crypto/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c

   1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
   2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
   3  * All rights reserved.
   4  *
   5  * This package is an SSL implementation written
   6  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
   7  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
   8  *
   9  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
  10  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
  11  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
  12  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
  13  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
  14  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
  15  *
  16  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
  17  * the code are not to be removed.
  18  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
  19  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
  20  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
  21  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
  22  *
  23  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  24  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  25  * are met:
  26  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
  27  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  28  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  29  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
  30  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
  31  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
  32  *    must display the following acknowledgement:
  33  *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
  34  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
  35  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
  36  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
  37  * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
  38  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
  39  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
  40  *
  41  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
  42  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
  43  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
  44  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
  45  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
  46  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
  47  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
  48  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
  49  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  50  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  51  * SUCH DAMAGE.
  52  *
  53  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
  54  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
  55  * copied and put under another distribution licence
  56  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  57  */
  58
  59 #include <stdio.h>
  60 #include <time.h>
  61 #include <errno.h>
  62
  63 #include "cryptlib.h"
  64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
  65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
  66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
  67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
  68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
  69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
  70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
  71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
  72
  73 /* CRL score values */
  74
  75 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
  76
  77 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL    0x100
  78
  79 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
  80
  81 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE         0x080
  82
  83 /* CRL times valid */
  84
  85 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME          0x040
  86
  87 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
  88
  89 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME   0x020
  90
  91 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
  92
  93 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
  94
  95 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
  96
  97 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT   0x018
  98
  99 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
 100
 101 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH     0x008
 102
 103 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
 104
 105 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID          0x004
 106
 107 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
 108
 109 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA    0x002
 110
 111 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
 112 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
 113 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
 114 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 115 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 116 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 117 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 118 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 119 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 120
 121 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
 122                         unsigned int *preasons,
 123                         X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
 124 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
 125                                 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
 126 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
 127                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
 128 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
 129                                 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
 130 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
 131                                 unsigned int *preasons);
 132 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
 133 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
 134                         STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
 135                         STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
 136
 137 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 138 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
 139
 140
 141 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
 142         {
 143         return ok;
 144         }
 145
 146 #if 0
 147 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
 148         {
 149         return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
 150         }
 151 #endif
 152
 153 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 154         {
 155         X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
 156         int bad_chain = 0;
 157         X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
 158         int depth,i,ok=0;
 159         int num;
 160         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
 161         STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
 162         if (ctx->cert == NULL)
 163                 {
 164                 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
 165                 return -1;
 166                 }
 167
 168         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
 169
 170         /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
 171          * present and that the first entry is in place */
 172         if (ctx->chain == NULL)
 173                 {
 174                 if (    ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
 175                         (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
 176                         {
 177                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 178                         goto end;
 179                         }
 180                 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
 181                 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
 182                 }
 183
 184         /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
 185         if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
 186             && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
 187                 {
 188                 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 189                 goto end;
 190                 }
 191
 192         num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
 193         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
 194         depth=param->depth;
 195
 196
 197         for (;;)
 198                 {
 199                 /* If we have enough, we break */
 200                 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
 201                                          * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
 202                                          * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
 203                                          * code later.
 204                                          */
 205
 206                 /* If we are self signed, we break */
 207                 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
 208
 209                 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
 210                 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
 211                         {
 212                         xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
 213                         if (xtmp != NULL)
 214                                 {
 215                                 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
 216                                         {
 217                                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 218                                         goto end;
 219                                         }
 220                                 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
 221                                 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
 222                                 ctx->last_untrusted++;
 223                                 x=xtmp;
 224                                 num++;
 225                                 /* reparse the full chain for
 226                                  * the next one */
 227                                 continue;
 228                                 }
 229                         }
 230                 break;
 231                 }
 232
 233         /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
 234          * certificates.  We now need to add at least one trusted one,
 235          * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
 236
 237         /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
 238          * is self signed.
 239          */
 240
 241         i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
 242         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
 243         if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
 244                 {
 245                 /* we have a self signed certificate */
 246                 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
 247                         {
 248                         /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
 249                          * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
 250                          * match to avoid possible impersonation.
 251                          */
 252                         ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
 253                         if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
 254                                 {
 255                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
 256                                 ctx->current_cert=x;
 257                                 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
 258                                 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
 259                                 bad_chain = 1;
 260                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
 261                                 if (!ok) goto end;
 262                                 }
 263                         else
 264                                 {
 265                                 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
 266                                  * so we get any trust settings.
 267                                  */
 268                                 X509_free(x);
 269                                 x = xtmp;
 270                                 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
 271                                 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
 272                                 }
 273                         }
 274                 else
 275                         {
 276                         /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
 277                         chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
 278                         ctx->last_untrusted--;
 279                         num--;
 280                         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
 281                         }
 282                 }
 283
 284         /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
 285         for (;;)
 286                 {
 287                 /* If we have enough, we break */
 288                 if (depth < num) break;
 289
 290                 /* If we are self signed, we break */
 291                 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
 292
 293                 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
 294
 295                 if (ok < 0) return ok;
 296                 if (ok == 0) break;
 297
 298                 x = xtmp;
 299                 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
 300                         {
 301                         X509_free(xtmp);
 302                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 303                         return 0;
 304                         }
 305                 num++;
 306                 }
 307
 308         /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
 309
 310         /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
 311         if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
 312                 {
 313                 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
 314                         {
 315                         if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
 316                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
 317                         else
 318                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
 319                         ctx->current_cert=x;
 320                         }
 321                 else
 322                         {
 323
 324                         sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
 325                         num++;
 326                         ctx->last_untrusted=num;
 327                         ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
 328                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
 329                         chain_ss=NULL;
 330                         }
 331
 332                 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
 333                 bad_chain = 1;
 334                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
 335                 if (!ok) goto end;
 336                 }
 337
 338         /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
 339         ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
 340
 341         if (!ok) goto end;
 342
 343         /* Check name constraints */
 344
 345         ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
 346
 347         if (!ok) goto end;
 348
 349         /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
 350
 351         if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
 352
 353         if (!ok) goto end;
 354
 355         /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
 356         X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
 357
 358         /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
 359          * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
 360          */
 361
 362         ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
 363         if(!ok) goto end;
 364
 365         /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
 366         if (ctx->verify != NULL)
 367                 ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
 368         else
 369                 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
 370         if(!ok) goto end;
 371
 372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
 373         /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
 374         ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
 375         if (!ok) goto end;
 376         ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
 377         if (!ok) goto end;
 378 #endif
 379
 380         /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
 381         if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
 382                 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
 383         if(!ok) goto end;
 384         if (0)
 385                 {
 386 end:
 387                 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
 388                 }
 389         if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
 390         if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
 391         return ok;
 392         }
 393
 394
 395 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
 396  */
 397
 398 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
 399 {
 400         int i;
 401         X509 *issuer;
 402         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
 403                 {
 404                 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
 405                 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
 406                         return issuer;
 407                 }
 408         return NULL;
 409 }
 410
 411 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
 412
 413 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
 414 {
 415         int ret;
 416         ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
 417         if (ret == X509_V_OK)
 418                 return 1;
 419         /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
 420         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
 421                 return 0;
 422
 423         ctx->error = ret;
 424         ctx->current_cert = x;
 425         ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
 426         return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
 427         return 0;
 428 }
 429
 430 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
 431
 432 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
 433 {
 434         *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
 435         if (*issuer)
 436                 {
 437                 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
 438                 return 1;
 439                 }
 440         else
 441                 return 0;
 442 }
 443
 444
 445 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
 446  * with the supplied purpose
 447  */
 448
 449 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 450 {
 451 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
 452         return 1;
 453 #else
 454         int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
 455         X509 *x;
 456         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
 457         int proxy_path_length = 0;
 458         int purpose;
 459         int allow_proxy_certs;
 460         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
 461
 462         /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
 463            -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
 464                use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
 465            0:  we only accept non-CA certificates.  This is currently not
 466                used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
 467            1:  we only accept CA certificates.  This is currently used for
 468                all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
 469         */
 470         must_be_ca = -1;
 471
 472         /* CRL path validation */
 473         if (ctx->parent)
 474                 {
 475                 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
 476                 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
 477                 }
 478         else
 479                 {
 480                 allow_proxy_certs =
 481                         !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
 482                 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
 483                    software happy */
 484                 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
 485                         allow_proxy_certs = 1;
 486                 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
 487                 }
 488
 489         /* Check all untrusted certificates */
 490         for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
 491                 {
 492                 int ret;
 493                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
 494                 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
 495                         && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
 496                         {
 497                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
 498                         ctx->error_depth = i;
 499                         ctx->current_cert = x;
 500                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
 501                         if (!ok) goto end;
 502                         }
 503                 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
 504                         {
 505                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
 506                         ctx->error_depth = i;
 507                         ctx->current_cert = x;
 508                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
 509                         if (!ok) goto end;
 510                         }
 511                 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
 512                 switch(must_be_ca)
 513                         {
 514                 case -1:
 515                         if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
 516                                 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
 517                                 {
 518                                 ret = 0;
 519                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
 520                                 }
 521                         else
 522                                 ret = 1;
 523                         break;
 524                 case 0:
 525                         if (ret != 0)
 526                                 {
 527                                 ret = 0;
 528                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
 529                                 }
 530                         else
 531                                 ret = 1;
 532                         break;
 533                 default:
 534                         if ((ret == 0)
 535                                 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
 536                                         && (ret != 1)))
 537                                 {
 538                                 ret = 0;
 539                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
 540                                 }
 541                         else
 542                                 ret = 1;
 543                         break;
 544                         }
 545                 if (ret == 0)
 546                         {
 547                         ctx->error_depth = i;
 548                         ctx->current_cert = x;
 549                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
 550                         if (!ok) goto end;
 551                         }
 552                 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
 553                         {
 554                         ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
 555                         if ((ret == 0)
 556                                 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
 557                                         && (ret != 1)))
 558                                 {
 559                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
 560                                 ctx->error_depth = i;
 561                                 ctx->current_cert = x;
 562                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
 563                                 if (!ok) goto end;
 564                                 }
 565                         }
 566                 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
 567                 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
 568                            && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
 569                            && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
 570                         {
 571                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
 572                         ctx->error_depth = i;
 573                         ctx->current_cert = x;
 574                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
 575                         if (!ok) goto end;
 576                         }
 577                 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
 578                 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
 579                         plen++;
 580                 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
 581                    certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
 582                    certificate.  If not, the next certificate must be a
 583                    CA certificate.  */
 584                 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
 585                         {
 586                         if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
 587                                 {
 588                                 ctx->error =
 589                                         X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
 590                                 ctx->error_depth = i;
 591                                 ctx->current_cert = x;
 592                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
 593                                 if (!ok) goto end;
 594                                 }
 595                         proxy_path_length++;
 596                         must_be_ca = 0;
 597                         }
 598                 else
 599                         must_be_ca = 1;
 600                 }
 601         ok = 1;
 602  end:
 603         return ok;
 604 #endif
 605 }
 606
 607 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 608         {
 609         X509 *x;
 610         int i, j, rv;
 611         /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
 612         for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
 613                 {
 614                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
 615                 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
 616                 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
 617                         continue;
 618                 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
 619                  * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
 620                  * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
 621                  * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
 622                  */
 623                 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
 624                         {
 625                         NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
 626                         if (nc)
 627                                 {
 628                                 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
 629                                 if (rv != X509_V_OK)
 630                                         {
 631                                         ctx->error = rv;
 632                                         ctx->error_depth = i;
 633                                         ctx->current_cert = x;
 634                                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
 635                                                 return 0;
 636                                         }
 637                                 }
 638                         }
 639                 }
 640         return 1;
 641         }
 642
 643 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 644 {
 645 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
 646         return 1;
 647 #else
 648         int i, ok;
 649         X509 *x;
 650         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
 651         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
 652 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
 653         i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
 654         x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
 655         ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
 656         if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
 657                 return 1;
 658         ctx->error_depth = i;
 659         ctx->current_cert = x;
 660         if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
 661                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
 662         else
 663                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
 664         ok = cb(0, ctx);
 665         return ok;
 666 #endif
 667 }
 668
 669 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 670         {
 671         int i, last, ok;
 672         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
 673                 return 1;
 674         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
 675                 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
 676         else
 677                 {
 678                 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
 679                 if (ctx->parent)
 680                         return 1;
 681                 last = 0;
 682                 }
 683         for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
 684                 {
 685                 ctx->error_depth = i;
 686                 ok = check_cert(ctx);
 687                 if (!ok) return ok;
 688                 }
 689         return 1;
 690         }
 691
 692 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 693         {
 694         X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
 695         X509 *x;
 696         int ok, cnum;
 697         cnum = ctx->error_depth;
 698         x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
 699         ctx->current_cert = x;
 700         ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
 701         ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
 702         ctx->current_reasons = 0;
 703         while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
 704                 {
 705                 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
 706                 if (ctx->get_crl)
 707                         ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
 708                 else
 709                         ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
 710                 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
 711                  * notify callback
 712                  */
 713                 if(!ok)
 714                         {
 715                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
 716                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
 717                         goto err;
 718                         }
 719                 ctx->current_crl = crl;
 720                 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
 721                 if (!ok)
 722                         goto err;
 723
 724                 if (dcrl)
 725                         {
 726                         ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
 727                         if (!ok)
 728                                 goto err;
 729                         ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
 730                         if (!ok)
 731                                 goto err;
 732                         }
 733                 else
 734                         ok = 1;
 735
 736                 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
 737                 if (ok != 2)
 738                         {
 739                         ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
 740                         if (!ok)
 741                                 goto err;
 742                         }
 743
 744                 X509_CRL_free(crl);
 745                 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
 746                 crl = NULL;
 747                 dcrl = NULL;
 748                 }
 749         err:
 750         X509_CRL_free(crl);
 751         X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
 752
 753         ctx->current_crl = NULL;
 754         return ok;
 755
 756         }
 757
 758 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
 759
 760 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
 761         {
 762         time_t *ptime;
 763         int i;
 764         if (notify)
 765                 ctx->current_crl = crl;
 766         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
 767                 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
 768         else
 769                 ptime = NULL;
 770
 771         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
 772         if (i == 0)
 773                 {
 774                 if (!notify)
 775                         return 0;
 776                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
 777                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
 778                         return 0;
 779                 }
 780
 781         if (i > 0)
 782                 {
 783                 if (!notify)
 784                         return 0;
 785                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
 786                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
 787                         return 0;
 788                 }
 789
 790         if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
 791                 {
 792                 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
 793
 794                 if (i == 0)
 795                         {
 796                         if (!notify)
 797                                 return 0;
 798                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
 799                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
 800                                 return 0;
 801                         }
 802                 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
 803                 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
 804                         {
 805                         if (!notify)
 806                                 return 0;
 807                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
 808                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
 809                                 return 0;
 810                         }
 811                 }
 812
 813         if (notify)
 814                 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
 815
 816         return 1;
 817         }
 818
 819 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
 820                         X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
 821                         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
 822         {
 823         int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
 824         unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
 825         X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
 826         X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
 827         X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
 828
 829         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
 830                 {
 831                 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
 832                 reasons = *preasons;
 833                 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
 834
 835                 if (crl_score > best_score)
 836                         {
 837                         best_crl = crl;
 838                         best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
 839                         best_score = crl_score;
 840                         best_reasons = reasons;
 841                         }
 842                 }
 843
 844         if (best_crl)
 845                 {
 846                 if (*pcrl)
 847                         X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
 848                 *pcrl = best_crl;
 849                 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
 850                 *pscore = best_score;
 851                 *preasons = best_reasons;
 852                 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
 853                 if (*pdcrl)
 854                         {
 855                         X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
 856                         *pdcrl = NULL;
 857                         }
 858                 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
 859                 }
 860
 861         if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
 862                 return 1;
 863
 864         return 0;
 865         }
 866
 867 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
 868  * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
 869  */
 870
 871 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
 872         {
 873         ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
 874         int i;
 875         i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, 0);
 876         if (i >= 0)
 877                 {
 878                 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
 879                 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
 880                         return 0;
 881                 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
 882                 }
 883         else
 884                 exta = NULL;
 885
 886         i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, 0);
 887
 888         if (i >= 0)
 889                 {
 890
 891                 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
 892                         return 0;
 893                 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
 894                 }
 895         else
 896                 extb = NULL;
 897
 898         if (!exta && !extb)
 899                 return 1;
 900
 901         if (!exta || !extb)
 902                 return 0;
 903
 904
 905         if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
 906                 return 0;
 907
 908         return 1;
 909         }
 910
 911 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
 912
 913 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
 914         {
 915         /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
 916         if (!delta->base_crl_number)
 917                         return 0;
 918         /* Base must have a CRL number */
 919         if (!base->crl_number)
 920                         return 0;
 921         /* Issuer names must match */
 922         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
 923                                 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
 924                 return 0;
 925         /* AKID and IDP must match */
 926         if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
 927                         return 0;
 928         if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
 929                         return 0;
 930         /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
 931         if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
 932                         return 0;
 933         /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
 934         if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
 935                         return 1;
 936         return 0;
 937         }
 938
 939 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
 940  * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
 941  */
 942
 943 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
 944                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
 945         {
 946         X509_CRL *delta;
 947         int i;
 948         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
 949                 return;
 950         if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
 951                 return;
 952         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
 953                 {
 954                 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
 955                 if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
 956                         {
 957                         if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
 958                                 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
 959                         CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
 960                         *dcrl = delta;
 961                         return;
 962                         }
 963                 }
 964         *dcrl = NULL;
 965         }
 966
 967 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
 968  * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
 969  * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
 970  * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
 971  * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
 972  */
 973
 974 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
 975                         unsigned int *preasons,
 976                         X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
 977         {
 978
 979         int crl_score = 0;
 980         unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
 981
 982         /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
 983
 984         /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
 985         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
 986                 return 0;
 987         /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
 988         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
 989                 {
 990                 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
 991                         return 0;
 992                 }
 993         else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
 994                 {
 995                 /* If no new reasons reject */
 996                 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
 997                         return 0;
 998                 }
 999         /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1000         else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1001                 return 0;
1002         /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1003         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
1004                 {
1005                 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1006                         return 0;
1007                 }
1008         else
1009                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1010
1011         if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1012                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1013
1014         /* Check expiry */
1015         if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1016                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1017
1018         /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1019         crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1020
1021         /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1022
1023         if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1024                 return 0;
1025
1026         /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1027
1028         if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
1029                 {
1030                 /* If no new reasons reject */
1031                 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1032                         return 0;
1033                 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1034                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1035                 }
1036
1037         *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1038
1039         return crl_score;
1040
1041         }
1042
1043 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1044                                 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1045         {
1046         X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1047         X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1048         int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1049         int i;
1050
1051         if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1052                 cidx++;
1053
1054         crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1055
1056         if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1057                 {
1058                 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
1059                         {
1060                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1061                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1062                         return;
1063                         }
1064                 }
1065
1066         for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
1067                 {
1068                 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1069                 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1070                         continue;
1071                 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1072                         {
1073                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1074                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1075                         return;
1076                         }
1077                 }
1078
1079         /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1080
1081         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1082                 return;
1083
1084         /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
1085          * set of untrusted certificates.
1086          */
1087         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
1088                 {
1089                 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1090                 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1091                         continue;
1092                 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1093                         {
1094                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1095                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1096                         return;
1097                         }
1098                 }
1099         }
1100
1101 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1102  * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1103  * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
1104  * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in
1105  * practice.
1106  */
1107
1108 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1109         {
1110         X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1111         int ret;
1112         /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1113         if (ctx->parent)
1114                 return 0;
1115         if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1116                 return -1;
1117
1118         crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1119         /* Copy verify params across */
1120         X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1121
1122         crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1123         crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1124
1125         /* Verify CRL issuer */
1126         ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1127
1128         if (ret <= 0)
1129                 goto err;
1130
1131         /* Check chain is acceptable */
1132
1133         ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1134         err:
1135         X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1136         return ret;
1137         }
1138
1139 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
1140  * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
1141  * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
1142  * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
1143  * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
1144  * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
1145  */
1146
1147 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1148                         STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1149                         STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1150         {
1151         X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1152         cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1153         crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1154         if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1155                 return 1;
1156         return 0;
1157         }
1158
1159 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1160  * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1161  * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1162  * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1163  * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1164  */
1165
1166
1167 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1168         {
1169         X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1170         GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1171         GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1172         int i, j;
1173         if (!a || !b)
1174                 return 1;
1175         if (a->type == 1)
1176                 {
1177                 if (!a->dpname)
1178                         return 0;
1179                 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1180                 if (b->type == 1)
1181                         {
1182                         if (!b->dpname)
1183                                 return 0;
1184                         if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1185                                 return 1;
1186                         else
1187                                 return 0;
1188                         }
1189                 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1190                 nm = a->dpname;
1191                 gens = b->name.fullname;
1192                 }
1193         else if (b->type == 1)
1194                 {
1195                 if (!b->dpname)
1196                         return 0;
1197                 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1198                 gens = a->name.fullname;
1199                 nm = b->dpname;
1200                 }
1201
1202         /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1203         if (nm)
1204                 {
1205                 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
1206                         {
1207                         gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1208                         if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1209                                 continue;
1210                         if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1211                                 return 1;
1212                         }
1213                 return 0;
1214                 }
1215
1216         /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1217
1218         for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
1219                 {
1220                 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1221                 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
1222                         {
1223                         genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1224                         if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1225                                 return 1;
1226                         }
1227                 }
1228
1229         return 0;
1230
1231         }
1232
1233 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1234         {
1235         int i;
1236         X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1237         /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1238         if (!dp->CRLissuer)
1239                 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1240         for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
1241                 {
1242                 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1243                 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1244                         continue;
1245                 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1246                         return 1;
1247                 }
1248         return 0;
1249         }
1250
1251 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1252
1253 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1254                                 unsigned int *preasons)
1255         {
1256         int i;
1257         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1258                 return 0;
1259         if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
1260                 {
1261                 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1262                         return 0;
1263                 }
1264         else
1265                 {
1266                 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1267                         return 0;
1268                 }
1269         *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1270         for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
1271                 {
1272                 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1273                 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
1274                         {
1275                         if (!crl->idp ||
1276                              idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
1277                                 {
1278                                 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1279                                 return 1;
1280                                 }
1281                         }
1282                 }
1283         if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1284                 return 1;
1285         return 0;
1286         }
1287
1288 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
1289  * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
1290  */
1291
1292 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1293                                 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1294         {
1295         int ok;
1296         X509 *issuer = NULL;
1297         int crl_score = 0;
1298         unsigned int reasons;
1299         X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1300         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1301         X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1302         reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1303         ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1304                                 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1305
1306         if (ok)
1307                 goto done;
1308
1309         /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1310
1311         skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1312
1313         /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1314         if (!skcrl && crl)
1315                 goto done;
1316
1317         get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1318
1319         sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1320
1321         done:
1322
1323         /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1324         if (crl)
1325                 {
1326                 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1327                 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1328                 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1329                 *pcrl = crl;
1330                 *pdcrl = dcrl;
1331                 return 1;
1332                 }
1333
1334         return 0;
1335         }
1336
1337 /* Check CRL validity */
1338 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1339         {
1340         X509 *issuer = NULL;
1341         EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1342         int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1343         cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1344         chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1345         /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1346         if (ctx->current_issuer)
1347                 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1348
1349         /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
1350          * is next certificate in chain.
1351          */
1352         else if (cnum < chnum)
1353                 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1354         else
1355                 {
1356                 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1357                 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1358                 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
1359                         {
1360                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1361                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1362                         if(!ok) goto err;
1363                         }
1364                 }
1365
1366         if(issuer)
1367                 {
1368                 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
1369                  * been done
1370                  */
1371                 if (!crl->base_crl_number)
1372                         {
1373                         /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1374                         if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1375                                 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
1376                                 {
1377                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1378                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1379                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1380                                 }
1381
1382                         if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
1383                                 {
1384                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1385                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1386                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1387                                 }
1388
1389                         if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
1390                                 {
1391                                 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0)
1392                                         {
1393                                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1394                                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1395                                         if(!ok) goto err;
1396                                         }
1397                                 }
1398
1399                         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1400                                 {
1401                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1402                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1403                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1404                                 }
1405
1406
1407                         }
1408
1409                 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
1410                         {
1411                         ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1412                         if (!ok)
1413                                 goto err;
1414                         }
1415
1416                 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1417                 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1418
1419                 if(!ikey)
1420                         {
1421                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1422                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1423                         if (!ok) goto err;
1424                         }
1425                 else
1426                         {
1427                         /* Verify CRL signature */
1428                         if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
1429                                 {
1430                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1431                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1432                                 if (!ok) goto err;
1433                                 }
1434                         }
1435                 }
1436
1437         ok = 1;
1438
1439         err:
1440         EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1441         return ok;
1442         }
1443
1444 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1445 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1446         {
1447         int ok;
1448         X509_REVOKED *rev;
1449         /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
1450          * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
1451          * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
1452          * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
1453          */
1454         if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
1455                 {
1456                 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1457                         return 1;
1458                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1459                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1460                 if(!ok)
1461                         return 0;
1462                 }
1463         /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
1464          * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
1465          */
1466         if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
1467                 {
1468                 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1469                         return 2;
1470                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1471                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1472                 if (!ok)
1473                         return 0;
1474                 }
1475
1476         return 1;
1477         }
1478
1479 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1480         {
1481         int ret;
1482         if (ctx->parent)
1483                 return 1;
1484         ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1485                                 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1486         if (ret == 0)
1487                 {
1488                 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1489                 return 0;
1490                 }
1491         /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1492         if (ret == -1)
1493                 {
1494                 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
1495                  * callback.
1496                  */
1497                 X509 *x;
1498                 int i;
1499                 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
1500                         {
1501                         x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1502                         if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1503                                 continue;
1504                         ctx->current_cert = x;
1505                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1506                         if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1507                                 return 0;
1508                         }
1509                 return 1;
1510                 }
1511         if (ret == -2)
1512                 {
1513                 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1514                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1515                 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1516                 }
1517
1518         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
1519                 {
1520                 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1521                 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1522                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1523                         return 0;
1524                 }
1525
1526         return 1;
1527         }
1528
1529 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1530         {
1531         time_t *ptime;
1532         int i;
1533
1534         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1535                 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1536         else
1537                 ptime = NULL;
1538
1539         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1540         if (i == 0)
1541                 {
1542                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1543                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1544                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1545                         return 0;
1546                 }
1547
1548         if (i > 0)
1549                 {
1550                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1551                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1552                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1553                         return 0;
1554                 }
1555
1556         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1557         if (i == 0)
1558                 {
1559                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1560                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1561                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1562                         return 0;
1563                 }
1564
1565         if (i < 0)
1566                 {
1567                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1568                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1569                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1570                         return 0;
1571                 }
1572
1573         return 1;
1574         }
1575
1576 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1577         {
1578         int ok=0,n;
1579         X509 *xs,*xi;
1580         EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1581         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1582
1583         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
1584
1585         n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1586         ctx->error_depth=n-1;
1587         n--;
1588         xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1589
1590         if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1591                 xs=xi;
1592         else
1593                 {
1594                 if (n <= 0)
1595                         {
1596                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1597                         ctx->current_cert=xi;
1598                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
1599                         goto end;
1600                         }
1601                 else
1602                         {
1603                         n--;
1604                         ctx->error_depth=n;
1605                         xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1606                         }
1607                 }
1608
1609 /*      ctx->error=0;  not needed */
1610         while (n >= 0)
1611                 {
1612                 ctx->error_depth=n;
1613
1614                 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1615                  * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
1616                  * just wastes time.
1617                  */
1618                 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
1619                         {
1620                         if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
1621                                 {
1622                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1623                                 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1624                                 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1625                                 if (!ok) goto end;
1626                                 }
1627                         else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1628                                 {
1629                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1630                                 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1631                                 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1632                                 if (!ok)
1633                                         {
1634                                         EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1635                                         goto end;
1636                                         }
1637                                 }
1638                         EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1639                         pkey=NULL;
1640                         }
1641
1642                 xs->valid = 1;
1643
1644                 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1645                 if (!ok)
1646                         goto end;
1647
1648                 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1649                 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1650                 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1651                 ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
1652                 if (!ok) goto end;
1653
1654                 n--;
1655                 if (n >= 0)
1656                         {
1657                         xi=xs;
1658                         xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1659                         }
1660                 }
1661         ok=1;
1662 end:
1663         return ok;
1664         }
1665
1666 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1667 {
1668         return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1669 }
1670
1671 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1672         {
1673         char *str;
1674         ASN1_TIME atm;
1675         long offset;
1676         char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1677         int i,j;
1678
1679         p=buff1;
1680         i=ctm->length;
1681         str=(char *)ctm->data;
1682         if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1683                 {
1684                 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1685                 memcpy(p,str,10);
1686                 p+=10;
1687                 str+=10;
1688                 }
1689         else
1690                 {
1691                 if (i < 13) return 0;
1692                 memcpy(p,str,12);
1693                 p+=12;
1694                 str+=12;
1695                 }
1696
1697         if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1698                 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1699         else
1700                 {
1701                 *(p++)= *(str++);
1702                 *(p++)= *(str++);
1703                 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1704                 if (*str == '.')
1705                         {
1706                         str++;
1707                         while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1708                         }
1709
1710                 }
1711         *(p++)='Z';
1712         *(p++)='\0';
1713
1714         if (*str == 'Z')
1715                 offset=0;
1716         else
1717                 {
1718                 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1719                         return 0;
1720                 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1721                 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1722                 if (*str == '-')
1723                         offset= -offset;
1724                 }
1725         atm.type=ctm->type;
1726         atm.flags = 0;
1727         atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1728         atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1729
1730         if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1731                 return 0;
1732
1733         if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1734                 {
1735                 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1736                 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1737                 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1738                 if (j < 50) j+=100;
1739
1740                 if (i < j) return -1;
1741                 if (i > j) return 1;
1742                 }
1743         i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1744         if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1745                 return -1;
1746         else
1747                 return i;
1748         }
1749
1750 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1751 {
1752         return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1753 }
1754
1755 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1756         {
1757         return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1758         }
1759
1760 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1761                                 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1762         {
1763         time_t t;
1764
1765         if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1766         else time(&t);
1767
1768         if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
1769                 {
1770                 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1771                         return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1772                 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1773                         return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
1774                                                                 offset_sec);
1775                 }
1776         return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1777         }
1778
1779 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1780         {
1781         EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1782         int i,j;
1783
1784         if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1785
1786         for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1787                 {
1788                 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1789                 if (ktmp == NULL)
1790                         {
1791                         X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1792                         return 0;
1793                         }
1794                 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1795                         break;
1796                 else
1797                         {
1798                         EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1799                         ktmp=NULL;
1800                         }
1801                 }
1802         if (ktmp == NULL)
1803                 {
1804                 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1805                 return 0;
1806                 }
1807
1808         /* first, populate the other certs */
1809         for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1810                 {
1811                 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1812                 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1813                 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1814                 }
1815
1816         if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1817         EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1818         return 1;
1819         }
1820
1821 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
1822              CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
1823         {
1824         /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
1825          * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
1826         return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
1827                         new_func, dup_func, free_func);
1828         }
1829
1830 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
1831         {
1832         return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
1833         }
1834
1835 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
1836         {
1837         return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
1838         }
1839
1840 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1841         {
1842         return ctx->error;
1843         }
1844
1845 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
1846         {
1847         ctx->error=err;
1848         }
1849
1850 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1851         {
1852         return ctx->error_depth;
1853         }
1854
1855 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1856         {
1857         return ctx->current_cert;
1858         }
1859
1860 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1861         {
1862         return ctx->chain;
1863         }
1864
1865 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1866         {
1867         int i;
1868         X509 *x;
1869         STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
1870         if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
1871         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1872                 {
1873                 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1874                 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1875                 }
1876         return chain;
1877         }
1878
1879 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1880         {
1881         return ctx->current_issuer;
1882         }
1883
1884 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1885         {
1886         return ctx->current_crl;
1887         }
1888
1889 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1890         {
1891         return ctx->parent;
1892         }
1893
1894 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1895         {
1896         ctx->cert=x;
1897         }
1898
1899 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1900         {
1901         ctx->untrusted=sk;
1902         }
1903
1904 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
1905         {
1906         ctx->crls=sk;
1907         }
1908
1909 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
1910         {
1911         return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
1912         }
1913
1914 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
1915         {
1916         return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
1917         }
1918
1919 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
1920  * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
1921  * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
1922  * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
1923  * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
1924  * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
1925  * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
1926  * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
1927  */
1928
1929 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
1930                                 int purpose, int trust)
1931 {
1932         int idx;
1933         /* If purpose not set use default */
1934         if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
1935         /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
1936         if (purpose)
1937                 {
1938                 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
1939                 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
1940                 if (idx == -1)
1941                         {
1942                         X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1943                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1944                         return 0;
1945                         }
1946                 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1947                 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
1948                         {
1949                         idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
1950                         if (idx == -1)
1951                                 {
1952                                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1953                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1954                                 return 0;
1955                                 }
1956                         ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1957                         }
1958                 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
1959                 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
1960                 }
1961         if (trust)
1962                 {
1963                 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
1964                 if (idx == -1)
1965                         {
1966                         X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1967                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
1968                         return 0;
1969                         }
1970                 }
1971
1972         if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
1973         if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
1974         return 1;
1975 }
1976
1977 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
1978 {
1979         X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
1980         ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1981         if (!ctx)
1982                 {
1983                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1984                 return NULL;
1985                 }
1986         memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1987         return ctx;
1988 }
1989
1990 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1991 {
1992         X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
1993         OPENSSL_free(ctx);
1994 }
1995
1996 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
1997              STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1998         {
1999         int ret = 1;
2000         ctx->ctx=store;
2001         ctx->current_method=0;
2002         ctx->cert=x509;
2003         ctx->untrusted=chain;
2004         ctx->crls = NULL;
2005         ctx->last_untrusted=0;
2006         ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
2007         ctx->valid=0;
2008         ctx->chain=NULL;
2009         ctx->error=0;
2010         ctx->explicit_policy=0;
2011         ctx->error_depth=0;
2012         ctx->current_cert=NULL;
2013         ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
2014         ctx->current_crl=NULL;
2015         ctx->current_crl_score=0;
2016         ctx->current_reasons=0;
2017         ctx->tree = NULL;
2018         ctx->parent = NULL;
2019
2020         ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2021
2022         if (!ctx->param)
2023                 {
2024                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2025                 return 0;
2026                 }
2027
2028         /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
2029          * use defaults.
2030          */
2031
2032
2033         if (store)
2034                 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2035         else
2036                 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2037
2038         if (store)
2039                 {
2040                 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2041                 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2042                 }
2043         else
2044                 ctx->cleanup = 0;
2045
2046         if (ret)
2047                 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2048                                         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2049
2050         if (ret == 0)
2051                 {
2052                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2053                 return 0;
2054                 }
2055
2056         if (store && store->check_issued)
2057                 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2058         else
2059                 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2060
2061         if (store && store->get_issuer)
2062                 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2063         else
2064                 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2065
2066         if (store && store->verify_cb)
2067                 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2068         else
2069                 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2070
2071         if (store && store->verify)
2072                 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2073         else
2074                 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2075
2076         if (store && store->check_revocation)
2077                 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2078         else
2079                 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2080
2081         if (store && store->get_crl)
2082                 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2083         else
2084                 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2085
2086         if (store && store->check_crl)
2087                 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2088         else
2089                 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2090
2091         if (store && store->cert_crl)
2092                 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2093         else
2094                 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2095
2096         if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2097                 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2098         else
2099                 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2100
2101         if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2102                 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2103         else
2104                 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2105
2106         ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2107
2108
2109         /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2110          * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2111          * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
2112         /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2113         if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2114                                 &(ctx->ex_data)))
2115                 {
2116                 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2117                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2118                 return 0;
2119                 }
2120         return 1;
2121         }
2122
2123 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
2124  * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2125  */
2126
2127 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2128 {
2129         ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2130         ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2131 }
2132
2133 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2134         {
2135         if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2136         if (ctx->param != NULL)
2137                 {
2138                 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2139                         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2140                 ctx->param=NULL;
2141                 }
2142         if (ctx->tree != NULL)
2143                 {
2144                 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2145                 ctx->tree=NULL;
2146                 }
2147         if (ctx->chain != NULL)
2148                 {
2149                 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
2150                 ctx->chain=NULL;
2151                 }
2152         CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2153         memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2154         }
2155
2156 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2157         {
2158         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2159         }
2160
2161 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2162         {
2163         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2164         }
2165
2166 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
2167         {
2168         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2169         }
2170
2171 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2172                                   int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2173         {
2174         ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
2175         }
2176
2177 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2178         {
2179         return ctx->tree;
2180         }
2181
2182 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2183         {
2184         return ctx->explicit_policy;
2185         }
2186
2187 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2188         {
2189         const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2190         param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2191         if (!param)
2192                 return 0;
2193         return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2194         }
2195
2196 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2197         {
2198         return ctx->param;
2199         }
2200
2201 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2202         {
2203         if (ctx->param)
2204                 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2205         ctx->param = param;
2206         }
2207
2208 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2209 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2210
2211 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2212
2213 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2214 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)