Import OpenSSL-1.0.0c.

diff --git a/crypto/openssl/CHANGES b/crypto/openssl/CHANGES
index aad698c..38bfd34 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/openssl/CHANGES
+++ b/crypto/openssl/CHANGES
@@ -2,6 +2,18 @@
  OpenSSL CHANGES
  _______________
 
+ Changes between 1.0.0b and 1.0.0c  [2 Dec 2010]
+
+  *) Disable code workaround for ancient and obsolete Netscape browsers
+     and servers: an attacker can use it in a ciphersuite downgrade attack.
+     Thanks to Martin Rex for discovering this bug. CVE-2010-4180
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fixed J-PAKE implementation error, originally discovered by
+     Sebastien Martini, further info and confirmation from Stefan
+     Arentz and Feng Hao. Note that this fix is a security fix. CVE-2010-4252
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
  Changes between 1.0.0a and 1.0.0b  [16 Nov 2010]
 
   *) Fix extension code to avoid race conditions which can result in a buffer

diff --git a/crypto/openssl/FAQ b/crypto/openssl/FAQ
index f7bdc88..50e9314 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/openssl/FAQ
+++ b/crypto/openssl/FAQ
@@ -52,6 +52,9 @@ OpenSSL  -  Frequently Asked Questions
 * Why does the OpenSSL test suite fail in sha512t on x86 CPU?
 * Why does compiler fail to compile sha512.c?
 * Test suite still fails, what to do?
+* I think I've found a bug, what should I do?
+* I'm SURE I've found a bug, how do I report it?
+* I've found a security issue, how do I report it?
 
 [PROG] Questions about programming with OpenSSL
 
@@ -79,7 +82,7 @@ OpenSSL  -  Frequently Asked Questions
 * Which is the current version of OpenSSL?
 
 The current version is available from <URL: http://www.openssl.org>.
-OpenSSL 1.0.0b was released on Nov 16th, 2010.
+OpenSSL 1.0.0c was released on Dec 2nd, 2010.
 
 In addition to the current stable release, you can also access daily
 snapshots of the OpenSSL development version at <URL:
@@ -131,7 +134,7 @@ OpenSSL.  Information on the OpenSSL mailing lists is available from
 * Where can I get a compiled version of OpenSSL?
 
 You can finder pointers to binary distributions in
-http://www.openssl.org/related/binaries.html .
+<URL: http://www.openssl.org/related/binaries.html> .
 
 Some applications that use OpenSSL are distributed in binary form.
 When using such an application, you don't need to install OpenSSL
@@ -463,7 +466,7 @@ administrators.
 Other projects do have other policies so you can for example extract the CA
 bundle used by Mozilla and/or modssl as described in this article:
 
-  http://www.mail-archive.com/modssl-users@modssl.org/msg16980.html
+  <URL: http://www.mail-archive.com/modssl-users@modssl.org/msg16980.html>
 
 
 [BUILD] =======================================================================
@@ -505,7 +508,7 @@ when you run the test suite (using "make test").  The message returned is
 "bc: 1 not implemented".
 
 The best way to deal with this is to find another implementation of bc
-and compile/install it.  GNU bc (see http://www.gnu.org/software/software.html
+and compile/install it.  GNU bc (see <URL: http://www.gnu.org/software/software.html>
 for download instructions) can be safely used, for example.
 
 
@@ -516,7 +519,7 @@ that the OpenSSL bntest throws at it.  This gets triggered when you run the
 test suite (using "make test").  The message returned is "bc: stack empty".
 
 The best way to deal with this is to find another implementation of bc
-and compile/install it.  GNU bc (see http://www.gnu.org/software/software.html
+and compile/install it.  GNU bc (see <URL: http://www.gnu.org/software/software.html>
 for download instructions) can be safely used, for example.
 
 
@@ -709,6 +712,46 @@ never make sense, and tend to emerge when you least expect them. In order
 to identify one, drop optimization level, e.g. by editing CFLAG line in
 top-level Makefile, recompile and re-run the test.
 
+* I think I've found a bug, what should I do?
+
+If you are a new user then it is quite likely you haven't found a bug and
+something is happening you aren't familiar with. Check this FAQ, the associated
+documentation and the mailing lists for similar queries. If you are still
+unsure whether it is a bug or not submit a query to the openssl-users mailing
+list.
+
+
+* I'm SURE I've found a bug, how do I report it?
+
+Bug reports with no security implications should be sent to the request
+tracker. This can be done by mailing the report to <rt@openssl.org> (or its
+alias <openssl-bugs@openssl.org>), please note that messages sent to the
+request tracker also appear in the public openssl-dev mailing list.
+
+The report should be in plain text. Any patches should be sent as
+plain text attachments because some mailers corrupt patches sent inline.
+If your issue affects multiple versions of OpenSSL check any patches apply
+cleanly and, if possible include patches to each affected version.
+
+The report should be given a meaningful subject line briefly summarising the
+issue. Just "bug in OpenSSL" or "bug in OpenSSL 0.9.8n" is not very helpful.
+
+By sending reports to the request tracker the bug can then be given a priority
+and assigned to the appropriate maintainer. The history of discussions can be
+accessed and if the issue has been addressed or a reason why not. If patches
+are only sent to openssl-dev they can be mislaid if a team member has to
+wade through months of old messages to review the discussion.
+
+See also <URL: http://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html>
+
+
+* I've found a security issue, how do I report it?
+
+If you think your bug has security implications then please send it to
+openssl-security@openssl.org if you don't get a prompt reply at least 
+acknowledging receipt then resend or mail it directly to one of the
+more active team members (e.g. Steve).
+
 [PROG] ========================================================================
 
 * Is OpenSSL thread-safe?

diff --git a/crypto/openssl/NEWS b/crypto/openssl/NEWS
index 23edac2..139c1e0 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/openssl/NEWS
+++ b/crypto/openssl/NEWS
@@ -5,6 +5,14 @@
   This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
   release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
 
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0b and OpenSSL 1.0.0c:
+
+      o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-4180
+      o Fix for CVE-2010-4252
+      o Fix mishandling of absent EC point format extension.
+      o Fix various platform compilation issues.
+      o Corrected fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864.
+
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0a and OpenSSL 1.0.0b:
 
       o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864.

diff --git a/crypto/openssl/README b/crypto/openssl/README
index 6b87a4c..509350d 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/openssl/README
+++ b/crypto/openssl/README
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 
- OpenSSL 1.0.0b 16 Nov 2010
+ OpenSSL 1.0.0c 2 Dec 2010
 
  Copyright (c) 1998-2010 The OpenSSL Project
  Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson

diff --git a/crypto/openssl/README.DELETED b/crypto/openssl/README.DELETED
index 638d5df..9ed6f5f 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/openssl/README.DELETED
+++ b/crypto/openssl/README.DELETED
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
 CHANGES.SSLeay
 Configure
 INSTALL

diff --git a/crypto/openssl/apps/speed.c b/crypto/openssl/apps/speed.c
index d5e9e24..0cb7f24 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/openssl/apps/speed.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/apps/speed.c
@@ -1230,7 +1230,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
                count*=2;
                Time_F(START);
                for (it=count; it; it--)
-                       DES_ecb_encrypt(buf_as_des_cblock,buf_as_des_cblock,
+                       DES_ecb_encrypt((DES_cblock *)buf,
+                               (DES_cblock *)buf,
                                &sch,DES_ENCRYPT);
                d=Time_F(STOP);
                } while (d <3);

diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c
index b4449b8..14bae0d 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c
@@ -743,6 +743,16 @@ BOOL WINAPI DllMain(HINSTANCE hinstDLL, DWORD fdwReason,
 #if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__)
 #include <tchar.h>
 #include <signal.h>
+#ifdef __WATCOMC__
+#if defined(_UNICODE) || defined(__UNICODE__)
+#define _vsntprintf _vsnwprintf
+#else
+#define _vsntprintf _vsnprintf
+#endif
+#endif
+#ifdef _MSC_VER
+#define alloca _alloca
+#endif
 
 #if defined(_WIN32_WINNT) && _WIN32_WINNT>=0x0333
 int OPENSSL_isservice(void)
@@ -773,11 +783,7 @@ int OPENSSL_isservice(void)
 
     if (len>512) return -1;            /* paranoia */
     len++,len&=~1;                     /* paranoia */
-#ifdef _MSC_VER
-    name=(WCHAR *)_alloca(len+sizeof(WCHAR));
-#else
     name=(WCHAR *)alloca(len+sizeof(WCHAR));
-#endif
     if (!GetUserObjectInformationW (h,UOI_NAME,name,len,&len))
        return -1;
 
@@ -822,11 +828,7 @@ void OPENSSL_showfatal (const char *fmta,...)
       size_t len_0=strlen(fmta)+1,i;
       WCHAR *fmtw;
 
-#ifdef _MSC_VER
-       fmtw = (WCHAR *)_alloca (len_0*sizeof(WCHAR));
-#else
-       fmtw = (WCHAR *)alloca (len_0*sizeof(WCHAR));
-#endif
+       fmtw = (WCHAR *)alloca(len_0*sizeof(WCHAR));
        if (fmtw == NULL) { fmt=(const TCHAR *)L"no stack?"; break; }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBYTE

diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
index f0b7f95..7e2731f 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret, size_t *siglen)
                sctx = 0;
        if (sigret)
                {
-               MS_STATIC EVP_MD_CTX tmp_ctx;
+               EVP_MD_CTX tmp_ctx;
                unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
                unsigned int mdlen;
                EVP_MD_CTX_init(&tmp_ctx);
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret, size_t *siglen)
 
 int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen)
        {
-       MS_STATIC EVP_MD_CTX tmp_ctx;
+       EVP_MD_CTX tmp_ctx;
        unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
        int r;
        unsigned int mdlen;

diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/p_lib.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
index 1916c61..e26ccd0 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
@@ -411,7 +411,10 @@ void EVP_PKEY_free(EVP_PKEY *x)
 static void EVP_PKEY_free_it(EVP_PKEY *x)
        {
        if (x->ameth && x->ameth->pkey_free)
+               {
                x->ameth->pkey_free(x);
+               x->pkey.ptr = NULL;
+               }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
        if (x->engine)
                {

diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/p_sign.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/p_sign.c
index 8df6d48..bb893f5 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/p_sign.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/p_sign.c
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ int EVP_SignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen,
        unsigned char m[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
        unsigned int m_len;
        int i,ok=0,v;
-       MS_STATIC EVP_MD_CTX tmp_ctx;
+       EVP_MD_CTX tmp_ctx;
 
        *siglen=0;
        EVP_MD_CTX_init(&tmp_ctx);

diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/p_verify.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/p_verify.c
index 8db4641..41d4b67 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/p_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/p_verify.c
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ int EVP_VerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sigbuf,
        unsigned char m[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
        unsigned int m_len;
        int i,ok=0,v;
-       MS_STATIC EVP_MD_CTX tmp_ctx;
+       EVP_MD_CTX tmp_ctx;
 
        EVP_MD_CTX_init(&tmp_ctx);
        EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&tmp_ctx,ctx);     

diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
index 6c66aee..79c679c 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000002f
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000003f
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT   "OpenSSL 1.0.0b-fips 16 Nov 2010"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT   "OpenSSL 1.0.0c-fips 2 Dec 2010"
 #else
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT   "OpenSSL 1.0.0b 16 Nov 2010"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT   "OpenSSL 1.0.0c 2 Dec 2010"
 #endif
 #define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT  " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
 

diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c
index 678b0fe..f9b709e 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c
@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf, size_t size)
         * to something hopefully decent if that isn't available. 
         */
 
-       if (!ok)
+       if (!buf[0])
                if (BUF_strlcpy(buf,"/dev/arandom",size) >= size) {
                        return(NULL);
                }       

diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/stack/safestack.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/stack/safestack.h
index da59178..a498f1b 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/stack/safestack.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/stack/safestack.h
@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ DECLARE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_BLOCK, void)
        sk_is_sorted(CHECKED_STACK_OF(type, st))
 
 #define        SKM_ASN1_SET_OF_d2i(type, st, pp, length, d2i_func, free_func, ex_tag, ex_class) \
-  (STACK_OF(type) *)d2i_ASN1_SET((STACK_OF(OPENSSL_BLOCK) **)CHECKED_STACK_OF(type, st), \
+  (STACK_OF(type) *)d2i_ASN1_SET( \
+                               (STACK_OF(OPENSSL_BLOCK) **)CHECKED_PTR_OF(STACK_OF(type)*, st), \
                                pp, length, \
                                CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i_func), \
                                CHECKED_SK_FREE_FUNC(type, free_func), \

diff --git a/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify.pod b/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify.pod
index 10633da..f93e5fc 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify.pod
+++ b/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify.pod
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ Verify signature using PKCS#1 and SHA256 digest:
        /* Error */
 
  /* Perform operation */
- ret = EVP_PKEY_verify(ctx, md, mdlen, sig, siglen);
+ ret = EVP_PKEY_verify(ctx, sig, siglen, md, mdlen);
 
  /* ret == 1 indicates success, 0 verify failure and < 0 for some
   * other error.

diff --git a/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover.pod b/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover.pod
index e2a2a8c..f3605eb 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover.pod
+++ b/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover.pod
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ Recover digest originally signed using PKCS#1 and SHA256 digest:
        /* Error */
 
  /* Determine buffer length */
- if (EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(ctx, rout, &routlen, sig, siglen) <= 0)
+ if (EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(ctx, NULL, &routlen, sig, siglen) <= 0)
        /* Error */
 
  rout = OPENSSL_malloc(routlen);

diff --git a/crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod b/crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod
index 310db84..cc588f3 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod
+++ b/crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod
@@ -78,18 +78,7 @@ this breaks this server so 16 bytes is the way to go.
 
 =item SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
 
-ssl3.netscape.com:443, first a connection is established with RC4-MD5.
-If it is then resumed, we end up using DES-CBC3-SHA.  It should be
-RC4-MD5 according to 7.6.1.3, 'cipher_suite'.
-
-Netscape-Enterprise/2.01 (https://merchant.netscape.com) has this bug.
-It only really shows up when connecting via SSLv2/v3 then reconnecting
-via SSLv3. The cipher list changes....
-
-NEW INFORMATION.  Try connecting with a cipher list of just
-DES-CBC-SHA:RC4-MD5.  For some weird reason, each new connection uses
-RC4-MD5, but a re-connect tries to use DES-CBC-SHA.  So netscape, when
-doing a re-connect, always takes the first cipher in the cipher list.
+As of OpenSSL 0.9.8q and 1.0.0c, this option has no effect.
 
 =item SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG
 

diff --git a/crypto/openssl/engines/e_aep.c b/crypto/openssl/engines/e_aep.c
index 742b4f9..d7f89e5 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/openssl/engines/e_aep.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/engines/e_aep.c
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ typedef int pid_t;
 #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && defined(NETWARE_CLIB)
 #define getpid GetThreadID
 extern int GetThreadID(void);
+#elif defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__WATCOMC__)
+#define getpid _getpid
 #endif
 
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
@@ -867,13 +869,7 @@ static AEP_RV aep_get_connection(AEP_CONNECTION_HNDL_PTR phConnection)
 
        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
 
-#ifdef NETWARE_CLIB
-       curr_pid = GetThreadID();
-#elif defined(_WIN32)
-       curr_pid = _getpid();
-#else
        curr_pid = getpid();
-#endif
 
        /*Check if this is the first time this is being called from the current
          process*/

diff --git a/crypto/openssl/engines/e_capi.c b/crypto/openssl/engines/e_capi.c
index e2a7cb5..5871491 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/openssl/engines/e_capi.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/engines/e_capi.c
@@ -76,10 +76,16 @@
  * CertGetCertificateContextProperty. CERT_KEY_PROV_INFO_PROP_ID is
  * one of possible values you can pass to function in question. By
  * checking if it's defined we can see if wincrypt.h and accompanying
- * crypt32.lib are in shape. Yes, it's rather "weak" test and if
- * compilation fails, then re-configure with -DOPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG.
+ * crypt32.lib are in shape. The native MingW32 headers up to and
+ * including __W32API_VERSION 3.14 lack of struct DSSPUBKEY and the
+ * defines CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_A and CERT_STORE_READONLY_FLAG,
+ * so we check for these too and avoid compiling.
+ * Yes, it's rather "weak" test and if compilation fails,
+ * then re-configure with -DOPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG.
  */
-#ifdef CERT_KEY_PROV_INFO_PROP_ID
+#if defined(CERT_KEY_PROV_INFO_PROP_ID) && \
+    defined(CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_A) && \
+    defined(CERT_STORE_READONLY_FLAG)
 # define __COMPILE_CAPIENG
 #endif /* CERT_KEY_PROV_INFO_PROP_ID */
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG */

diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 6eab135..c22837d 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -866,8 +866,11 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
                s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
        if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id))
                {
+/* Workaround is now obsolete */
+#if 0
                if (!(s->options &
                        SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG))
+#endif
                        {
                        al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);

diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index d0921c5..514f72c 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -985,6 +985,10 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
                                break;
                                }
                        }
+/* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
+ * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
+ */
+#if 0
                if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
                        {
                        /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
@@ -999,6 +1003,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
                                j = 1;
                                }
                        }
+#endif
                if (j == 0)
                        {
                        /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher

diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
index eea5916..5cdd7e5 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -779,8 +779,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
                                {
                                if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
                                        {
-                                       *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                                       return 0;
+                                       OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+                                       s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
                                        }
                                s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
                                if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
@@ -1452,23 +1452,20 @@ int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
        int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-       /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, then server
-        * must return a an EC point formats lists containing uncompressed.
+       /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
+        * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
+        * it must contain uncompressed.
         */
        unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
        unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
        if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 
+           (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 
            ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
                {
                /* we are using an ECC cipher */
                size_t i;
                unsigned char *list;
                int found_uncompressed = 0;
-               if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist == NULL) || (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length == 0))
-                       {
-                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
-                       return -1;
-                       }
                list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
                for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
                        {