/*! \file ssl/ssl_lib.c * \brief Version independent SSL functions. */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #ifdef REF_CHECK # include #endif #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include "kssl_lcl.h" #include #include #include #include const char *SSL_version_str=OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT; SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method={ /* evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library bug */ (int (*)(SSL *,int))ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function, ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL*, int))ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL *, EVP_MD_CTX *, EVP_MD_CTX *, const char*, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function }; int SSL_clear(SSL *s) { if (s->method == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED); return(0); } if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s)) { SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); s->session=NULL; } s->error=0; s->hit=0; s->shutdown=0; #if 0 /* Disabled since version 1.10 of this file (early return not * needed because SSL_clear is not called when doing renegotiation) */ /* This is set if we are doing dynamic renegotiation so keep * the old cipher. It is sort of a SSL_clear_lite :-) */ if (s->new_session) return(1); #else if (s->new_session) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } #endif s->type=0; s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|((s->server)?SSL_ST_ACCEPT:SSL_ST_CONNECT); s->version=s->method->version; s->client_version=s->version; s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; #if 0 s->read_ahead=s->ctx->read_ahead; #endif if (s->init_buf != NULL) { BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); s->init_buf=NULL; } ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); s->first_packet=0; #if 1 /* Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if * so, revert back if we are not doing session-id reuse. */ if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL) && (s->method != s->ctx->method)) { s->method->ssl_free(s); s->method=s->ctx->method; if (!s->method->ssl_new(s)) return(0); } else #endif s->method->ssl_clear(s); return(1); } /** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */ int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx,SSL_METHOD *meth) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; ctx->method=meth; sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&(ctx->cipher_list), &(ctx->cipher_list_by_id),SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST); if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION,SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); return(0); } return(1); } SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) { SSL *s; if (ctx == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX); return(NULL); } if (ctx->method == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION); return(NULL); } s=(SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL)); if (s == NULL) goto err; memset(s,0,sizeof(SSL)); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 s->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ s->options=ctx->options; s->mode=ctx->mode; s->max_cert_list=ctx->max_cert_list; if (ctx->cert != NULL) { /* Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to * the CERT, not its contents; only when setting new * parameters for the per-SSL copy, ssl_cert_new would be * called (and the direct reference to the per-SSL_CTX * settings would be lost, but those still were indirectly * accessed for various purposes, and for that reason they * used to be known as s->ctx->default_cert). * Now we don't look at the SSL_CTX's CERT after having * duplicated it once. */ s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); if (s->cert == NULL) goto err; } else s->cert=NULL; /* Cannot really happen (see SSL_CTX_new) */ s->read_ahead=ctx->read_ahead; s->msg_callback=ctx->msg_callback; s->msg_callback_arg=ctx->msg_callback_arg; s->verify_mode=ctx->verify_mode; #if 0 s->verify_depth=ctx->verify_depth; #endif s->sid_ctx_length=ctx->sid_ctx_length; OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx); memcpy(&s->sid_ctx,&ctx->sid_ctx,sizeof(s->sid_ctx)); s->verify_callback=ctx->default_verify_callback; s->generate_session_id=ctx->generate_session_id; s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); if (!s->param) goto err; X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param); #if 0 s->purpose = ctx->purpose; s->trust = ctx->trust; #endif s->quiet_shutdown=ctx->quiet_shutdown; CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); s->ctx=ctx; s->verify_result=X509_V_OK; s->method=ctx->method; if (!s->method->ssl_new(s)) goto err; s->references=1; s->server=(ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function)?0:1; SSL_clear(s); CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data); return(s); err: if (s != NULL) { if (s->cert != NULL) ssl_cert_free(s->cert); if (s->ctx != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); /* decrement reference count */ OPENSSL_free(s); } SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return(NULL); } int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx,const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len) { if(sid_ctx_len > sizeof ctx->sid_ctx) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); return 0; } ctx->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len; memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len); return 1; } int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl,const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len) { if(sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); return 0; } ssl->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len; memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len); return 1; } int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) { CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); ctx->generate_session_id = cb; CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); return 1; } int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) { CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); ssl->generate_session_id = cb; CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); return 1; } int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id, unsigned int id_len) { /* A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how * we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to * find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with * any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in * use by this SSL. */ SSL_SESSION r, *p; if(id_len > sizeof r.session_id) return 0; r.ssl_version = ssl->version; r.session_id_length = id_len; memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len); /* NB: SSLv2 always uses a fixed 16-byte session ID, so even if a * callback is calling us to check the uniqueness of a shorter ID, it * must be compared as a padded-out ID because that is what it will be * converted to when the callback has finished choosing it. */ if((r.ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) && (id_len < SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) { memset(r.session_id + id_len, 0, SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - id_len); r.session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; } CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); p = (SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r); CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); return (p != NULL); } int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose); } int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose); } int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust); } int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust); } void SSL_free(SSL *s) { int i; if(s == NULL) return; i=CRYPTO_add(&s->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); #ifdef REF_PRINT REF_PRINT("SSL",s); #endif if (i > 0) return; #ifdef REF_CHECK if (i < 0) { fprintf(stderr,"SSL_free, bad reference count\n"); abort(); /* ok */ } #endif if (s->param) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data); if (s->bbio != NULL) { /* If the buffering BIO is in place, pop it off */ if (s->bbio == s->wbio) { s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio); } BIO_free(s->bbio); s->bbio=NULL; } if (s->rbio != NULL) BIO_free_all(s->rbio); if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != s->rbio)) BIO_free_all(s->wbio); if (s->init_buf != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); /* add extra stuff */ if (s->cipher_list != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); /* Make the next call work :-) */ if (s->session != NULL) { ssl_clear_bad_session(s); SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); } ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); if (s->cert != NULL) ssl_cert_free(s->cert); /* Free up if allocated */ if (s->ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); if (s->client_CA != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA,X509_NAME_free); if (s->method != NULL) s->method->ssl_free(s); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 if (s->kssl_ctx != NULL) kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx); #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ OPENSSL_free(s); } void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s,BIO *rbio,BIO *wbio) { /* If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it */ if (s->bbio != NULL) { if (s->wbio == s->bbio) { s->wbio=s->wbio->next_bio; s->bbio->next_bio=NULL; } } if ((s->rbio != NULL) && (s->rbio != rbio)) BIO_free_all(s->rbio); if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != wbio) && (s->rbio != s->wbio)) BIO_free_all(s->wbio); s->rbio=rbio; s->wbio=wbio; } BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s) { return(s->rbio); } BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s) { return(s->wbio); } int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s) { return(SSL_get_rfd(s)); } int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s) { int ret= -1; BIO *b,*r; b=SSL_get_rbio(s); r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); if (r != NULL) BIO_get_fd(r,&ret); return(ret); } int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s) { int ret= -1; BIO *b,*r; b=SSL_get_wbio(s); r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); if (r != NULL) BIO_get_fd(r,&ret); return(ret); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s,int fd) { int ret=0; BIO *bio=NULL; bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); if (bio == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE); SSL_set_bio(s,bio,bio); ret=1; err: return(ret); } int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s,int fd) { int ret=0; BIO *bio=NULL; if ((s->rbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET) || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->rbio,NULL) != fd)) { bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); if (bio == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE); SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_rbio(s),bio); } else SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_rbio(s),SSL_get_rbio(s)); ret=1; err: return(ret); } int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s,int fd) { int ret=0; BIO *bio=NULL; if ((s->wbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET) || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->wbio,NULL) != fd)) { bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); if (bio == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE); SSL_set_bio(s,bio,SSL_get_wbio(s)); } else SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_wbio(s),SSL_get_wbio(s)); ret=1; err: return(ret); } #endif /* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */ size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) { size_t ret = 0; if (s->s3 != NULL) { ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len; if (count > ret) count = ret; memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count); } return ret; } /* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */ size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) { size_t ret = 0; if (s->s3 != NULL) { ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; if (count > ret) count = ret; memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count); } return ret; } int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s) { return(s->verify_mode); } int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param); } int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *) { return(s->verify_callback); } int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return(ctx->verify_mode); } int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param); } int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *) { return(ctx->default_verify_callback); } void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s,int mode, int (*callback)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)) { s->verify_mode=mode; if (callback != NULL) s->verify_callback=callback; } void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s,int depth) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth); } void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s,int yes) { s->read_ahead=yes; } int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s) { return(s->read_ahead); } int SSL_pending(const SSL *s) { /* SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled * (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)), * and it is impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report * errors that may be observed while scanning the new data. * (Note that SSL_pending() is often used as a boolean value, * so we'd better not return -1.) */ return(s->method->ssl_pending(s)); } X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s) { X509 *r; if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL)) r=NULL; else r=s->session->peer; if (r == NULL) return(r); CRYPTO_add(&r->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); return(r); } STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s) { STACK_OF(X509) *r; if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL) || (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)) r=NULL; else r=s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain; /* If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own * certificate; if we are a server, it does not. */ return(r); } /* Now in theory, since the calling process own 't' it should be safe to * modify. We need to be able to read f without being hassled */ void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t,const SSL *f) { CERT *tmp; /* Do we need to to SSL locking? */ SSL_set_session(t,SSL_get_session(f)); /* what if we are setup as SSLv2 but want to talk SSLv3 or * vice-versa */ if (t->method != f->method) { t->method->ssl_free(t); /* cleanup current */ t->method=f->method; /* change method */ t->method->ssl_new(t); /* setup new */ } tmp=t->cert; if (f->cert != NULL) { CRYPTO_add(&f->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT); t->cert=f->cert; } else t->cert=NULL; if (tmp != NULL) ssl_cert_free(tmp); SSL_set_session_id_context(t,f->sid_ctx,f->sid_ctx_length); } /* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */ int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { if ( (ctx == NULL) || (ctx->cert == NULL) || (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); return(0); } if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); return(0); } return(X509_check_private_key(ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey)); } /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl) { if (ssl == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return(0); } if (ssl->cert == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); return 0; } if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); return(0); } if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); return(0); } return(X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509, ssl->cert->key->privatekey)); } int SSL_accept(SSL *s) { if (s->handshake_func == 0) /* Not properly initialized yet */ SSL_set_accept_state(s); return(s->method->ssl_accept(s)); } int SSL_connect(SSL *s) { if (s->handshake_func == 0) /* Not properly initialized yet */ SSL_set_connect_state(s); return(s->method->ssl_connect(s)); } long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s) { return(s->method->get_timeout()); } int SSL_read(SSL *s,void *buf,int num) { if (s->handshake_func == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -1; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; return(0); } return(s->method->ssl_read(s,buf,num)); } int SSL_peek(SSL *s,void *buf,int num) { if (s->handshake_func == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -1; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { return(0); } return(s->method->ssl_peek(s,buf,num)); } int SSL_write(SSL *s,const void *buf,int num) { if (s->handshake_func == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -1; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE,SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN); return(-1); } return(s->method->ssl_write(s,buf,num)); } int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s) { /* Note that this function behaves differently from what one might * expect. Return values are 0 for no success (yet), * 1 for success; but calling it once is usually not enough, * even if blocking I/O is used (see ssl3_shutdown). */ if (s->handshake_func == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -1; } if ((s != NULL) && !SSL_in_init(s)) return(s->method->ssl_shutdown(s)); else return(1); } int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s) { if (s->new_session == 0) { s->new_session=1; } return(s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s)); } int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s) { /* becomes true when negotiation is requested; * false again once a handshake has finished */ return (s->new_session != 0); } long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg) { long l; switch (cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD: return(s->read_ahead); case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD: l=s->read_ahead; s->read_ahead=larg; return(l); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG: s->msg_callback_arg = parg; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS: return(s->options|=larg); case SSL_CTRL_MODE: return(s->mode|=larg); case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: return(s->max_cert_list); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: l=s->max_cert_list; s->max_cert_list=larg; return(l); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU: if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION) { s->d1->mtu = larg; return larg; } return 0; default: return(s->method->ssl_ctrl(s,cmd,larg,parg)); } } long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp)(void)) { switch(cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK: s->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp); return 1; default: return(s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s,cmd,fp)); } } struct lhash_st *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->sessions; } long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,long larg,void *parg) { long l; switch (cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD: return(ctx->read_ahead); case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD: l=ctx->read_ahead; ctx->read_ahead=larg; return(l); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG: ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: return(ctx->max_cert_list); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: l=ctx->max_cert_list; ctx->max_cert_list=larg; return(l); case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: l=ctx->session_cache_size; ctx->session_cache_size=larg; return(l); case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: return(ctx->session_cache_size); case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE: l=ctx->session_cache_mode; ctx->session_cache_mode=larg; return(l); case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE: return(ctx->session_cache_mode); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER: return(ctx->sessions->num_items); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT: return(ctx->stats.sess_connect); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD: return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_good); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE: return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT: return(ctx->stats.sess_accept); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD: return(ctx->stats.sess_accept_good); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE: return(ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT: return(ctx->stats.sess_hit); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT: return(ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES: return(ctx->stats.sess_miss); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS: return(ctx->stats.sess_timeout); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL: return(ctx->stats.sess_cache_full); case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS: return(ctx->options|=larg); case SSL_CTRL_MODE: return(ctx->mode|=larg); default: return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx,cmd,larg,parg)); } } long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void)) { switch(cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK: ctx->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp); return 1; default: return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx,cmd,fp)); } } int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b) { long l; l=a->id-b->id; if (l == 0L) return(0); else return((l > 0)?1:-1); } int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER * const *ap, const SSL_CIPHER * const *bp) { long l; l=(*ap)->id-(*bp)->id; if (l == 0L) return(0); else return((l > 0)?1:-1); } /** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of * preference */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s) { if (s != NULL) { if (s->cipher_list != NULL) { return(s->cipher_list); } else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL)) { return(s->ctx->cipher_list); } } return(NULL); } /** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of * algorithm id */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s) { if (s != NULL) { if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) { return(s->cipher_list_by_id); } else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)) { return(s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id); } } return(NULL); } /** The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers() */ const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s,int n) { SSL_CIPHER *c; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; if (s == NULL) return(NULL); sk=SSL_get_ciphers(s); if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= n)) return(NULL); c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,n); if (c == NULL) return(NULL); return(c->name); } /** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */ int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&ctx->cipher_list, &ctx->cipher_list_by_id,str); /* ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it * was unable to find a cipher matching the given rule string * (for example if the rule string specifies a cipher which * has been disabled). This is not an error as far as * ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence * ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been * updated. */ if (sk == NULL) return 0; else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); return 0; } return 1; } /** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */ int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s,const char *str) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method,&s->cipher_list, &s->cipher_list_by_id,str); /* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */ if (sk == NULL) return 0; else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); return 0; } return 1; } /* works well for SSLv2, not so good for SSLv3 */ char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s,char *buf,int len) { char *p; const char *cp; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; SSL_CIPHER *c; int i; if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ciphers == NULL) || (len < 2)) return(NULL); p=buf; sk=s->session->ciphers; for (i=0; iname; *cp; ) { if (len-- == 0) { *p='\0'; return(buf); } else *(p++)= *(cp++); } *(p++)=':'; } p[-1]='\0'; return(buf); } int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p, int (*put_cb)(const SSL_CIPHER *, unsigned char *)) { int i,j=0; SSL_CIPHER *c; unsigned char *q; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 int nokrb5 = !kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx); #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ if (sk == NULL) return(0); q=p; for (i=0; ialgorithms & SSL_KRB5) && nokrb5) continue; #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ j = put_cb ? put_cb(c,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p); p+=j; } return(p-q); } STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp) { SSL_CIPHER *c; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; int i,n; n=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL); if ((num%n) != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); return(NULL); } if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) sk=sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */ else { sk= *skp; sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk); } for (i=0; isession_id[0] )| ((unsigned int) a->session_id[1]<< 8L)| ((unsigned long)a->session_id[2]<<16L)| ((unsigned long)a->session_id[3]<<24L); return(l); } /* NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of * coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being * able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session * with a matching session ID. */ int SSL_SESSION_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a,const SSL_SESSION *b) { if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version) return(1); if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length) return(1); return(memcmp(a->session_id,b->session_id,a->session_id_length)); } /* These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring * SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each * variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed via * ssl.h. */ static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(SSL_SESSION_hash, SSL_SESSION *) static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(SSL_SESSION_cmp, SSL_SESSION *) SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(SSL_METHOD *meth) { SSL_CTX *ret=NULL; if (meth == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED); return(NULL); } if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS); goto err; } ret=(SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX)); if (ret == NULL) goto err; memset(ret,0,sizeof(SSL_CTX)); ret->method=meth; ret->cert_store=NULL; ret->session_cache_mode=SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER; ret->session_cache_size=SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT; ret->session_cache_head=NULL; ret->session_cache_tail=NULL; /* We take the system default */ ret->session_timeout=meth->get_timeout(); ret->new_session_cb=0; ret->remove_session_cb=0; ret->get_session_cb=0; ret->generate_session_id=0; memset((char *)&ret->stats,0,sizeof(ret->stats)); ret->references=1; ret->quiet_shutdown=0; /* ret->cipher=NULL;*/ /* ret->s2->challenge=NULL; ret->master_key=NULL; ret->key_arg=NULL; ret->s2->conn_id=NULL; */ ret->info_callback=NULL; ret->app_verify_callback=0; ret->app_verify_arg=NULL; ret->max_cert_list=SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT; ret->read_ahead=0; ret->msg_callback=0; ret->msg_callback_arg=NULL; ret->verify_mode=SSL_VERIFY_NONE; #if 0 ret->verify_depth=-1; /* Don't impose a limit (but x509_lu.c does) */ #endif ret->sid_ctx_length=0; ret->default_verify_callback=NULL; if ((ret->cert=ssl_cert_new()) == NULL) goto err; ret->default_passwd_callback=0; ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata=NULL; ret->client_cert_cb=0; ret->app_gen_cookie_cb=0; ret->app_verify_cookie_cb=0; ret->sessions=lh_new(LHASH_HASH_FN(SSL_SESSION_hash), LHASH_COMP_FN(SSL_SESSION_cmp)); if (ret->sessions == NULL) goto err; ret->cert_store=X509_STORE_new(); if (ret->cert_store == NULL) goto err; ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method, &ret->cipher_list,&ret->cipher_list_by_id, SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST); if (ret->cipher_list == NULL || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); goto err2; } ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); if (!ret->param) goto err; if ((ret->rsa_md5=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl2-md5")) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES); goto err2; } if ((ret->md5=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-md5")) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES); goto err2; } if ((ret->sha1=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-sha1")) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES); goto err2; } if ((ret->client_CA=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL) goto err; CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data); ret->extra_certs=NULL; ret->comp_methods=SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(); return(ret); err: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err2: if (ret != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ret); return(NULL); } #if 0 static void SSL_COMP_free(SSL_COMP *comp) { OPENSSL_free(comp); } #endif void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a) { int i; if (a == NULL) return; i=CRYPTO_add(&a->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); #ifdef REF_PRINT REF_PRINT("SSL_CTX",a); #endif if (i > 0) return; #ifdef REF_CHECK if (i < 0) { fprintf(stderr,"SSL_CTX_free, bad reference count\n"); abort(); /* ok */ } #endif if (a->param) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param); /* * Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference * the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed * after the sessions were flushed. * As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache, * the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then * free ex_data, then finally free the cache. * (See ticket [openssl.org #212].) */ if (a->sessions != NULL) SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a,0); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data); if (a->sessions != NULL) lh_free(a->sessions); if (a->cert_store != NULL) X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store); if (a->cipher_list != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list); if (a->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id); if (a->cert != NULL) ssl_cert_free(a->cert); if (a->client_CA != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA,X509_NAME_free); if (a->extra_certs != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs,X509_free); #if 0 /* This should never be done, since it removes a global database */ if (a->comp_methods != NULL) sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(a->comp_methods,SSL_COMP_free); #else a->comp_methods = NULL; #endif OPENSSL_free(a); } void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb) { ctx->default_passwd_callback=cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx,void *u) { ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata=u; } void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *), void *arg) { ctx->app_verify_callback=cb; ctx->app_verify_arg=arg; } void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode,int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) { ctx->verify_mode=mode; ctx->default_verify_callback=cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx,int depth) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); } void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, SSL_CIPHER *cipher) { CERT_PKEY *cpk; int rsa_enc,rsa_tmp,rsa_sign,dh_tmp,dh_rsa,dh_dsa,dsa_sign; int rsa_enc_export,dh_rsa_export,dh_dsa_export; int rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp_export,kl; unsigned long mask,emask; int have_ecc_cert, have_ecdh_tmp, ecdh_ok, ecdsa_ok, ecc_pkey_size; X509 *x = NULL; EVP_PKEY *ecc_pkey = NULL; int signature_nid = 0; if (c == NULL) return; kl=SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA rsa_tmp=(c->rsa_tmp != NULL || c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL); rsa_tmp_export=(c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL || (rsa_tmp && RSA_size(c->rsa_tmp)*8 <= kl)); #else rsa_tmp=rsa_tmp_export=0; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH dh_tmp=(c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL); dh_tmp_export=(c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL || (dh_tmp && DH_size(c->dh_tmp)*8 <= kl)); #else dh_tmp=dh_tmp_export=0; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH have_ecdh_tmp=(c->ecdh_tmp != NULL || c->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL); #endif cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]); rsa_enc= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); rsa_enc_export=(rsa_enc && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl); cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN]); rsa_sign=(cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN]); dsa_sign=(cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA]); dh_rsa= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); dh_rsa_export=(dh_rsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl); cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA]); /* FIX THIS EAY EAY EAY */ dh_dsa= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); dh_dsa_export=(dh_dsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl); cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]); have_ecc_cert= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); mask=0; emask=0; #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG printf("rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n", rsa_tmp,rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp, rsa_enc,rsa_enc_export,rsa_sign,dsa_sign,dh_rsa,dh_dsa); #endif if (rsa_enc || (rsa_tmp && rsa_sign)) mask|=SSL_kRSA; if (rsa_enc_export || (rsa_tmp_export && (rsa_sign || rsa_enc))) emask|=SSL_kRSA; #if 0 /* The match needs to be both kEDH and aRSA or aDSA, so don't worry */ if ( (dh_tmp || dh_rsa || dh_dsa) && (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign)) mask|=SSL_kEDH; if ((dh_tmp_export || dh_rsa_export || dh_dsa_export) && (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign)) emask|=SSL_kEDH; #endif if (dh_tmp_export) emask|=SSL_kEDH; if (dh_tmp) mask|=SSL_kEDH; if (dh_rsa) mask|=SSL_kDHr; if (dh_rsa_export) emask|=SSL_kDHr; if (dh_dsa) mask|=SSL_kDHd; if (dh_dsa_export) emask|=SSL_kDHd; if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign) { mask|=SSL_aRSA; emask|=SSL_aRSA; } if (dsa_sign) { mask|=SSL_aDSS; emask|=SSL_aDSS; } mask|=SSL_aNULL; emask|=SSL_aNULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 mask|=SSL_kKRB5|SSL_aKRB5; emask|=SSL_kKRB5|SSL_aKRB5; #endif /* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or * ECDSA cipher suites depending on the key usage extension. */ if (have_ecc_cert) { /* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */ x = (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]).x509; X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); ecdh_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ? (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT) : 1; ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ? (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1; ecc_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); ecc_pkey_size = (ecc_pkey != NULL) ? EVP_PKEY_bits(ecc_pkey) : 0; EVP_PKEY_free(ecc_pkey); if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (ecdh_ok) { if ((signature_nid == NID_md5WithRSAEncryption) || (signature_nid == NID_md4WithRSAEncryption) || (signature_nid == NID_md2WithRSAEncryption)) { mask|=SSL_kECDH|SSL_aRSA; if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) emask|=SSL_kECDH|SSL_aRSA; } if (signature_nid == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1) { mask|=SSL_kECDH|SSL_aECDSA; if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) emask|=SSL_kECDH|SSL_aECDSA; } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA if (ecdsa_ok) { mask|=SSL_aECDSA; emask|=SSL_aECDSA; } #endif } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (have_ecdh_tmp) { mask|=SSL_kECDHE; emask|=SSL_kECDHE; } #endif c->mask=mask; c->export_mask=emask; c->valid=1; } /* This handy macro borrowed from crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c */ #define ku_reject(x, usage) \ (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage))) int check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL_CIPHER *cs) { unsigned long alg = cs->algorithms; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; int keysize = 0; int signature_nid = 0; if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cs)) { /* ECDH key length in export ciphers must be <= 163 bits */ pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); if (pkey == NULL) return 0; keysize = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); if (keysize > 163) return 0; } /* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm); if (alg & SSL_kECDH) { /* key usage, if present, must allow key agreement */ if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) { return 0; } if (alg & SSL_aECDSA) { /* signature alg must be ECDSA */ if (signature_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1) { return 0; } } if (alg & SSL_aRSA) { /* signature alg must be RSA */ if ((signature_nid != NID_md5WithRSAEncryption) && (signature_nid != NID_md4WithRSAEncryption) && (signature_nid != NID_md2WithRSAEncryption)) { return 0; } } } else if (alg & SSL_aECDSA) { /* key usage, if present, must allow signing */ if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) { return 0; } } return 1; /* all checks are ok */ } /* THIS NEEDS CLEANING UP */ X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *s) { unsigned long alg,mask,kalg; CERT *c; int i,is_export; c=s->cert; ssl_set_cert_masks(c, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); alg=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms; is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); mask=is_export?c->export_mask:c->mask; kalg=alg&(SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK); if (kalg & SSL_kECDH) { /* we don't need to look at SSL_kECDHE * since no certificate is needed for * anon ECDH and for authenticated * ECDHE, the check for the auth * algorithm will set i correctly * NOTE: For ECDH-RSA, we need an ECC * not an RSA cert but for ECDHE-RSA * we need an RSA cert. Placing the * checks for SSL_kECDH before RSA * checks ensures the correct cert is chosen. */ i=SSL_PKEY_ECC; } else if (kalg & SSL_aECDSA) { i=SSL_PKEY_ECC; } else if (kalg & SSL_kDHr) i=SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA; else if (kalg & SSL_kDHd) i=SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA; else if (kalg & SSL_aDSS) i=SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; else if (kalg & SSL_aRSA) { if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509 == NULL) i=SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; else i=SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; } else if (kalg & SSL_aKRB5) { /* VRS something else here? */ return(NULL); } else /* if (kalg & SSL_aNULL) */ { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return(NULL); } if (c->pkeys[i].x509 == NULL) return(NULL); return(c->pkeys[i].x509); } EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,SSL_CIPHER *cipher) { unsigned long alg; CERT *c; alg=cipher->algorithms; c=s->cert; if ((alg & SSL_aDSS) && (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)) return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey); else if (alg & SSL_aRSA) { if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL) return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey); else if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL) return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey); else return(NULL); } else if ((alg & SSL_aECDSA) && (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL)) return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey); else /* if (alg & SSL_aNULL) */ { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return(NULL); } } void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s,int mode) { int i; /* If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, * and it would be rather hard to do anyway :-) */ if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) return; i=s->ctx->session_cache_mode; if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit) && ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->ctx,s->session)) && (s->ctx->new_session_cb != NULL)) { CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); if (!s->ctx->new_session_cb(s,s->session)) SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); } /* auto flush every 255 connections */ if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) && ((i & mode) == mode)) { if ( (((mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) ?s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good :s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff) { SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->ctx,time(NULL)); } } } SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s) { return(s->method); } int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s,SSL_METHOD *meth) { int conn= -1; int ret=1; if (s->method != meth) { if (s->handshake_func != NULL) conn=(s->handshake_func == s->method->ssl_connect); if (s->method->version == meth->version) s->method=meth; else { s->method->ssl_free(s); s->method=meth; ret=s->method->ssl_new(s); } if (conn == 1) s->handshake_func=meth->ssl_connect; else if (conn == 0) s->handshake_func=meth->ssl_accept; } return(ret); } int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s,int i) { int reason; unsigned long l; BIO *bio; if (i > 0) return(SSL_ERROR_NONE); /* Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake * etc, where we do encode the error */ if ((l=ERR_peek_error()) != 0) { if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS) return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); else return(SSL_ERROR_SSL); } if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_read(s)) { bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); if (BIO_should_read(bio)) return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ); else if (BIO_should_write(bio)) /* This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try * to write to the rbio, and an application program where * rbio and wbio are separate couldn't even know what it * should wait for. * However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly * (so that we have SSL_want_read(s) instead of * SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and wbio *are* the same, * this test works around that bug; so it might be safer * to keep it. */ return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE); else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT); else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT); else return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */ } } if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_write(s)) { bio=SSL_get_wbio(s); if (BIO_should_write(bio)) return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE); else if (BIO_should_read(bio)) /* See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio)) */ return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ); else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT); else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT); else return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); } } if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_x509_lookup(s)) { return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP); } if (i == 0) { if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION) { /* assume it is the socket being closed */ return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN); } else { if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) && (s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)) return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN); } } return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); } int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s) { int ret=1; if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE,SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET); return(-1); } s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s); if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) { ret=s->handshake_func(s); } return(ret); } /* For the next 2 functions, SSL_clear() sets shutdown and so * one of these calls will reset it */ void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s) { s->server=1; s->shutdown=0; s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_ST_BEFORE; s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept; /* clear the current cipher */ ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); } void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s) { s->server=0; s->shutdown=0; s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_ST_BEFORE; s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_connect; /* clear the current cipher */ ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); } int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return(0); } int ssl_undefined_void_function(void) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return(0); } int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return(0); } SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return(NULL); } const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s) { if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) return("TLSv1"); else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) return("SSLv3"); else if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION) return("SSLv2"); else return("unknown"); } SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s) { STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk; X509_NAME *xn; SSL *ret; int i; if ((ret=SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL) return(NULL); ret->version = s->version; ret->type = s->type; ret->method = s->method; if (s->session != NULL) { /* This copies session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' */ SSL_copy_session_id(ret,s); } else { /* No session has been established yet, so we have to expect * that s->cert or ret->cert will be changed later -- * they should not both point to the same object, * and thus we can't use SSL_copy_session_id. */ ret->method->ssl_free(ret); ret->method = s->method; ret->method->ssl_new(ret); if (s->cert != NULL) { if (ret->cert != NULL) { ssl_cert_free(ret->cert); } ret->cert = ssl_cert_dup(s->cert); if (ret->cert == NULL) goto err; } SSL_set_session_id_context(ret, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length); } ret->options=s->options; ret->mode=s->mode; SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret,SSL_get_max_cert_list(s)); SSL_set_read_ahead(ret,SSL_get_read_ahead(s)); ret->msg_callback = s->msg_callback; ret->msg_callback_arg = s->msg_callback_arg; SSL_set_verify(ret,SSL_get_verify_mode(s), SSL_get_verify_callback(s)); SSL_set_verify_depth(ret,SSL_get_verify_depth(s)); ret->generate_session_id = s->generate_session_id; SSL_set_info_callback(ret,SSL_get_info_callback(s)); ret->debug=s->debug; /* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */ if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data)) goto err; /* setup rbio, and wbio */ if (s->rbio != NULL) { if (!BIO_dup_state(s->rbio,(char *)&ret->rbio)) goto err; } if (s->wbio != NULL) { if (s->wbio != s->rbio) { if (!BIO_dup_state(s->wbio,(char *)&ret->wbio)) goto err; } else ret->wbio=ret->rbio; } ret->rwstate = s->rwstate; ret->in_handshake = s->in_handshake; ret->handshake_func = s->handshake_func; ret->server = s->server; ret->new_session = s->new_session; ret->quiet_shutdown = s->quiet_shutdown; ret->shutdown=s->shutdown; ret->state=s->state; /* SSL_dup does not really work at any state, though */ ret->rstate=s->rstate; ret->init_num = 0; /* would have to copy ret->init_buf, ret->init_msg, ret->init_num, ret->init_off */ ret->hit=s->hit; X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ret->param, s->param); /* dup the cipher_list and cipher_list_by_id stacks */ if (s->cipher_list != NULL) { if ((ret->cipher_list=sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list)) == NULL) goto err; } if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) if ((ret->cipher_list_by_id=sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list_by_id)) == NULL) goto err; /* Dup the client_CA list */ if (s->client_CA != NULL) { if ((sk=sk_X509_NAME_dup(s->client_CA)) == NULL) goto err; ret->client_CA=sk; for (i=0; ienc_read_ctx != NULL) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx); OPENSSL_free(s->enc_read_ctx); s->enc_read_ctx=NULL; } if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx); OPENSSL_free(s->enc_write_ctx); s->enc_write_ctx=NULL; } if (s->expand != NULL) { COMP_CTX_free(s->expand); s->expand=NULL; } if (s->compress != NULL) { COMP_CTX_free(s->compress); s->compress=NULL; } } /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s) { if (s->cert != NULL) return(s->cert->key->x509); else return(NULL); } /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(SSL *s) { if (s->cert != NULL) return(s->cert->key->privatekey); else return(NULL); } SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s) { if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) return(s->session->cipher); return(NULL); } const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s) { if (s->compress != NULL) return(s->compress->meth); return(NULL); } const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s) { if (s->expand != NULL) return(s->expand->meth); return(NULL); } int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s,int push) { BIO *bbio; if (s->bbio == NULL) { bbio=BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); if (bbio == NULL) return(0); s->bbio=bbio; } else { bbio=s->bbio; if (s->bbio == s->wbio) s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio); } (void)BIO_reset(bbio); /* if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(bbio,16*1024)) */ if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio,1)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return(0); } if (push) { if (s->wbio != bbio) s->wbio=BIO_push(bbio,s->wbio); } else { if (s->wbio == bbio) s->wbio=BIO_pop(bbio); } return(1); } void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s) { if (s->bbio == NULL) return; if (s->bbio == s->wbio) { /* remove buffering */ s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio); #ifdef REF_CHECK /* not the usual REF_CHECK, but this avoids adding one more preprocessor symbol */ assert(s->wbio != NULL); #endif } BIO_free(s->bbio); s->bbio=NULL; } void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode) { ctx->quiet_shutdown=mode; } int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return(ctx->quiet_shutdown); } void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode) { s->quiet_shutdown=mode; } int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *s) { return(s->quiet_shutdown); } void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode) { s->shutdown=mode; } int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s) { return(s->shutdown); } int SSL_version(const SSL *s) { return(s->version); } SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl) { return(ssl->ctx); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return(X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store)); } int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile, const char *CApath) { return(X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store,CAfile,CApath)); } #endif void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)) { ssl->info_callback=cb; } /* One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned function pointer. */ void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL * /*ssl*/,int /*type*/,int /*val*/) { return ssl->info_callback; } int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl) { return(ssl->state); } void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl,long arg) { ssl->verify_result=arg; } long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl) { return(ssl->verify_result); } int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, argl, argp, new_func, dup_func, free_func); } int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s,int idx,void *arg) { return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg)); } void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s,int idx) { return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx)); } int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, argl, argp, new_func, dup_func, free_func); } int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s,int idx,void *arg) { return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg)); } void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s,int idx) { return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx)); } int ssl_ok(SSL *s) { return(1); } X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return(ctx->cert_store); } void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509_STORE *store) { if (ctx->cert_store != NULL) X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store); ctx->cert_store=store; } int SSL_want(const SSL *s) { return(s->rwstate); } /*! * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary RSA keys. * \param ctx the SSL context. * \param cb the callback */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb); } void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb); } #endif #ifdef DOXYGEN /*! * \brief The RSA temporary key callback function. * \param ssl the SSL session. * \param is_export \c TRUE if the temp RSA key is for an export ciphersuite. * \param keylength if \c is_export is \c TRUE, then \c keylength is the size * of the required key in bits. * \return the temporary RSA key. * \sa SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback */ RSA *cb(SSL *ssl,int is_export,int keylength) {} #endif /*! * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary DH keys. * \param ctx the SSL context. * \param dh the callback */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh); } void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh); } void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh); } #endif void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) { SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); } void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) { SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); } #if defined(_WINDLL) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16) #include "../crypto/bio/bss_file.c" #endif IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)