen, af;
 
 	debug2("channel %d: decode socks5", c->self);
 	p = buffer_ptr(&c->input);
@@ -1075,7 +1078,8 @@ static void
 channel_pre_dynamic(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 {
 	u_char *p;
-	int have, ret;
+	u_int have;
+	int ret;
 
 	have = buffer_len(&c->input);
 	c->delayed = 0;
@@ -1178,7 +1182,7 @@ port_open_helper(Channel *c, char *rtype)
 	int direct;
 	char buf[1024];
 	char *remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(c->sock);
-	u_short remote_port = get_peer_port(c->sock);
+	int remote_port = get_peer_port(c->sock);
 
 	direct = (strcmp(rtype, "direct-tcpip") == 0);
 
@@ -1208,7 +1212,7 @@ port_open_helper(Channel *c, char *rtype)
 		}
 		/* originator host and port */
 		packet_put_cstring(remote_ipaddr);
-		packet_put_int(remote_port);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)remote_port);
 		packet_send();
 	} else {
 		packet_start(SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN);
@@ -1809,8 +1813,8 @@ channel_output_poll(void)
 			 * hack for extended data: delay EOF if EFD still in use.
 			 */
 			if (CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c))
-			       debug2("channel %d: ibuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%d)",
-				   c->self, c->efd, buffer_len(&c->extended));
+				debug2("channel %d: ibuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%d)",
+				    c->self, c->efd, buffer_len(&c->extended));
 			else
 				chan_ibuf_empty(c);
 		}
@@ -2195,11 +2199,11 @@ channel_setup_fwd_listener(int type, const char *listen_addr, u_short listen_por
 
 	if (host == NULL) {
 		error("No forward host name.");
-		return success;
+		return 0;
 	}
 	if (strlen(host) > SSH_CHANNEL_PATH_LEN - 1) {
 		error("Forward host name too long.");
-		return success;
+		return 0;
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -2250,12 +2254,10 @@ channel_setup_fwd_listener(int type, const char *listen_addr, u_short listen_por
 			packet_disconnect("getaddrinfo: fatal error: %s",
 			    gai_strerror(r));
 		} else {
-			verbose("channel_setup_fwd_listener: "
-			    "getaddrinfo(%.64s): %s", addr, gai_strerror(r));
-			packet_send_debug("channel_setup_fwd_listener: "
+			error("channel_setup_fwd_listener: "
 			    "getaddrinfo(%.64s): %s", addr, gai_strerror(r));
 		}
-		aitop = NULL;
+		return 0;
 	}
 
 	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
@@ -2657,7 +2659,7 @@ channel_send_window_changes(void)
  */
 int
 x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_offset, int x11_use_localhost,
-    int single_connection, u_int *display_numberp)
+    int single_connection, u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids)
 {
 	Channel *nc = NULL;
 	int display_number, sock;
@@ -2747,6 +2749,8 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_offset, int x11_use_localhost,
 	}
 
 	/* Allocate a channel for each socket. */
+	if (chanids != NULL)
+		*chanids = xmalloc(sizeof(**chanids) * (num_socks + 1));
 	for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
 		sock = socks[n];
 		nc = channel_new("x11 listener",
@@ -2754,7 +2758,11 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_offset, int x11_use_localhost,
 		    CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
 		    0, "X11 inet listener", 1);
 		nc->single_connection = single_connection;
+		if (*chanids != NULL)
+			(*chanids)[n] = nc->self;
 	}
+	if (*chanids != NULL)
+		(*chanids)[n] = -1;
 
 	/* Return the display number for the DISPLAY environment variable. */
 	*display_numberp = display_number;
@@ -2952,19 +2960,27 @@ deny_input_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
  * This should be called in the client only.
  */
 void
-x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int client_session_id,
+x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int client_session_id, const char *disp,
     const char *proto, const char *data)
 {
 	u_int data_len = (u_int) strlen(data) / 2;
-	u_int i, value, len;
+	u_int i, value;
 	char *new_data;
 	int screen_number;
 	const char *cp;
 	u_int32_t rnd = 0;
 
-	cp = getenv("DISPLAY");
-	if (cp)
-		cp = strchr(cp, ':');
+	if (x11_saved_display == NULL)
+		x11_saved_display = xstrdup(disp);
+	else if (strcmp(disp, x11_saved_display) != 0) {
+		error("x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing: different "
+		    "$DISPLAY already forwarded");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	cp = disp;
+	if (disp)
+		cp = strchr(disp, ':');
 	if (cp)
 		cp = strchr(cp, '.');
 	if (cp)
@@ -2972,33 +2988,31 @@ x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int client_session_id,
 	else
 		screen_number = 0;
 
-	/* Save protocol name. */
-	x11_saved_proto = xstrdup(proto);
-
-	/*
-	 * Extract real authentication data and generate fake data of the
-	 * same length.
-	 */
-	x11_saved_data = xmalloc(data_len);
-	x11_fake_data = xmalloc(data_len);
-	for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) {
-		if (sscanf(data + 2 * i, "%2x", &value) != 1)
-			fatal("x11_request_forwarding: bad authentication data: %.100s", data);
-		if (i % 4 == 0)
-			rnd = arc4random();
-		x11_saved_data[i] = value;
-		x11_fake_data[i] = rnd & 0xff;
-		rnd >>= 8;
-	}
-	x11_saved_data_len = data_len;
-	x11_fake_data_len = data_len;
+	if (x11_saved_proto == NULL) {
+		/* Save protocol name. */
+		x11_saved_proto = xstrdup(proto);
+		/*
+		 * Extract real authentication data and generate fake data
+		 * of the same length.
+		 */
+		x11_saved_data = xmalloc(data_len);
+		x11_fake_data = xmalloc(data_len);
+		for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) {
+			if (sscanf(data + 2 * i, "%2x", &value) != 1)
+				fatal("x11_request_forwarding: bad "
+				    "authentication data: %.100s", data);
+			if (i % 4 == 0)
+				rnd = arc4random();
+			x11_saved_data[i] = value;
+			x11_fake_data[i] = rnd & 0xff;
+			rnd >>= 8;
+		}
+		x11_saved_data_len = data_len;
+		x11_fake_data_len = data_len;
+	}
 
 	/* Convert the fake data into hex. */
-	len = 2 * data_len + 1;
-	new_data = xmalloc(len);
-	for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++)
-		snprintf(new_data + 2 * i, len - 2 * i,
-		    "%02x", (u_char) x11_fake_data[i]);
+	new_data = tohex(x11_fake_data, data_len);
 
 	/* Send the request packet. */
 	if (compat20) {
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/channels.h b/crypto/openssh-4/channels.h
index fc20fb2c33..1cb2c3a342 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/channels.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/channels.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.76 2005/03/01 10:09:52 djm Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.79 2005/07/17 06:49:04 djm Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ struct Channel {
 	buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0))
 #define CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c) \
 	(compat20 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && \
-	((c->efd != -1 && !(c->flags & (CHAN_EOF_RCVD|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD))) || \
+	c->efd != -1 && (!(c->flags & (CHAN_EOF_RCVD|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) || \
 	buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0))
 
 /* channel management */
@@ -214,9 +214,10 @@ int	 channel_cancel_rport_listener(const char *, u_short);
 /* x11 forwarding */
 
 int	 x11_connect_display(void);
-int	 x11_create_display_inet(int, int, int, u_int *);
+int	 x11_create_display_inet(int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
 void     x11_input_open(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void	 x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int, const char *, const char *);
+void	 x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int, const char *, const char *,
+	    const char *);
 void	 deny_input_open(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 
 /* agent forwarding */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/cipher-acss.c b/crypto/openssh-4/cipher-acss.c
index 3a966a74d5..a95fa67478 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/cipher-acss.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/cipher-acss.c
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 #include "includes.h"
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 
-RCSID("$Id: cipher-acss.c,v 1.2 2004/02/06 04:26:11 dtucker Exp $");
+RCSID("$Id: cipher-acss.c,v 1.3 2005/07/17 07:04:47 djm Exp $");
 
 #if !defined(EVP_CTRL_SET_ACSS_MODE) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
 
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ typedef struct {
 #define EVP_CTRL_SET_ACSS_SUBKEY        0xff07
 
 static int
-acss_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, 
+acss_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
     const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
 {
 	acss_setkey(&data(ctx)->ks,key,enc,ACSS_DATA);
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ acss_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
 }
 
 static int
-acss_ciph(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, 
+acss_ciph(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
     unsigned int inl)
 {
 	acss(&data(ctx)->ks,inl,in,out);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/cipher-ctr.c b/crypto/openssh-4/cipher-ctr.c
index 43f1ede571..856177349d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/cipher-ctr.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/cipher-ctr.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher-ctr.c,v 1.5 2004/12/22 02:13:19 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher-ctr.c,v 1.6 2005/07/17 07:17:55 djm Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
 	}
 	if (key != NULL)
 		AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
-		     &c->aes_ctx);
+		    &c->aes_ctx);
 	if (iv != NULL)
 		memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
 	return (1);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/cipher.c b/crypto/openssh-4/cipher.c
index beba4618dc..0dddf270af 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/cipher.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/cipher.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.73 2005/01/23 10:18:12 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.77 2005/07/16 01:35:24 djm Exp $");
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "log.h"
@@ -43,25 +43,8 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.73 2005/01/23 10:18:12 djm Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
 
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00906000L
-#define SSH_OLD_EVP
-#define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(e)          ((e)->app_data)
-#endif
-
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
-extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_rijndael(void);
-extern void ssh_rijndael_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, u_int);
-#endif
-
-#if !defined(EVP_CTRL_SET_ACSS_MODE)
-# if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
-extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_acss(void);
-#  define EVP_acss evp_acss
-#  define EVP_CTRL_SET_ACSS_MODE xxx	/* used below */
-# else
-#  define EVP_acss NULL /* Don't try to support ACSS on older OpenSSL */
-# endif /* (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00906000L) */
-#endif /* !defined(EVP_CTRL_SET_ACSS_MODE) */
+/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
 
 extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_bf(void);
 extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(void);
@@ -74,39 +57,32 @@ struct Cipher {
 	int	number;		/* for ssh1 only */
 	u_int	block_size;
 	u_int	key_len;
+	u_int	discard_len;
 	const EVP_CIPHER	*(*evptype)(void);
 } ciphers[] = {
-	{ "none",		SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, EVP_enc_null },
-	{ "des",		SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, EVP_des_cbc },
-	{ "3des",		SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, evp_ssh1_3des },
-	{ "blowfish",		SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH, 8, 32, evp_ssh1_bf },
-
-	{ "3des-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
-	{ "blowfish-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, EVP_bf_cbc },
-	{ "cast128-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, EVP_cast5_cbc },
-	{ "arcfour",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, EVP_rc4 },
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
-	{ "aes128-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, evp_rijndael },
-	{ "aes192-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, evp_rijndael },
-	{ "aes256-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, evp_rijndael },
+	{ "none",		SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
+	{ "des",		SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, EVP_des_cbc },
+	{ "3des",		SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, evp_ssh1_3des },
+	{ "blowfish",		SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH, 8, 32, 0, evp_ssh1_bf },
+
+	{ "3des-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
+	{ "blowfish-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, EVP_bf_cbc },
+	{ "cast128-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, EVP_cast5_cbc },
+	{ "arcfour",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, EVP_rc4 },
+	{ "arcfour128",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 1536, EVP_rc4 },
+	{ "arcfour256",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 32, 1536, EVP_rc4 },
+	{ "aes128-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, EVP_aes_128_cbc },
+	{ "aes192-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, EVP_aes_192_cbc },
+	{ "aes256-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
 	{ "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se",
-				SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, evp_rijndael },
-#else
-	{ "aes128-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, EVP_aes_128_cbc },
-	{ "aes192-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, EVP_aes_192_cbc },
-	{ "aes256-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
-	{ "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se",
-				SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
-#endif
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00905000L
-	{ "aes128-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, evp_aes_128_ctr },
-	{ "aes192-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, evp_aes_128_ctr },
-	{ "aes256-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, evp_aes_128_ctr },
+				SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
+	{ "aes128-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr },
+	{ "aes192-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr },
+	{ "aes256-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr },
+#ifdef USE_CIPHER_ACSS
+	{ "acss@openssh.org",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 5, 0, EVP_acss },
 #endif
-#if defined(EVP_CTRL_SET_ACSS_MODE)
-	{ "acss@openssh.org",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 5, EVP_acss },
-#endif
-	{ NULL,			SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, NULL }
+	{ NULL,			SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
 };
 
 /*--*/
@@ -222,8 +198,9 @@ cipher_init(CipherContext *cc, Cipher *cipher,
 	EVP_CIPHER *type;
 #else
 	const EVP_CIPHER *type;
-#endif
 	int klen;
+#endif
+	u_char *junk, *discard;
 
 	if (cipher->number == SSH_CIPHER_DES) {
 		if (dowarn) {
@@ -261,7 +238,7 @@ cipher_init(CipherContext *cc, Cipher *cipher,
 		fatal("cipher_init: EVP_CipherInit failed for %s",
 		    cipher->name);
 	klen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(&cc->evp);
-	if (klen > 0 && keylen != klen) {
+	if (klen > 0 && keylen != (u_int)klen) {
 		debug2("cipher_init: set keylen (%d -> %d)", klen, keylen);
 		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&cc->evp, keylen) == 0)
 			fatal("cipher_init: set keylen failed (%d -> %d)",
@@ -271,6 +248,17 @@ cipher_init(CipherContext *cc, Cipher *cipher,
 		fatal("cipher_init: EVP_CipherInit: set key failed for %s",
 		    cipher->name);
 #endif
+
+	if (cipher->discard_len > 0) {
+		junk = xmalloc(cipher->discard_len);
+		discard = xmalloc(cipher->discard_len);
+		if (EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, discard, junk,
+		    cipher->discard_len) == 0)
+			fatal("evp_crypt: EVP_Cipher failed during discard");
+		memset(discard, 0, cipher->discard_len);
+		xfree(junk);
+		xfree(discard);
+	}
 }
 
 void
@@ -278,23 +266,15 @@ cipher_crypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len)
 {
 	if (len % cc->cipher->block_size)
 		fatal("cipher_encrypt: bad plaintext length %d", len);
-#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
-	EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, dest, (u_char *)src, len);
-#else
 	if (EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, dest, (u_char *)src, len) == 0)
 		fatal("evp_crypt: EVP_Cipher failed");
-#endif
 }
 
 void
 cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *cc)
 {
-#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cc->evp);
-#else
 	if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cc->evp) == 0)
 		error("cipher_cleanup: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup failed");
-#endif
 }
 
 /*
@@ -349,9 +329,9 @@ cipher_get_keyiv(CipherContext *cc, u_char *iv, u_int len)
 	case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
 	case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
 		evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cc->evp);
-		if (evplen == 0)
+		if (evplen <= 0)
 			return;
-		if (evplen != len)
+		if ((u_int)evplen != len)
 			fatal("%s: wrong iv length %d != %d", __func__,
 			    evplen, len);
 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/clientloop.c b/crypto/openssh-4/clientloop.c
index 1591215bda..47f3c7ecd9 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/clientloop.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/clientloop.c
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.136 2005/03/10 22:01:05 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.141 2005/07/16 01:35:24 djm Exp $");
 
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "ssh1.h"
@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ int	session_ident = -1;
 struct confirm_ctx {
 	int want_tty;
 	int want_subsys;
+	int want_x_fwd;
+	int want_agent_fwd;
 	Buffer cmd;
 	char *term;
 	struct termios tio;
@@ -208,6 +210,109 @@ get_current_time(void)
 	return (double) tv.tv_sec + (double) tv.tv_usec / 1000000.0;
 }
 
+#define SSH_X11_PROTO "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1"
+void
+client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
+    u_int trusted, char **_proto, char **_data)
+{
+	char cmd[1024];
+	char line[512];
+	char xdisplay[512];
+	static char proto[512], data[512];
+	FILE *f;
+	int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i;
+	char *xauthdir, *xauthfile;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	xauthdir = xauthfile = NULL;
+	*_proto = proto;
+	*_data = data;
+	proto[0] = data[0] = '\0';
+
+	if (xauth_path == NULL ||(stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1)) {
+		debug("No xauth program.");
+	} else {
+		if (display == NULL) {
+			debug("x11_get_proto: DISPLAY not set");
+			return;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Handle FamilyLocal case where $DISPLAY does
+		 * not match an authorization entry.  For this we
+		 * just try "xauth list unix:displaynum.screennum".
+		 * XXX: "localhost" match to determine FamilyLocal
+		 *      is not perfect.
+		 */
+		if (strncmp(display, "localhost:", 10) == 0) {
+			snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s",
+			    display + 10);
+			display = xdisplay;
+		}
+		if (trusted == 0) {
+			xauthdir = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
+			xauthfile = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
+			strlcpy(xauthdir, "/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX", MAXPATHLEN);
+			if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) != NULL) {
+				do_unlink = 1;
+				snprintf(xauthfile, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/xauthfile",
+				    xauthdir);
+				snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
+				    "%s -f %s generate %s " SSH_X11_PROTO
+				    " untrusted timeout 1200 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
+				    xauth_path, xauthfile, display);
+				debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd);
+				if (system(cmd) == 0)
+					generated = 1;
+			}
+		}
+		snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
+		    "%s %s%s list %s . 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
+		    xauth_path,
+		    generated ? "-f " : "" ,
+		    generated ? xauthfile : "",
+		    display);
+		debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd);
+		f = popen(cmd, "r");
+		if (f && fgets(line, sizeof(line), f) &&
+		    sscanf(line, "%*s %511s %511s", proto, data) == 2)
+			got_data = 1;
+		if (f)
+			pclose(f);
+	}
+
+	if (do_unlink) {
+		unlink(xauthfile);
+		rmdir(xauthdir);
+	}
+	if (xauthdir)
+		xfree(xauthdir);
+	if (xauthfile)
+		xfree(xauthfile);
+
+	/*
+	 * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some
+	 * data.  The forwarding code will check the validity of the
+	 * response anyway, and substitute this data.  The X11
+	 * server, however, will ignore this fake data and use
+	 * whatever authentication mechanisms it was using otherwise
+	 * for the local connection.
+	 */
+	if (!got_data) {
+		u_int32_t rnd = 0;
+
+		logit("Warning: No xauth data; "
+		    "using fake authentication data for X11 forwarding.");
+		strlcpy(proto, SSH_X11_PROTO, sizeof proto);
+		for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+			if (i % 4 == 0)
+				rnd = arc4random();
+			snprintf(data + 2 * i, sizeof data - 2 * i, "%02x",
+			    rnd & 0xff);
+			rnd >>= 8;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 /*
  * This is called when the interactive is entered.  This checks if there is
  * an EOF coming on stdin.  We must check this explicitly, as select() does
@@ -528,6 +633,7 @@ static void
 client_extra_session2_setup(int id, void *arg)
 {
 	struct confirm_ctx *cctx = arg;
+	const char *display;
 	Channel *c;
 	int i;
 
@@ -536,6 +642,24 @@ client_extra_session2_setup(int id, void *arg)
 	if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL)
 		fatal("%s: no channel for id %d", __func__, id);
 
+	display = getenv("DISPLAY");
+	if (cctx->want_x_fwd && options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
+		char *proto, *data;
+		/* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
+		client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
+		    options.forward_x11_trusted, &proto, &data);
+		/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
+		debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication spoofing.");
+		x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto, data);
+		/* XXX wait for reply */
+	}
+
+	if (cctx->want_agent_fwd && options.forward_agent) {
+		debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding.");
+		channel_request_start(id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0);
+		packet_send();
+	}
+
 	client_session2_setup(id, cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_subsys,
 	    cctx->term, &cctx->tio, c->rfd, &cctx->cmd, cctx->env,
 	    client_subsystem_reply);
@@ -556,12 +680,12 @@ client_process_control(fd_set * readset)
 {
 	Buffer m;
 	Channel *c;
-	int client_fd, new_fd[3], ver, i, allowed;
+	int client_fd, new_fd[3], ver, allowed;
 	socklen_t addrlen;
 	struct sockaddr_storage addr;
 	struct confirm_ctx *cctx;
 	char *cmd;
-	u_int len, env_len, command, flags;
+	u_int i, len, env_len, command, flags;
 	uid_t euid;
 	gid_t egid;
 
@@ -601,7 +725,7 @@ client_process_control(fd_set * readset)
 		buffer_free(&m);
 		return;
 	}
-	if ((ver = buffer_get_char(&m)) != 1) {
+	if ((ver = buffer_get_char(&m)) != SSHMUX_VER) {
 		error("%s: wrong client version %d", __func__, ver);
 		buffer_free(&m);
 		close(client_fd);
@@ -616,13 +740,15 @@ client_process_control(fd_set * readset)
 
 	switch (command) {
 	case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN:
-		if (options.control_master == 2)
+		if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
+		    options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK)
 			allowed = ask_permission("Allow shared connection "
 			    "to %s? ", host);
 		/* continue below */
 		break;
 	case SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE:
-		if (options.control_master == 2)
+		if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
+		    options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK)
 			allowed = ask_permission("Terminate shared connection "
 			    "to %s? ", host);
 		if (allowed)
@@ -633,7 +759,7 @@ client_process_control(fd_set * readset)
 		buffer_clear(&m);
 		buffer_put_int(&m, allowed);
 		buffer_put_int(&m, getpid());
-		if (ssh_msg_send(client_fd, /* version */1, &m) == -1) {
+		if (ssh_msg_send(client_fd, SSHMUX_VER, &m) == -1) {
 			error("%s: client msg_send failed", __func__);
 			close(client_fd);
 			buffer_free(&m);
@@ -653,7 +779,7 @@ client_process_control(fd_set * readset)
 	buffer_clear(&m);
 	buffer_put_int(&m, allowed);
 	buffer_put_int(&m, getpid());
-	if (ssh_msg_send(client_fd, /* version */1, &m) == -1) {
+	if (ssh_msg_send(client_fd, SSHMUX_VER, &m) == -1) {
 		error("%s: client msg_send failed", __func__);
 		close(client_fd);
 		buffer_free(&m);
@@ -674,7 +800,7 @@ client_process_control(fd_set * readset)
 		buffer_free(&m);
 		return;
 	}
-	if ((ver = buffer_get_char(&m)) != 1) {
+	if ((ver = buffer_get_char(&m)) != SSHMUX_VER) {
 		error("%s: wrong client version %d", __func__, ver);
 		buffer_free(&m);
 		close(client_fd);
@@ -685,6 +811,8 @@ client_process_control(fd_set * readset)
 	memset(cctx, 0, sizeof(*cctx));
 	cctx->want_tty = (flags & SSHMUX_FLAG_TTY) != 0;
 	cctx->want_subsys = (flags & SSHMUX_FLAG_SUBSYS) != 0;
+	cctx->want_x_fwd = (flags & SSHMUX_FLAG_X11_FWD) != 0;
+	cctx->want_agent_fwd = (flags & SSHMUX_FLAG_AGENT_FWD) != 0;
 	cctx->term = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
 
 	cmd = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
@@ -718,7 +846,7 @@ client_process_control(fd_set * readset)
 
 	/* This roundtrip is just for synchronisation of ttymodes */
 	buffer_clear(&m);
-	if (ssh_msg_send(client_fd, /* version */1, &m) == -1) {
+	if (ssh_msg_send(client_fd, SSHMUX_VER, &m) == -1) {
 		error("%s: client msg_send failed", __func__);
 		close(client_fd);
 		close(new_fd[0]);
@@ -866,7 +994,10 @@ process_escapes(Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr, char *buf, int len)
 	u_char ch;
 	char *s;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+	if (len <= 0)
+		return (0);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < (u_int)len; i++) {
 		/* Get one character at a time. */
 		ch = buf[i];
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/clientloop.h b/crypto/openssh-4/clientloop.h
index b23c111cbd..aed2d918b1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/clientloop.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/clientloop.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.12 2004/11/07 00:01:46 djm Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.14 2005/07/04 00:58:43 djm Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -37,10 +37,15 @@
 
 /* Client side main loop for the interactive session. */
 int	 client_loop(int, int, int);
+void	 client_x11_get_proto(const char *, const char *, u_int,
+	    char **, char **);
 void	 client_global_request_reply_fwd(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 void	 client_session2_setup(int, int, int, const char *, struct termios *,
 	    int, Buffer *, char **, dispatch_fn *);
 
+/* Multiplexing protocol version */
+#define SSHMUX_VER			1
+
 /* Multiplexing control protocol flags */
 #define SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN		1	/* Open new connection */
 #define SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK	2	/* Check master is alive */
@@ -48,3 +53,5 @@ void	 client_session2_setup(int, int, int, const char *, struct termios *,
 
 #define SSHMUX_FLAG_TTY			(1)	/* Request tty on open */
 #define SSHMUX_FLAG_SUBSYS		(1<<1)	/* Subsystem request on open */
+#define SSHMUX_FLAG_X11_FWD		(1<<2)	/* Request X11 forwarding */
+#define SSHMUX_FLAG_AGENT_FWD		(1<<3)	/* Request agent forwarding */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/defines.h b/crypto/openssh-4/defines.h
index 7758bc37a5..408b988b5a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/defines.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/defines.h
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
 #ifndef _DEFINES_H
 #define _DEFINES_H
 
-/* $Id: defines.h,v 1.119 2005/02/20 10:01:49 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: defines.h,v 1.127 2005/08/31 16:59:49 tim Exp $ */
 
 
 /* Constants */
@@ -54,10 +54,24 @@ enum
 # ifdef PATH_MAX
 #  define MAXPATHLEN PATH_MAX
 # else /* PATH_MAX */
-#  define MAXPATHLEN 64 /* Should be safe */
+#  define MAXPATHLEN 64
+/* realpath uses a fixed buffer of size MAXPATHLEN, so force use of ours */
+#  ifndef BROKEN_REALPATH
+#   define BROKEN_REALPATH 1
+#  endif /* BROKEN_REALPATH */
 # endif /* PATH_MAX */
 #endif /* MAXPATHLEN */
 
+#ifndef PATH_MAX
+# ifdef _POSIX_PATH_MAX
+# define PATH_MAX _POSIX_PATH_MAX
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef MAXSYMLINKS
+# define MAXSYMLINKS 5
+#endif
+
 #ifndef STDIN_FILENO
 # define STDIN_FILENO    0
 #endif
@@ -432,6 +446,10 @@ struct winsize {
 # define __dead	__attribute__((noreturn))
 #endif
 
+#if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__) && !defined(__sentinel__)
+# define __sentinel__
+#endif
+
 /* *-*-nto-qnx doesn't define this macro in the system headers */
 #ifdef MISSING_HOWMANY
 # define howmany(x,y)	(((x)+((y)-1))/(y))
@@ -567,6 +585,23 @@ struct winsize {
 # define SSH_SYSFDMAX 10000
 #endif
 
+#if defined(__Lynx__)
+ /*
+  * LynxOS defines these in param.h which we do not want to include since
+  * it will also pull in a bunch of kernel definitions.
+  */
+# define ALIGNBYTES (sizeof(int) - 1)
+# define ALIGN(p) (((unsigned)p + ALIGNBYTES) & ~ALIGNBYTES)
+  /* Missing prototypes on LynxOS */
+  int snprintf (char *, size_t, const char *, ...);
+  int mkstemp (char *);
+  char *crypt (const char *, const char *);
+  int seteuid (uid_t);
+  int setegid (gid_t);
+  char *mkdtemp (char *);
+  int rresvport_af (int *, sa_family_t);
+  int innetgr (const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+#endif
 
 /*
  * Define this to use pipes instead of socketpairs for communicating with the
@@ -653,6 +688,10 @@ struct winsize {
 # define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1
 #endif
 
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF)  &&  !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF)
+# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1
+#endif
+
 /* HP-UX 11.11 */
 #ifdef BTMP_FILE
 # define _PATH_BTMP BTMP_FILE
@@ -664,4 +703,12 @@ struct winsize {
 
 /** end of login recorder definitions */
 
+#ifdef BROKEN_GETGROUPS
+# define getgroups(a,b) ((a)==0 && (b)==NULL ? NGROUPS_MAX : getgroups((a),(b)))
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_MMAP) && defined(BROKEN_MMAP)
+# undef HAVE_MMAP
+#endif
+
 #endif /* _DEFINES_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/dns.c b/crypto/openssh-4/dns.c
index 140ab60429..4487c1abaf 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/dns.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/dns.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.10 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.12 2005/06/17 02:44:32 djm Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved.
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
 #include "uuencode.h"
 
 extern char *__progname;
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.10 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.12 2005/06/17 02:44:32 djm Exp $");
 
 #ifndef LWRES
 static const char *errset_text[] = {
@@ -142,6 +142,26 @@ dns_read_rdata(u_int8_t *algorithm, u_int8_t *digest_type,
 	return success;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Check if hostname is numerical.
+ * Returns -1 if hostname is numeric, 0 otherwise
+ */
+static int
+is_numeric_hostname(const char *hostname)
+{
+	struct addrinfo hints, *ai;
+
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;
+	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+
+	if (getaddrinfo(hostname, "0", &hints, &ai) == 0) {
+		freeaddrinfo(ai);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
 
 /*
  * Verify the given hostname, address and host key using DNS.
@@ -151,7 +171,7 @@ int
 verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address,
     const Key *hostkey, int *flags)
 {
-	int counter;
+	u_int counter;
 	int result;
 	struct rrsetinfo *fingerprints = NULL;
 
@@ -171,6 +191,11 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address,
 	if (hostkey == NULL)
 		fatal("No key to look up!");
 
+	if (is_numeric_hostname(hostname)) {
+		debug("skipped DNS lookup for numerical hostname");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
 	result = getrrsetbyname(hostname, DNS_RDATACLASS_IN,
 	    DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, 0, &fingerprints);
 	if (result) {
@@ -249,7 +274,7 @@ export_dns_rr(const char *hostname, const Key *key, FILE *f, int generic)
 	u_char *rdata_digest;
 	u_int rdata_digest_len;
 
-	int i;
+	u_int i;
 	int success = 0;
 
 	if (dns_read_key(&rdata_pubkey_algorithm, &rdata_digest_type,
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/entropy.c b/crypto/openssh-4/entropy.c
index 0997174b62..410bbb9275 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/entropy.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/entropy.c
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
  * XXX: we should tell the child how many bytes we need.
  */
 
-RCSID("$Id: entropy.c,v 1.48 2003/11/21 12:56:47 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$Id: entropy.c,v 1.49 2005/07/17 07:26:44 djm Exp $");
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
 #define RANDOM_SEED_SIZE 48
@@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ seed_rng(void)
 	close(p[0]);
 
 	if (waitpid(pid, &ret, 0) == -1)
-	       fatal("Couldn't wait for ssh-rand-helper completion: %s",
-		   strerror(errno));
+		fatal("Couldn't wait for ssh-rand-helper completion: %s",
+		    strerror(errno));
 	signal(SIGCHLD, old_sigchld);
 
 	/* We don't mind if the child exits upon a SIGPIPE */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/gss-genr.c b/crypto/openssh-4/gss-genr.c
index 3f5727b3ed..9bc31aa2a2 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/gss-genr.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/gss-genr.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.3 2003/11/21 11:57:03 djm Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.4 2005/07/17 07:17:55 djm Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
@@ -78,8 +78,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_error(Gssctxt *ctxt)
 }
 
 char *
-ssh_gssapi_last_error(Gssctxt *ctxt,
-		      OM_uint32 *major_status, OM_uint32 *minor_status)
+ssh_gssapi_last_error(Gssctxt *ctxt, OM_uint32 *major_status,
+    OM_uint32 *minor_status)
 {
 	OM_uint32 lmin;
 	gss_buffer_desc msg = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/gss-serv-krb5.c b/crypto/openssh-4/gss-serv-krb5.c
index 91d87f798f..4f02621ddd 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/gss-serv-krb5.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/gss-serv-krb5.c
@@ -65,9 +65,6 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
 		logit("Cannot initialize krb5 context");
 		return 0;
 	}
-#ifdef KRB5_INIT_ETS
-	krb5_init_ets(krb_context);
-#endif
 
 	return 1;
 }
@@ -131,34 +128,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
 		return;
 	}
 #else
-	{
-		int tmpfd;
-		char ccname[40];
-		mode_t old_umask;
-
-		snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
-		    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXX", geteuid());
-
-		old_umask = umask(0177);
-		tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
-		umask(old_umask);
-		if (tmpfd == -1) {
-			logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(errno));
-			problem = errno;
-			return;
-		}
-		if (fchmod(tmpfd, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
-			logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(errno));
-			close(tmpfd);
-			problem = errno;
-			return;
-		}
-		close(tmpfd);
-		if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, ccname, &ccache))) {
-			logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
-			    krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
-			return;
-		}
+	if ((problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb_context, &ccache))) {
+		logit("ssh_krb5_cc_gen(): %.100s",
+		    krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+		return;
 	}
 #endif	/* #ifdef HEIMDAL */
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/gss-serv.c b/crypto/openssh-4/gss-serv.c
index de32a3f2ea..1171304591 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/gss-serv.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/gss-serv.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.5 2003/11/17 11:06:07 markus Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.8 2005/08/30 22:08:05 djm Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
 static OM_uint32
 ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t ename, gss_buffer_t name)
 {
-	char *tok;
+	u_char *tok;
 	OM_uint32 offset;
 	OM_uint32 oidl;
 
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t ename, gss_buffer_t name)
 	 */
 	if (tok[4] != 0x06 || tok[5] != oidl ||
 	    ename->length < oidl+6 ||
-	   !ssh_gssapi_check_oid(ctx,tok+6,oidl))
+	    !ssh_gssapi_check_oid(ctx,tok+6,oidl))
 		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
 
 	offset = oidl+6;
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep)
 		debug("Setting %s to %s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
 		gssapi_client.store.envval);
 		child_set_env(envp, envsizep, gssapi_client.store.envvar,
-		     gssapi_client.store.envval);
+		    gssapi_client.store.envval);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -275,13 +275,24 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep)
 int
 ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
 {
+	OM_uint32 lmin;
+
 	if (gssapi_client.exportedname.length == 0 ||
 	    gssapi_client.exportedname.value == NULL) {
 		debug("No suitable client data");
 		return 0;
 	}
 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
-		return ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user));
+		if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
+			return 1;
+		else {
+			/* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
+			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
+			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
+			gss_release_cred(&lmin, &gssapi_client.creds);
+			memset(&gssapi_client, 0, sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client));
+			return 0;
+		}
 	else
 		debug("ssh_gssapi_userok: Unknown GSSAPI mechanism");
 	return (0);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/hostfile.c b/crypto/openssh-4/hostfile.c
index bf2a31c9ba..63550a29dd 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/hostfile.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/hostfile.c
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.34 2005/03/10 22:01:05 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.35 2005/07/27 10:39:03 dtucker Exp $");
 
 #include <resolv.h>
 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ add_host_to_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host, const Key *key,
 {
 	FILE *f;
 	int success = 0;
-	char *hashed_host;
+	char *hashed_host = NULL;
 
 	if (key == NULL)
 		return 1;	/* XXX ? */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/includes.h b/crypto/openssh-4/includes.h
index 3d3aa3b21c..fa65aa38d6 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/includes.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/includes.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: includes.h,v 1.18 2004/06/13 15:03:02 djm Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: includes.h,v 1.19 2005/05/19 02:42:26 djm Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -17,10 +17,11 @@
 #define INCLUDES_H
 
 #define RCSID(msg) \
-static /**/const char *const rcsid[] = { (char *)rcsid, "\100(#)" msg }
+static /**/const char *const rcsid[] = { (const char *)rcsid, "\100(#)" msg }
 
 #include "config.h"
 
+#include <stdarg.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <ctype.h>
 #include <errno.h>
@@ -168,6 +169,10 @@ static /**/const char *const rcsid[] = { (char *)rcsid, "\100(#)" msg }
 # include <ia.h>
 #endif
 
+#ifdef HAVE_IAF_H
+# include <iaf.h>
+#endif
+
 #ifdef HAVE_TMPDIR_H
 # include <tmpdir.h>
 #endif
@@ -181,6 +186,10 @@ static /**/const char *const rcsid[] = { (char *)rcsid, "\100(#)" msg }
 # include <kafs.h>
 #endif
 
+#if defined(HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H)
+# include <sys/syslog.h>
+#endif
+
 /*
  * On HP-UX 11.11, shadow.h and prot.h provide conflicting declarations
  * of getspnam when _INCLUDE__STDC__ is defined, so we unset it here.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/kex.c b/crypto/openssh-4/kex.c
index a668346c39..5dce335fe5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/kex.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/kex.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.60 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.64 2005/07/25 11:59:39 markus Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ static void kex_choose_conf(Kex *);
 static void
 kex_prop2buf(Buffer *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
 {
-	int i;
+	u_int i;
 
 	buffer_clear(b);
 	/*
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ kex_buf2prop(Buffer *raw, int *first_kex_follows)
 static void
 kex_prop_free(char **proposal)
 {
-	int i;
+	u_int i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
 		xfree(proposal[i]);
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ kex_send_kexinit(Kex *kex)
 {
 	u_int32_t rnd = 0;
 	u_char *cookie;
-	int i;
+	u_int i;
 
 	if (kex == NULL) {
 		error("kex_send_kexinit: no kex, cannot rekey");
@@ -183,8 +183,7 @@ void
 kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	char *ptr;
-	int dlen;
-	int i;
+	u_int i, dlen;
 	Kex *kex = (Kex *)ctxt;
 
 	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received");
@@ -276,10 +275,12 @@ choose_comp(Comp *comp, char *client, char *server)
 	char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
 	if (name == NULL)
 		fatal("no matching comp found: client %s server %s", client, server);
-	if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) {
-		comp->type = 1;
+	if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) {
+		comp->type = COMP_DELAYED;
+	} else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) {
+		comp->type = COMP_ZLIB;
 	} else if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) {
-		comp->type = 0;
+		comp->type = COMP_NONE;
 	} else {
 		fatal("unsupported comp %s", name);
 	}
@@ -343,9 +344,7 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex)
 	char **my, **peer;
 	char **cprop, **sprop;
 	int nenc, nmac, ncomp;
-	int mode;
-	int ctos;				/* direction: if true client-to-server */
-	int need;
+	u_int mode, ctos, need;
 	int first_kex_follows, type;
 
 	my   = kex_buf2prop(&kex->my, NULL);
@@ -395,7 +394,7 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex)
 
 	/* ignore the next message if the proposals do not match */
 	if (first_kex_follows && !proposals_match(my, peer) &&
-	   !(datafellows & SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX)) {
+	    !(datafellows & SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX)) {
 		type = packet_read();
 		debug2("skipping next packet (type %u)", type);
 	}
@@ -405,15 +404,19 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex)
 }
 
 static u_char *
-derive_key(Kex *kex, int id, int need, u_char *hash, BIGNUM *shared_secret)
+derive_key(Kex *kex, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, BIGNUM *shared_secret)
 {
 	Buffer b;
 	const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_sha1();
 	EVP_MD_CTX md;
 	char c = id;
-	int have;
+	u_int have;
 	int mdsz = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
-	u_char *digest = xmalloc(roundup(need, mdsz));
+	u_char *digest;
+
+	if (mdsz < 0)
+		fatal("derive_key: mdsz < 0");
+	digest = xmalloc(roundup(need, mdsz));
 
 	buffer_init(&b);
 	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, shared_secret);
@@ -455,7 +458,7 @@ void
 kex_derive_keys(Kex *kex, u_char *hash, BIGNUM *shared_secret)
 {
 	u_char *keys[NKEYS];
-	int i, mode, ctos;
+	u_int i, mode, ctos;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < NKEYS; i++)
 		keys[i] = derive_key(kex, 'A'+i, kex->we_need, hash, shared_secret);
@@ -493,13 +496,13 @@ derive_ssh1_session_id(BIGNUM *host_modulus, BIGNUM *server_modulus,
 	EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
 
 	len = BN_num_bytes(host_modulus);
-	if (len < (512 / 8) || len > sizeof(nbuf))
+	if (len < (512 / 8) || (u_int)len > sizeof(nbuf))
 		fatal("%s: bad host modulus (len %d)", __func__, len);
 	BN_bn2bin(host_modulus, nbuf);
 	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, nbuf, len);
 
 	len = BN_num_bytes(server_modulus);
-	if (len < (512 / 8) || len > sizeof(nbuf))
+	if (len < (512 / 8) || (u_int)len > sizeof(nbuf))
 		fatal("%s: bad server modulus (len %d)", __func__, len);
 	BN_bn2bin(server_modulus, nbuf);
 	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, nbuf, len);
@@ -518,7 +521,7 @@ derive_ssh1_session_id(BIGNUM *host_modulus, BIGNUM *server_modulus,
 void
 dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, int len)
 {
-	int i;
+	u_int i;
 
 	fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", msg);
 	for (i = 0; i< len; i++) {
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/kex.h b/crypto/openssh-4/kex.h
index d9e9d6522f..3024a27172 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/kex.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/kex.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.35 2004/06/13 12:53:24 djm Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.37 2005/07/25 11:59:39 markus Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@
 #define	KEX_DH14	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
 #define	KEX_DHGEX	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1"
 
+#define COMP_NONE	0
+#define COMP_ZLIB	1
+#define COMP_DELAYED	2
+
 enum kex_init_proposals {
 	PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS,
 	PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS,
@@ -83,9 +87,9 @@ struct Mac {
 	char	*name;
 	int	enabled;
 	const EVP_MD	*md;
-	int	mac_len;
+	u_int	mac_len;
 	u_char	*key;
-	int	key_len;
+	u_int	key_len;
 };
 struct Comp {
 	int	type;
@@ -101,7 +105,7 @@ struct Kex {
 	u_char	*session_id;
 	u_int	session_id_len;
 	Newkeys	*newkeys[MODE_MAX];
-	int	we_need;
+	u_int	we_need;
 	int	server;
 	char	*name;
 	int	hostkey_type;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/key.c b/crypto/openssh-4/key.c
index e419304641..08c158b59c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/key.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/key.c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.57 2004/10/29 23:57:05 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.58 2005/06/17 02:44:32 djm Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ static char *
 key_fingerprint_hex(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len)
 {
 	char *retval;
-	int i;
+	u_int i;
 
 	retval = xmalloc(dgst_raw_len * 3 + 1);
 	retval[0] = '\0';
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/loginrec.c b/crypto/openssh-4/loginrec.c
index 361ac4cb7f..c3783c991d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/loginrec.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/loginrec.c
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@
 # include <libutil.h>
 #endif
 
-RCSID("$Id: loginrec.c,v 1.67 2005/02/15 11:19:28 dtucker Exp $");
+RCSID("$Id: loginrec.c,v 1.70 2005/07/17 07:26:44 djm Exp $");
 
 /**
  ** prototypes for helper functions in this file
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ login_init_entry(struct logininfo *li, int pid, const char *username,
 		strlcpy(li->username, username, sizeof(li->username));
 		pw = getpwnam(li->username);
 		if (pw == NULL) {
-			fatal("%s: Cannot find user \"%s\"", __func__, 
+			fatal("%s: Cannot find user \"%s\"", __func__,
 			    li->username);
 		}
 		li->uid = pw->pw_uid;
@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ login_init_entry(struct logininfo *li, int pid, const char *username,
 	return (1);
 }
 
-/* 
+/*
  * login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *)    - set the current time
  *
  * Set the current time in a logininfo structure. This function is
@@ -443,8 +443,9 @@ login_write(struct logininfo *li)
 	wtmpx_write_entry(li);
 #endif
 #ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_RECORD_LOGIN
-	if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN && 
-	   !sys_auth_record_login(li->username,li->hostname,li->line, &loginmsg))
+	if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN &&
+	    !sys_auth_record_login(li->username,li->hostname,li->line,
+	    &loginmsg))
 		logit("Writing login record failed for %s", li->username);
 #endif
 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
@@ -534,7 +535,7 @@ getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li)
  * sure dst has enough space, if not just copy src (ugh)
  */
 char *
-line_fullname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize)
+line_fullname(char *dst, const char *src, u_int dstsize)
 {
 	memset(dst, '\0', dstsize);
 	if ((strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0) || (dstsize < (strlen(src) + 5)))
@@ -558,7 +559,7 @@ line_stripname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize)
 	return (dst);
 }
 
-/* 
+/*
  * line_abbrevname(): Return the abbreviated (usually four-character)
  * form of the line (Just use the last <dstsize> characters of the
  * full name.)
@@ -808,7 +809,7 @@ utmp_write_library(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
 }
 # else /* UTMP_USE_LIBRARY */
 
-/* 
+/*
  * Write a utmp entry direct to the file
  * This is a slightly modification of code in OpenBSD's login.c
  */
@@ -852,7 +853,7 @@ utmp_write_direct(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
 			return (0);
 		}
 		if (ret != pos) {
-			logit("%s: Couldn't seek to tty %d slot in %s", 
+			logit("%s: Couldn't seek to tty %d slot in %s",
 			    __func__, tty, UTMP_FILE);
 			return (0);
 		}
@@ -1052,7 +1053,7 @@ utmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
 
 #ifdef USE_WTMP
 
-/* 
+/*
  * Write a wtmp entry direct to the end of the file
  * This is a slight modification of code in OpenBSD's logwtmp.c
  */
@@ -1113,7 +1114,7 @@ wtmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
 }
 
 
-/* 
+/*
  * Notes on fetching login data from wtmp/wtmpx
  *
  * Logouts are usually recorded with (amongst other things) a blank
@@ -1157,12 +1158,12 @@ wtmp_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
 	li->tv_sec = li->tv_usec = 0;
 
 	if ((fd = open(WTMP_FILE, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
-		logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__, 
+		logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__,
 		    WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
 		return (0);
 	}
 	if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) {
-		logit("%s: couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__, 
+		logit("%s: couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__,
 		    WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
 		close(fd);
 		return (0);
@@ -1177,7 +1178,7 @@ wtmp_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
 
 	while (!found) {
 		if (atomicio(read, fd, &ut, sizeof(ut)) != sizeof(ut)) {
-			logit("%s: read of %s failed: %s", __func__, 
+			logit("%s: read of %s failed: %s", __func__,
 			    WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
 			close (fd);
 			return (0);
@@ -1235,7 +1236,7 @@ wtmpx_write(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
 	int fd, ret = 1;
 
 	if ((fd = open(WTMPX_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0)) < 0) {
-		logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__, 
+		logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__,
 		    WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
 		return (0);
 	}
@@ -1322,12 +1323,12 @@ wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
 	li->tv_sec = li->tv_usec = 0;
 
 	if ((fd = open(WTMPX_FILE, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
-		logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__, 
+		logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__,
 		    WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
 		return (0);
 	}
 	if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) {
-		logit("%s: couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__, 
+		logit("%s: couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__,
 		    WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
 		close(fd);
 		return (0);
@@ -1342,13 +1343,13 @@ wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
 
 	while (!found) {
 		if (atomicio(read, fd, &utx, sizeof(utx)) != sizeof(utx)) {
-			logit("%s: read of %s failed: %s", __func__, 
+			logit("%s: read of %s failed: %s", __func__,
 			    WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
 			close (fd);
 			return (0);
 		}
 		/*
-		 * Logouts are recorded as a blank username on a particular 
+		 * Logouts are recorded as a blank username on a particular
 		 * line. So, we just need to find the username in struct utmpx
 		 */
 		if (wtmpx_islogin(li, &utx)) {
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/loginrec.h b/crypto/openssh-4/loginrec.h
index d1a12a8531..8e33901787 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/loginrec.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/loginrec.h
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
 #include <netinet/in.h>
 #include <sys/socket.h>
 
-/* RCSID("$Id: loginrec.h,v 1.9 2005/02/02 06:10:11 dtucker Exp $"); */
+/* RCSID("$Id: loginrec.h,v 1.10 2005/06/19 00:19:44 djm Exp $"); */
 
 /**
  ** you should use the login_* calls to work around platform dependencies
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ struct logininfo *login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *li, const int uid);
 unsigned int login_get_lastlog_time(const int uid);
 
 /* produce various forms of the line filename */
-char *line_fullname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize);
+char *line_fullname(char *dst, const char *src, u_int dstsize);
 char *line_stripname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize);
 char *line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize);
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/mac.c b/crypto/openssh-4/mac.c
index 097f0b93bf..2bda5a1b99 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/mac.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/mac.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.6 2003/09/18 13:02:21 miod Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.7 2005/06/17 02:44:32 djm Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
 
@@ -51,12 +51,15 @@ struct {
 int
 mac_init(Mac *mac, char *name)
 {
-	int i;
+	int i, evp_len;
+
 	for (i = 0; macs[i].name; i++) {
 		if (strcmp(name, macs[i].name) == 0) {
 			if (mac != NULL) {
 				mac->md = (*macs[i].mdfunc)();
-				mac->key_len = mac->mac_len = EVP_MD_size(mac->md);
+				if ((evp_len = EVP_MD_size(mac->md)) <= 0)
+					fatal("mac %s len %d", name, evp_len);
+				mac->key_len = mac->mac_len = (u_int)evp_len;
 				if (macs[i].truncatebits != 0)
 					mac->mac_len = macs[i].truncatebits/8;
 			}
@@ -77,7 +80,7 @@ mac_compute(Mac *mac, u_int32_t seqno, u_char *data, int datalen)
 
 	if (mac->key == NULL)
 		fatal("mac_compute: no key");
-	if ((u_int)mac->mac_len > sizeof(m))
+	if (mac->mac_len > sizeof(m))
 		fatal("mac_compute: mac too long");
 	HMAC_Init(&c, mac->key, mac->key_len, mac->md);
 	PUT_32BIT(b, seqno);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/match.c b/crypto/openssh-4/match.c
index 3ddb627302..29fb7dab94 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/match.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/match.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.19 2002/03/01 13:12:10 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.20 2005/06/17 02:44:32 djm Exp $");
 
 #include "match.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ match_list(const char *client, const char *server, u_int *next)
 				ret = xstrdup(p);
 				if (next != NULL)
 					*next = (cp == NULL) ?
-					    strlen(c) : cp - c;
+					    strlen(c) : (u_int)(cp - c);
 				xfree(c);
 				xfree(s);
 				return ret;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/misc.c b/crypto/openssh-4/misc.c
index 7adbcea1c1..2dd8ae6e36 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/misc.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/misc.c
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -23,7 +24,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.29 2005/03/10 22:01:05 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.34 2005/07/08 09:26:18 dtucker Exp $");
 
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "log.h"
@@ -375,6 +376,114 @@ addargs(arglist *args, char *fmt, ...)
 	args->list[args->num] = NULL;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Expands tildes in the file name.  Returns data allocated by xmalloc.
+ * Warning: this calls getpw*.
+ */
+char *
+tilde_expand_filename(const char *filename, uid_t uid)
+{
+	const char *path;
+	char user[128], ret[MAXPATHLEN];
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	u_int len, slash;
+
+	if (*filename != '~')
+		return (xstrdup(filename));
+	filename++;
+
+	path = strchr(filename, '/');
+	if (path != NULL && path > filename) {		/* ~user/path */
+		slash = path - filename;
+		if (slash > sizeof(user) - 1)
+			fatal("tilde_expand_filename: ~username too long");
+		memcpy(user, filename, slash);
+		user[slash] = '\0';
+		if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL)
+			fatal("tilde_expand_filename: No such user %s", user);
+	} else if ((pw = getpwuid(uid)) == NULL)	/* ~/path */
+		fatal("tilde_expand_filename: No such uid %d", uid);
+
+	if (strlcpy(ret, pw->pw_dir, sizeof(ret)) >= sizeof(ret))
+		fatal("tilde_expand_filename: Path too long");
+
+	/* Make sure directory has a trailing '/' */
+	len = strlen(pw->pw_dir);
+	if ((len == 0 || pw->pw_dir[len - 1] != '/') &&
+	    strlcat(ret, "/", sizeof(ret)) >= sizeof(ret))
+		fatal("tilde_expand_filename: Path too long");
+
+	/* Skip leading '/' from specified path */
+	if (path != NULL)
+		filename = path + 1;
+	if (strlcat(ret, filename, sizeof(ret)) >= sizeof(ret))
+		fatal("tilde_expand_filename: Path too long");
+
+	return (xstrdup(ret));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Expand a string with a set of %[char] escapes. A number of escapes may be
+ * specified as (char *escape_chars, char *replacement) pairs. The list must
+ * be terminated by a NULL escape_char. Returns replaced string in memory
+ * allocated by xmalloc.
+ */
+char *
+percent_expand(const char *string, ...)
+{
+#define EXPAND_MAX_KEYS	16
+	struct {
+		const char *key;
+		const char *repl;
+	} keys[EXPAND_MAX_KEYS];
+	u_int num_keys, i, j;
+	char buf[4096];
+	va_list ap;
+
+	/* Gather keys */
+	va_start(ap, string);
+	for (num_keys = 0; num_keys < EXPAND_MAX_KEYS; num_keys++) {
+		keys[num_keys].key = va_arg(ap, char *);
+		if (keys[num_keys].key == NULL)
+			break;
+		keys[num_keys].repl = va_arg(ap, char *);
+		if (keys[num_keys].repl == NULL)
+			fatal("percent_expand: NULL replacement");
+	}
+	va_end(ap);
+
+	if (num_keys >= EXPAND_MAX_KEYS)
+		fatal("percent_expand: too many keys");
+
+	/* Expand string */
+	*buf = '\0';
+	for (i = 0; *string != '\0'; string++) {
+		if (*string != '%') {
+ append:
+			buf[i++] = *string;
+			if (i >= sizeof(buf))
+				fatal("percent_expand: string too long");
+			buf[i] = '\0';
+			continue;
+		}
+		string++;
+		if (*string == '%')
+			goto append;
+		for (j = 0; j < num_keys; j++) {
+			if (strchr(keys[j].key, *string) != NULL) {
+				i = strlcat(buf, keys[j].repl, sizeof(buf));
+				if (i >= sizeof(buf))
+					fatal("percent_expand: string too long");
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		if (j >= num_keys)
+			fatal("percent_expand: unknown key %%%c", *string);
+	}
+	return (xstrdup(buf));
+#undef EXPAND_MAX_KEYS
+}
+
 /*
  * Read an entire line from a public key file into a static buffer, discarding
  * lines that exceed the buffer size.  Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
@@ -397,3 +506,20 @@ read_keyfile_line(FILE *f, const char *filename, char *buf, size_t bufsz,
 	}
 	return -1;
 }
+
+char *
+tohex(const u_char *d, u_int l)
+{
+	char b[3], *r;
+	u_int i, hl;
+
+	hl = l * 2 + 1;
+	r = xmalloc(hl);
+	*r = '\0';
+	for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
+		snprintf(b, sizeof(b), "%02x", d[i]);
+		strlcat(r, b, hl);
+	}
+	return (r);
+}
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/misc.h b/crypto/openssh-4/misc.h
index 8bbc87f0db..2d630feb5f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/misc.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/misc.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.21 2005/03/01 10:09:52 djm Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.25 2005/07/14 04:00:43 dtucker Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ char	*hpdelim(char **);
 char	*cleanhostname(char *);
 char	*colon(char *);
 long	 convtime(const char *);
+char	*tilde_expand_filename(const char *, uid_t);
+char	*percent_expand(const char *, ...) __attribute__((__sentinel__));
+char	*tohex(const u_char *, u_int);
 
 struct passwd *pwcopy(struct passwd *);
 
@@ -35,10 +38,6 @@ struct arglist {
 };
 void	 addargs(arglist *, char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
 
-/* tildexpand.c */
-
-char	*tilde_expand_filename(const char *, uid_t);
-
 /* readpass.c */
 
 #define RP_ECHO			0x0001
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/moduli.c b/crypto/openssh-4/moduli.c
index 8b05248e23..d53806ea6b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/moduli.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/moduli.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: moduli.c,v 1.10 2005/01/17 03:25:46 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: moduli.c,v 1.12 2005/07/17 07:17:55 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 1994 Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com>
  * Copyright 1996-1998, 2003 William Allen Simpson <wsimpson@greendragon.com>
@@ -112,22 +112,22 @@
 #define TINY_NUMBER	(1UL<<16)
 
 /* Ensure enough bit space for testing 2*q. */
-#define TEST_MAXIMUM    (1UL<<16)
-#define TEST_MINIMUM    (QSIZE_MINIMUM + 1)
-/* real TEST_MINIMUM    (1UL << (SHIFT_WORD - TEST_POWER)) */
-#define TEST_POWER      (3)	/* 2**n, n < SHIFT_WORD */
+#define TEST_MAXIMUM	(1UL<<16)
+#define TEST_MINIMUM	(QSIZE_MINIMUM + 1)
+/* real TEST_MINIMUM	(1UL << (SHIFT_WORD - TEST_POWER)) */
+#define TEST_POWER	(3)	/* 2**n, n < SHIFT_WORD */
 
 /* bit operations on 32-bit words */
-#define BIT_CLEAR(a,n)  ((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] &= ~(1L << ((n) & 31)))
-#define BIT_SET(a,n)    ((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] |= (1L << ((n) & 31)))
-#define BIT_TEST(a,n)   ((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] & (1L << ((n) & 31)))
+#define BIT_CLEAR(a,n)	((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] &= ~(1L << ((n) & 31)))
+#define BIT_SET(a,n)	((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] |= (1L << ((n) & 31)))
+#define BIT_TEST(a,n)	((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] & (1L << ((n) & 31)))
 
 /*
  * Prime testing defines
  */
 
 /* Minimum number of primality tests to perform */
-#define TRIAL_MINIMUM           (4)
+#define TRIAL_MINIMUM	(4)
 
 /*
  * Sieving data (XXX - move to struct)
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ static u_int32_t *LargeSieve, largewords, largetries, largenumbers;
 static u_int32_t largebits, largememory;	/* megabytes */
 static BIGNUM *largebase;
 
-int gen_candidates(FILE *, int, int, BIGNUM *);
+int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *);
 int prime_test(FILE *, FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t);
 
 /*
@@ -241,19 +241,20 @@ sieve_large(u_int32_t s)
  * The list is checked against small known primes (less than 2**30).
  */
 int
-gen_candidates(FILE *out, int memory, int power, BIGNUM *start)
+gen_candidates(FILE *out, u_int32_t memory, u_int32_t power, BIGNUM *start)
 {
 	BIGNUM *q;
 	u_int32_t j, r, s, t;
 	u_int32_t smallwords = TINY_NUMBER >> 6;
 	u_int32_t tinywords = TINY_NUMBER >> 6;
 	time_t time_start, time_stop;
-	int i, ret = 0;
+	u_int32_t i;
+	int ret = 0;
 
 	largememory = memory;
 
 	if (memory != 0 &&
-	   (memory < LARGE_MINIMUM || memory > LARGE_MAXIMUM)) {
+	    (memory < LARGE_MINIMUM || memory > LARGE_MAXIMUM)) {
 		error("Invalid memory amount (min %ld, max %ld)",
 		    LARGE_MINIMUM, LARGE_MAXIMUM);
 		return (-1);
@@ -371,8 +372,8 @@ gen_candidates(FILE *out, int memory, int power, BIGNUM *start)
 	 * fencepost errors, the last pass is skipped.
 	 */
 	for (smallbase = TINY_NUMBER + 3;
-	     smallbase < (SMALL_MAXIMUM - TINY_NUMBER);
-	     smallbase += TINY_NUMBER) {
+	    smallbase < (SMALL_MAXIMUM - TINY_NUMBER);
+	    smallbase += TINY_NUMBER) {
 		for (i = 0; i < tinybits; i++) {
 			if (BIT_TEST(TinySieve, i))
 				continue; /* 2*i+3 is composite */
@@ -548,7 +549,7 @@ prime_test(FILE *in, FILE *out, u_int32_t trials, u_int32_t generator_wanted)
 		 * due to earlier inconsistencies in interpretation, check
 		 * the proposed bit size.
 		 */
-		if (BN_num_bits(p) != (in_size + 1)) {
+		if ((u_int32_t)BN_num_bits(p) != (in_size + 1)) {
 			debug2("%10u: bit size %u mismatch", count_in, in_size);
 			continue;
 		}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/monitor.c b/crypto/openssh-4/monitor.c
index 9dca9c8034..ef613cd3c5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/monitor.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/monitor.c
@@ -869,8 +869,8 @@ int
 mm_answer_pam_query(int sock, Buffer *m)
 {
 	char *name, *info, **prompts;
-	u_int num, *echo_on;
-	int i, ret;
+	u_int i, num, *echo_on;
+	int ret;
 
 	debug3("%s", __func__);
 	sshpam_authok = NULL;
@@ -903,8 +903,8 @@ int
 mm_answer_pam_respond(int sock, Buffer *m)
 {
 	char **resp;
-	u_int num;
-	int i, ret;
+	u_int i, num;
+	int ret;
 
 	debug3("%s", __func__);
 	sshpam_authok = NULL;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/monitor_wrap.c b/crypto/openssh-4/monitor_wrap.c
index e1b6512b42..1489e7f08f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.39 2004/07/17 05:31:41 dtucker Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.40 2005/05/24 17:32:43 avsm Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
@@ -95,9 +95,9 @@ mm_request_send(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, Buffer *m)
 	PUT_32BIT(buf, mlen + 1);
 	buf[4] = (u_char) type;		/* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */
 	if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf))
-		fatal("%s: write", __func__);
+		fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
 	if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buffer_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen)
-		fatal("%s: write", __func__);
+		fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
 }
 
 void
@@ -105,24 +105,21 @@ mm_request_receive(int sock, Buffer *m)
 {
 	u_char buf[4];
 	u_int msg_len;
-	ssize_t res;
 
 	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
 
-	res = atomicio(read, sock, buf, sizeof(buf));
-	if (res != sizeof(buf)) {
-		if (res == 0)
+	if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
+		if (errno == EPIPE)
 			cleanup_exit(255);
-		fatal("%s: read: %ld", __func__, (long)res);
+		fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
 	}
 	msg_len = GET_32BIT(buf);
 	if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
 		fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len);
 	buffer_clear(m);
 	buffer_append_space(m, msg_len);
-	res = atomicio(read, sock, buffer_ptr(m), msg_len);
-	if (res != msg_len)
-		fatal("%s: read: %ld != msg_len", __func__, (long)res);
+	if (atomicio(read, sock, buffer_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len)
+		fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
 }
 
 void
@@ -767,7 +764,8 @@ mm_sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
     u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
 {
 	Buffer m;
-	int i, ret;
+	u_int i;
+	int ret;
 
 	debug3("%s", __func__);
 	buffer_init(&m);
@@ -793,7 +791,8 @@ int
 mm_sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
 {
 	Buffer m;
-	int i, ret;
+	u_int i;
+	int ret;
 
 	debug3("%s", __func__);
 	buffer_init(&m);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/msg.c b/crypto/openssh-4/msg.c
index 30bc3f1076..3e4c2882c5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/msg.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/msg.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: msg.c,v 1.7 2003/11/17 09:45:39 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: msg.c,v 1.8 2005/05/24 17:32:43 avsm Exp $");
 
 #include "buffer.h"
 #include "getput.h"
@@ -55,15 +55,13 @@ int
 ssh_msg_recv(int fd, Buffer *m)
 {
 	u_char buf[4];
-	ssize_t res;
 	u_int msg_len;
 
 	debug3("ssh_msg_recv entering");
 
-	res = atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
-	if (res != sizeof(buf)) {
-		if (res != 0)
-			error("ssh_msg_recv: read: header %ld", (long)res);
+	if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
+		if (errno != EPIPE)
+			error("ssh_msg_recv: read: header");
 		return (-1);
 	}
 	msg_len = GET_32BIT(buf);
@@ -73,9 +71,8 @@ ssh_msg_recv(int fd, Buffer *m)
 	}
 	buffer_clear(m);
 	buffer_append_space(m, msg_len);
-	res = atomicio(read, fd, buffer_ptr(m), msg_len);
-	if (res != msg_len) {
-		error("ssh_msg_recv: read: %ld != msg_len", (long)res);
+	if (atomicio(read, fd, buffer_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
+		error("ssh_msg_recv: read: %s", strerror(errno));
 		return (-1);
 	}
 	return (0);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/myproposal.h b/crypto/openssh-4/myproposal.h
index 228ed68828..d8cba1caf8 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/myproposal.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/myproposal.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.16 2004/06/13 12:53:24 djm Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.18 2005/07/25 11:59:39 markus Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -28,14 +28,15 @@
 	"diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
 #define	KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG	"ssh-rsa,ssh-dss"
 #define	KEX_DEFAULT_ENCRYPT \
-	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour," \
+	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc," \
+	"arcfour128,arcfour256,arcfour," \
 	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se," \
 	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr"
 #define	KEX_DEFAULT_MAC \
 	"hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,hmac-ripemd160," \
 	"hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com," \
 	"hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96"
-#define	KEX_DEFAULT_COMP	"none,zlib"
+#define	KEX_DEFAULT_COMP	"none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib"
 #define	KEX_DEFAULT_LANG	""
 
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c b/crypto/openssh-4/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
index 41f92cce9f..6ba9bd9865 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 #include "includes.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 
-RCSID("$Id: bsd-misc.c,v 1.26 2005/02/25 23:07:38 dtucker Exp $");
+RCSID("$Id: bsd-misc.c,v 1.27 2005/05/27 11:13:41 dtucker Exp $");
 
 #ifndef HAVE___PROGNAME
 char *__progname;
@@ -212,3 +212,21 @@ mysignal(int sig, mysig_t act)
 	return (signal(sig, act));
 #endif
 }
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRDUP
+char *
+strdup(const char *str)
+{
+	size_t len;
+	char *cp;
+
+	len = strlen(str) + 1;
+	cp = malloc(len);
+	if (cp != NULL)
+		if (strlcpy(cp, str, len) != len) {
+			free(cp);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+	return cp;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h b/crypto/openssh-4/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h
index 636792ed71..cbcf7f7271 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: fake-rfc2553.h,v 1.10 2005/02/11 07:32:13 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: fake-rfc2553.h,v 1.12 2005/08/03 05:36:21 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (C) 2000-2003 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -114,10 +114,16 @@ struct sockaddr_in6 {
 #endif /* !NI_MAXHOST */
 
 #ifndef EAI_NODATA
-# define EAI_NODATA	1
-# define EAI_MEMORY	2
-# define EAI_NONAME	3
-# define EAI_SYSTEM	4
+# define EAI_NODATA	(INT_MAX - 1)
+#endif
+#ifndef EAI_MEMORY
+# define EAI_MEMORY	(INT_MAX - 2)
+#endif
+#ifndef EAI_NONAME
+# define EAI_NONAME	(INT_MAX - 3)
+#endif
+#ifndef EAI_SYSTEM
+# define EAI_SYSTEM	(INT_MAX - 4)
 #endif
 
 #ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c b/crypto/openssh-4/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
index 4e869c4dfd..2016ffe312 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
@@ -144,6 +144,8 @@ _getshort(msgp)
 	GETSHORT(u, msgp);
 	return (u);
 }
+#elif defined(HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT) && (HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT == 0)
+u_int16_t _getshort(register const u_char *);
 #endif
 
 #ifndef HAVE__GETLONG
@@ -156,6 +158,8 @@ _getlong(msgp)
 	GETLONG(u, msgp);
 	return (u);
 }
+#elif defined(HAVE_DECL__GETLONG) && (HAVE_DECL__GETLONG == 0)
+u_int32_t _getlong(register const u_char *);
 #endif
 
 int
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h b/crypto/openssh-4/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
index 89d1454e07..ba68bc27e7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: openbsd-compat.h,v 1.26 2004/08/15 08:41:00 djm Exp $ */
+/* $Id: openbsd-compat.h,v 1.30 2005/08/26 20:15:20 tim Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -152,6 +152,10 @@ int openpty(int *, int *, char *, struct termios *, struct winsize *);
 int snprintf(char *, size_t, const char *, ...);
 #endif 
 
+#ifndef HAVE_STRTONUM
+long long strtonum(const char *, long long, long long, const char **);
+#endif
+
 #ifndef HAVE_VSNPRINTF
 int vsnprintf(char *, size_t, const char *, va_list);
 #endif
@@ -169,5 +173,6 @@ char *shadow_pw(struct passwd *pw);
 #include "bsd-cygwin_util.h"
 #include "port-irix.h"
 #include "port-aix.h"
+#include "port-uw.h"
 
 #endif /* _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h b/crypto/openssh-4/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d9b2fa55ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/* $Id: openssl-compat.h,v 1.1 2005/06/09 11:45:11 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER
+ * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00906000L
+# define SSH_OLD_EVP
+# define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(e)		((e)->app_data)
+#endif
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
+# define EVP_aes_128_cbc evp_rijndael
+# define EVP_aes_192_cbc evp_rijndael
+# define EVP_aes_256_cbc evp_rijndael
+extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_rijndael(void);
+extern void ssh_rijndael_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, u_int);
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(EVP_CTRL_SET_ACSS_MODE)
+# if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
+#  define USE_CIPHER_ACSS 1
+extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_acss(void);
+#  define EVP_acss evp_acss
+# else
+#  define EVP_acss NULL
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * insert comment here
+ */
+#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
+
+# ifndef SSH_DONT_REDEF_EVP
+
+#  ifdef EVP_Cipher
+#   undef EVP_Cipher
+#  endif
+
+#  define EVP_CipherInit(a,b,c,d,e)	ssh_EVP_CipherInit((a),(b),(c),(d),(e))
+#  define EVP_Cipher(a,b,c,d)		ssh_EVP_Cipher((a),(b),(c),(d))
+#  define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(a)	ssh_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup((a))
+# endif
+
+int ssh_EVP_CipherInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, const EVP_CIPHER *, unsigned char *,
+    unsigned char *, int);
+int ssh_EVP_Cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, char *, char *, int);
+int ssh_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *);
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h b/crypto/openssh-4/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h
index 9e3dce4dd2..37b2c12b09 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
-/* $Id: port-aix.h,v 1.25 2005/03/21 11:46:34 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: port-aix.h,v 1.26 2005/05/28 10:28:40 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  *
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Gert Doering.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -47,23 +48,23 @@
 
 /* These should be in the system headers but are not. */
 int usrinfo(int, char *, int);
-#if (HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB == 0)
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB) && (HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB == 0)
 int setauthdb(const char *, char *);
 #endif
 /* these may or may not be in the headers depending on the version */
-#if (HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE == 0)
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE) && (HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE == 0)
 int authenticate(char *, char *, int *, char **);
 #endif
-#if (HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED == 0)
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED) && (HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED == 0)
 int loginfailed(char *, char *, char *);
 #endif
-#if (HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS == 0)
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS) && (HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS == 0)
 int loginrestrictions(char *, int, char *, char **);
 #endif
-#if (HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS == 0)
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS) && (HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS == 0)
 int loginsuccess(char *, char *, char *, char **);
 #endif
-#if (HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED == 0)
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED) && (HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED == 0)
 int passwdexpired(char *, char **);
 #endif
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/atomicio.h b/crypto/openssh-4/openbsd-compat/port-uw.h
similarity index 77%
copy from crypto/openssh-4/atomicio.h
copy to crypto/openssh-4/openbsd-compat/port-uw.h
index 5c0f392eff..3589b2e446 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/atomicio.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/openbsd-compat/port-uw.h
@@ -1,8 +1,5 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: atomicio.h,v 1.5 2003/06/28 16:23:06 deraadt Exp $	*/
-
 /*
- * Copyright (c) 1995,1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
- * All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Tim Rice.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -25,9 +22,9 @@
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 
-/*
- * Ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==read || f==vwrite
- */
-ssize_t	atomicio(ssize_t (*)(int, void *, size_t), int, void *, size_t);
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF)  &&  !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF)
+char * get_iaf_password(struct passwd *pw);
+#endif
 
-#define vwrite (ssize_t (*)(int, void *, size_t))write
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/packet.c b/crypto/openssh-4/packet.c
index 7c150fde73..70e0110cba 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/packet.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/packet.c
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.116 2004/10/20 11:48:53 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.119 2005/07/28 17:36:22 markus Exp $");
 
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
 
@@ -116,6 +116,12 @@ static int initialized = 0;
 /* Set to true if the connection is interactive. */
 static int interactive_mode = 0;
 
+/* Set to true if we are the server side. */
+static int server_side = 0;
+
+/* Set to true if we are authenticated. */
+static int after_authentication = 0;
+
 /* Session key information for Encryption and MAC */
 Newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX];
 static struct packet_state {
@@ -624,7 +630,9 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)
 	/* Deleting the keys does not gain extra security */
 	/* memset(enc->iv,  0, enc->block_size);
 	   memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len); */
-	if (comp->type != 0 && comp->enabled == 0) {
+	if ((comp->type == COMP_ZLIB ||
+	    (comp->type == COMP_DELAYED && after_authentication)) &&
+	    comp->enabled == 0) {
 		packet_init_compression();
 		if (mode == MODE_OUT)
 			buffer_compress_init_send(6);
@@ -644,6 +652,35 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)
 		*max_blocks = MIN(*max_blocks, rekey_limit / enc->block_size);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Delayed compression for SSH2 is enabled after authentication:
+ * This happans on the server side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is sent,
+ * and on the client side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is received.
+ */
+static void
+packet_enable_delayed_compress(void)
+{
+	Comp *comp = NULL;
+	int mode;
+
+	/*
+	 * Remember that we are past the authentication step, so rekeying
+	 * with COMP_DELAYED will turn on compression immediately.
+	 */
+	after_authentication = 1;
+	for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+		comp = &newkeys[mode]->comp;
+		if (comp && !comp->enabled && comp->type == COMP_DELAYED) {
+			packet_init_compression();
+			if (mode == MODE_OUT)
+				buffer_compress_init_send(6);
+			else
+				buffer_compress_init_recv();
+			comp->enabled = 1;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 /*
  * Finalize packet in SSH2 format (compress, mac, encrypt, enqueue)
  */
@@ -757,6 +794,8 @@ packet_send2_wrapped(void)
 
 	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
 		set_newkeys(MODE_OUT);
+	else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && server_side)
+		packet_enable_delayed_compress();
 }
 
 static void
@@ -992,7 +1031,7 @@ packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 	static u_int packet_length = 0;
 	u_int padlen, need;
 	u_char *macbuf, *cp, type;
-	int maclen, block_size;
+	u_int maclen, block_size;
 	Enc *enc   = NULL;
 	Mac *mac   = NULL;
 	Comp *comp = NULL;
@@ -1099,6 +1138,8 @@ packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 		packet_disconnect("Invalid ssh2 packet type: %d", type);
 	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
 		set_newkeys(MODE_IN);
+	else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && !server_side)
+		packet_enable_delayed_compress();
 #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
 	fprintf(stderr, "read/plain[%d]:\r\n", type);
 	buffer_dump(&incoming_packet);
@@ -1229,9 +1270,9 @@ packet_get_bignum2(BIGNUM * value)
 }
 
 void *
-packet_get_raw(int *length_ptr)
+packet_get_raw(u_int *length_ptr)
 {
-	int bytes = buffer_len(&incoming_packet);
+	u_int bytes = buffer_len(&incoming_packet);
 
 	if (length_ptr != NULL)
 		*length_ptr = bytes;
@@ -1524,3 +1565,15 @@ packet_set_rekey_limit(u_int32_t bytes)
 {
 	rekey_limit = bytes;
 }
+
+void
+packet_set_server(void)
+{
+	server_side = 1;
+}
+
+void
+packet_set_authenticated(void)
+{
+	after_authentication = 1;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/packet.h b/crypto/openssh-4/packet.h
index 37f82f2f60..8c23646aaa 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/packet.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/packet.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.41 2004/05/11 19:01:43 deraadt Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.43 2005/07/25 11:59:40 markus Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ u_int	 packet_get_protocol_flags(void);
 void     packet_start_compression(int);
 void     packet_set_interactive(int);
 int      packet_is_interactive(void);
+void     packet_set_server(void);
+void     packet_set_authenticated(void);
 
 void     packet_start(u_char);
 void     packet_put_char(int ch);
@@ -52,7 +54,7 @@ u_int	 packet_get_char(void);
 u_int	 packet_get_int(void);
 void     packet_get_bignum(BIGNUM * value);
 void     packet_get_bignum2(BIGNUM * value);
-void	*packet_get_raw(int *length_ptr);
+void	*packet_get_raw(u_int *length_ptr);
 void	*packet_get_string(u_int *length_ptr);
 void     packet_disconnect(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
 void     packet_send_debug(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/progressmeter.c b/crypto/openssh-4/progressmeter.c
index 93f5a3e622..3cda090616 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/progressmeter.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/progressmeter.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: progressmeter.c,v 1.22 2004/07/11 17:48:47 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: progressmeter.c,v 1.24 2005/06/07 13:25:23 jaredy Exp $");
 
 #include "progressmeter.h"
 #include "atomicio.h"
@@ -42,6 +42,10 @@ static int can_output(void);
 static void format_size(char *, int, off_t);
 static void format_rate(char *, int, off_t);
 
+/* window resizing */
+static void sig_winch(int);
+static void setscreensize(void);
+
 /* updates the progressmeter to reflect the current state of the transfer */
 void refresh_progress_meter(void);
 
@@ -57,6 +61,7 @@ static volatile off_t *counter;	/* progress counter */
 static long stalled;		/* how long we have been stalled */
 static int bytes_per_second;	/* current speed in bytes per second */
 static int win_size;		/* terminal window size */
+static volatile sig_atomic_t win_resized; /* for window resizing */
 
 /* units for format_size */
 static const char unit[] = " KMGT";
@@ -147,6 +152,8 @@ refresh_progress_meter(void)
 		len = snprintf(buf, file_len + 1, "\r%s", file);
 		if (len < 0)
 			len = 0;
+		if (len >= file_len + 1)
+			len = file_len;
 		for (i = len;  i < file_len; i++ )
 			buf[i] = ' ';
 		buf[file_len] = '\0';
@@ -215,6 +222,10 @@ update_progress_meter(int ignore)
 
 	save_errno = errno;
 
+	if (win_resized) {
+		setscreensize();
+		win_resized = 0;
+	}
 	if (can_output())
 		refresh_progress_meter();
 
@@ -226,8 +237,6 @@ update_progress_meter(int ignore)
 void
 start_progress_meter(char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr)
 {
-	struct winsize winsize;
-
 	start = last_update = time(NULL);
 	file = f;
 	end_pos = filesize;
@@ -236,20 +245,12 @@ start_progress_meter(char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr)
 	stalled = 0;
 	bytes_per_second = 0;
 
-	if (ioctl(STDOUT_FILENO, TIOCGWINSZ, &winsize) != -1 &&
-	    winsize.ws_col != 0) {
-		if (winsize.ws_col > MAX_WINSIZE)
-			win_size = MAX_WINSIZE;
-		else
-			win_size = winsize.ws_col;
-	} else
-		win_size = DEFAULT_WINSIZE;
-	win_size += 1;					/* trailing \0 */
-
+	setscreensize();
 	if (can_output())
 		refresh_progress_meter();
 
 	signal(SIGALRM, update_progress_meter);
+	signal(SIGWINCH, sig_winch);
 	alarm(UPDATE_INTERVAL);
 }
 
@@ -267,3 +268,25 @@ stop_progress_meter(void)
 
 	atomicio(vwrite, STDOUT_FILENO, "\n", 1);
 }
+
+static void
+sig_winch(int sig)
+{
+	win_resized = 1;
+}
+
+static void
+setscreensize(void)
+{
+	struct winsize winsize;
+
+	if (ioctl(STDOUT_FILENO, TIOCGWINSZ, &winsize) != -1 &&
+	    winsize.ws_col != 0) {
+		if (winsize.ws_col > MAX_WINSIZE)
+			win_size = MAX_WINSIZE;
+		else
+			win_size = winsize.ws_col;
+	} else
+		win_size = DEFAULT_WINSIZE;
+	win_size += 1;					/* trailing \0 */
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/readconf.c b/crypto/openssh-4/readconf.c
index 8ace1bbd45..cf27a9f410 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/readconf.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/readconf.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.139 2005/03/10 22:01:05 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.143 2005/07/30 02:03:47 djm Exp $");
 
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -695,7 +695,7 @@ parse_int:
 			fwd.listen_host = cleanhostname(fwd.listen_host);
 		} else {
 			fwd.listen_port = a2port(fwd.listen_host);
-			fwd.listen_host = "";
+			fwd.listen_host = NULL;
 		}
 		if (fwd.listen_port == 0)
 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Badly formatted port number.",
@@ -743,6 +743,9 @@ parse_int:
 
 	case oAddressFamily:
 		arg = strdelim(&s);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing address family.",
+			    filename, linenum);
 		intptr = &options->address_family;
 		if (strcasecmp(arg, "inet") == 0)
 			value = AF_INET;
@@ -793,7 +796,27 @@ parse_int:
 
 	case oControlMaster:
 		intptr = &options->control_master;
-		goto parse_yesnoask;
+		arg = strdelim(&s);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing ControlMaster argument.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		value = 0;	/* To avoid compiler warning... */
+		if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "true") == 0)
+			value = SSHCTL_MASTER_YES;
+		else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "false") == 0)
+			value = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO;
+		else if (strcmp(arg, "auto") == 0)
+			value = SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO;
+		else if (strcmp(arg, "ask") == 0)
+			value = SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK;
+		else if (strcmp(arg, "autoask") == 0)
+			value = SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK;
+		else
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad ControlMaster argument.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
 
 	case oHashKnownHosts:
 		intptr = &options->hash_known_hosts;
@@ -816,7 +839,7 @@ parse_int:
 	/* Check that there is no garbage at end of line. */
 	if ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
 		fatal("%.200s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".",
-		     filename, linenum, arg);
+		    filename, linenum, arg);
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/readconf.h b/crypto/openssh-4/readconf.h
index de4b4cb278..2b9deb9db3 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/readconf.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/readconf.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.66 2005/03/01 10:40:27 djm Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.67 2005/06/08 11:25:09 djm Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -116,6 +116,11 @@ typedef struct {
 	int	hash_known_hosts;
 }       Options;
 
+#define SSHCTL_MASTER_NO	0
+#define SSHCTL_MASTER_YES	1
+#define SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO	2
+#define SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK	3
+#define SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK	4
 
 void     initialize_options(Options *);
 void     fill_default_options(Options *);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/readpass.c b/crypto/openssh-4/readpass.c
index c2bacdcd48..7914799a49 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/readpass.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/readpass.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: readpass.c,v 1.31 2004/10/29 22:53:56 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: readpass.c,v 1.33 2005/05/02 21:13:22 markus Exp $");
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "misc.h"
@@ -106,15 +106,20 @@ read_passphrase(const char *prompt, int flags)
 	if (flags & RP_USE_ASKPASS)
 		use_askpass = 1;
 	else if (flags & RP_ALLOW_STDIN) {
-		if (!isatty(STDIN_FILENO))
+		if (!isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) {
+			debug("read_passphrase: stdin is not a tty");
 			use_askpass = 1;
+		}
 	} else {
 		rppflags |= RPP_REQUIRE_TTY;
 		ttyfd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR);
 		if (ttyfd >= 0)
 			close(ttyfd);
-		else
+		else {
+			debug("read_passphrase: can't open %s: %s", _PATH_TTY,
+			    strerror(errno));
 			use_askpass = 1;
+		}
 	}
 
 	if ((flags & RP_USE_ASKPASS) && getenv("DISPLAY") == NULL)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/scp.c b/crypto/openssh-4/scp.c
index 1d34cc6393..1407aa71d8 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/scp.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/scp.c
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.121 2005/04/02 12:41:16 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.125 2005/07/27 10:39:03 dtucker Exp $");
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "atomicio.h"
@@ -109,11 +109,13 @@ static void
 killchild(int signo)
 {
 	if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
-		kill(do_cmd_pid, signo);
+		kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
 		waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
 	}
 
-	_exit(1);
+	if (signo)
+		_exit(1);
+	exit(1);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -184,7 +186,7 @@ do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout, int argc)
 }
 
 typedef struct {
-	int cnt;
+	size_t cnt;
 	char *buf;
 } BUF;
 
@@ -502,8 +504,9 @@ source(int argc, char **argv)
 	struct stat stb;
 	static BUF buffer;
 	BUF *bp;
-	off_t i, amt, result, statbytes;
-	int fd, haderr, indx;
+	off_t i, amt, statbytes;
+	size_t result;
+	int fd = -1, haderr, indx;
 	char *last, *name, buf[2048];
 	int len;
 
@@ -578,14 +581,14 @@ next:			(void) close(fd);
 			if (!haderr) {
 				result = atomicio(read, fd, bp->buf, amt);
 				if (result != amt)
-					haderr = result >= 0 ? EIO : errno;
+					haderr = errno;
 			}
 			if (haderr)
 				(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt);
 			else {
 				result = atomicio(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt);
 				if (result != amt)
-					haderr = result >= 0 ? EIO : errno;
+					haderr = errno;
 				statbytes += result;
 			}
 			if (limit_rate)
@@ -720,8 +723,9 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
 		YES, NO, DISPLAYED
 	} wrerr;
 	BUF *bp;
-	off_t i, j;
-	int amt, count, exists, first, mask, mode, ofd, omode;
+	off_t i;
+	size_t j, count;
+	int amt, exists, first, mask, mode, ofd, omode;
 	off_t size, statbytes;
 	int setimes, targisdir, wrerrno = 0;
 	char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048];
@@ -748,7 +752,7 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
 		targisdir = 1;
 	for (first = 1;; first = 0) {
 		cp = buf;
-		if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) <= 0)
+		if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1)
 			return;
 		if (*cp++ == '\n')
 			SCREWUP("unexpected <newline>");
@@ -829,7 +833,7 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
 		}
 		if (targisdir) {
 			static char *namebuf;
-			static int cursize;
+			static size_t cursize;
 			size_t need;
 
 			need = strlen(targ) + strlen(cp) + 250;
@@ -902,7 +906,7 @@ bad:			run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno));
 			count += amt;
 			do {
 				j = atomicio(read, remin, cp, amt);
-				if (j <= 0) {
+				if (j == 0) {
 					run_err("%s", j ? strerror(errno) :
 					    "dropped connection");
 					exit(1);
@@ -918,10 +922,10 @@ bad:			run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno));
 			if (count == bp->cnt) {
 				/* Keep reading so we stay sync'd up. */
 				if (wrerr == NO) {
-					j = atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf, count);
-					if (j != count) {
+					if (atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf,
+					    count) != count) {
 						wrerr = YES;
-						wrerrno = j >= 0 ? EIO : errno;
+						wrerrno = errno;
 					}
 				}
 				count = 0;
@@ -931,9 +935,9 @@ bad:			run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno));
 		if (showprogress)
 			stop_progress_meter();
 		if (count != 0 && wrerr == NO &&
-		    (j = atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf, count)) != count) {
+		    atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf, count) != count) {
 			wrerr = YES;
-			wrerrno = j >= 0 ? EIO : errno;
+			wrerrno = errno;
 		}
 		if (wrerr == NO && ftruncate(ofd, size) != 0) {
 			run_err("%s: truncate: %s", np, strerror(errno));
@@ -1070,7 +1074,7 @@ verifydir(char *cp)
 		errno = ENOTDIR;
 	}
 	run_err("%s: %s", cp, strerror(errno));
-	exit(1);
+	killchild(0);
 }
 
 int
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/servconf.c b/crypto/openssh-4/servconf.c
index 96ad18084c..9e420a527d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/servconf.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/servconf.c
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.140 2005/03/10 22:01:05 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.144 2005/08/06 10:03:12 dtucker Exp $");
 
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "log.h"
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	if (options->use_login == -1)
 		options->use_login = 0;
 	if (options->compression == -1)
-		options->compression = 1;
+		options->compression = COMP_DELAYED;
 	if (options->allow_tcp_forwarding == -1)
 		options->allow_tcp_forwarding = 1;
 	if (options->gateway_ports == -1)
@@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename,
 static void
 add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, u_short port)
 {
-	int i;
+	u_int i;
 
 	if (options->num_ports == 0)
 		options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
@@ -438,9 +438,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
     const char *filename, int linenum)
 {
 	char *cp, **charptr, *arg, *p;
-	int *intptr, value, i, n;
+	int *intptr, value, n;
 	ServerOpCodes opcode;
 	u_short port;
+	u_int i;
 
 	cp = line;
 	arg = strdelim(&cp);
@@ -516,6 +517,12 @@ parse_time:
 		if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0')
 			fatal("%s line %d: missing address",
 			    filename, linenum);
+		/* check for bare IPv6 address: no "[]" and 2 or more ":" */
+		if (strchr(arg, '[') == NULL && (p = strchr(arg, ':')) != NULL
+		    && strchr(p+1, ':') != NULL) {
+			add_listen_addr(options, arg, 0);
+			break;
+		}
 		p = hpdelim(&arg);
 		if (p == NULL)
 			fatal("%s line %d: bad address:port usage",
@@ -532,6 +539,9 @@ parse_time:
 
 	case sAddressFamily:
 		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing address family.",
+			    filename, linenum);
 		intptr = &options->address_family;
 		if (options->listen_addrs != NULL)
 			fatal("%s line %d: address family must be specified before "
@@ -721,7 +731,23 @@ parse_flag:
 
 	case sCompression:
 		intptr = &options->compression;
-		goto parse_flag;
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing yes/no/delayed "
+			    "argument.", filename, linenum);
+		value = 0;	/* silence compiler */
+		if (strcmp(arg, "delayed") == 0)
+			value = COMP_DELAYED;
+		else if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0)
+			value = COMP_ZLIB;
+		else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0)
+			value = COMP_NONE;
+		else
+			fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/no/delayed "
+			    "argument: %s", filename, linenum, arg);
+		if (*intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
 
 	case sGatewayPorts:
 		intptr = &options->gateway_ports;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/serverloop.c b/crypto/openssh-4/serverloop.c
index eee1e79598..d2eff170a9 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/serverloop.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/serverloop.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.117 2004/08/11 21:43:05 avsm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.118 2005/07/17 07:17:55 djm Exp $");
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "packet.h"
@@ -865,7 +865,7 @@ server_request_direct_tcpip(void)
 	packet_check_eom();
 
 	debug("server_request_direct_tcpip: originator %s port %d, target %s port %d",
-	   originator, originator_port, target, target_port);
+	    originator, originator_port, target, target_port);
 
 	/* XXX check permission */
 	sock = channel_connect_to(target, target_port);
@@ -983,7 +983,7 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 #ifndef NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT
 		    || (listen_port < IPPORT_RESERVED && pw->pw_uid != 0)
 #endif
-		   ) {
+		    ) {
 			success = 0;
 			packet_send_debug("Server has disabled port forwarding.");
 		} else {
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/session.c b/crypto/openssh-4/session.c
index 8ac476c691..db8722f47c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/session.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/session.c
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.181 2004/12/23 17:35:48 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.186 2005/07/25 11:59:40 markus Exp $");
 
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "ssh1.h"
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.181 2004/12/23 17:35:48 markus Exp $");
 #include "serverloop.h"
 #include "canohost.h"
 #include "session.h"
+#include "kex.h"
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
 
 #if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS)
@@ -196,11 +197,11 @@ auth_input_request_forwarding(struct passwd * pw)
 static void
 display_loginmsg(void)
 {
-        if (buffer_len(&loginmsg) > 0) {
-                buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\0", 1);
-                printf("%s", (char *)buffer_ptr(&loginmsg));
-                buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
-        }
+	if (buffer_len(&loginmsg) > 0) {
+		buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\0", 1);
+		printf("%s", (char *)buffer_ptr(&loginmsg));
+		buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
+	}
 }
 
 void
@@ -272,7 +273,7 @@ do_authenticated1(Authctxt *authctxt)
 				    compression_level);
 				break;
 			}
-			if (!options.compression) {
+			if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
 				debug2("compression disabled");
 				break;
 			}
@@ -946,7 +947,8 @@ read_etc_default_login(char ***env, u_int *envsize, uid_t uid)
 }
 #endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */
 
-void copy_environment(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize)
+void
+copy_environment(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize)
 {
 	char *var_name, *var_val;
 	int i;
@@ -1332,6 +1334,11 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
 # ifdef _AIX
 		aix_usrinfo(pw);
 # endif /* _AIX */
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF)  &&  !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF)
+		if (set_id(pw->pw_name) != 0) {
+			exit(1);
+		}
+#endif /* HAVE_LIBIAF  && !BROKEN_LIBIAF */
 		/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
 		permanently_set_uid(pw);
 #endif
@@ -1529,7 +1536,7 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
 	 */
 
 	if (options.kerberos_get_afs_token && k_hasafs() &&
-	     (s->authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL)) {
+	    (s->authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL)) {
 		char cell[64];
 
 		debug("Getting AFS token");
@@ -1633,6 +1640,7 @@ session_new(void)
 			s->ttyfd = -1;
 			s->used = 1;
 			s->self = i;
+			s->x11_chanids = NULL;
 			debug("session_new: session %d", i);
 			return s;
 		}
@@ -1705,6 +1713,29 @@ session_by_channel(int id)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
+static Session *
+session_by_x11_channel(int id)
+{
+	int i, j;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) {
+		Session *s = &sessions[i];
+
+		if (s->x11_chanids == NULL || !s->used)
+			continue;
+		for (j = 0; s->x11_chanids[j] != -1; j++) {
+			if (s->x11_chanids[j] == id) {
+				debug("session_by_x11_channel: session %d "
+				    "channel %d", s->self, id);
+				return s;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	debug("session_by_x11_channel: unknown channel %d", id);
+	session_dump();
+	return NULL;
+}
+
 static Session *
 session_by_pid(pid_t pid)
 {
@@ -1800,7 +1831,7 @@ session_subsystem_req(Session *s)
 	u_int len;
 	int success = 0;
 	char *cmd, *subsys = packet_get_string(&len);
-	int i;
+	u_int i;
 
 	packet_check_eom();
 	logit("subsystem request for %.100s", subsys);
@@ -1834,6 +1865,11 @@ session_x11_req(Session *s)
 {
 	int success;
 
+	if (s->auth_proto != NULL || s->auth_data != NULL) {
+		error("session_x11_req: session %d: "
+		    "x11 fowarding already active", s->self);
+		return 0;
+	}
 	s->single_connection = packet_get_char();
 	s->auth_proto = packet_get_string(NULL);
 	s->auth_data = packet_get_string(NULL);
@@ -2058,10 +2094,67 @@ sig2name(int sig)
 	return "SIG@openssh.com";
 }
 
+static void
+session_close_x11(int id)
+{
+	Channel *c;
+
+	if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL) {
+		debug("session_close_x11: x11 channel %d missing", id);
+	} else {
+		/* Detach X11 listener */
+		debug("session_close_x11: detach x11 channel %d", id);
+		channel_cancel_cleanup(id);
+		if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
+			chan_mark_dead(c);
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+session_close_single_x11(int id, void *arg)
+{
+	Session *s;
+	u_int i;
+
+	debug3("session_close_single_x11: channel %d", id);
+	channel_cancel_cleanup(id);
+	if ((s  = session_by_x11_channel(id)) == NULL)
+		fatal("session_close_single_x11: no x11 channel %d", id);
+	for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
+		debug("session_close_single_x11: session %d: "
+		    "closing channel %d", s->self, s->x11_chanids[i]);
+		/*
+		 * The channel "id" is already closing, but make sure we
+		 * close all of its siblings.
+		 */
+		if (s->x11_chanids[i] != id)
+			session_close_x11(s->x11_chanids[i]);
+	}
+	xfree(s->x11_chanids);
+	s->x11_chanids = NULL;
+	if (s->display) {
+		xfree(s->display);
+		s->display = NULL;
+	}
+	if (s->auth_proto) {
+		xfree(s->auth_proto);
+		s->auth_proto = NULL;
+	}
+	if (s->auth_data) {
+		xfree(s->auth_data);
+		s->auth_data = NULL;
+	}
+	if (s->auth_display) {
+		xfree(s->auth_display);
+		s->auth_display = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
 static void
 session_exit_message(Session *s, int status)
 {
 	Channel *c;
+	u_int i;
 
 	if ((c = channel_lookup(s->chanid)) == NULL)
 		fatal("session_exit_message: session %d: no channel %d",
@@ -2101,12 +2194,20 @@ session_exit_message(Session *s, int status)
 	if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
 		chan_write_failed(c);
 	s->chanid = -1;
+
+	/* Close any X11 listeners associated with this session */
+	if (s->x11_chanids != NULL) {
+		for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
+			session_close_x11(s->x11_chanids[i]);
+			s->x11_chanids[i] = -1;
+		}
+	}
 }
 
 void
 session_close(Session *s)
 {
-	int i;
+	u_int i;
 
 	debug("session_close: session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid);
 	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
@@ -2115,6 +2216,8 @@ session_close(Session *s)
 		xfree(s->term);
 	if (s->display)
 		xfree(s->display);
+	if (s->x11_chanids)
+		xfree(s->x11_chanids);
 	if (s->auth_display)
 		xfree(s->auth_display);
 	if (s->auth_data)
@@ -2153,6 +2256,7 @@ void
 session_close_by_channel(int id, void *arg)
 {
 	Session *s = session_by_channel(id);
+
 	if (s == NULL) {
 		debug("session_close_by_channel: no session for id %d", id);
 		return;
@@ -2233,6 +2337,7 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s)
 	struct stat st;
 	char display[512], auth_display[512];
 	char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
+	u_int i;
 
 	if (no_x11_forwarding_flag) {
 		packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled in user configuration file.");
@@ -2258,10 +2363,14 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s)
 	}
 	if (x11_create_display_inet(options.x11_display_offset,
 	    options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection,
-	    &s->display_number) == -1) {
+	    &s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
 		debug("x11_create_display_inet failed.");
 		return 0;
 	}
+	for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
+		channel_register_cleanup(s->x11_chanids[i],
+		    session_close_single_x11);
+	}
 
 	/* Set up a suitable value for the DISPLAY variable. */
 	if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/session.h b/crypto/openssh-4/session.h
index 48be5070c8..a2598a99c2 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/session.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/session.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: session.h,v 1.23 2004/07/17 05:31:41 dtucker Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: session.h,v 1.25 2005/07/17 06:49:04 djm Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -49,8 +49,9 @@ struct Session {
 	int	single_connection;
 	/* proto 2 */
 	int	chanid;
+	int	*x11_chanids;
 	int	is_subsystem;
-	int	num_env;
+	u_int	num_env;
 	struct {
 		char	*name;
 		char	*val;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/sftp-client.c b/crypto/openssh-4/sftp-client.c
index 92df427515..afbd1e6f37 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/sftp-client.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/sftp-client.c
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
 /* XXX: copy between two remote sites */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.53 2005/03/10 22:01:05 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.57 2005/07/27 10:39:03 dtucker Exp $");
 
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
 
@@ -64,10 +64,10 @@ send_msg(int fd, Buffer *m)
 
 	/* Send length first */
 	PUT_32BIT(mlen, buffer_len(m));
-	if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, mlen, sizeof(mlen)) <= 0)
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, mlen, sizeof(mlen)) != sizeof(mlen))
 		fatal("Couldn't send packet: %s", strerror(errno));
 
-	if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buffer_ptr(m), buffer_len(m)) <= 0)
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buffer_ptr(m), buffer_len(m)) != buffer_len(m))
 		fatal("Couldn't send packet: %s", strerror(errno));
 
 	buffer_clear(m);
@@ -76,26 +76,27 @@ send_msg(int fd, Buffer *m)
 static void
 get_msg(int fd, Buffer *m)
 {
-	ssize_t len;
 	u_int msg_len;
 
 	buffer_append_space(m, 4);
-	len = atomicio(read, fd, buffer_ptr(m), 4);
-	if (len == 0)
-		fatal("Connection closed");
-	else if (len == -1)
-		fatal("Couldn't read packet: %s", strerror(errno));
+	if (atomicio(read, fd, buffer_ptr(m), 4) != 4) {
+		if (errno == EPIPE)
+			fatal("Connection closed");
+		else
+			fatal("Couldn't read packet: %s", strerror(errno));
+	}
 
 	msg_len = buffer_get_int(m);
 	if (msg_len > MAX_MSG_LENGTH)
 		fatal("Received message too long %u", msg_len);
 
 	buffer_append_space(m, msg_len);
-	len = atomicio(read, fd, buffer_ptr(m), msg_len);
-	if (len == 0)
-		fatal("Connection closed");
-	else if (len == -1)
-		fatal("Read packet: %s", strerror(errno));
+	if (atomicio(read, fd, buffer_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
+		if (errno == EPIPE)
+			fatal("Connection closed");
+		else
+			fatal("Read packet: %s", strerror(errno));
+	}
 }
 
 static void
@@ -310,7 +311,7 @@ do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int printflag,
     SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
 {
 	Buffer msg;
-	u_int type, id, handle_len, i, expected_id, ents = 0;
+	u_int count, type, id, handle_len, i, expected_id, ents = 0;
 	char *handle;
 
 	id = conn->msg_id++;
@@ -334,8 +335,6 @@ do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int printflag,
 	}
 
 	for (; !interrupted;) {
-		int count;
-
 		id = expected_id = conn->msg_id++;
 
 		debug3("Sending SSH2_FXP_READDIR I:%u", id);
@@ -743,10 +742,10 @@ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path, char *local_path,
 	Attrib junk, *a;
 	Buffer msg;
 	char *handle;
-	int local_fd, status, num_req, max_req, write_error;
+	int local_fd, status = 0, write_error;
 	int read_error, write_errno;
 	u_int64_t offset, size;
-	u_int handle_len, mode, type, id, buflen;
+	u_int handle_len, mode, type, id, buflen, num_req, max_req;
 	off_t progress_counter;
 	struct request {
 		u_int id;
@@ -1127,7 +1126,7 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *local_path, char *remote_path,
 				goto done;
 			}
 			debug3("In write loop, ack for %u %u bytes at %llu",
-			   ack->id, ack->len, (unsigned long long)ack->offset);
+			    ack->id, ack->len, (unsigned long long)ack->offset);
 			++ackid;
 			xfree(ack);
 		}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/sftp-client.h b/crypto/openssh-4/sftp-client.h
index 991e05d332..c8a41f3773 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/sftp-client.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/sftp-client.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.h,v 1.13 2004/11/29 07:41:24 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.h,v 1.14 2005/04/26 12:59:02 jmc Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ struct SFTP_DIRENT {
 };
 
 /*
- * Initialiase a SSH filexfer connection. Returns NULL on error or
+ * Initialise a SSH filexfer connection. Returns NULL on error or
  * a pointer to a initialized sftp_conn struct on success.
  */
 struct sftp_conn *do_init(int, int, u_int, u_int);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/sftp-server.c b/crypto/openssh-4/sftp-server.c
index e822800575..6870e77320 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/sftp-server.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/sftp-server.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.47 2004/06/25 05:38:48 dtucker Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.48 2005/06/17 02:44:33 djm Exp $");
 
 #include "buffer.h"
 #include "bufaux.h"
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ Handle	handles[100];
 static void
 handle_init(void)
 {
-	int i;
+	u_int i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(handles)/sizeof(Handle); i++)
 		handles[i].use = HANDLE_UNUSED;
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ handle_init(void)
 static int
 handle_new(int use, const char *name, int fd, DIR *dirp)
 {
-	int i;
+	u_int i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(handles)/sizeof(Handle); i++) {
 		if (handles[i].use == HANDLE_UNUSED) {
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ handle_new(int use, const char *name, int fd, DIR *dirp)
 static int
 handle_is_ok(int i, int type)
 {
-	return i >= 0 && i < sizeof(handles)/sizeof(Handle) &&
+	return i >= 0 && (u_int)i < sizeof(handles)/sizeof(Handle) &&
 	    handles[i].use == type;
 }
 
@@ -477,10 +477,10 @@ process_write(void)
 		} else {
 /* XXX ATOMICIO ? */
 			ret = write(fd, data, len);
-			if (ret == -1) {
+			if (ret < 0) {
 				error("process_write: write failed");
 				status = errno_to_portable(errno);
-			} else if (ret == len) {
+			} else if ((size_t)ret == len) {
 				status = SSH2_FX_OK;
 			} else {
 				logit("nothing at all written");
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/sftp.c b/crypto/openssh-4/sftp.c
index 16a6cf0c62..f98ed7d275 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/sftp.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/sftp.c
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.63 2005/03/10 22:01:05 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.66 2005/08/08 13:22:48 jaredy Exp $");
 
 #ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
 #include <histedit.h>
@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ get_pathname(const char **cpp, char **path)
 {
 	const char *cp = *cpp, *end;
 	char quot;
-	int i, j;
+	u_int i, j;
 
 	cp += strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
 	if (!*cp) {
@@ -664,14 +664,15 @@ sdirent_comp(const void *aa, const void *bb)
 static int
 do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path, int lflag)
 {
-	int n, c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1;
+	int n;
+	u_int c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1;
 	SFTP_DIRENT **d;
 
 	if ((n = do_readdir(conn, path, &d)) != 0)
 		return (n);
 
 	if (!(lflag & LS_SHORT_VIEW)) {
-		int m = 0, width = 80;
+		u_int m = 0, width = 80;
 		struct winsize ws;
 		char *tmp;
 
@@ -747,7 +748,7 @@ do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path,
     int lflag)
 {
 	glob_t g;
-	int i, c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1;
+	u_int i, c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1;
 	Attrib *a = NULL;
 
 	memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
@@ -783,7 +784,7 @@ do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path,
 	}
 
 	if (!(lflag & LS_SHORT_VIEW)) {
-		int m = 0, width = 80;
+		u_int m = 0, width = 80;
 		struct winsize ws;
 
 		/* Count entries for sort and find longest filename */
@@ -1236,7 +1237,7 @@ interactive_loop(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *file1, char *file2)
 	char *dir = NULL;
 	char cmd[2048];
 	struct sftp_conn *conn;
-	int err;
+	int err, interactive;
 	EditLine *el = NULL;
 #ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
 	History *hl = NULL;
@@ -1294,14 +1295,15 @@ interactive_loop(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *file1, char *file2)
 		xfree(dir);
 	}
 
-#if HAVE_SETVBUF
+#if defined(HAVE_SETVBUF) && !defined(BROKEN_SETVBUF)
 	setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
 	setvbuf(infile, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
 #else
-       setlinebuf(stdout);
-       setlinebuf(infile);
+	setlinebuf(stdout);
+	setlinebuf(infile);
 #endif
 
+	interactive = !batchmode && isatty(STDIN_FILENO);
 	err = 0;
 	for (;;) {
 		char *cp;
@@ -1309,20 +1311,28 @@ interactive_loop(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *file1, char *file2)
 		signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
 
 		if (el == NULL) {
-			printf("sftp> ");
+			if (interactive)
+				printf("sftp> ");
 			if (fgets(cmd, sizeof(cmd), infile) == NULL) {
-				printf("\n");
+				if (interactive)
+					printf("\n");
 				break;
 			}
-			if (batchmode) /* Echo command */
-				printf("%s", cmd);
+			if (!interactive) { /* Echo command */
+				printf("sftp> %s", cmd);
+				if (strlen(cmd) > 0 &&
+				    cmd[strlen(cmd) - 1] != '\n')
+					printf("\n");
+			}
 		} else {
 #ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
 			const char *line;
 			int count = 0;
 
-			if ((line = el_gets(el, &count)) == NULL || count <= 0)
-				break;
+			if ((line = el_gets(el, &count)) == NULL || count <= 0) {
+				printf("\n");
+ 				break;
+			}
 			history(hl, &hev, H_ENTER, line);
 			if (strlcpy(cmd, line, sizeof(cmd)) >= sizeof(cmd)) {
 				fprintf(stderr, "Error: input line too long\n");
@@ -1345,6 +1355,11 @@ interactive_loop(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *file1, char *file2)
 	}
 	xfree(pwd);
 
+#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
+	if (el != NULL)
+		el_end(el);
+#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
+
 	/* err == 1 signifies normal "quit" exit */
 	return (err >= 0 ? 0 : -1);
 }
@@ -1475,7 +1490,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 
 			/* Allow "-" as stdin */
 			if (strcmp(optarg, "-") != 0 &&
-			   (infile = fopen(optarg, "r")) == NULL)
+			    (infile = fopen(optarg, "r")) == NULL)
 				fatal("%s (%s).", strerror(errno), optarg);
 			showprogress = 0;
 			batchmode = 1;
@@ -1561,8 +1576,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 	err = interactive_loop(in, out, file1, file2);
 
 #if !defined(USE_PIPES)
-       shutdown(in, SHUT_RDWR);
-       shutdown(out, SHUT_RDWR);
+	shutdown(in, SHUT_RDWR);
+	shutdown(out, SHUT_RDWR);
 #endif
 
 	close(in);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/ssh-add.1 b/crypto/openssh-4/ssh-add.1
index 1f3df5bec2..327fcddaef 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/ssh-add.1
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/ssh-add.1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.42 2005/03/01 17:32:19 jmc Exp $
+.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.43 2005/04/21 06:17:50 djm Exp $
 .\"
 .\"  -*- nroff -*-
 .\"
@@ -57,10 +57,10 @@
 adds RSA or DSA identities to the authentication agent,
 .Xr ssh-agent 1 .
 When run without arguments, it adds the files
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa ,
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
 and
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity .
+.Pa ~/.ssh/identity .
 Alternative file names can be given on the command line.
 If any file requires a passphrase,
 .Nm
@@ -142,11 +142,11 @@ agent.
 .El
 .Sh FILES
 .Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity
 Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user.
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
 Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user.
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
 Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of the user.
 .El
 .Pp
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/ssh-add.c b/crypto/openssh-4/ssh-add.c
index a796647a76..a3428769c9 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/ssh-add.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/ssh-add.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.71 2005/03/10 22:01:06 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.72 2005/07/17 07:17:55 djm Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ add_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename)
 		/* clear passphrase since it did not work */
 		clear_pass();
 		snprintf(msg, sizeof msg, "Enter passphrase for %.200s: ",
-		   comment);
+		    comment);
 		for (;;) {
 			pass = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
 			if (strcmp(pass, "") == 0) {
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/ssh-agent.1 b/crypto/openssh-4/ssh-agent.1
index 226804e5f0..741cf4bd18 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/ssh-agent.1
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/ssh-agent.1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.41 2004/07/11 17:48:47 deraadt Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.42 2005/04/21 06:17:50 djm Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -111,10 +111,10 @@ Keys are added using
 When executed without arguments,
 .Xr ssh-add 1
 adds the files
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa ,
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
 and
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity .
+.Pa ~/.ssh/identity .
 If the identity has a passphrase,
 .Xr ssh-add 1
 asks for the passphrase (using a small X11 application if running
@@ -179,11 +179,11 @@ The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command
 line terminates.
 .Sh FILES
 .Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity
 Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user.
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
 Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user.
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
 Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of the user.
 .It Pa /tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXX/agent.<ppid>
 Unix-domain sockets used to contain the connection to the
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/ssh-keygen.1 b/crypto/openssh-4/ssh-keygen.1
index c14eed14e8..5454d00ce8 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/ssh-keygen.1
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/ssh-keygen.1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.67 2005/03/14 10:09:03 dtucker Exp $
+.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.69 2005/06/08 03:50:00 djm Exp $
 .\"
 .\"  -*- nroff -*-
 .\"
@@ -129,10 +129,10 @@ section for details.
 Normally each user wishing to use SSH
 with RSA or DSA authentication runs this once to create the authentication
 key in
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity ,
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa
+.Pa ~/.ssh/identity ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
 or
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa .
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa .
 Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys,
 as seen in
 .Pa /etc/rc .
@@ -188,8 +188,8 @@ Show the bubblebabble digest of specified private or public key file.
 .It Fl b Ar bits
 Specifies the number of bits in the key to create.
 Minimum is 512 bits.
-Generally, 1024 bits is considered sufficient.
-The default is 1024 bits.
+Generally, 2048 bits is considered sufficient.
+The default is 2048 bits.
 .It Fl C Ar comment
 Provides a new comment.
 .It Fl c
@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ It is important that this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths and
 that both ends of a connection share common moduli.
 .Sh FILES
 .Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity
 Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user.
 This file should not be readable by anyone but the user.
 It is possible to
@@ -392,14 +392,14 @@ This file is not automatically accessed by
 but it is offered as the default file for the private key.
 .Xr ssh 1
 will read this file when a login attempt is made.
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity.pub
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity.pub
 Contains the protocol version 1 RSA public key for authentication.
 The contents of this file should be added to
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
 on all machines
 where the user wishes to log in using RSA authentication.
 There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
 Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user.
 This file should not be readable by anyone but the user.
 It is possible to
@@ -410,14 +410,14 @@ This file is not automatically accessed by
 but it is offered as the default file for the private key.
 .Xr ssh 1
 will read this file when a login attempt is made.
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
 Contains the protocol version 2 DSA public key for authentication.
 The contents of this file should be added to
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
 on all machines
 where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication.
 There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
 Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of the user.
 This file should not be readable by anyone but the user.
 It is possible to
@@ -428,10 +428,10 @@ This file is not automatically accessed by
 but it is offered as the default file for the private key.
 .Xr ssh 1
 will read this file when a login attempt is made.
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
 Contains the protocol version 2 RSA public key for authentication.
 The contents of this file should be added to
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
 on all machines
 where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication.
 There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/ssh-keygen.c b/crypto/openssh-4/ssh-keygen.c
index 92885506a9..b17851946c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.122 2005/03/11 14:59:06 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.128 2005/07/17 07:17:55 djm Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/pem.h>
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.122 2005/03/11 14:59:06 markus Exp $");
 #include "dns.h"
 
 /* Number of bits in the RSA/DSA key.  This value can be changed on the command line. */
-int bits = 1024;
+u_int32_t bits = 2048;
 
 /*
  * Flag indicating that we just want to change the passphrase.  This can be
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ extern char *__progname;
 char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
 
 /* moduli.c */
-int gen_candidates(FILE *, int, int, BIGNUM *);
+int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *);
 int prime_test(FILE *, FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t);
 
 static void
@@ -738,7 +738,7 @@ do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name)
 			fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: %s contains unhashed "
 			    "entries\n", old);
 			fprintf(stderr, "Delete this file to ensure privacy "
-			     "of hostnames\n");
+			    "of hostnames\n");
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -959,31 +959,38 @@ usage(void)
 {
 	fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options]\n", __progname);
 	fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -a trials   Number of trials for screening DH-GEX moduli.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -B          Show bubblebabble digest of key file.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -b bits     Number of bits in the key to create.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -C comment  Provide new comment.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -c          Change comment in private and public key files.\n");
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -D reader   Download public key from smartcard.\n");
+#endif /* SMARTCARD */
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -e          Convert OpenSSH to IETF SECSH key file.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -F hostname Find hostname in known hosts file.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -f filename Filename of the key file.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -G file     Generate candidates for DH-GEX moduli.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -g          Use generic DNS resource record format.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -H          Hash names in known_hosts file.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -i          Convert IETF SECSH to OpenSSH key file.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -l          Show fingerprint of key file.\n");
-	fprintf(stderr, "  -p          Change passphrase of private key file.\n");
-	fprintf(stderr, "  -q          Quiet.\n");
-	fprintf(stderr, "  -y          Read private key file and print public key.\n");
-	fprintf(stderr, "  -t type     Specify type of key to create.\n");
-	fprintf(stderr, "  -B          Show bubblebabble digest of key file.\n");
-	fprintf(stderr, "  -H          Hash names in known_hosts file\n");
-	fprintf(stderr, "  -F hostname Find hostname in known hosts file\n");
-	fprintf(stderr, "  -C comment  Provide new comment.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -M memory   Amount of memory (MB) to use for generating DH-GEX moduli.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -N phrase   Provide new passphrase.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -P phrase   Provide old passphrase.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -p          Change passphrase of private key file.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -q          Quiet.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -R hostname Remove host from known_hosts file.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -r hostname Print DNS resource record.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -S start    Start point (hex) for generating DH-GEX moduli.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -T file     Screen candidates for DH-GEX moduli.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -t type     Specify type of key to create.\n");
 #ifdef SMARTCARD
-	fprintf(stderr, "  -D reader   Download public key from smartcard.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -U reader   Upload private key to smartcard.\n");
 #endif /* SMARTCARD */
-
-	fprintf(stderr, "  -G file     Generate candidates for DH-GEX moduli\n");
-	fprintf(stderr, "  -T file     Screen candidates for DH-GEX moduli\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -v          Verbose.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -W gen      Generator to use for generating DH-GEX moduli.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -y          Read private key file and print public key.\n");
 
 	exit(1);
 }
@@ -1000,12 +1007,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	Key *private, *public;
 	struct passwd *pw;
 	struct stat st;
-	int opt, type, fd, download = 0, memory = 0;
-	int generator_wanted = 0, trials = 100;
+	int opt, type, fd, download = 0;
+	u_int32_t memory = 0, generator_wanted = 0, trials = 100;
 	int do_gen_candidates = 0, do_screen_candidates = 0;
 	int log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
 	BIGNUM *start = NULL;
 	FILE *f;
+	const char *errstr;
 
 	extern int optind;
 	extern char *optarg;
@@ -1033,11 +1041,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	    "degiqpclBHvxXyF:b:f:t:U:D:P:N:C:r:g:R:T:G:M:S:a:W:")) != -1) {
 		switch (opt) {
 		case 'b':
-			bits = atoi(optarg);
-			if (bits < 512 || bits > 32768) {
-				printf("Bits has bad value.\n");
-				exit(1);
-			}
+			bits = strtonum(optarg, 512, 32768, &errstr);
+			if (errstr)
+				fatal("Bits has bad value %s (%s)",
+					optarg, errstr);
 			break;
 		case 'F':
 			find_host = 1;
@@ -1063,7 +1070,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			change_comment = 1;
 			break;
 		case 'f':
-			strlcpy(identity_file, optarg, sizeof(identity_file));
+			if (strlcpy(identity_file, optarg, sizeof(identity_file)) >=
+			    sizeof(identity_file))
+				fatal("Identity filename too long");
 			have_identity = 1;
 			break;
 		case 'g':
@@ -1118,23 +1127,34 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			rr_hostname = optarg;
 			break;
 		case 'W':
-			generator_wanted = atoi(optarg);
-			if (generator_wanted < 1)
-				fatal("Desired generator has bad value.");
+			generator_wanted = strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr);
+			if (errstr)
+				fatal("Desired generator has bad value: %s (%s)",
+					optarg, errstr);
 			break;
 		case 'a':
-			trials = atoi(optarg);
+			trials = strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr);
+			if (errstr)
+				fatal("Invalid number of trials: %s (%s)",
+					optarg, errstr);
 			break;
 		case 'M':
-			memory = atoi(optarg);
+			memory = strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr);
+			if (errstr) {
+				fatal("Memory limit is %s: %s", errstr, optarg);
+			}
 			break;
 		case 'G':
 			do_gen_candidates = 1;
-			strlcpy(out_file, optarg, sizeof(out_file));
+			if (strlcpy(out_file, optarg, sizeof(out_file)) >=
+			    sizeof(out_file))
+				fatal("Output filename too long");
 			break;
 		case 'T':
 			do_screen_candidates = 1;
-			strlcpy(out_file, optarg, sizeof(out_file));
+			if (strlcpy(out_file, optarg, sizeof(out_file)) >=
+			    sizeof(out_file))
+				fatal("Output filename too long");
 			break;
 		case 'S':
 			/* XXX - also compare length against bits */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/ssh-keyscan.c b/crypto/openssh-4/ssh-keyscan.c
index bc2c3b7288..46f063687b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/ssh-keyscan.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/ssh-keyscan.c
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.52 2005/03/01 15:47:14 jmc Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.55 2005/06/17 02:44:33 djm Exp $");
 
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
 
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ Linebuf_lineno(Linebuf * lb)
 static char *
 Linebuf_getline(Linebuf * lb)
 {
-	int n = 0;
+	size_t n = 0;
 	void *p;
 
 	lb->lineno++;
@@ -493,7 +493,7 @@ conrecycle(int s)
 static void
 congreet(int s)
 {
-	int remote_major = 0, remote_minor = 0, n = 0;
+	int n = 0, remote_major = 0, remote_minor = 0;
 	char buf[256], *cp;
 	char remote_version[sizeof buf];
 	size_t bufsiz;
@@ -506,14 +506,17 @@ congreet(int s)
 			*cp = '\n';
 		cp++;
 	}
-	if (n < 0) {
-		if (errno != ECONNREFUSED)
-			error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
-		conrecycle(s);
-		return;
-	}
 	if (n == 0) {
-		error("%s: Connection closed by remote host", c->c_name);
+		switch (errno) {
+		case EPIPE:
+			error("%s: Connection closed by remote host", c->c_name);
+			break;
+		case ECONNREFUSED:
+			break;
+		default:
+			error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
+			break;
+		}
 		conrecycle(s);
 		return;
 	}
@@ -543,7 +546,12 @@ congreet(int s)
 	n = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-OpenSSH-keyscan\r\n",
 	    c->c_keytype == KT_RSA1? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2,
 	    c->c_keytype == KT_RSA1? PROTOCOL_MINOR_1 : PROTOCOL_MINOR_2);
-	if (atomicio(vwrite, s, buf, n) != n) {
+	if (n < 0 || (size_t)n >= sizeof(buf)) {
+		error("snprintf: buffer too small");
+		confree(s);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, s, buf, n) != (size_t)n) {
 		error("write (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
 		confree(s);
 		return;
@@ -561,14 +569,14 @@ static void
 conread(int s)
 {
 	con *c = &fdcon[s];
-	int n;
+	size_t n;
 
 	if (c->c_status == CS_CON) {
 		congreet(s);
 		return;
 	}
 	n = atomicio(read, s, c->c_data + c->c_off, c->c_len - c->c_off);
-	if (n < 0) {
+	if (n == 0) {
 		error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
 		confree(s);
 		return;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/ssh-rsa.c b/crypto/openssh-4/ssh-rsa.c
index 6e3be0a7ec..eb422d07e9 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/ssh-rsa.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/ssh-rsa.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.31 2003/11/10 16:23:41 jakob Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.32 2005/06/17 02:44:33 djm Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ openssh_RSA_verify(int type, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
 		    ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
 		goto done;
 	}
-	if (len != hlen + oidlen) {
+	if (len < 0 || (u_int)len != hlen + oidlen) {
 		error("bad decrypted len: %d != %d + %d", len, hlen, oidlen);
 		goto done;
 	}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/ssh.1 b/crypto/openssh-4/ssh.1
index e6f4b4a54f..b0749763b8 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/ssh.1
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/ssh.1
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.205 2005/03/07 23:41:54 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.209 2005/07/06 09:33:05 dtucker Exp $
 .Dd September 25, 1999
 .Dt SSH 1
 .Os
@@ -109,9 +109,9 @@ or
 .Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
 on the remote machine, and the user names are
 the same on both sides, or if the files
-.Pa $HOME/.rhosts
+.Pa ~/.rhosts
 or
-.Pa $HOME/.shosts
+.Pa ~/.shosts
 exist in the user's home directory on the
 remote machine and contain a line containing the name of the client
 machine and the name of the user on that machine, the user is
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ Additionally, if the server can verify the client's
 host key (see
 .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
 and
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
 in the
 .Sx FILES
 section), only then is login permitted.
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ This authentication method closes security holes due to IP
 spoofing, DNS spoofing and routing spoofing.
 [Note to the administrator:
 .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv ,
-.Pa $HOME/.rhosts ,
+.Pa ~/.rhosts ,
 and the rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are inherently insecure and should be
 disabled if security is desired.]
 .Pp
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ key pair for authentication purposes.
 The server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key.
 .Pp
 The file
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
 lists the public keys that are permitted for logging in.
 When the user logs in, the
 .Nm
@@ -165,18 +165,18 @@ implements the RSA authentication protocol automatically.
 The user creates his/her RSA key pair by running
 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
 This stores the private key in
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity
+.Pa ~/.ssh/identity
 and stores the public key in
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity.pub
+.Pa ~/.ssh/identity.pub
 in the user's home directory.
 The user should then copy the
 .Pa identity.pub
 to
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
 in his/her home directory on the remote machine (the
 .Pa authorized_keys
 file corresponds to the conventional
-.Pa $HOME/.rhosts
+.Pa ~/.rhosts
 file, and has one key
 per line, though the lines can be very long).
 After this, the user can log in without giving the password.
@@ -206,12 +206,12 @@ password authentication are tried.
 The public key method is similar to RSA authentication described
 in the previous section and allows the RSA or DSA algorithm to be used:
 The client uses his private key,
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
 or
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa ,
 to sign the session identifier and sends the result to the server.
 The server checks whether the matching public key is listed in
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
 and grants access if both the key is found and the signature is correct.
 The session identifier is derived from a shared Diffie-Hellman value
 and is only known to the client and the server.
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ electronic purse; another is going through firewalls.
 automatically maintains and checks a database containing
 identifications for all hosts it has ever been used with.
 Host keys are stored in
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
 in the user's home directory.
 Additionally, the file
 .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
@@ -423,8 +423,11 @@ authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent.
 .It Fl a
 Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection.
 .It Fl b Ar bind_address
-Specify the interface to transmit from on machines with multiple
-interfaces or aliased addresses.
+Use
+.Ar bind_address
+on the local machine as the source address
+of the connection.
+Only useful on systems with more than one address.
 .It Fl C
 Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout, stderr, and
 data for forwarded X11 and TCP/IP connections).
@@ -479,14 +482,17 @@ The supported ciphers are
 .Dq aes128-ctr ,
 .Dq aes192-ctr ,
 .Dq aes256-ctr ,
+.Dq arcfour128 ,
+.Dq arcfour256 ,
 .Dq arcfour ,
 .Dq blowfish-cbc ,
 and
 .Dq cast128-cbc .
 The default is
 .Bd -literal
-  ``aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour,
-    aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc''
+  ``aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour128,
+    arcfour256,arcfour,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,aes128-ctr,
+    aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr''
 .Ed
 .It Fl D Ar port
 Specifies a local
@@ -522,7 +528,7 @@ the system-wide configuration file
 .Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
 will be ignored.
 The default for the per-user configuration file is
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/config .
+.Pa ~/.ssh/config .
 .It Fl f
 Requests
 .Nm
@@ -548,11 +554,11 @@ private RSA key.
 Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for
 RSA or DSA authentication is read.
 The default is
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity
+.Pa ~/.ssh/identity
 for protocol version 1, and
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
 and
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
 for protocol version 2.
 Identity files may also be specified on
 a per-host basis in the configuration file.
@@ -941,7 +947,7 @@ Set to the name of the user logging in.
 Additionally,
 .Nm
 reads
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/environment ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/environment ,
 and adds lines of the format
 .Dq VARNAME=value
 to the environment if the file exists and if users are allowed to
@@ -952,13 +958,13 @@ option in
 .Xr sshd_config 5 .
 .Sh FILES
 .Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
 Records host keys for all hosts the user has logged into that are not
 in
 .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts .
 See
 .Xr sshd 8 .
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity, $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa, $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity, ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_rsa
 Contains the authentication identity of the user.
 They are for protocol 1 RSA, protocol 2 DSA, and protocol 2 RSA, respectively.
 These files
@@ -970,21 +976,21 @@ ignores a private key file if it is accessible by others.
 It is possible to specify a passphrase when
 generating the key; the passphrase will be used to encrypt the
 sensitive part of this file using 3DES.
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity.pub, $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa.pub, $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity.pub, ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub, ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
 Contains the public key for authentication (public part of the
 identity file in human-readable form).
 The contents of the
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity.pub
+.Pa ~/.ssh/identity.pub
 file should be added to the file
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
 on all machines
 where the user wishes to log in using protocol version 1 RSA authentication.
 The contents of the
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
 and
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
 file should be added to
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
 on all machines
 where the user wishes to log in using protocol version 2 DSA/RSA authentication.
 These files are not
@@ -992,13 +998,13 @@ sensitive and can (but need not) be readable by anyone.
 These files are
 never used automatically and are not necessary; they are only provided for
 the convenience of the user.
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/config
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/config
 This is the per-user configuration file.
 The file format and configuration options are described in
 .Xr ssh_config 5 .
 Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
 read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
 Lists the public keys (RSA/DSA) that can be used for logging in as this user.
 The format of this file is described in the
 .Xr sshd 8
@@ -1058,7 +1064,7 @@ be setuid root when that authentication method is used.
 By default
 .Nm
 is not setuid root.
-.It Pa $HOME/.rhosts
+.It Pa ~/.rhosts
 This file is used in
 .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
 and
@@ -1088,12 +1094,12 @@ authentication before permitting log in.
 If the server machine does not have the client's host key in
 .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts ,
 it can be stored in
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts .
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts .
 The easiest way to do this is to
 connect back to the client from the server machine using ssh; this
 will automatically add the host key to
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts .
-.It Pa $HOME/.shosts
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts .
+.It Pa ~/.shosts
 This file is used exactly the same way as
 .Pa .rhosts .
 The purpose for
@@ -1133,7 +1139,7 @@ when the user logs in just before the user's shell (or command) is started.
 See the
 .Xr sshd 8
 manual page for more information.
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/rc
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/rc
 Commands in this file are executed by
 .Nm
 when the user logs in just before the user's shell (or command) is
@@ -1141,7 +1147,7 @@ started.
 See the
 .Xr sshd 8
 manual page for more information.
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/environment
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/environment
 Contains additional definitions for environment variables, see section
 .Sx ENVIRONMENT
 above.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/ssh.c b/crypto/openssh-4/ssh.c
index 1f19229b71..c9e5aac7a9 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/ssh.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/ssh.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.234 2005/03/10 22:01:06 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.249 2005/07/30 01:26:16 djm Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ pid_t proxy_command_pid = 0;
 int control_fd = -1;
 
 /* Multiplexing control command */
-static u_int mux_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN;
+static u_int mux_command = 0;
 
 /* Only used in control client mode */
 volatile sig_atomic_t control_client_terminate = 0;
@@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	int dummy;
 	extern int optind, optreset;
 	extern char *optarg;
+	struct servent *sp;
 	Forward fwd;
 
 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
@@ -386,8 +387,10 @@ again:
 			}
 			break;
 		case 'M':
-			options.control_master =
-			    (options.control_master >= 1) ? 2 : 1;
+			if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_YES)
+				options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK;
+			else
+				options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_YES;
 			break;
 		case 'p':
 			options.port = a2port(optarg);
@@ -436,7 +439,7 @@ again:
 				fwd.listen_host = cleanhostname(fwd.listen_host);
 			} else {
 				fwd.listen_port = a2port(fwd.listen_host);
-				fwd.listen_host = "";
+				fwd.listen_host = NULL;
 			}
 
 			if (fwd.listen_port == 0) {
@@ -550,7 +553,7 @@ again:
 	if (no_tty_flag)
 		tty_flag = 0;
 	/* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */
-	if (!isatty(fileno(stdin)) && !force_tty_flag) {
+	if ((!isatty(fileno(stdin)) || stdin_null_flag) && !force_tty_flag) {
 		if (tty_flag)
 			logit("Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because stdin is not a terminal.");
 		tty_flag = 0;
@@ -604,16 +607,31 @@ again:
 				*p = tolower(*p);
 	}
 
+	/* Get default port if port has not been set. */
+	if (options.port == 0) {
+		sp = getservbyname(SSH_SERVICE_NAME, "tcp");
+		options.port = sp ? ntohs(sp->s_port) : SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
+	}
+
 	if (options.proxy_command != NULL &&
 	    strcmp(options.proxy_command, "none") == 0)
 		options.proxy_command = NULL;
+	if (options.control_path != NULL &&
+	    strcmp(options.control_path, "none") == 0)
+		options.control_path = NULL;
 
 	if (options.control_path != NULL) {
-		options.control_path = tilde_expand_filename(
-		   options.control_path, original_real_uid);
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", options.port);
+		cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.control_path,
+		    original_real_uid);
+		options.control_path = percent_expand(cp, "p", buf, "h", host,
+		    "r", options.user, (char *)NULL);
+		xfree(cp);
 	}
-	if (options.control_path != NULL && options.control_master == 0)
-		control_client(options.control_path); /* This doesn't return */
+	if (mux_command != 0 && options.control_path == NULL)
+		fatal("No ControlPath specified for \"-O\" command");
+	if (options.control_path != NULL)
+		control_client(options.control_path);
 
 	/* Open a connection to the remote host. */
 	if (ssh_connect(host, &hostaddr, options.port,
@@ -742,110 +760,6 @@ again:
 	return exit_status;
 }
 
-#define SSH_X11_PROTO "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1"
-
-static void
-x11_get_proto(char **_proto, char **_data)
-{
-	char cmd[1024];
-	char line[512];
-	char xdisplay[512];
-	static char proto[512], data[512];
-	FILE *f;
-	int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i;
-	char *display, *xauthdir, *xauthfile;
-	struct stat st;
-
-	xauthdir = xauthfile = NULL;
-	*_proto = proto;
-	*_data = data;
-	proto[0] = data[0] = '\0';
-
-	if (!options.xauth_location ||
-	    (stat(options.xauth_location, &st) == -1)) {
-		debug("No xauth program.");
-	} else {
-		if ((display = getenv("DISPLAY")) == NULL) {
-			debug("x11_get_proto: DISPLAY not set");
-			return;
-		}
-		/*
-		 * Handle FamilyLocal case where $DISPLAY does
-		 * not match an authorization entry.  For this we
-		 * just try "xauth list unix:displaynum.screennum".
-		 * XXX: "localhost" match to determine FamilyLocal
-		 *      is not perfect.
-		 */
-		if (strncmp(display, "localhost:", 10) == 0) {
-			snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s",
-			    display + 10);
-			display = xdisplay;
-		}
-		if (options.forward_x11_trusted == 0) {
-			xauthdir = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
-			xauthfile = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
-			strlcpy(xauthdir, "/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX", MAXPATHLEN);
-			if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) != NULL) {
-				do_unlink = 1;
-				snprintf(xauthfile, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/xauthfile",
-				    xauthdir);
-				snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
-				    "%s -f %s generate %s " SSH_X11_PROTO
-				    " untrusted timeout 1200 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
-				    options.xauth_location, xauthfile, display);
-				debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd);
-				if (system(cmd) == 0)
-					generated = 1;
-			}
-		}
-		snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
-		    "%s %s%s list %s . 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
-		    options.xauth_location,
-		    generated ? "-f " : "" ,
-		    generated ? xauthfile : "",
-		    display);
-		debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd);
-		f = popen(cmd, "r");
-		if (f && fgets(line, sizeof(line), f) &&
-		    sscanf(line, "%*s %511s %511s", proto, data) == 2)
-			got_data = 1;
-		if (f)
-			pclose(f);
-	}
-
-	if (do_unlink) {
-		unlink(xauthfile);
-		rmdir(xauthdir);
-	}
-	if (xauthdir)
-		xfree(xauthdir);
-	if (xauthfile)
-		xfree(xauthfile);
-
-	/*
-	 * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some
-	 * data.  The forwarding code will check the validity of the
-	 * response anyway, and substitute this data.  The X11
-	 * server, however, will ignore this fake data and use
-	 * whatever authentication mechanisms it was using otherwise
-	 * for the local connection.
-	 */
-	if (!got_data) {
-		u_int32_t rnd = 0;
-
-		logit("Warning: No xauth data; "
-		    "using fake authentication data for X11 forwarding.");
-		strlcpy(proto, SSH_X11_PROTO, sizeof proto);
-		for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
-			if (i % 4 == 0)
-				rnd = arc4random();
-			snprintf(data + 2 * i, sizeof data - 2 * i, "%02x",
-			    rnd & 0xff);
-			rnd >>= 8;
-		}
-	}
-}
-
 static void
 ssh_init_forwarding(void)
 {
@@ -876,8 +790,8 @@ ssh_init_forwarding(void)
 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
 		debug("Remote connections from %.200s:%d forwarded to "
 		    "local address %.200s:%d",
-		    (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ? 
-		    (options.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") : 
+		    (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ?
+		    (options.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") :
 		    options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host,
 		    options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port,
 		    options.remote_forwards[i].connect_host,
@@ -908,6 +822,7 @@ ssh_session(void)
 	int have_tty = 0;
 	struct winsize ws;
 	char *cp;
+	const char *display;
 
 	/* Enable compression if requested. */
 	if (options.compression) {
@@ -969,13 +884,15 @@ ssh_session(void)
 			packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for pty request response.");
 	}
 	/* Request X11 forwarding if enabled and DISPLAY is set. */
-	if (options.forward_x11 && getenv("DISPLAY") != NULL) {
+	display = getenv("DISPLAY");
+	if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
 		char *proto, *data;
 		/* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
-		x11_get_proto(&proto, &data);
+		client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
+		    options.forward_x11_trusted, &proto, &data);
 		/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
 		debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication spoofing.");
-		x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(0, proto, data);
+		x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(0, display, proto, data);
 
 		/* Read response from the server. */
 		type = packet_read();
@@ -1077,9 +994,12 @@ ssh_control_listener(void)
 	mode_t old_umask;
 	int addr_len;
 
-	if (options.control_path == NULL || options.control_master <= 0)
+	if (options.control_path == NULL ||
+	    options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO)
 		return;
 
+	debug("setting up multiplex master socket");
+
 	memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr));
 	addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
 	addr_len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) +
@@ -1114,15 +1034,18 @@ static void
 ssh_session2_setup(int id, void *arg)
 {
 	extern char **environ;
-
+	const char *display;
 	int interactive = tty_flag;
-	if (options.forward_x11 && getenv("DISPLAY") != NULL) {
+
+	display = getenv("DISPLAY");
+	if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
 		char *proto, *data;
 		/* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
-		x11_get_proto(&proto, &data);
+		client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
+		    options.forward_x11_trusted, &proto, &data);
 		/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
 		debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication spoofing.");
-		x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, proto, data);
+		x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto, data);
 		interactive = 1;
 		/* XXX wait for reply */
 	}
@@ -1290,13 +1213,18 @@ control_client(const char *path)
 	extern char **environ;
 	u_int  flags;
 
-	if (stdin_null_flag) {
-		if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
-			fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
-		if (dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
-			fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
-		if (fd > STDERR_FILENO)
-			close(fd);
+	if (mux_command == 0)
+		mux_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN;
+
+	switch (options.control_master) {
+	case SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO:
+	case SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK:
+		debug("auto-mux: Trying existing master");
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	case SSHCTL_MASTER_NO:
+		break;
+	default:
+		return;
 	}
 
 	memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr));
@@ -1311,31 +1239,55 @@ control_client(const char *path)
 	if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
 		fatal("%s socket(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
 
-	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, addr_len) == -1)
-		fatal("Couldn't connect to %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
+	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, addr_len) == -1) {
+		if (mux_command != SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN) {
+			fatal("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path,
+			    strerror(errno));
+		}
+		if (errno == ENOENT)
+	 		debug("Control socket \"%.100s\" does not exist", path);
+		else {
+	 		error("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path,
+			    strerror(errno));
+		}
+ 		close(sock);
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+
+ 	if (stdin_null_flag) {
+ 		if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
+ 			fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
+ 		if (dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
+ 			fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+ 		if (fd > STDERR_FILENO)
+ 			close(fd);
+ 	}
 
-	if ((term = getenv("TERM")) == NULL)
-		term = "";
+	term = getenv("TERM");
 
 	flags = 0;
 	if (tty_flag)
 		flags |= SSHMUX_FLAG_TTY;
 	if (subsystem_flag)
 		flags |= SSHMUX_FLAG_SUBSYS;
+	if (options.forward_x11)
+		flags |= SSHMUX_FLAG_X11_FWD;
+	if (options.forward_agent)
+		flags |= SSHMUX_FLAG_AGENT_FWD;
 
 	buffer_init(&m);
 
 	/* Send our command to server */
 	buffer_put_int(&m, mux_command);
 	buffer_put_int(&m, flags);
-	if (ssh_msg_send(sock, /* version */1, &m) == -1)
+	if (ssh_msg_send(sock, SSHMUX_VER, &m) == -1)
 		fatal("%s: msg_send", __func__);
 	buffer_clear(&m);
 
 	/* Get authorisation status and PID of controlee */
 	if (ssh_msg_recv(sock, &m) == -1)
 		fatal("%s: msg_recv", __func__);
-	if (buffer_get_char(&m) != 1)
+	if (buffer_get_char(&m) != SSHMUX_VER)
 		fatal("%s: wrong version", __func__);
 	if (buffer_get_int(&m) != 1)
 		fatal("Connection to master denied");
@@ -1359,7 +1311,7 @@ control_client(const char *path)
 	}
 
 	/* SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN */
-	buffer_put_cstring(&m, term);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, term ? term : "");
 	buffer_append(&command, "\0", 1);
 	buffer_put_cstring(&m, buffer_ptr(&command));
 
@@ -1381,7 +1333,7 @@ control_client(const char *path)
 			}
 	}
 
-	if (ssh_msg_send(sock, /* version */1, &m) == -1)
+	if (ssh_msg_send(sock, SSHMUX_VER, &m) == -1)
 		fatal("%s: msg_send", __func__);
 
 	mm_send_fd(sock, STDIN_FILENO);
@@ -1392,7 +1344,7 @@ control_client(const char *path)
 	buffer_clear(&m);
 	if (ssh_msg_recv(sock, &m) == -1)
 		fatal("%s: msg_recv", __func__);
-	if (buffer_get_char(&m) != 1)
+	if (buffer_get_char(&m) != SSHMUX_VER)
 		fatal("%s: wrong version", __func__);
 	buffer_free(&m);
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/ssh_config.5 b/crypto/openssh-4/ssh_config.5
index b35753307a..9ddb094802 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/ssh_config.5
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/ssh_config.5
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.49 2005/03/16 11:10:38 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.61 2005/07/08 12:53:10 jmc Exp $
 .Dd September 25, 1999
 .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
 .Os
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
 .Nd OpenSSH SSH client configuration files
 .Sh SYNOPSIS
 .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/config
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/config
 .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
 .El
 .Sh DESCRIPTION
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ the following order:
 command-line options
 .It
 user's configuration file
-.Pq Pa $HOME/.ssh/config
+.Pq Pa ~/.ssh/config
 .It
 system-wide configuration file
 .Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
@@ -136,8 +136,9 @@ or
 The default is
 .Dq no .
 .It Cm BindAddress
-Specify the interface to transmit from on machines with multiple
-interfaces or aliased addresses.
+Use the specified address on the local machine as the source address of
+the connection.
+Only useful on systems with more than one address.
 Note that this option does not work if
 .Cm UsePrivilegedPort
 is set to
@@ -193,14 +194,17 @@ The supported ciphers are
 .Dq aes128-ctr ,
 .Dq aes192-ctr ,
 .Dq aes256-ctr ,
+.Dq arcfour128 ,
+.Dq arcfour256 ,
 .Dq arcfour ,
 .Dq blowfish-cbc ,
 and
 .Dq cast128-cbc .
 The default is
 .Bd -literal
-  ``aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour,
-    aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc''
+  ``aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour128,
+    arcfour256,arcfour,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,aes128-ctr,
+    aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr''
 .Ed
 .It Cm ClearAllForwardings
 Specifies that all local, remote and dynamic port forwardings
@@ -270,11 +274,47 @@ to listen for control connections, but require confirmation using the
 program before they are accepted (see
 .Xr ssh-add 1
 for details).
+If the
+.Cm ControlPath
+can not be opened,
+.Nm ssh
+will continue without connecting to a master instance.
+.Pp
+X11 and
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+forwarding is supported over these multiplexed connections, however the
+display and agent fowarded will be the one belonging to the master
+connection i.e. it is not possible to forward multiple displays or agents.
+.Pp
+Two additional options allow for opportunistic multiplexing: try to use a
+master connection but fall back to creating a new one if one does not already
+exist.
+These options are:
+.Dq auto
+and
+.Dq autoask .
+The latter requires confirmation like the
+.Dq ask
+option.
 .It Cm ControlPath
-Specify the path to the control socket used for connection sharing.
-See
+Specify the path to the control socket used for connection sharing as described
+in the
 .Cm ControlMaster
-above.
+section above or the string
+.Dq none
+to disable connection sharing.
+In the path,
+.Ql %h
+will be substituted by the target host name,
+.Ql %p
+the port and
+.Ql %r
+by the remote login username.
+It is recommended that any
+.Cm ControlPath
+used for opportunistic connection sharing include
+all three of these escape sequences.
+This ensures that shared connections are uniquely identified.
 .It Cm DynamicForward
 Specifies that a TCP/IP port on the local machine be forwarded
 over the secure channel, and the application
@@ -411,7 +451,7 @@ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
 Indicates that
 .Nm ssh
 should hash host names and addresses when they are added to
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts .
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts .
 These hashed names may be used normally by
 .Nm ssh
 and
@@ -457,11 +497,11 @@ specifications).
 Specifies a file from which the user's RSA or DSA authentication identity
 is read.
 The default is
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity
+.Pa ~/.ssh/identity
 for protocol version 1, and
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
 and
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
 for protocol version 2.
 Additionally, any identities represented by the authentication agent
 will be used for authentication.
@@ -616,6 +656,14 @@ Note that
 .Cm CheckHostIP
 is not available for connects with a proxy command.
 .Pp
+This directive is useful in conjunction with
+.Xr nc 1
+and its proxy support.
+For example, the following directive would connect via an HTTP proxy at
+192.0.2.0:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ProxyCommand /usr/bin/nc -X connect -x 192.0.2.0:8080 %h %p
+.Ed
 .It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
 Specifies whether to try public key authentication.
 The argument to this keyword must be
@@ -751,7 +799,7 @@ If this flag is set to
 .Dq yes ,
 .Nm ssh
 will never automatically add host keys to the
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
 file, and refuses to connect to hosts whose host key has changed.
 This provides maximum protection against trojan horse attacks,
 however, can be annoying when the
@@ -823,7 +871,7 @@ having to remember to give the user name on the command line.
 .It Cm UserKnownHostsFile
 Specifies a file to use for the user
 host key database instead of
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts .
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts .
 .It Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS
 Specifies whether to verify the remote key using DNS and SSHFP resource
 records.
@@ -856,7 +904,7 @@ The default is
 .El
 .Sh FILES
 .Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/config
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/config
 This is the per-user configuration file.
 The format of this file is described above.
 This file is used by the
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/sshconnect.c b/crypto/openssh-4/sshconnect.c
index 07703cf770..ba7b9b71ec 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/sshconnect.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/sshconnect.c
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.162 2005/03/10 22:01:06 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.168 2005/07/17 07:17:55 djm Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 
@@ -59,12 +59,11 @@ static void warn_changed_key(Key *);
 static int
 ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
 {
-	Buffer command;
-	const char *cp;
-	char *command_string;
+	char *command_string, *tmp;
 	int pin[2], pout[2];
 	pid_t pid;
 	char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+	size_t len;
 
 	/* Convert the port number into a string. */
 	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%hu", port);
@@ -76,31 +75,13 @@ ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
 	 * Use "exec" to avoid "sh -c" processes on some platforms
 	 * (e.g. Solaris)
 	 */
-	buffer_init(&command);
-	buffer_append(&command, "exec ", 5);
-
-	for (cp = proxy_command; *cp; cp++) {
-		if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == '%') {
-			buffer_append(&command, "%", 1);
-			cp++;
-			continue;
-		}
-		if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'h') {
-			buffer_append(&command, host, strlen(host));
-			cp++;
-			continue;
-		}
-		if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'p') {
-			buffer_append(&command, strport, strlen(strport));
-			cp++;
-			continue;
-		}
-		buffer_append(&command, cp, 1);
-	}
-	buffer_append(&command, "\0", 1);
-
-	/* Get the final command string. */
-	command_string = buffer_ptr(&command);
+	len = strlen(proxy_command) + 6;
+	tmp = xmalloc(len);
+	strlcpy(tmp, "exec ", len);
+	strlcat(tmp, proxy_command, len);
+	command_string = percent_expand(tmp, "h", host,
+	    "p", strport, (char *)NULL);
+	xfree(tmp);
 
 	/* Create pipes for communicating with the proxy. */
 	if (pipe(pin) < 0 || pipe(pout) < 0)
@@ -154,7 +135,7 @@ ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
 	close(pout[1]);
 
 	/* Free the command name. */
-	buffer_free(&command);
+	xfree(command_string);
 
 	/* Set the connection file descriptors. */
 	packet_set_connection(pout[0], pin[1]);
@@ -308,18 +289,9 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr,
 	int sock = -1, attempt;
 	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
 	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
-	struct servent *sp;
 
 	debug2("ssh_connect: needpriv %d", needpriv);
 
-	/* Get default port if port has not been set. */
-	if (port == 0) {
-		sp = getservbyname(SSH_SERVICE_NAME, "tcp");
-		if (sp)
-			port = ntohs(sp->s_port);
-		else
-			port = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
-	}
 	/* If a proxy command is given, connect using it. */
 	if (proxy_command != NULL)
 		return ssh_proxy_connect(host, port, proxy_command);
@@ -421,19 +393,21 @@ static void
 ssh_exchange_identification(void)
 {
 	char buf[256], remote_version[256];	/* must be same size! */
-	int remote_major, remote_minor, i, mismatch;
+	int remote_major, remote_minor, mismatch;
 	int connection_in = packet_get_connection_in();
 	int connection_out = packet_get_connection_out();
 	int minor1 = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1;
+	u_int i;
 
-	/* Read other side\'s version identification. */
+	/* Read other side's version identification. */
 	for (;;) {
 		for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
-			int len = atomicio(read, connection_in, &buf[i], 1);
-			if (len < 0)
-				fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: read: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-			if (len != 1)
+			size_t len = atomicio(read, connection_in, &buf[i], 1);
+
+			if (len != 1 && errno == EPIPE)
 				fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: Connection closed by remote host");
+			else if (len != 1)
+				fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: read: %.100s", strerror(errno));
 			if (buf[i] == '\r') {
 				buf[i] = '\n';
 				buf[i + 1] = 0;
@@ -573,7 +547,7 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key,
 	switch (hostaddr->sa_family) {
 	case AF_INET:
 		local = (ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *)hostaddr)->
-		   sin_addr.s_addr) >> 24) == IN_LOOPBACKNET;
+		    sin_addr.s_addr) >> 24) == IN_LOOPBACKNET;
 		salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
 		break;
 	case AF_INET6:
@@ -706,8 +680,8 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key,
 
 			if (show_other_keys(host, host_key))
 				snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1),
-				   "\nbut keys of different type are already"
-				   " known for this host.");
+				    "\nbut keys of different type are already"
+				    " known for this host.");
 			else
 				snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), ".");
 			/* The default */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/sshconnect1.c b/crypto/openssh-4/sshconnect1.c
index 6e2e31c028..bd05723c74 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/sshconnect1.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/sshconnect1.c
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.60 2004/07/28 09:40:29 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.61 2005/06/17 02:44:33 djm Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ respond_to_rsa_challenge(BIGNUM * challenge, RSA * prv)
 	/* Compute the response. */
 	/* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
 	len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
-	if (len <= 0 || len > sizeof(buf))
+	if (len <= 0 || (u_int)len > sizeof(buf))
 		packet_disconnect(
 		    "respond_to_rsa_challenge: bad challenge length %d", len);
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/sshconnect2.c b/crypto/openssh-4/sshconnect2.c
index 68d56d0207..ee7932d681 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/sshconnect2.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.138 2004/06/13 12:53:24 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.142 2005/08/30 22:08:05 djm Exp $");
 
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
 
@@ -101,10 +101,10 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
 	    compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]);
 	if (options.compression) {
 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
-		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "zlib,none";
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "zlib@openssh.com,zlib,none";
 	} else {
 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
-		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none,zlib";
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib";
 	}
 	if (options.macs != NULL) {
 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ void
 input_userauth_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	fatal("input_userauth_error: bad message during authentication: "
-	   "type %d", type);
+	    "type %d", type);
 }
 
 void
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
 	Gssctxt *gssctxt = NULL;
 	static gss_OID_set gss_supported = NULL;
-	static int mech = 0;
+	static u_int mech = 0;
 	OM_uint32 min;
 	int ok = 0;
 
@@ -509,7 +509,8 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (!ok) return 0;
+	if (!ok)
+		return 0;
 
 	authctxt->methoddata=(void *)gssctxt;
 
@@ -544,7 +545,8 @@ process_gssapi_token(void *ctxt, gss_buffer_t recv_tok)
 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
 	Gssctxt *gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
 	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
+	gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
 	OM_uint32 status, ms, flags;
 	Buffer b;
 
@@ -678,7 +680,7 @@ input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
 
 	/* Stick it into GSSAPI and see what it says */
 	status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds,
-				     &recv_tok, &send_tok, NULL);
+	    &recv_tok, &send_tok, NULL);
 
 	xfree(recv_tok.value);
 	gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/sshd.8 b/crypto/openssh-4/sshd.8
index ac3bf96cfe..fdff4ac916 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/sshd.8
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/sshd.8
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.206 2005/03/01 14:59:49 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.208 2005/06/08 03:50:00 djm Exp $
 .Dd September 25, 1999
 .Dt SSHD 8
 .Os
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ supports both SSH protocol version 1 and 2 simultaneously.
 works as follows:
 .Ss SSH protocol version 1
 Each host has a host-specific RSA key
-(normally 1024 bits) used to identify the host.
+(normally 2048 bits) used to identify the host.
 Additionally, when
 the daemon starts, it generates a server RSA key (normally 768 bits).
 This key is normally regenerated every hour if it has been used, and
@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ If the login is on a tty, and no command has been specified,
 prints last login time and
 .Pa /etc/motd
 (unless prevented in the configuration file or by
-.Pa $HOME/.hushlogin ;
+.Pa ~/.hushlogin ;
 see the
 .Sx FILES
 section).
@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ Changes to run with normal user privileges.
 Sets up basic environment.
 .It
 Reads the file
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/environment ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/environment ,
 if it exists, and users are allowed to change their environment.
 See the
 .Cm PermitUserEnvironment
@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ option in
 Changes to user's home directory.
 .It
 If
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/rc
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
 exists, runs it; else if
 .Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
 exists, runs
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ authentication protocol and cookie in standard input.
 Runs user's shell or command.
 .El
 .Sh AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
 is the default file that lists the public keys that are
 permitted for RSA authentication in protocol version 1
 and for public key authentication (PubkeyAuthentication)
@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ permitopen="10.2.1.55:80",permitopen="10.2.1.56:25" 1024 33 23...2323
 The
 .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
 and
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
 files contain host public keys for all known hosts.
 The global file should
 be prepared by the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is
@@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ listening for connections (if there are several daemons running
 concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
 started last).
 The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
 Lists the public keys (RSA or DSA) that can be used to log into the user's account.
 This file must be readable by root (which may on some machines imply
 it being world-readable if the user's home directory resides on an NFS
@@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ and/or
 .Pa id_rsa.pub
 files into this file, as described in
 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
-.It Pa "/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts", "$HOME/.ssh/known_hosts"
+.It Pa "/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts", "~/.ssh/known_hosts"
 These files are consulted when using rhosts with RSA host
 authentication or protocol version 2 hostbased authentication
 to check the public key of the host.
@@ -663,12 +663,12 @@ to verify that it is connecting to the correct remote host.
 These files should be writable only by root/the owner.
 .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
 should be world-readable, and
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
 can, but need not be, world-readable.
 .It Pa /etc/motd
 See
 .Xr motd 5 .
-.It Pa $HOME/.hushlogin
+.It Pa ~/.hushlogin
 This file is used to suppress printing the last login time and
 .Pa /etc/motd ,
 if
@@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ The file should be world-readable.
 Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here.
 Further details are described in
 .Xr hosts_access 5 .
-.It Pa $HOME/.rhosts
+.It Pa ~/.rhosts
 This file is used during
 .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
 and
@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ It is also possible to use netgroups in the file.
 Either host or user
 name may be of the form +@groupname to specify all hosts or all users
 in the group.
-.It Pa $HOME/.shosts
+.It Pa ~/.shosts
 For ssh,
 this file is exactly the same as for
 .Pa .rhosts .
@@ -758,7 +758,7 @@ This is processed exactly as
 .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv .
 However, this file may be useful in environments that want to run both
 rsh/rlogin and ssh.
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/environment
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/environment
 This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists).
 It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with
 .Ql # ) ,
@@ -769,7 +769,7 @@ Environment processing is disabled by default and is
 controlled via the
 .Cm PermitUserEnvironment
 option.
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/rc
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/rc
 If this file exists, it is run with
 .Pa /bin/sh
 after reading the
@@ -814,7 +814,7 @@ This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be
 readable by anyone else.
 .It Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
 Like
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/rc .
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc .
 This can be used to specify
 machine-specific login-time initializations globally.
 This file should be writable only by root, and should be world-readable.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/sshd.c b/crypto/openssh-4/sshd.c
index b3fcc6964e..92aa9bbd21 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/sshd.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/sshd.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.308 2005/02/08 22:24:57 dtucker Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.312 2005/07/25 11:59:40 markus Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
@@ -358,7 +358,8 @@ key_regeneration_alarm(int sig)
 static void
 sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
 {
-	int i, mismatch;
+	u_int i;
+	int mismatch;
 	int remote_major, remote_minor;
 	int major, minor;
 	char *s;
@@ -670,6 +671,12 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
 
 	/* It is safe now to apply the key state */
 	monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
+
+	/*
+	 * Tell the packet layer that authentication was successful, since
+	 * this information is not part of the key state.
+	 */
+	packet_set_authenticated();
 }
 
 static char *
@@ -1033,7 +1040,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	/*
 	 * Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from
 	 * root's environment
-	 */ 
+	 */
 	if (getenv("KRB5CCNAME") != NULL)
 		unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME");
 
@@ -1615,19 +1622,22 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
 	signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
 
-	/* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
-	if (options.tcp_keep_alive &&
-	    setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on,
-	    sizeof(on)) < 0)
-		error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-
 	/*
 	 * Register our connection.  This turns encryption off because we do
 	 * not have a key.
 	 */
 	packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out);
+	packet_set_server();
 
-	remote_port = get_remote_port();
+	/* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
+	if (options.tcp_keep_alive && packet_connection_is_on_socket() &&
+	    setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
+		error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+	if ((remote_port = get_remote_port()) < 0) {
+		debug("get_remote_port failed");
+		cleanup_exit(255);
+	}
 	remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
 
 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
@@ -1898,7 +1908,7 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
 	if (!rsafail) {
 		BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8);
 		len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
-		if (len < 0 || len > sizeof(session_key)) {
+		if (len < 0 || (u_int)len > sizeof(session_key)) {
 			error("do_connection: bad session key len from %s: "
 			    "session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu",
 			    get_remote_ipaddr(), len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key));
@@ -1985,10 +1995,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
 	}
-	if (!options.compression) {
+	if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
+	} else if (options.compression == COMP_DELAYED) {
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none,zlib@openssh.com";
 	}
+	
 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
 
 	/* start key exchange */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/sshd_config b/crypto/openssh-4/sshd_config
index 53ae9942e0..1440c05ffc 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/sshd_config
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/sshd_config
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.70 2004/12/23 23:11:00 djm Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.72 2005/07/25 11:59:40 markus Exp $
 
 # This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file.  See
 # sshd_config(5) for more information.
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
 #ServerKeyBits 768
 
 # Logging
-#obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging
+# obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging
 #SyslogFacility AUTH
 #LogLevel INFO
 
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@
 #UseLogin no
 #UsePrivilegeSeparation yes
 #PermitUserEnvironment no
-#Compression yes
+#Compression delayed
 #ClientAliveInterval 0
 #ClientAliveCountMax 3
 #UseDNS yes
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/sshd_config.5 b/crypto/openssh-4/sshd_config.5
index ea79a54bf2..048e8924e3 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/sshd_config.5
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/sshd_config.5
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.40 2005/03/18 17:05:00 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.44 2005/07/25 11:59:40 markus Exp $
 .Dd September 25, 1999
 .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
 .Os
@@ -168,24 +168,18 @@ The supported ciphers are
 .Dq aes128-ctr ,
 .Dq aes192-ctr ,
 .Dq aes256-ctr ,
+.Dq arcfour128 ,
+.Dq arcfour256 ,
 .Dq arcfour ,
 .Dq blowfish-cbc ,
 and
 .Dq cast128-cbc .
 The default is
 .Bd -literal
-  ``aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour,
-    aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr''
+  ``aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour128,
+    arcfour256,arcfour,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,aes128-ctr,
+    aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr''
 .Ed
-.It Cm ClientAliveInterval
-Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
-from the client,
-.Nm sshd
-will send a message through the encrypted
-channel to request a response from the client.
-The default
-is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the client.
-This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
 .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
 Sets the number of client alive messages (see above) which may be
 sent without
@@ -213,14 +207,25 @@ If
 .Cm ClientAliveCountMax
 is left at the default, unresponsive ssh clients
 will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds.
+.It Cm ClientAliveInterval
+Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
+from the client,
+.Nm sshd
+will send a message through the encrypted
+channel to request a response from the client.
+The default
+is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the client.
+This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
 .It Cm Compression
-Specifies whether compression is allowed.
+Specifies whether compression is allowed, or delayed until
+the user has authenticated successfully.
 The argument must be
-.Dq yes
+.Dq yes ,
+.Dq delayed ,
 or
 .Dq no .
 The default is
-.Dq yes .
+.Dq delayed .
 .It Cm DenyGroups
 This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated
 by spaces.
@@ -327,7 +332,7 @@ The default is
 Specifies whether
 .Nm sshd
 should ignore the user's
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
 during
 .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
 or
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/sshpty.c b/crypto/openssh-4/sshpty.c
index efd1dfefa3..36788c4d79 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/sshpty.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/sshpty.c
@@ -128,10 +128,10 @@ pty_make_controlling_tty(int *ttyfd, const char *tty)
 	if (ioctl(*ttyfd, TIOCSCTTY, NULL) < 0)
 		error("ioctl(TIOCSCTTY): %.100s", strerror(errno));
 #endif /* TIOCSCTTY */
-#ifdef HAVE_NEWS4
+#ifdef NEED_SETPGRP
 	if (setpgrp(0,0) < 0)
 		error("SETPGRP %s",strerror(errno));
-#endif /* HAVE_NEWS4 */
+#endif /* NEED_SETPGRP */
 #ifdef USE_VHANGUP
 	old = signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN);
 	vhangup();
diff --git a/crypto/openssh-4/ttymodes.c b/crypto/openssh-4/ttymodes.c
index c32e213a43..cf4c7d5c6c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh-4/ttymodes.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh-4/ttymodes.c
@@ -240,6 +240,32 @@ baud_to_speed(int baud)
 	}
 }
 
+/*
+ * Encode a special character into SSH line format.
+ */
+static u_int
+special_char_encode(cc_t c)
+{
+#ifdef _POSIX_VDISABLE
+	if (c == _POSIX_VDISABLE)
+		return 255;
+#endif /* _POSIX_VDISABLE */
+	return c;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decode a special character from SSH line format.
+ */
+static cc_t
+special_char_decode(u_int c)
+{
+#ifdef _POSIX_VDISABLE
+	if (c == 255)
+		return _POSIX_VDISABLE;
+#endif /* _POSIX_VDISABLE */
+	return c;
+}
+
 /*
  * Encodes terminal modes for the terminal referenced by fd
  * or tiop in a portable manner, and appends the modes to a packet
@@ -287,7 +313,7 @@ tty_make_modes(int fd, struct termios *tiop)
 #define TTYCHAR(NAME, OP) \
 	debug3("tty_make_modes: %d %d", OP, tio.c_cc[NAME]); \
 	buffer_put_char(&buf, OP); \
-	put_arg(&buf, tio.c_cc[NAME]);
+	put_arg(&buf, special_char_encode(tio.c_cc[NAME]));
 
 #define TTYMODE(NAME, FIELD, OP) \
 	debug3("tty_make_modes: %d %d", OP, ((tio.FIELD & NAME) != 0)); \
@@ -375,7 +401,7 @@ tty_parse_modes(int fd, int *n_bytes_ptr)
 #define TTYCHAR(NAME, OP) \
 	case OP: \
 	  n_bytes += arg_size; \
-	  tio.c_cc[NAME] = get_arg(); \
+	  tio.c_cc[NAME] = special_char_decode(get_arg()); \
 	  debug3("tty_parse_modes: %d %d", OP, tio.c_cc[NAME]); \
 	  break;
 #define TTYMODE(NAME, FIELD, OP) \