2 ***Much of this chapter has been taken from the security(7) manual page by Matthew Dillon. ***
8 This chapter will provide a basic introduction to system security concepts, some general good rules of thumb, and some advanced topics under DragonFly. A lot of the topics covered here can be applied to system and Internet security in general as well. The Internet is no longer a ***friendly*** place in which everyone wants to be your kind neighbor. Securing your system is imperative to protect your data, intellectual property, time, and much more from the hands of hackers and the like.
10 DragonFly provides an array of utilities and mechanisms to ensure the integrity and security of your system and network.
12 After reading this chapter, you will know:
14 * Basic system security concepts, in respect to DragonFly.
16 * About the various crypt mechanisms available in DragonFly, such as DES and MD5.
18 * How to set up one-time password authentication.
20 * How to create firewalls using IPFW.
22 * How to configure IPsec and create a VPN between DragonFly/Windows® machines.
24 * How to configure and use **OpenSSH** , DragonFly's SSH implementation.
26 Before reading this chapter, you should:
28 * Understand basic DragonFly and Internet concepts.
36 Security is a function that begins and ends with the system administrator. While all BSD UNIX® multi-user systems have some inherent security, the job of building and maintaining additional security mechanisms to keep those users ***honest*** is probably one of the single largest undertakings of the sysadmin. Machines are only as secure as you make them, and security concerns are ever competing with the human necessity for convenience. UNIX systems, in general, are capable of running a huge number of simultaneous processes and many of these processes operate as servers -- meaning that external entities can connect and talk to them. As yesterday's mini-computers and mainframes become today's desktops, and as computers become networked and internetworked, security becomes an even bigger issue.
38 Security is best implemented through a layered ***onion*** approach. In a nutshell, what you want to do is to create as many layers of security as are convenient and then carefully monitor the system for intrusions. You do not want to overbuild your security or you will interfere with the detection side, and detection is one of the single most important aspects of any security mechanism. For example, it makes little sense to set the `schg` flags (see [chflags(1)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#chflags§ion1)) on every system binary because while this may temporarily protect the binaries, it prevents an attacker who has broken in from making an easily detectable change that may result in your security mechanisms not detecting the attacker at all.
40 System security also pertains to dealing with various forms of attack, including attacks that attempt to crash, or otherwise make a system unusable, but do not attempt to compromise the `root` account (***break root***). Security concerns can be split up into several categories:
42 1. Denial of service attacks.
44 1. User account compromises.
46 1. Root compromise through accessible servers.
48 1. Root compromise via user accounts.
52 A denial of service attack is an action that deprives the machine of needed resources. Typically, DoS attacks are brute-force mechanisms that attempt to crash or otherwise make a machine unusable by overwhelming its servers or network stack. Some DoS attacks try to take advantage of bugs in the networking stack to crash a machine with a single packet. The latter can only be fixed by applying a bug fix to the kernel. Attacks on servers can often be fixed by properly specifying options to limit the load the servers incur on the system under adverse conditions. Brute-force network attacks are harder to deal with. A spoofed-packet attack, for example, is nearly impossible to stop, short of cutting your system off from the Internet. It may not be able to take your machine down, but it can saturate your Internet connection.
54 A user account compromise is even more common than a DoS attack. Many sysadmins still run standard **telnetd** , **rlogind** , **rshd** , and **ftpd** servers on their machines. These servers, by default, do not operate over encrypted connections. The result is that if you have any moderate-sized user base, one or more of your users logging into your system from a remote location (which is the most common and convenient way to login to a system) will have his or her password sniffed. The attentive system admin will analyze his remote access logs looking for suspicious source addresses even for successful logins.
56 One must always assume that once an attacker has access to a user account, the attacker can break `root`. However, the reality is that in a well secured and maintained system, access to a user account does not necessarily give the attacker access to `root`. The distinction is important because without access to `root` the attacker cannot generally hide his tracks and may, at best, be able to do nothing more than mess with the user's files, or crash the machine. User account compromises are very common because users tend not to take the precautions that sysadmins take.
58 System administrators must keep in mind that there are potentially many ways to break `root` on a machine. The attacker may know the `root` password, the attacker may find a bug in a root-run server and be able to break `root` over a network connection to that server, or the attacker may know of a bug in a suid-root program that allows the attacker to break `root` once he has broken into a user's account. If an attacker has found a way to break `root` on a machine, the attacker may not have a need to install a backdoor. Many of the `root` holes found and closed to date involve a considerable amount of work by the attacker to cleanup after himself, so most attackers install backdoors. A backdoor provides the attacker with a way to easily regain `root` access to the system, but it also gives the smart system administrator a convenient way to detect the intrusion. Making it impossible for an attacker to install a backdoor may actually be detrimental to your security, because it will not close off the hole the attacker found to break in the first place.
60 Security remedies should always be implemented with a multi-layered ***onion peel*** approach and can be categorized as follows:
62 1. Securing `root` and staff accounts.
64 1. Securing `root` -- root-run servers and suid/sgid binaries.
66 1. Securing user accounts.
68 1. Securing the password file.
70 1. Securing the kernel core, raw devices, and filesystems.
72 1. Quick detection of inappropriate changes made to the system.
76 The next section of this chapter will cover the above bullet items in greater depth.
80 CategoryHandbook-security
84 **Command vs. Protocol:** Throughout this document, we will use **bold** text to refer to a command or application. This is used for instances such as ssh, since it is a protocol as well as command.
86 The sections that follow will cover the methods of securing your DragonFly system that were mentioned in the [last section](security-intro.html) of this chapter.
88 ### Securing the root Account and Staff Accounts
90 First off, do not bother securing staff accounts if you have not secured the `root` account. Most systems have a password assigned to the `root` account. The first thing you do is assume that the password is ***always*** compromised. This does not mean that you should remove the password. The password is almost always necessary for console access to the machine. What it does mean is that you should not make it possible to use the password outside of the console or possibly even with the [su(1)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#su§ion1) command. For example, make sure that your pty's are specified as being insecure in the `/etc/ttys` file so that direct `root` logins via `telnet` or `rlogin` are disallowed. If using other login services such as **sshd** , make sure that direct `root` logins are disabled there as well. You can do this by editing your `/etc/ssh/sshd_config` file, and making sure that `PermitRootLogin` is set to `NO`. Consider every access method -- services such as FTP often fall through the cracks. Direct `root` logins should only be allowed via the system console.
92 Of course, as a sysadmin you have to be able to get to `root`, so we open up a few holes. But we make sure these holes require additional password verification to operate. One way to make `root` accessible is to add appropriate staff accounts to the `wheel` group (in `/etc/group`). The staff members placed in the `wheel` group are allowed to `su` to `root`. You should never give staff members native `wheel` access by putting them in the `wheel` group in their password entry. Staff accounts should be placed in a `staff` group, and then added to the `wheel` group via the `/etc/group` file. Only those staff members who actually need to have `root` access should be placed in the `wheel` group. While having the `wheel` mechanism is better than having nothing at all, it is not necessarily the safest option.
94 An indirect way to secure staff accounts, and ultimately `root` access is to use an alternative login access method and do what is known as ***starring*** out the encrypted password for the staff accounts. Using the [vipw(8)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#vipw§ion8) command, one can replace each instance of an encrypted password with a single `*` character. This command will update the `/etc/master.passwd` file and user/password database to disable password-authenticated logins.
96 A staff account entry such as:
100 foobar:R9DT/Fa1/LV9U:1000:1000::0:0:Foo Bar:/home/foobar:/usr/local/bin/tcsh
102 Should be changed to this:
106 foobar:*:1000:1000::0:0:Foo Bar:/home/foobar:/usr/local/bin/tcsh
108 This change will prevent normal logins from occurring, since the encrypted password will never match `*`. With this done, staff members must use another mechanism to authenticate themselves such as [ssh(1)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command=ssh§ion=1&manpath=OpenBSD+3.3) using a public/private key pair. When using a public/private key pair with ssh, one must generally secure the machine used to login ***from*** (typically one's workstation). An additional layer of protection can be added to the key pair by password protecting the key pair when creating it with [ssh-keygen(1)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command=ssh-keygen§ion=1). Being able to ***star*** out the passwords for staff accounts also guarantees that staff members can only login through secure access methods that you have set up. This forces all staff members to use secure, encrypted connections for all of their sessions, which closes an important hole used by many intruders: sniffing the network from an unrelated, less secure machine.
110 The more indirect security mechanisms also assume that you are logging in from a more restrictive server to a less restrictive server. For example, if your main box is running all sorts of servers, your workstation should not be running any. In order for your workstation to be reasonably secure you should run as few servers as possible, up to and including no servers at all, and you should run a password-protected screen blanker. Of course, given physical access to a workstation an attacker can break any sort of security you put on it. This is definitely a problem that you should consider, but you should also consider the fact that the vast majority of break-ins occur remotely, over a network, from people who do not have physical access to your workstation or servers.
112 ### Securing Root-run Servers and SUID/SGID Binaries
114 The prudent sysadmin only runs the servers he needs to, no more, no less. Be aware that third party servers are often the most bug-prone. For example, running an old version of **imapd** or **popper** is like giving a universal `root` ticket out to the entire world. Never run a server that you have not checked out carefully. Many servers do not need to be run as `root`. For example, the **ntalk** , **comsat** , and **finger** daemons can be run in special user ***sandboxes***. A sandbox is not perfect, unless you go through a large amount of trouble, but the onion approach to security still stands: If someone is able to break in through a server running in a sandbox, they still have to break out of the sandbox. The more layers the attacker must break through, the lower the likelihood of his success. Root holes have historically been found in virtually every server ever run as `root`, including basic system servers. If you are running a machine through which people only login via **sshd** and never login via **telnetd** or **rshd** or **rlogind** , then turn off those services!
116 DragonFly now defaults to running **ntalkd** , **comsat** , and **finger** in a sandbox. Another program which may be a candidate for running in a sandbox is [named(8)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#named§ion8). `/etc/defaults/rc.conf` includes the arguments necessary to run **named** in a sandbox in a commented-out form. Depending on whether you are installing a new system or upgrading an existing system, the special user accounts used by these sandboxes may not be installed. The prudent sysadmin would research and implement sandboxes for servers whenever possible.
118 There are a number of other servers that typically do not run in sandboxes: **sendmail** , **popper** , **imapd** , **ftpd** , and others. There are alternatives to some of these, but installing them may require more work than you are willing to perform (the convenience factor strikes again). You may have to run these servers as `root` and rely on other mechanisms to detect break-ins that might occur through them.
120 The other big potential `root` holes in a system are the suid-root and sgid binaries installed on the system. Most of these binaries, such as **rlogin** , reside in `/bin`, `/sbin`, `/usr/bin`, or `/usr/sbin`. While nothing is 100% safe, the system-default suid and sgid binaries can be considered reasonably safe. Still, `root` holes are occasionally found in these binaries. A `root` hole was found in `Xlib` in 1998 that made **xterm** (which is typically suid) vulnerable. It is better to be safe than sorry and the prudent sysadmin will restrict suid binaries, that only staff should run, to a special group that only staff can access, and get rid of (`chmod 000`) any suid binaries that nobody uses. A server with no display generally does not need an **xterm** binary. Sgid binaries can be almost as dangerous. If an intruder can break an sgid-kmem binary, the intruder might be able to read `/dev/kmem` and thus read the encrypted password file, potentially compromising any passworded account. Alternatively an intruder who breaks group `kmem` can monitor keystrokes sent through pty's, including pty's used by users who login through secure methods. An intruder that breaks the `tty` group can write to almost any user's tty. If a user is running a terminal program or emulator with a keyboard-simulation feature, the intruder can potentially generate a data stream that causes the user's terminal to echo a command, which is then run as that user.
122 ### Securing User Accounts
124 User accounts are usually the most difficult to secure. While you can impose Draconian access restrictions on your staff and ***star*** out their passwords, you may not be able to do so with any general user accounts you might have. If you do have sufficient control, then you may win out and be able to secure the user accounts properly. If not, you simply have to be more vigilant in your monitoring of those accounts. Use of ssh for user accounts is more problematic, due to the extra administration and technical support required, but still a very good solution compared to a crypted password file.
126 ### Securing the Password File
128 The only sure fire way is to `*` out as many passwords as you can and use ssh for access to those accounts. Even though the encrypted password file (`/etc/spwd.db`) can only be read by `root`, it may be possible for an intruder to obtain read access to that file even if the attacker cannot obtain root-write access.
130 Your security scripts should always check for and report changes to the password file (see the [Checking file integrity](securing-freebsd.html#SECURITY-INTEGRITY) section below).
132 ### Securing the Kernel Core, Raw Devices, and Filesystems
134 If an attacker breaks `root` he can do just about anything, but there are certain conveniences. For example, most modern kernels have a packet sniffing device driver built in. Under DragonFly it is called the `bpf` device. An intruder will commonly attempt to run a packet sniffer on a compromised machine. You do not need to give the intruder the capability and most systems do not have the need for the `bpf` device compiled in.
136 But even if you turn off the `bpf` device, you still have `/dev/mem` and `/dev/kmem` to worry about. For that matter, the intruder can still write to raw disk devices. Also, there is another kernel feature called the module loader, [kldload(8)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#kldload§ion8). An enterprising intruder can use a KLD module to install his own `bpf` device, or other sniffing device, on a running kernel. To avoid these problems you have to run the kernel at a higher secure level, at least securelevel 1. The securelevel can be set with a `sysctl` on the `kern.securelevel` variable. Once you have set the securelevel to 1, write access to raw devices will be denied and special `chflags` flags, such as `schg`, will be enforced. You must also ensure that the `schg` flag is set on critical startup binaries, directories, and script files -- everything that gets run up to the point where the securelevel is set. This might be overdoing it, and upgrading the system is much more difficult when you operate at a higher secure level. You may compromise and run the system at a higher secure level but not set the `schg` flag for every system file and directory under the sun. Another possibility is to simply mount `/` and `/usr` read-only. It should be noted that being too Draconian in what you attempt to protect may prevent the all-important detection of an intrusion.
138 ### Checking File Integrity: Binaries, Configuration Files, Etc.
140 When it comes right down to it, you can only protect your core system configuration and control files so much before the convenience factor rears its ugly head. For example, using `chflags` to set the `schg` bit on most of the files in `/` and `/usr` is probably counterproductive, because while it may protect the files, it also closes a detection window. The last layer of your security onion is perhaps the most important -- detection. The rest of your security is pretty much useless (or, worse, presents you with a false sense of safety) if you cannot detect potential incursions. Half the job of the onion is to slow down the attacker, rather than stop him, in order to give the detection side of the equation a chance to catch him in the act.
142 The best way to detect an incursion is to look for modified, missing, or unexpected files. The best way to look for modified files is from another (often centralized) limited-access system. Writing your security scripts on the extra-secure limited-access system makes them mostly invisible to potential attackers, and this is important. In order to take maximum advantage you generally have to give the limited-access box significant access to the other machines in the business, usually either by doing a read-only NFS export of the other machines to the limited-access box, or by setting up ssh key-pairs to allow the limited-access box to ssh to the other machines. Except for its network traffic, NFS is the least visible method -- allowing you to monitor the filesystems on each client box virtually undetected. If your limited-access server is connected to the client boxes through a switch, the NFS method is often the better choice. If your limited-access server is connected to the client boxes through a hub, or through several layers of routing, the NFS method may be too insecure (network-wise) and using ssh may be the better choice even with the audit-trail tracks that ssh lays.
144 Once you give a limited-access box, at least read access to the client systems it is supposed to monitor, you must write scripts to do the actual monitoring. Given an NFS mount, you can write scripts out of simple system utilities such as [find(1)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#find§ion1) and [md5(1)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command=md5§ion=1). It is best to physically md5 the client-box files at least once a day, and to test control files such as those found in `/etc` and `/usr/local/etc` even more often. When mismatches are found, relative to the base md5 information the limited-access machine knows is valid, it should scream at a sysadmin to go check it out. A good security script will also check for inappropriate suid binaries and for new or deleted files on system partitions such as `/` and `/usr`.
146 When using ssh rather than NFS, writing the security script is much more difficult. You essentially have to `scp` the scripts to the client box in order to run them, making them visible, and for safety you also need to `scp` the binaries (such as find) that those scripts use. The **ssh** client on the client box may already be compromised. All in all, using ssh may be necessary when running over insecure links, but it is also a lot harder to deal with.
148 A good security script will also check for changes to user and staff members access configuration files: `.rhosts`, `.shosts`, `.ssh/authorized_keys` and so forth... files that might fall outside the purview of the `MD5` check.
150 If you have a huge amount of user disk space, it may take too long to run through every file on those partitions. In this case, setting mount flags to disallow suid binaries and devices on those partitions is a good idea. The `nodev` and `nosuid` options (see [mount(8)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#mount§ion8)) are what you want to look into. You should probably scan them anyway, at least once a week, since the object of this layer is to detect a break-in whether or not the break-in is effective.
152 Process accounting (see [accton(8)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#accton§ion8)) is a relatively low-overhead feature of the operating system which might help as a post-break-in evaluation mechanism. It is especially useful in tracking down how an intruder has actually broken into a system, assuming the file is still intact after the break-in occurs.
154 Finally, security scripts should process the log files, and the logs themselves should be generated in as secure a manner as possible -- remote syslog can be very useful. An intruder tries to cover his tracks, and log files are critical to the sysadmin trying to track down the time and method of the initial break-in. One way to keep a permanent record of the log files is to run the system console to a serial port and collect the information on a continuing basis through a secure machine monitoring the consoles.
158 A little paranoia never hurts. As a rule, a sysadmin can add any number of security features, as long as they do not affect convenience, and can add security features that ***do*** affect convenience with some added thought. Even more importantly, a security administrator should mix it up a bit -- if you use recommendations such as those given by this document verbatim, you give away your methodologies to the prospective attacker who also has access to this document.
160 ### Denial of Service Attacks
162 This section covers Denial of Service attacks. A DoS attack is typically a packet attack. While there is not much you can do about modern spoofed packet attacks that saturate your network, you can generally limit the damage by ensuring that the attacks cannot take down your servers.
164 1. Limiting server forks.
166 1. Limiting springboard attacks (ICMP response attacks, ping broadcast, etc.).
168 1. Kernel Route Cache.
170 A common DoS attack is against a forking server that attempts to cause the server to eat processes, file descriptors, and memory, until the machine dies. **inetd** (see [inetd(8)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#inetd§ion8)) has several options to limit this sort of attack. It should be noted that while it is possible to prevent a machine from going down, it is not generally possible to prevent a service from being disrupted by the attack. Read the **inetd** manual page carefully and pay specific attention to the `-c`, `-C`, and `-R` options. Note that spoofed-IP attacks will circumvent the `-C` option to **inetd** , so typically a combination of options must be used. Some standalone servers have self-fork-limitation parameters.
172 **Sendmail** has its `-OMaxDaemonChildren` option, which tends to work much better than trying to use sendmail's load limiting options due to the load lag. You should specify a `MaxDaemonChildren` parameter, when you start **sendmail** , high enough to handle your expected load, but not so high that the computer cannot handle that number of **sendmails** without falling on its face. It is also prudent to run sendmail in queued mode (`-ODeliveryMode=queued`) and to run the daemon (`sendmail -bd`) separate from the queue-runs (`sendmail -q15m`). If you still want real-time delivery you can run the queue at a much lower interval, such as `-q1m`, but be sure to specify a reasonable `MaxDaemonChildren` option for ***that*** sendmail to prevent cascade failures.
174 **Syslogd** can be attacked directly and it is strongly recommended that you use the `-s` option whenever possible, and the `-a` option otherwise.
176 You should also be fairly careful with connect-back services such as **tcpwrapper** s reverse-identd, which can be attacked directly. You generally do not want to use the reverse-ident feature of **tcpwrappers** for this reason.
178 It is a very good idea to protect internal services from external access by firewalling them off at your border routers. The idea here is to prevent saturation attacks from outside your LAN, not so much to protect internal services from network-based `root` compromise. Always configure an exclusive firewall, i.e., firewall everything ***except*** ports A, B, C, D, and M-Z. This way you can firewall off all of your low ports except for certain specific services such as **named** (if you are primary for a zone), **ntalkd** , **sendmail** , and other Internet-accessible services. If you try to configure the firewall the other way -- as an inclusive or permissive firewall, there is a good chance that you will forget to ***close*** a couple of services, or that you will add a new internal service and forget to update the firewall. You can still open up the high-numbered port range on the firewall, to allow permissive-like operation, without compromising your low ports. Also take note that DragonFly allows you to control the range of port numbers used for dynamic binding, via the various `net.inet.ip.portrange` `sysctl`'s (`sysctl -a | fgrep portrange`), which can also ease the complexity of your firewall's configuration. For example, you might use a normal first/last range of 4000 to 5000, and a hiport range of 49152 to 65535, then block off everything under 4000 in your firewall (except for certain specific Internet-accessible ports, of course).
180 Another common DoS attack is called a springboard attack -- to attack a server in a manner that causes the server to generate responses which overloads the server, the local network, or some other machine. The most common attack of this nature is the ***ICMP ping broadcast attack***. The attacker spoofs ping packets sent to your LAN's broadcast address with the source IP address set to the actual machine they wish to attack. If your border routers are not configured to stomp on ping's to broadcast addresses, your LAN winds up generating sufficient responses to the spoofed source address to saturate the victim, especially when the attacker uses the same trick on several dozen broadcast addresses over several dozen different networks at once. Broadcast attacks of over a hundred and twenty megabits have been measured. A second common springboard attack is against the ICMP error reporting system. By constructing packets that generate ICMP error responses, an attacker can saturate a server's incoming network and cause the server to saturate its outgoing network with ICMP responses. This type of attack can also crash the server by running it out of mbuf's, especially if the server cannot drain the ICMP responses it generates fast enough. The DragonFly kernel has a new kernel compile option called `ICMP_BANDLIM` which limits the effectiveness of these sorts of attacks. The last major class of springboard attacks is related to certain internal **inetd** services such as the udp echo service. An attacker simply spoofs a UDP packet with the source address being server A's echo port, and the destination address being server B's echo port, where server A and B are both on your LAN. The two servers then bounce this one packet back and forth between each other. The attacker can overload both servers and their LANs simply by injecting a few packets in this manner. Similar problems exist with the internal **chargen** port. A competent sysadmin will turn off all of these inetd-internal test services.
182 Spoofed packet attacks may also be used to overload the kernel route cache. Refer to the `net.inet.ip.rtexpire`, `rtminexpire`, and `rtmaxcache` `sysctl` parameters. A spoofed packet attack that uses a random source IP will cause the kernel to generate a temporary cached route in the route table, viewable with `netstat -rna | fgrep W3`. These routes typically timeout in 1600 seconds or so. If the kernel detects that the cached route table has gotten too big it will dynamically reduce the `rtexpire` but will never decrease it to less than `rtminexpire`. There are two problems:
184 1. The kernel does not react quickly enough when a lightly loaded server is suddenly attacked.
186 1. The `rtminexpire` is not low enough for the kernel to survive a sustained attack.
188 If your servers are connected to the Internet via a T3 or better, it may be prudent to manually override both `rtexpire` and `rtminexpire` via [sysctl(8)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#sysctl§ion8). Never set either parameter to zero (unless you want to crash the machine). Setting both parameters to two seconds should be sufficient to protect the route table from attack.
190 ## DES, MD5, and Crypt
192 ***Parts rewritten and updated by Bill Swingle. ***
194 Every user on a UNIX® system has a password associated with their account. It seems obvious that these passwords need to be known only to the user and the actual operating system. In order to keep these passwords secret, they are encrypted with what is known as a ***one-way hash***, that is, they can only be easily encrypted but not decrypted. In other words, what we told you a moment ago was obvious is not even true: the operating system itself does not ***really*** know the password. It only knows the ***encrypted*** form of the password. The only way to get the ***plain-text*** password is by a brute force search of the space of possible passwords.
196 Unfortunately the only secure way to encrypt passwords when UNIX came into being was based on DES, the Data Encryption Standard. This was not such a problem for users resident in the US, but since the source code for DES could not be exported outside the US, DragonFly had to find a way to both comply with US law and retain compatibility with all the other UNIX variants that still used DES.
198 The solution was to divide up the encryption libraries so that US users could install the DES libraries and use DES but international users still had an encryption method that could be exported abroad. This is how DragonFly came to use MD5 as its default encryption method. MD5 is believed to be more secure than DES, so installing DES is offered primarily for compatibility reasons.
200 ### Recognizing Your Crypt Mechanism
202 `libcrypt.a` provides a configurable password authentication hash library. Currently the library supports DES, MD5, Blowfish, SHA256, and SHA512 hash functions. By default DragonFly uses SHA256 to encrypt passwords.
204 It is pretty easy to identify which encryption method DragonFly is set up to use. Examining the encrypted passwords in the `/etc/master.passwd` file is one way. Passwords encrypted with the MD5 hash are longer than those encrypted with the DES hash and also begin with the characters `$1$`. Passwords starting with `$2a$` are encrypted with the Blowfish hash function. DES password strings do not have any particular identifying characteristics, but they are shorter than MD5 passwords, and are coded in a 64-character alphabet which does not include the `$` character, so a relatively short string which does not begin with a dollar sign is very likely a DES password.
206 The password format used for new passwords is controlled by the `passwd_format` login capability in `/etc/login.conf`, which takes values of `des`, `md5` or `blf`. See the [login.conf(5)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#login.conf&section5) manual page for more information about login capabilities.
208 ## One-time Passwords
210 S/Key is a one-time password scheme based on a one-way hash function. DragonFly uses the MD4 hash for compatibility but other systems have used MD5 and DES-MAC. S/Key ia part of the FreeBSD base system, and is also used on a growing number of other operating systems. S/Key is a registered trademark of Bell Communications Research, Inc.
212 There are three different sorts of passwords which we will discuss below. The first is your usual UNIX® style password; we will call this a ***UNIX password***. The second sort is the one-time password which is generated by the S/Key `key` program or the OPIE [opiekey(1)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#opiekey§ion1) program and accepted by the `keyinit` or [opiepasswd(1)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command=opiepasswd§ion=1) programs and the login prompt; we will call this a ***one-time password***. The final sort of password is the secret password which you give to the `key`/`opiekey` programs (and sometimes the `keyinit`/`opiepasswd` programs) which it uses to generate one-time passwords; we will call it a ***secret password*** or just unqualified ***password***.
214 The secret password does not have anything to do with your UNIX password; they can be the same but this is not recommended. S/Key and OPIE secret passwords are not limited to eight characters like old UNIX passwords[(1)](#FTN.AEN8429), they can be as long as you like. Passwords of six or seven word long phrases are fairly common. For the most part, the S/Key or OPIE system operates completely independently of the UNIX password system.
216 Besides the password, there are two other pieces of data that are important to S/Key and OPIE. One is what is known as the ***seed*** or ***key***, consisting of two letters and five digits. The other is what is called the ***iteration count***, a number between 1 and 100. S/Key creates the one-time password by concatenating the seed and the secret password, then applying the MD4/MD5 hash as many times as specified by the iteration count and turning the result into six short English words. These six English words are your one-time password. The authentication system (primarily PAM) keeps track of the last one-time password used, and the user is authenticated if the hash of the user-provided password is equal to the previous password. Because a one-way hash is used it is impossible to generate future one-time passwords if a successfully used password is captured; the iteration count is decremented after each successful login to keep the user and the login program in sync. When the iteration count gets down to 1, S/Key and OPIE must be reinitialized.
218 There are three programs involved in each system which we will discuss below. The `key` and `opiekey` programs accept an iteration count, a seed, and a secret password, and generate a one-time password or a consecutive list of one-time passwords. The `keyinit` and `opiepasswd` programs are used to initialize S/Key and OPIE respectively, and to change passwords, iteration counts, or seeds; they take either a secret passphrase, or an iteration count, seed, and one-time password. The `keyinfo` and `opieinfo` programs examine the relevant credentials files (`/etc/skeykeys` or `/etc/opiekeys`) and print out the invoking user's current iteration count and seed.
220 There are four different sorts of operations we will cover. The first is using `keyinit` or `opiepasswd` over a secure connection to set up one-time-passwords for the first time, or to change your password or seed. The second operation is using `keyinit` or `opiepasswd` over an insecure connection, in conjunction with `key` or `opiekey` over a secure connection, to do the same. The third is using `key`/`opiekey` to log in over an insecure connection. The fourth is using `key` or `opiekey` to generate a number of keys which can be written down or printed out to carry with you when going to some location without secure connections to anywhere.
222 ### Secure Connection Initialization
224 To initialize S/Key for the first time, change your password, or change your seed while logged in over a secure connection (e.g., on the console of a machine or via **ssh** ), use the `keyinit` command without any parameters while logged in as yourself:
232 Reminder - Only use this method if you are directly connected.
234 If you are using telnet or rlogin exit with no password and use keyinit -s.
236 Enter secret password:
238 Again secret password:
242 ID unfurl s/key is 99 to17757
244 DEFY CLUB PRO NASH LACE SOFT
246 For OPIE, `opiepasswd` is used instead:
252 [grimreaper] ~ $ opiepasswd -f -c
256 Only use this method from the console; NEVER from remote. If you are using
258 telnet, xterm, or a dial-in, type ^C now or exit with no password.
260 Then run opiepasswd without the -c parameter.
262 Using MD5 to compute responses.
264 Enter new secret pass phrase:
266 Again new secret pass phrase:
268 ID unfurl OTP key is 499 to4268
270 MOS MALL GOAT ARM AVID COED
272 At the Enter new secret pass phrase: or Enter secret password: prompts, you should enter a password or phrase. Remember, this is not the password that you will use to login with, this is used to generate your one-time login keys. The ***ID*** line gives the parameters of your particular instance: your login name, the iteration count, and seed. When logging in the system will remember these parameters and present them back to you so you do not have to remember them. The last line gives the particular one-time password which corresponds to those parameters and your secret password; if you were to re-login immediately, this one-time password is the one you would use.
274 ### Insecure Connection Initialization
276 To initialize or change your secret password over an insecure connection, you will need to already have a secure connection to some place where you can run `key` or `opiekey`; this might be in the form of a desk accessory on a Macintosh®, or a shell prompt on a machine you trust. You will also need to make up an iteration count (100 is probably a good value), and you may make up your own seed or use a randomly-generated one. Over on the insecure connection (to the machine you are initializing), use the `keyinit -s` command:
286 Reminder you need the 6 English words from the key command.
288 Enter sequence count from 1 to 9999: 100
290 Enter new key [default to17759]:
294 s/key access password:
296 s/key access password:CURE MIKE BANE HIM RACY GORE
298 For OPIE, you need to use `opiepasswd`:
308 You need the response from an OTP generator.
310 Old secret pass phrase:
312 otp-md5 498 to4268 ext
314 Response: GAME GAG WELT OUT DOWN CHAT
316 New secret pass phrase:
320 Response: LINE PAP MILK NELL BUOY TROY
324 ID mark OTP key is 499 gr4269
326 LINE PAP MILK NELL BUOY TROY
328 To accept the default seed (which the `keyinit` program confusingly calls a `key`), press **Return** . Then before entering an access password, move over to your secure connection or S/Key desk accessory, and give it the same parameters:
334 Reminder - Do not use this program while logged in via telnet or rlogin.
336 Enter secret password: <secret password>
338 CURE MIKE BANE HIM RACY GORE
346 Using the MD5 algorithm to compute response.
348 Reminder: Don't use opiekey from telnet or dial-in sessions.
350 Enter secret pass phrase:
352 GAME GAG WELT OUT DOWN CHAT
354 Now switch back over to the insecure connection, and copy the one-time password generated over to the relevant program.
356 ### Generating a Single One-time Password
358 Once you have initialized S/Key, when you login you will be presented with a prompt like this:
366 Connected to example.com
368 Escape character is '^]'.
372 DragonFly/i386 (example.com) (ttypa)
376 login: <username>
390 Connected to example.com
392 Escape character is '^]'.
396 DragonFly/i386 (example.com) (ttypa)
400 login: <username>
402 otp-md5 498 gr4269 ext
406 As a side note, the S/Key and OPIE prompts have a useful feature (not shown here): if you press **Return** at the password prompt, the prompter will turn echo on, so you can see what you are typing. This can be extremely useful if you are attempting to type in a password by hand, such as from a printout.
408 At this point you need to generate your one-time password to answer this login prompt. This must be done on a trusted system that you can run `key` or `opiekey` on. (There are versions of these for DOS, Windows® and Mac OS® as well.) They need both the iteration count and the seed as command line options. You can cut-and-paste these right from the login prompt on the machine that you are logging in to.
410 On the trusted system:
416 Reminder - Do not use this program while logged in via telnet or rlogin.
418 Enter secret password:
420 WELD LIP ACTS ENDS ME HAAG
428 Using the MD5 algorithm to compute response.
430 Reminder: Don't use opiekey from telnet or dial-in sessions.
432 Enter secret pass phrase:
434 GAME GAG WELT OUT DOWN CHAT
436 Now that you have your one-time password you can continue logging in:
440 login: <username>
444 Password: <return to enable echo>
448 Password [echo on]: WELD LIP ACTS ENDS ME HAAG
450 Last login: Tue Mar 21 11:56:41 from 10.0.0.2 ...
452 ### Generating Multiple One-time Passwords
454 Sometimes you have to go places where you do not have access to a trusted machine or secure connection. In this case, it is possible to use the `key` and `opiekey` commands to generate a number of one-time passwords beforehand to be printed out and taken with you. For example:
458 % key -n 5 30 zz99999
460 Reminder - Do not use this program while logged in via telnet or rlogin.
462 Enter secret password: <secret password>
464 26: SODA RUDE LEA LIND BUDD SILT
466 27: JILT SPY DUTY GLOW COWL ROT
468 28: THEM OW COLA RUNT BONG SCOT
470 29: COT MASH BARR BRIM NAN FLAG
472 30: CAN KNEE CAST NAME FOLK BILK
478 % opiekey -n 5 30 zz99999
480 Using the MD5 algorithm to compute response.
482 Reminder: Don't use opiekey from telnet or dial-in sessions.
484 Enter secret pass phrase: <secret password>
486 26: JOAN BORE FOSS DES NAY QUIT
488 27: LATE BIAS SLAY FOLK MUCH TRIG
490 28: SALT TIN ANTI LOON NEAL USE
492 29: RIO ODIN GO BYE FURY TIC
494 30: GREW JIVE SAN GIRD BOIL PHI
496 The `-n 5` requests five keys in sequence, the `30` specifies what the last iteration number should be. Note that these are printed out in ***reverse*** order of eventual use. If you are really paranoid, you might want to write the results down by hand; otherwise you can cut-and-paste into `lpr`. Note that each line shows both the iteration count and the one-time password; you may still find it handy to scratch off passwords as you use them.
498 ### Restricting Use of UNIX® Passwords
500 S/Key can place restrictions on the use of UNIX passwords based on the host name, user name, terminal port, or IP address of a login session. These restrictions can be found in the configuration file `/etc/skey.access`. The [skey.access(5)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#skey.access§ion5) manual page has more information on the complete format of the file and also details some security cautions to be aware of before depending on this file for security.
502 If there is no `/etc/skey.access` file (this is the default), then all users will be allowed to use UNIX passwords. If the file exists, however, then all users will be required to use S/Key unless explicitly permitted to do otherwise by configuration statements in the `skey.access` file. In all cases, UNIX passwords are permitted on the console.
504 Here is a sample `skey.access` configuration file which illustrates the three most common sorts of configuration statements:
508 permit internet 192.168.0.0 255.255.0.0
514 The first line (`permit internet`) allows users whose IP source address (which is vulnerable to spoofing) matches the specified value and mask, to use UNIX passwords. This should not be considered a security mechanism, but rather, a means to remind authorized users that they are using an insecure network and need to use S/Key for authentication.
516 The second line (`permit user`) allows the specified username, in this case `fnord`, to use UNIX passwords at any time. Generally speaking, this should only be used for people who are either unable to use the `key` program, like those with dumb terminals, or those who are uneducable.
518 The third line (`permit port`) allows all users logging in on the specified terminal line to use UNIX passwords; this would be used for dial-ups.
520 Here is a sample `opieaccess` file:
524 permit 192.168.0.0 255.255.0.0
526 This line allows users whose IP source address (which is vulnerable to spoofing) matches the specified value and mask, to use UNIX passwords at any time.
528 If no rules in `opieaccess` are matched, the default is to deny non-OPIE logins.
533 |<tablestyle="width:100%"> [one-time-passwords.html#AEN8429 (1)] | Under DragonFly the standard login password may be up to 128 characters in length. |
539 CategoryHandbook-security
543 ***Contributed by Gary Palmer and Alex Nash. ***
545 Firewalls are an area of increasing interest for people who are connected to the Internet, and are even finding applications on private networks to provide enhanced security. This section will hopefully explain what firewalls are, how to use them, and how to use the facilities provided in the DragonFly kernel to implement them.
547 **Note:** People often think that having a firewall between your internal network and the ***Big Bad Internet*** will solve all your security problems. It may help, but a poorly set up firewall system is more of a security risk than not having one at all. A firewall can add another layer of security to your systems, but it cannot stop a really determined cracker from penetrating your internal network. If you let internal security lapse because you believe your firewall to be impenetrable, you have just made the crackers job that much easier.
549 ### What Is a Firewall?
551 There are currently two distinct types of firewalls in common use on the Internet today. The first type is more properly called a ***packet filtering router***. This type of firewall utilizes a multi-homed machine and a set of rules to determine whether to forward or block individual packets. A multi-homed machine is simply a device with multiple network interfaces. The second type, known as a ***proxy server***, relies on daemons to provide authentication and to forward packets, possibly on a multi-homed machine which has kernel packet forwarding disabled.
553 Sometimes sites combine the two types of firewalls, so that only a certain machine (known as a ***bastion host***) is allowed to send packets through a packet filtering router onto an internal network. Proxy services are run on the bastion host, which are generally more secure than normal authentication mechanisms.
555 DragonFly comes with a kernel packet filter (known as IPFW), which is what the rest of this section will concentrate on. Proxy servers can be built on DragonFly from third party software, but there is such a variety of proxy servers available that it would be impossible to cover them in this section.
557 #### Packet Filtering Routers
559 A router is a machine which forwards packets between two or more networks. A packet filtering router is programmed to compare each packet to a list of rules before deciding if it should be forwarded or not. Most modern IP routing software includes packet filtering functionality that defaults to forwarding all packets. To enable the filters, you need to define a set of rules.
561 To decide whether a packet should be passed on, the firewall looks through its set of rules for a rule which matches the contents of the packet's headers. Once a match is found, the rule action is obeyed. The rule action could be to drop the packet, to forward the packet, or even to send an ICMP message back to the originator. Only the first match counts, as the rules are searched in order. Hence, the list of rules can be referred to as a ***rule chain***.
563 The packet-matching criteria varies depending on the software used, but typically you can specify rules which depend on the source IP address of the packet, the destination IP address, the source port number, the destination port number (for protocols which support ports), or even the packet type (UDP, TCP, ICMP, etc).
567 Proxy servers are machines which have had the normal system daemons ( **telnetd** , **ftpd** , etc) replaced with special servers. These servers are called ***proxy servers***, as they normally only allow onward connections to be made. This enables you to run (for example) a proxy **telnet** server on your firewall host, and people can **telnet** in to your firewall from the outside, go through some authentication mechanism, and then gain access to the internal network (alternatively, proxy servers can be used for signals coming from the internal network and heading out).
569 Proxy servers are normally more secure than normal servers, and often have a wider variety of authentication mechanisms available, including ***one-shot*** password systems so that even if someone manages to discover what password you used, they will not be able to use it to gain access to your systems as the password expires immediately after the first use. As they do not actually give users access to the host machine, it becomes a lot more difficult for someone to install backdoors around your security system.
571 Proxy servers often have ways of restricting access further, so that only certain hosts can gain access to the servers. Most will also allow the administrator to specify which users can talk to which destination machines. Again, what facilities are available depends largely on what proxy software you choose.
573 ### Firewall options in DragonFlyBSD
575 DragonFlyBSD inherited the IPFW firewall (versions 1 and 2) when it forked from FreeBSD. Pretty soon after though, we imported the new pf packet filter that the OpenBSD developers created from scratch. It is a cleaner code base and is now the recommended solution for firewalling DragonFly. Keep in mind that the PF version in DragonFly is not in sync with OpenBSD's PF code. We have not yet incorporated the improvements made in PF over the last few years, but we have some improvements of our own. IPFW is still and will remain supported for the foreseeable future; it has some features not yet available in PF.
577 A copy of the OpenBSD PF user's guide corresponding to the version of PF in DragonFly can be found in [[PFUsersGuide]].
579 #### What Does IPFW Allow Me to Do?
581 IPFW, the software supplied with DragonFly, is a packet filtering and accounting system which resides in the kernel, and has a user-land control utility, [ipfw(8)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#ipfw§ion8). Together, they allow you to define and query the rules used by the kernel in its routing decisions.
583 There are two related parts to IPFW. The firewall section performs packet filtering. There is also an IP accounting section which tracks usage of the router, based on rules similar to those used in the firewall section. This allows the administrator to monitor how much traffic the router is getting from a certain machine, or how much WWW traffic it is forwarding, for example.
585 As a result of the way that IPFW is designed, you can use IPFW on non-router machines to perform packet filtering on incoming and outgoing connections. This is a special case of the more general use of IPFW, and the same commands and techniques should be used in this situation.
587 #### Enabling IPFW on DragonFly
589 As the main part of the IPFW system lives in the kernel, you will need to add one or more options to your kernel configuration file, depending on what facilities you want, and recompile your kernel. See "Reconfiguring your Kernel" ([kernelconfig.html Chapter 9]) for more details on how to recompile your kernel.
591 **Warning:** IPFW defaults to a policy of `deny ip from any to any`. If you do not add other rules during startup to allow access, ***you will lock yourself out*** of the server upon rebooting into a firewall-enabled kernel. We suggest that you set `firewall_type=open` in your `/etc/rc.conf` file when first enabling this feature, then refining the firewall rules in `/etc/rc.firewall` after you have tested that the new kernel feature works properly. To be on the safe side, you may wish to consider performing the initial firewall configuration from the local console rather than via **ssh** . Another option is to build a kernel using both the `IPFIREWALL` and `IPFIREWALL_DEFAULT_TO_ACCEPT` options. This will change the default rule of IPFW to `allow ip from any to any` and avoid the possibility of a lockout.
593 There are currently four kernel configuration options relevant to IPFW:
595 `options IPFIREWALL`:: Compiles into the kernel the code for packet filtering.`options IPFIREWALL_VERBOSE`:: Enables code to allow logging of packets through [syslogd(8)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#syslogd§ion8). Without this option, even if you specify that packets should be logged in the filter rules, nothing will happen.`options IPFIREWALL_VERBOSE_LIMIT=10`:: Limits the number of packets logged through [syslogd(8)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command=syslogd§ion=8) on a per entry basis. You may wish to use this option in hostile environments in which you want to log firewall activity, but do not want to be open to a denial of service attack via syslog flooding.
597 When a chain entry reaches the packet limit specified, logging is turned off for that particular entry. To resume logging, you will need to reset the associated counter using the [ipfw(8)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#ipfw§ion8) utility:
603 Where 4500 is the chain entry you wish to continue logging.`options IPFIREWALL_DEFAULT_TO_ACCEPT`:: This changes the default rule action from ***deny*** to ***allow***. This avoids the possibility of locking yourself out if you happen to boot a kernel with `IPFIREWALL` support but have not configured your firewall yet. It is also very useful if you often use [ipfw(8)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#ipfw§ion8) as a filter for specific problems as they arise. Use with care though, as this opens up the firewall and changes the way it works.
605 #### Configuring IPFW
607 The configuration of the IPFW software is done through the [ipfw(8)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#ipfw§ion8) utility. The syntax for this command looks quite complicated, but it is relatively simple once you understand its structure.
609 There are currently four different command categories used by the utility: addition/deletion, listing, flushing, and clearing. Addition/deletion is used to build the rules that control how packets are accepted, rejected, and logged. Listing is used to examine the contents of your rule set (otherwise known as the chain) and packet counters (accounting). Flushing is used to remove all entries from the chain. Clearing is used to zero out one or more accounting entries.
611 ##### Altering the IPFW Rules
613 The syntax for this form of the command is:
615 `ipfw` [-N] command [index] action [log] protocol addresses [options]
617 There is one valid flag when using this form of the command:
619 -N:: Resolve addresses and service names in output.
621 The ***command*** given can be shortened to the shortest unique form. The valid ***commands*** are:
623 add:: Add an entry to the firewall/accounting rule listdelete:: Delete an entry from the firewall/accounting rule list
625 Previous versions of IPFW used separate firewall and accounting entries. The present version provides packet accounting with each firewall entry.
627 If an ***index*** value is supplied, it is used to place the entry at a specific point in the chain. Otherwise, the entry is placed at the end of the chain at an index 100 greater than the last chain entry (this does not include the default policy, rule 65535, deny).
629 The `log` option causes matching rules to be output to the system console if the kernel was compiled with `IPFIREWALL_VERBOSE`.
631 Valid ***actions*** are:
633 reject:: Drop the packet, and send an ICMP host or port unreachable (as appropriate) packet to the source.allow:: Pass the packet on as normal. (aliases: `pass`, `permit`, and `accept`)deny:: Drop the packet. The source is not notified via an ICMP message (thus it appears that the packet never arrived at the destination).count:: Update packet counters but do not allow/deny the packet based on this rule. The search continues with the next chain entry.
635 Each ***action*** will be recognized by the shortest unambiguous prefix.
637 The ***protocols*** which can be specified are:
639 all:: Matches any IP packeticmp:: Matches ICMP packetstcp:: Matches TCP packetsudp:: Matches UDP packets
641 The ***address*** specification is:
643 from `***address/mask***` [`***port***`] to `***address/mask***` [`***port***`] [via `***interface***`]
645 You can only specify `***port***` in conjunction with ***protocols*** which support ports (UDP and TCP).
647 The `via` is optional and may specify the IP address or domain name of a local IP interface, or an interface name (e.g. `ed0`) to match only packets coming through this interface. Interface unit numbers can be specified with an optional wildcard. For example, `ppp*` would match all kernel PPP interfaces.
649 The syntax used to specify an `***address/mask***` is:
659 `***address***`/`***mask-bits***`
665 `***address***`:`***mask-pattern***`
667 A valid hostname may be specified in place of the IP address. ' **mask-bits** ' is a decimal number representing how many bits in the address mask should be set. e.g. specifying `192.216.222.1/24` will create a mask which will allow any address in a class C subnet (in this case, `192.216.222`) to be matched. ' **mask-pattern** ' is an IP address which will be logically AND'ed with the address given. The keyword `any` may be used to specify ***any IP address***.
669 The port numbers to be blocked are specified as:
671 `***port***` [,`***port***` [,`***port***` [...]]]
673 to specify either a single port or a list of ports, or
675 `***port***`-`***port***`
677 to specify a range of ports. You may also combine a single range with a list, but the range must always be specified first.
679 The ***options*** available are:
681 frag:: Matches if the packet is not the first fragment of the datagram.in:: Matches if the packet is on the way in.out:: Matches if the packet is on the way out.ipoptions `***spec***`:: Matches if the IP header contains the comma separated list of options specified in `***spec***`. The supported IP options are: `ssrr` (strict source route), `lsrr` (loose source route), `rr` (record packet route), and `ts` (time stamp). The absence of a particular option may be specified with a leading `!`.established:: Matches if the packet is part of an already established TCP connection (i.e. it has the RST or ACK bits set). You can optimize the performance of the firewall by placing ***established*** rules early in the chain.setup:: Matches if the packet is an attempt to establish a TCP connection (the SYN bit is set but the ACK bit is not).tcpflags `***flags***`:: Matches if the TCP header contains the comma separated list of `***flags***`. The supported flags are `fin`, `syn`, `rst`, `psh`, `ack`, and `urg`. The absence of a particular flag may be indicated by a leading `!`.icmptypes `***types***`:: Matches if the ICMP type is present in the list `***types***`. The list may be specified as any combination of ranges and/or individual types separated by commas. Commonly used ICMP types are: `0` echo reply (ping reply), `3` destination unreachable, `5` redirect, `8` echo request (ping request), and `11` time exceeded (used to indicate TTL expiration as with [traceroute(8)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#traceroute§ion8)).
683 ##### Listing the IPFW Rules
685 The syntax for this form of the command is:
687 `ipfw` [-a] [-c] [-d] [-e] [-t] [-N] [-S] list
689 There are seven valid flags when using this form of the command:
691 -a:: While listing, show counter values. This option is the only way to see accounting counters.-c:: List rules in compact form.-d:: Show dynamic rules in addition to static rules.-e:: If `-d` was specified, also show expired dynamic rules.-t:: Display the last match times for each chain entry. The time listing is incompatible with the input syntax used by the [ipfw(8)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#ipfw§ion8) utility.-N:: Attempt to resolve given addresses and service names.-S:: Show the set each rule belongs to. If this flag is not specified, disabled rules will not be listed.
693 ##### Flushing the IPFW Rules
695 The syntax for flushing the chain is:
699 This causes all entries in the firewall chain to be removed except the fixed default policy enforced by the kernel (index 65535). Use caution when flushing rules; the default deny policy will leave your system cut off from the network until allow entries are added to the chain.
701 ##### Clearing the IPFW Packet Counters
703 The syntax for clearing one or more packet counters is:
705 `ipfw` zero [`***index***`]
707 When used without an `***index***` argument, all packet counters are cleared. If an `***index***` is supplied, the clearing operation only affects a specific chain entry.
709 #### Example Commands for **ipfw**
711 This command will deny all packets from the host `evil.crackers.org` to the telnet port of the host `nice.people.org`:
715 # ipfw add deny tcp from evil.crackers.org to nice.people.org 23
717 The next example denies and logs any TCP traffic from the entire `crackers.org` network (a class C) to the `nice.people.org` machine (any port).
721 # ipfw add deny log tcp from evil.crackers.org/24 to nice.people.org
723 If you do not want people sending X sessions to your internal network (a subnet of a class C), the following command will do the necessary filtering:
727 # ipfw add deny tcp from any to my.org/28 6000 setup
729 To see the accounting records:
741 You can also see the last time a chain entry was matched with:
747 #### Building a Packet Filtering Firewall
749 **Note:** The following suggestions are just that: suggestions. The requirements of each firewall are different and we cannot tell you how to build a firewall to meet your particular requirements.
751 When initially setting up your firewall, unless you have a test bench setup where you can configure your firewall host in a controlled environment, it is strongly recommend you use the logging version of the commands and enable logging in the kernel. This will allow you to quickly identify problem areas and cure them without too much disruption. Even after the initial setup phase is complete, I recommend using the logging for `deny' as it allows tracing of possible attacks and also modification of the firewall rules if your requirements alter.
753 **Note:** If you use the logging versions of the `accept` command, be aware that it can generate ***large*** amounts of log data. One log entry will be generated for every packet that passes through the firewall, so large FTP/http transfers, etc, will really slow the system down. It also increases the latencies on those packets as it requires more work to be done by the kernel before the packet can be passed on. **syslogd** will also start using up a lot more processor time as it logs all the extra data to disk, and it could quite easily fill the partition `/var/log` is located on.
755 You should enable your firewall from `/etc/rc.conf.local` or `/etc/rc.conf`. The associated manual page explains which knobs to fiddle and lists some preset firewall configurations. If you do not use a preset configuration, `ipfw list` will output the current ruleset into a file that you can pass to `rc.conf`. If you do not use `/etc/rc.conf.local` or `/etc/rc.conf` to enable your firewall, it is important to make sure your firewall is enabled before any IP interfaces are configured.
757 The next problem is what your firewall should actually ***do***! This is largely dependent on what access to your network you want to allow from the outside, and how much access to the outside world you want to allow from the inside. Some general rules are:
759 * Block all incoming access to ports below 1024 for TCP. This is where most of the security sensitive services are, like finger, SMTP (mail) and telnet.
761 * Block ***all*** incoming UDP traffic. There are very few useful services that travel over UDP, and what useful traffic there is, is normally a security threat (e.g. Suns RPC and NFS protocols). This has its disadvantages also, since UDP is a connectionless protocol, denying incoming UDP traffic also blocks the replies to outgoing UDP traffic. This can cause a problem for people (on the inside) using external archie (prospero) servers. If you want to allow access to archie, you will have to allow packets coming from ports 191 and 1525 to any internal UDP port through the firewall. **ntp** is another service you may consider allowing through, which comes from port 123.
763 * Block traffic to port 6000 from the outside. Port 6000 is the port used for access to X11 servers, and can be a security threat (especially if people are in the habit of doing `xhost +` on their workstations). X11 can actually use a range of ports starting at 6000, the upper limit being how many X displays you can run on the machine. The upper limit as defined by RFC 1700 (Assigned Numbers) is 6063.
765 * Check what ports any internal servers use (e.g. SQL servers, etc). It is probably a good idea to block those as well, as they normally fall outside the 1-1024 range specified above.
767 Another checklist for firewall configuration is available from CERT at http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/packet_filtering.html
769 As stated above, these are only ***guidelines***. You will have to decide what filter rules you want to use on your firewall yourself. We cannot accept ANY responsibility if someone breaks into your network, even if you follow the advice given above.
771 #### IPFW Overhead and Optimization
773 Many people want to know how much overhead IPFW adds to a system. The answer to this depends mostly on your rule set and processor speed. For most applications dealing with Ethernet and small rule sets, the answer is ***negligible***. For those of you that need actual measurements to satisfy your curiosity, read on.
775 The following measurements were made using FreeBSD 2.2.5-STABLE on a 486-66. (While IPFW has changed slightly in later releases of DragonFly, it still performs with similar speed.) IPFW was modified to measure the time spent within the `ip_fw_chk` routine, displaying the results to the console every 1000 packets.
777 Two rule sets, each with 1000 rules, were tested. The first set was designed to demonstrate a worst case scenario by repeating the rule:
781 # ipfw add deny tcp from any to any 55555
783 This demonstrates a worst case scenario by causing most of IPFW's packet check routine to be executed before finally deciding that the packet does not match the rule (by virtue of the port number). Following the 999th iteration of this rule was an `allow ip from any to any`.
785 The second set of rules were designed to abort the rule check quickly:
789 # ipfw add deny ip from 1.2.3.4 to 1.2.3.4
791 The non-matching source IP address for the above rule causes these rules to be skipped very quickly. As before, the 1000th rule was an `allow ip from any to any`.
793 The per-packet processing overhead in the former case was approximately 2.703 ms/packet, or roughly 2.7 microseconds per rule. Thus the theoretical packet processing limit with these rules is around 370 packets per second. Assuming 10 Mbps Ethernet and a ~1500 byte packet size, we would only be able to achieve 55.5% bandwidth utilization.
795 For the latter case each packet was processed in approximately 1.172 ms, or roughly 1.2 microseconds per rule. The theoretical packet processing limit here would be about 853 packets per second, which could consume 10 Mbps Ethernet bandwidth.
797 The excessive number of rules tested and the nature of those rules do not provide a real-world scenario -- they were used only to generate the timing information presented here. Here are a few things to keep in mind when building an efficient rule set:
799 * Place an `established` rule early on to handle the majority of TCP traffic. Do not put any `allow tcp` statements before this rule.
801 * Place heavily triggered rules earlier in the rule set than those rarely used (***without changing the permissiveness of the firewall***, of course). You can see which rules are used most often by examining the packet counting statistics with `ipfw -a l`.
805 CategoryHandbook-security
809 [OpenSSL](http://www.openssl.org/) provides a general-purpose cryptography library, as well as the Secure Sockets Layer v2/v3 (SSLv2/SSLv3) and Transport Layer Security v1 (TLSv1) network security protocols.
811 However, one of the algorithms (specifically IDEA) included in OpenSSL is protected by patents in the USA and elsewhere, and is not available for unrestricted use. IDEA is included in the OpenSSL sources in DragonFly, but it is not built by default. If you wish to use it, and you comply with the license terms, enable the `MAKE_IDEA` switch in `/etc/make.conf` and rebuild your sources using `make world`.
813 Today, the RSA algorithm is free for use in USA and other countries. In the past it was protected by a patent.
817 <!-- XXX: someone revise this and add words about pf. I've no clue about this stuff -->
819 ***Written by Nik Clayton. ***
821 Creating a VPN between two networks, separated by the Internet, using DragonFly gateways.
823 ### Understanding IPsec
825 ***Written by Hiten M. Pandya. ***
827 This section will guide you through the process of setting up IPsec, and to use it in an environment which consists of DragonFly and **Microsoft® Windows® 2000/XP** machines, to make them communicate securely. In order to set up IPsec, it is necessary that you are familiar with the concepts of building a custom kernel (see [kernelconfig.html Chapter 9]).
829 ***IPsec*** is a protocol which sits on top of the Internet Protocol (IP) layer. It allows two or more hosts to communicate in a secure manner (hence the name). The DragonFly IPsec ***network stack*** is based on the [KAME](http://www.kame.net/) implementation, which has support for both protocol families, IPv4 and IPv6.
831 IPsec consists of two sub-protocols:
833 * ***Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP)***, protects the IP packet data from third party interference, by encrypting the contents using symmetric cryptography algorithms (like Blowfish, 3DES).
835 * ***Authentication Header (AH)***, protects the IP packet header from third party interference and spoofing, by computing a cryptographic checksum and hashing the IP packet header fields with a secure hashing function. This is then followed by an additional header that contains the hash, to allow the information in the packet to be authenticated.
837 ESP and AH can either be used together or separately, depending on the environment.
839 IPsec can either be used to directly encrypt the traffic between two hosts (known as ***Transport Mode***); or to build ***virtual tunnels*** between two subnets, which could be used for secure communication between two corporate networks (known as ***Tunnel Mode***). The latter is more commonly known as a ***Virtual Private Network (VPN)***. The [ipsec(4)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#ipsec§ion4) manual page should be consulted for detailed information on the IPsec subsystem in DragonFly.
841 To add IPsec support to your kernel, add the following options to your kernel configuration file:
845 options IPSEC #IP security
847 options IPSEC_ESP #IP security (crypto; define w/ IPSEC)
851 If IPsec debugging support is desired, the following kernel option should also be added:
855 options IPSEC_DEBUG #debug for IP security
861 There's no standard for what constitutes a VPN. VPNs can be implemented using a number of different technologies, each of which have their own strengths and weaknesses. This article presents a number of scenarios, and strategies for implementing a VPN for each scenario.
863 ### Scenario #1: Two networks, connected to the Internet, to behave as one
865 This is the scenario that caused me to first investigating VPNs. The premise is as follows:
867 * You have at least two sites
869 * Both sites are using IP internally
871 * Both sites are connected to the Internet, through a gateway that is running DragonFly.
873 * The gateway on each network has at least one public IP address.
875 * The internal addresses of the two networks can be public or private IP addresses, it doesn't matter. You can be running NAT on the gateway machine if necessary.
877 * The internal IP addresses of the two networks ***do not collide***. While I expect it is theoretically possible to use a combination of VPN technology and NAT to get this to work, I expect it to be a configuration nightmare.
879 If you find that you are trying to connect two networks, both of which, internally, use the same private IP address range (e.g., both of them use `192.168.1.x`), then one of the networks will have to be renumbered.
881 The network topology might look something like this:
883 security/ipsec-network.png
885 Notice the two public IP addresses. I'll use the letters to refer to them in the rest of this article. Anywhere you see those letters in this article, replace them with your own public IP addresses. Note also that internally, the two gateway machines have .1 IP addresses, and that the two networks have different private IP addresses (`192.168.1.x` and `192.168.2.x` respectively). All the machines on the private networks have been configured to use the `.1` machine as their default gateway.
887 The intention is that, from a network point of view, each network should view the machines on the other network as though they were directly attached the same router -- albeit a slightly slow router with an occasional tendency to drop packets.
889 This means that (for example), machine `192.168.1.20` should be able to run
895 and have it work, transparently. Windows machines should be able to see the machines on the other network, browse file shares, and so on, in exactly the same way that they can browse machines on the local network.
897 And the whole thing has to be secure. This means that traffic between the two networks has to be encrypted.
899 Creating a VPN between these two networks is a multi-step process. The stages are as follows:
901 1. Create a ***virtual*** network link between the two networks, across the Internet. Test it, using tools like [ping(8)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#ping§ion8), to make sure it works.
903 1. Apply security policies to ensure that traffic between the two networks is transparently encrypted and decrypted as necessary. Test this, using tools like [tcpdump(1)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#tcpdump§ion1), to ensure that traffic is encrypted.
905 1. Configure additional software on the DragonFly gateways, to allow Windows machines to see one another across the VPN.
907 #### Step 1: Creating and testing a ***virtual*** network link
909 Suppose that you were logged in to the gateway machine on network #1 (with public IP address `A.B.C.D`, private IP address `192.168.1.1`), and you ran `ping 192.168.2.1`, which is the private address of the machine with IP address `W.X.Y.Z`. What needs to happen in order for this to work?
911 1. The gateway machine needs to know how to reach `192.168.2.1`. In other words, it needs to have a route to `192.168.2.1`.
913 1. Private IP addresses, such as those in the `192.168.x` range are not supposed to appear on the Internet at large. Instead, each packet you send to `192.168.2.1` will need to be wrapped up inside another packet. This packet will need to appear to be from `A.B.C.D`, and it will have to be sent to `W.X.Y.Z`. This process is called ***encapsulation***.
915 1. Once this packet arrives at `W.X.Y.Z` it will need to ***unencapsulated***, and delivered to `192.168.2.1`.
917 You can think of this as requiring a ***tunnel*** between the two networks. The two ***tunnel mouths*** are the IP addresses `A.B.C.D` and `W.X.Y.Z`, and the tunnel must be told the addresses of the private IP addresses that will be allowed to pass through it. The tunnel is used to transfer traffic with private IP addresses across the public Internet.
919 This tunnel is created by using the generic interface, or `gif` devices on DragonFly. As you can imagine, the `gif` interface on each gateway host must be configured with four IP addresses; two for the public IP addresses, and two for the private IP addresses.
921 Support for the gif device must be compiled in to the DragonFly kernel on both machines. You can do this by adding the line:
927 to the kernel configuration files on both machines, and then compile, install, and reboot as normal.
929 Configuring the tunnel is a two step process. First the tunnel must be told what the outside (or public) IP addresses are, using [gifconfig(8)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#gifconfig§ion8). Then the private IP addresses must be configured using [ifconfig(8)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command=ifconfig§ion=8).
931 On the gateway machine on network #1 you would run the following two commands to configure the tunnel.
935 gifconfig gif0 A.B.C.D W.X.Y.Z
937 ifconfig gif0 inet 192.168.1.1 192.168.2.1 netmask 0xffffffff
941 On the other gateway machine you run the same commands, but with the order of the IP addresses reversed.
945 gifconfig gif0 W.X.Y.Z A.B.C.D
947 ifconfig gif0 inet 192.168.2.1 192.168.1.1 netmask 0xffffffff
957 to see the configuration. For example, on the network #1 gateway, you would see this:
963 gif0: flags=8011<UP,POINTTOPOINT,MULTICAST> mtu 1280
965 inet 192.168.1.1 --> 192.168.2.1 netmask 0xffffffff
967 physical address inet A.B.C.D --> W.X.Y.Z
971 As you can see, a tunnel has been created between the physical addresses `A.B.C.D` and `W.X.Y.Z`, and the traffic allowed through the tunnel is that between `192.168.1.1` and `192.168.2.1`.
973 This will also have added an entry to the routing table on both machines, which you can examine with the command `netstat -rn`. This output is from the gateway host on network #1.
985 Destination Gateway Flags Refs Use Netif Expire
989 192.168.2.1 192.168.1.1 UH 0 0 gif0
995 As the ***Flags*** value indicates, this is a host route, which means that each gateway knows how to reach the other gateway, but they do not know how to reach the rest of their respective networks. That problem will be fixed shortly.
997 It is likely that you are running a firewall on both machines. This will need to be circumvented for your VPN traffic. You might want to allow all traffic between both networks, or you might want to include firewall rules that protect both ends of the VPN from one another.
999 It greatly simplifies testing if you configure the firewall to allow all traffic through the VPN. You can always tighten things up later. If you are using [ipfw(8)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#ipfw§ion8) on the gateway machines then a command like
1003 ipfw add 1 allow ip from any to any via gif0
1005 will allow all traffic between the two end points of the VPN, without affecting your other firewall rules. Obviously you will need to run this command on both gateway hosts.
1007 This is sufficient to allow each gateway machine to ping the other. On `192.168.1.1`, you should be able to run
1013 and get a response, and you should be able to do the same thing on the other gateway machine.
1015 However, you will not be able to reach internal machines on either network yet. This is because of the routing -- although the gateway machines know how to reach one another, they do not know how to reach the network behind each one.
1017 To solve this problem you must add a static route on each gateway machine. The command to do this on the first gateway would be:
1021 route add 192.168.2.0 192.168.2.1 netmask 0xffffff00
1025 This says ***In order to reach the hosts on the network `192.168.2.0`, send the packets to the host `192.168.2.1`***. You will need to run a similar command on the other gateway, but with the `192.168.1.x` addresses instead.
1027 IP traffic from hosts on one network will now be able to reach hosts on the other network.
1029 That has now created two thirds of a VPN between the two networks, in as much as it is ***virtual*** and it is a ***network***. It is not private yet. You can test this using [ping(8)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#ping§ion8) and [tcpdump(1)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command=tcpdump§ion=1). Log in to the gateway host and run
1033 tcpdump dst host 192.168.2.1
1035 In another log in session on the same host run
1041 You will see output that looks something like this:
1045 16:10:24.018080 192.168.1.1 > 192.168.2.1: icmp: echo request
1047 16:10:24.018109 192.168.1.1 > 192.168.2.1: icmp: echo reply
1049 16:10:25.018814 192.168.1.1 > 192.168.2.1: icmp: echo request
1051 16:10:25.018847 192.168.1.1 > 192.168.2.1: icmp: echo reply
1053 16:10:26.028896 192.168.1.1 > 192.168.2.1: icmp: echo request
1055 16:10:26.029112 192.168.1.1 > 192.168.2.1: icmp: echo reply
1059 As you can see, the ICMP messages are going back and forth unencrypted. If you had used the `-s` parameter to [tcpdump(1)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#tcpdump§ion1) to grab more bytes of data from the packets you would see more information.
1061 Obviously this is unacceptable. The next section will discuss securing the link between the two networks so that it all traffic is automatically encrypted.
1065 * Configure both kernels with ***pseudo-device gif***.
1067 * Edit `/etc/rc.conf` on gateway host #1 and add the following lines (replacing IP addresses as necessary).
1071 gifconfig_gif0="A.B.C.D W.X.Y.Z"
1073 ifconfig_gif0="inet 192.168.1.1 192.168.2.1 netmask 0xffffffff"
1077 route_vpn="192.168.2.0 192.168.2.1 netmask 0xffffff00"
1081 * Edit your firewall script (`/etc/rc.firewall`, or similar) on both hosts, and add
1085 ipfw add 1 allow ip from any to any via gif0
1089 * Make similar changes to `/etc/rc.conf` on gateway host #2, reversing the order of IP addresses.
1091 #### Step 2: Securing the link
1093 To secure the link we will be using IPsec. IPsec provides a mechanism for two hosts to agree on an encryption key, and to then use this key in order to encrypt data between the two hosts.
1095 The are two areas of configuration to be considered here.
1097 1. There must be a mechanism for two hosts to agree on the encryption mechanism to use. Once two hosts have agreed on this mechanism there is said to be a ***security association*** between them.
1099 1. There must be a mechanism for specifying which traffic should be encrypted. Obviously, you don't want to encrypt all your outgoing traffic -- you only want to encrypt the traffic that is part of the VPN. The rules that you put in place to determine what traffic will be encrypted are called ***security policies***.
1101 Security associations and security policies are both maintained by the kernel, and can be modified by userland programs. However, before you can do this you must configure the kernel to support IPsec and the Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP) protocol. This is done by configuring a kernel with:
1111 and recompiling, reinstalling, and rebooting. As before you will need to do this to the kernels on both of the gateway hosts.
1113 You have two choices when it comes to setting up security associations. You can configure them by hand between two hosts, which entails choosing the encryption algorithm, encryption keys, and so forth, or you can use daemons that implement the Internet Key Exchange protocol (IKE) to do this for you.
1115 I recommend the latter. Apart from anything else, it is easier to set up.
1117 Editing and displaying security policies is carried out using [setkey(8)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#setkey§ion8). By analogy, `setkey` is to the kernel's security policy tables as [route(8)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command=route§ion=8) is to the kernel's routing tables. `setkey` can also display the current security associations, and to continue the analogy further, is akin to `netstat -r` in that respect.
1119 There are a number of choices for daemons to manage security associations with DragonFly. This article will describe how to use one of these, racoon. racoon is in the FreeBSD ports collection, in the security/ category, and is installed in the usual way.
1121 racoon must be run on both gateway hosts. On each host it is configured with the IP address of the other end of the VPN, and a secret key (which you choose, and must be the same on both gateways).
1123 The two daemons then contact one another, confirm that they are who they say they are (by using the secret key that you configured). The daemons then generate a new secret key, and use this to encrypt the traffic over the VPN. They periodically change this secret, so that even if an attacker were to crack one of the keys (which is as theoretically close to unfeasible as it gets) it won't do them much good -- by the time they've cracked the key the two daemons have chosen another one.
1125 racoon's configuration is stored in `${PREFIX}/etc/racoon`. You should find a configuration file there, which should not need to be changed too much. The other component of racoon's configuration, which you will need to change, is the ***pre-shared key***.
1127 The default racoon configuration expects to find this in the file `${PREFIX}/etc/racoon/psk.txt`. It is important to note that the pre-shared key is ***not*** the key that will be used to encrypt your traffic across the VPN link, it is simply a token that allows the key management daemons to trust one another.
1129 `psk.txt` contains a line for each remote site you are dealing with. In this example, where there are two sites, each `psk.txt` file will contain one line (because each end of the VPN is only dealing with one other end).
1131 On gateway host #1 this line should look like this:
1137 That is, the ***public*** IP address of the remote end, whitespace, and a text string that provides the secret. Obviously, you shouldn't use ***secret*** as your key -- the normal rules for choosing a password apply.
1139 On gateway host #2 the line would look like this
1145 That is, the public IP address of the remote end, and the same secret key. `psk.txt` must be mode `0600` (i.e., only read/write to `root`) before racoon will run.
1147 You must run racoon on both gateway machines. You will also need to add some firewall rules to allow the IKE traffic, which is carried over UDP to the ISAKMP (Internet Security Association Key Management Protocol) port. Again, this should be fairly early in your firewall ruleset.
1151 ipfw add 1 allow udp from A.B.C.D to W.X.Y.Z isakmp
1153 ipfw add 1 allow udp from W.X.Y.Z to A.B.C.D isakmp
1157 Once racoon is running you can try pinging one gateway host from the other. The connection is still not encrypted, but racoon will then set up the security associations between the two hosts -- this might take a moment, and you may see this as a short delay before the ping commands start responding.
1159 Once the security association has been set up you can view it using [setkey(8)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#setkey§ion8). Run
1165 on either host to view the security association information.
1167 That's one half of the problem. They other half is setting your security policies.
1169 To create a sensible security policy, let's review what's been set up so far. This discussions hold for both ends of the link.
1171 Each IP packet that you send out has a header that contains data about the packet. The header includes the IP addresses of both the source and destination. As we already know, private IP addresses, such as the `192.168.x.y` range are not supposed to appear on the public Internet. Instead, they must first be encapsulated inside another packet. This packet must have the public source and destination IP addresses substituted for the private addresses.
1173 So if your outgoing packet started looking like this:
1175 security/ipsec-out-pkt.png
1177 Then it will be encapsulated inside another packet, looking something like this:
1179 security/ipsec-encap-pkt.png
1181 This encapsulation is carried out by the `gif` device. As you can see, the packet now has real IP addresses on the outside, and our original packet has been wrapped up as data inside the packet that will be put out on the Internet.
1183 Obviously, we want all traffic between the VPNs to be encrypted. You might try putting this in to words, as:
1185 ***If a packet leaves from `A.B.C.D`, and it is destined for `W.X.Y.Z`, then encrypt it, using the necessary security associations.***
1187 ***If a packet arrives from `W.X.Y.Z`, and it is destined for `A.B.C.D`, then decrypt it, using the necessary security associations.***
1189 That's close, but not quite right. If you did this, all traffic to and from `W.X.Y.Z`, even traffic that was not part of the VPN, would be encrypted. That's not quite what you want. The correct policy is as follows
1191 ***If a packet leaves from `A.B.C.D`, and that packet is encapsulating another packet, and it is destined for `W.X.Y.Z`, then encrypt it, using the necessary security associations.***
1193 ***If a packet arrives from `W.X.Y.Z`, and that packet is encapsulating another packet, and it is destined for `A.B.C.D`, then encrypt it, using the necessary security associations.***
1195 A subtle change, but a necessary one.
1197 Security policies are also set using [setkey(8)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#setkey§ion8). [setkey(8)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command=setkey§ion=8) features a configuration language for defining the policy. You can either enter configuration instructions via stdin, or you can use the `-f` option to specify a filename that contains configuration instructions.
1199 The configuration on gateway host #1 (which has the public IP address `A.B.C.D`) to force all outbound traffic to `W.X.Y.Z` to be encrypted is:
1203 spdadd A.B.C.D/32 W.X.Y.Z/32 ipencap -P out ipsec esp/tunnel/A.B.C.D-W.X.Y.Z/require;
1207 Put these commands in a file (e.g., `/etc/ipsec.conf`) and then run
1211 # setkey -f /etc/ipsec.conf
1213 `spdadd` tells [setkey(8)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#setkey§ion8) that we want to add a rule to the secure policy database. The rest of this line specifies which packets will match this policy. `A.B.C.D/32` and `W.X.Y.Z/32` are the IP addresses and netmasks that identify the network or hosts that this policy will apply to. In this case, we want it to apply to traffic between these two hosts. `ipencap` tells the kernel that this policy should only apply to packets that encapsulate other packets. `-P out` says that this policy applies to outgoing packets, and `ipsec` says that the packet will be secured.
1215 The second line specifies how this packet will be encrypted. `esp` is the protocol that will be used, while `tunnel` indicates that the packet will be further encapsulated in an IPsec packet. The repeated use of `A.B.C.D` and `W.X.Y.Z` is used to select the security association to use, and the final `require` mandates that packets must be encrypted if they match this rule.
1217 This rule only matches outgoing packets. You will need a similar rule to match incoming packets.
1221 spdadd W.X.Y.Z/32 A.B.C.D/32 ipencap -P in ipsec esp/tunnel/W.X.Y.Z-A.B.C.D/require;
1223 Note the `in` instead of `out` in this case, and the necessary reversal of the IP addresses.
1225 The other gateway host (which has the public IP address `W.X.Y.Z`) will need similar rules.
1229 spdadd W.X.Y.Z/32 A.B.C.D/32 ipencap -P out ipsec esp/tunnel/W.X.Y.Z-A.B.C.D/require;
1231 spdadd A.B.C.D/32 W.X.Y.Z/32 ipencap -P in ipsec esp/tunnel/A.B.C.D-W.X.Y.Z/require;
1233 Finally, you need to add firewall rules to allow ESP and IPENCAP packets back and forth. These rules will need to be added to both hosts.
1237 ipfw add 1 allow esp from A.B.C.D to W.X.Y.Z
1239 ipfw add 1 allow esp from W.X.Y.Z to A.B.C.D
1241 ipfw add 1 allow ipencap from A.B.C.D to W.X.Y.Z
1243 ipfw add 1 allow ipencap from W.X.Y.Z to A.B.C.D
1247 Because the rules are symmetric you can use the same rules on each gateway host.
1249 Outgoing packets will now look something like this:
1251 security/ipsec-crypt-pkt.png
1253 When they are received by the far end of the VPN they will first be decrypted (using the security associations that have been negotiated by racoon). Then they will enter the `gif` interface, which will unwrap the second layer, until you are left with the innermost packet, which can then travel in to the inner network.
1255 You can check the security using the same [ping(8)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#ping§ion8) test from earlier. First, log in to the `A.B.C.D` gateway machine, and run:
1259 tcpdump dst host 192.168.2.1
1261 In another log in session on the same host run
1267 This time you should see output like the following:
1273 Now, as you can see, [tcpdump(1)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#tcpdump§ion1) shows the ESP packets. If you try to examine them with the `-s` option you will see (apparently) gibberish, because of the encryption.
1275 Congratulations. You have just set up a VPN between two remote sites.
1279 * Configure both kernels with:
1289 * Install [`security/racoon`](http://pkgsrc.se/security/racoon). Edit `${PREFIX}/etc/racoon/psk.txt` on both gateway hosts, adding an entry for the remote host's IP address and a secret key that they both know. Make sure this file is mode 0600.
1291 * Add the following lines to `/etc/rc.conf` on each host:
1297 ipsec_file="/etc/ipsec.conf"
1301 * Create an `/etc/ipsec.conf` on each host that contains the necessary spdadd lines. On gateway host #1 this would be:
1305 spdadd A.B.C.D/32 W.X.Y.Z/32 ipencap -P out ipsec
1307 esp/tunnel/A.B.C.D-W.X.Y.Z/require;
1309 spdadd W.X.Y.Z/32 A.B.C.D/32 ipencap -P in ipsec
1311 esp/tunnel/W.X.Y.Z-A.B.C.D/require;
1315 On gateway host #2 this would be:
1319 spdadd W.X.Y.Z/32 A.B.C.D/32 ipencap -P out ipsec
1321 esp/tunnel/W.X.Y.Z-A.B.C.D/require;
1323 spdadd A.B.C.D/32 W.X.Y.Z/32 ipencap -P in ipsec
1325 esp/tunnel/A.B.C.D-W.X.Y.Z/require;
1329 * Add firewall rules to allow IKE, ESP, and IPENCAP traffic to both hosts:
1333 ipfw add 1 allow udp from A.B.C.D to W.X.Y.Z isakmp
1335 ipfw add 1 allow udp from W.X.Y.Z to A.B.C.D isakmp
1337 ipfw add 1 allow esp from A.B.C.D to W.X.Y.Z
1339 ipfw add 1 allow esp from W.X.Y.Z to A.B.C.D
1341 ipfw add 1 allow ipencap from A.B.C.D to W.X.Y.Z
1343 ipfw add 1 allow ipencap from W.X.Y.Z to A.B.C.D
1347 The previous two steps should suffice to get the VPN up and running. Machines on each network will be able to refer to one another using IP addresses, and all traffic across the link will be automatically and securely encrypted.
1353 ***Contributed by Chern Lee. ***
1355 **OpenSSH** is a set of network connectivity tools used to access remote machines securely. It can be used as a direct replacement for `rlogin`, `rsh`, `rcp`, and `telnet`. Additionally, any other TCP/IP connections can be tunneled/forwarded securely through SSH. **OpenSSH** encrypts all traffic to effectively eliminate eavesdropping, connection hijacking, and other network-level attacks.
1357 **OpenSSH** is maintained by the OpenBSD project, and is based upon SSH v1.2.12 with all the recent bug fixes and updates. It is compatible with both SSH protocols 1 and 2.
1359 ### Advantages of Using OpenSSH
1361 Normally, when using [telnet(1)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#telnet§ion1) or [rlogin(1)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command=rlogin§ion=1), data is sent over the network in an clear, un-encrypted form. Network sniffers anywhere in between the client and server can steal your user/password information or data transferred in your session. **OpenSSH** offers a variety of authentication and encryption methods to prevent this from happening.
1365 Be sure to make the following addition to your `rc.conf` file:
1371 This will load [sshd(8)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#sshd§ion8&manpath=OpenBSD+3.3), the daemon program for **OpenSSH** , the next time your system initializes. Alternatively, you can simply run directly the **sshd** daemon by typing `rcstart sshd` on the command line.
1375 The [ssh(1)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#ssh§ion1&manpath=OpenBSD+3.3) utility works similarly to [rlogin(1)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command=rlogin§ion=1).
1379 # ssh user@example.com
1381 Host key not found from the list of known hosts.
1383 Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? yes
1385 Host 'example.com' added to the list of known hosts.
1387 user@example.com's password: *******
1389 The login will continue just as it would have if a session was created using `rlogin` or `telnet`. SSH utilizes a key fingerprint system for verifying the authenticity of the server when the client connects. The user is prompted to enter `yes` only when connecting for the first time. Future attempts to login are all verified against the saved fingerprint key. The SSH client will alert you if the saved fingerprint differs from the received fingerprint on future login attempts. The fingerprints are saved in `~/.ssh/known_hosts`, or `~/.ssh/known_hosts2` for SSH v2 fingerprints.
1391 By default, **OpenSSH** servers are configured to accept both SSH v1 and SSH v2 connections. The client, however, can choose between the two. Version 2 is known to be more robust and secure than its predecessor.
1393 The [ssh(1)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#ssh§ion1&manpath=OpenBSD+3.3) command can be forced to use either protocol by passing it the `-1` or `-2` argument for v1 and v2, respectively.
1397 The [scp(1)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#scp§ion1&manpath=OpenBSD+3.3) command works similarly to [rcp(1)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command=rcp§ion=1); it copies a file to or from a remote machine, except in a secure fashion.
1401 # scp user@example.com:/COPYRIGHT COPYRIGHT
1403 user@example.com's password: *******
1405 COPYRIGHT 100% |*****************************| 4735
1411 Since the fingerprint was already saved for this host in the previous example, it is verified when using [scp(1)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#scp§ion1&manpath=OpenBSD+3.3) here.
1413 The arguments passed to [scp(1)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#scp§ion1&manpath=OpenBSD+3.3) are similar to [cp(1)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command=cp§ion=1), with the file or files in the first argument, and the destination in the second. Since the file is fetched over the network, through SSH, one or more of the file arguments takes on the form `user@host:<path_to_remote_file>`. The `user@` part is optional. If omitted, it will default to the same username as you are currently logged in as, unless configured otherwise.
1417 The system-wide configuration files for both the **OpenSSH** daemon and client reside within the `/etc/ssh` directory.
1419 `ssh_config` configures the client settings, while `sshd_config` configures the daemon.
1421 Additionally, the `sshd_program` (`/usr/sbin/sshd` by default), and `sshd_flags` `rc.conf` options can provide more levels of configuration.
1423 Each user can have a personal configuration file in `~/.ssh/config`. The file can configure various client options, and can include host-specific options. With the following configuration file, a user could type `ssh shell` which would be equivalent to `ssh -X user@shell.example.com`.
1429 Hostname shell.example.com
1439 Instead of using passwords, [ssh-keygen(1)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#ssh-keygen§ion1&manpath=OpenBSD+3.3) can be used to generate RSA keys to authenticate a user:
1443 % ssh-keygen -t rsa1
1445 Initializing random number generator...
1447 Generating p: .++ (distance 66)
1449 Generating q: ..............................++ (distance 498)
1451 Computing the keys...
1453 Key generation complete.
1455 Enter file in which to save the key (/home/user/.ssh/identity):
1459 Enter the same passphrase again:
1461 Your identification has been saved in /home/user/.ssh/identity.
1465 [ssh-keygen(1)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#ssh-keygen§ion1&manpath=OpenBSD+3.3) will create a public and private key pair for use in authentication. The private key is stored in `~/.ssh/identity`, whereas the public key is stored in `~/.ssh/identity.pub`. The public key must be placed in `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` of the remote machine in order for the setup to work.
1467 This will allow connection to the remote machine based upon RSA authentication instead of passwords.
1469 **Note:** The `-t rsa1` option will create RSA keys for use by SSH protocol version 1. If you want to use RSA keys with the SSH protocol version 2, you have to use the command `ssh-keygen -t rsa`.
1471 If a passphrase is used in [ssh-keygen(1)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#ssh-keygen§ion1&manpath=OpenBSD+3.3), the user will be prompted for a password each time in order to use the private key.
1473 A SSH protocol version 2 DSA key can be created for the same purpose by using the `ssh-keygen -t dsa` command. This will create a public/private DSA key for use in SSH protocol version 2 sessions only. The public key is stored in `~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub`, while the private key is in `~/.ssh/id_dsa`.
1475 DSA public keys are also placed in `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` on the remote machine.
1477 [ssh-agent(1)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#ssh-agent§ion1&manpath=OpenBSD+3.3) and [ssh-add(1)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command=ssh-add§ion=1&manpath=OpenBSD+3.3) are utilities used in managing multiple passworded private keys.
1479 **Warning:** The various options and files can be different according to the **OpenSSH** version you have on your system, to avoid problems you should consult the [ssh-keygen(1)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#ssh-keygen§ion1&manpath=OpenBSD+3.3) manual page.
1483 **OpenSSH** has the ability to create a tunnel to encapsulate another protocol in an encrypted session.
1485 The following command tells [ssh(1)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#ssh§ion1&manpath=OpenBSD+3.3) to create a tunnel for **telnet** :
1489 % ssh -2 -N -f -L 5023:localhost:23 user@foo.example.com
1493 The `ssh` command is used with the following options:
1497 :: Forces `ssh` to use version 2 of the protocol. (Do not use if you are working with older SSH servers)
1501 :: Indicates no command, or tunnel only. If omitted, `ssh` would initiate a normal session.
1505 :: Forces `ssh` to run in the background.
1509 :: Indicates a local tunnel in `***localport:remotehost:remoteport***` fashion.
1511 `user@foo.example.com`
1513 :: The remote SSH server.
1515 An SSH tunnel works by creating a listen socket on `localhost` on the specified port. It then forwards any connection received on the local host/port via the SSH connection to the specified remote host and port.
1517 In the example, port `***5023***` on `localhost` is being forwarded to port `***23***` on `localhost` of the remote machine. Since `***23***` is **telnet** , this would create a secure **telnet** session through an SSH tunnel.
1519 This can be used to wrap any number of insecure TCP protocols such as SMTP, POP3, FTP, etc.
1521 **Example 10-1. Using SSH to Create a Secure Tunnel for SMTP**
1525 % ssh -2 -N -f -L 5025:localhost:25 user@mailserver.example.com
1527 user@mailserver.example.com's password: *****
1529 % telnet localhost 5025
1533 Connected to localhost.
1535 Escape character is '^]'.
1537 220 mailserver.example.com ESMTP
1539 This can be used in conjunction with an [ssh-keygen(1)](http://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command#ssh-keygen§ion1&manpath=OpenBSD+3.3) and additional user accounts to create a more seamless/hassle-free SSH tunneling environment. Keys can be used in place of typing a password, and the tunnels can be run as a separate user.
1541 #### Practical SSH Tunneling Examples
1543 ##### Secure Access of a POP3 Server
1545 At work, there is an SSH server that accepts connections from the outside. On the same office network resides a mail server running a POP3 server. The network, or network path between your home and office may or may not be completely trustable. Because of this, you need to check your e-mail in a secure manner. The solution is to create an SSH connection to your office's SSH server, and tunnel through to the mail server.
1549 % ssh -2 -N -f -L 2110:mail.example.com:110 user@ssh-server.example.com
1551 user@ssh-server.example.com's password: ******
1553 When the tunnel is up and running, you can point your mail client to send POP3 requests to `localhost` port 2110. A connection here will be forwarded securely across the tunnel to `mail.example.com`.
1555 ##### Bypassing a Draconian Firewall
1557 Some network administrators impose extremely draconian firewall rules, filtering not only incoming connections, but outgoing connections. You may be only given access to contact remote machines on ports 22 and 80 for SSH and web surfing.
1559 You may wish to access another (perhaps non-work related) service, such as an Ogg Vorbis server to stream music. If this Ogg Vorbis server is streaming on some other port than 22 or 80, you will not be able to access it.
1561 The solution is to create an SSH connection to a machine outside of your network's firewall, and use it to tunnel to the Ogg Vorbis server.
1565 % ssh -2 -N -f -L 8888:music.example.com:8000 user@unfirewalled-system.example.org
1567 user@unfirewalled-system.example.org's password: *******
1569 Your streaming client can now be pointed to `localhost` port 8888, which will be forwarded over to `music.example.com` port 8000, successfully evading the firewall.
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