Import OpenSSL-1.0.1h.
[dragonfly.git] / crypto / openssl / ssl / t1_lib.c
CommitLineData
56276539
SS
1/* ssl/t1_lib.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
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58/* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
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111
112#include <stdio.h>
113#include <openssl/objects.h>
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114#include <openssl/evp.h>
115#include <openssl/hmac.h>
2e6ca3d0 116#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
672590bc 117#include <openssl/rand.h>
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118#include "ssl_locl.h"
119
e40c9513 120const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
56276539 121
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122#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126#endif
127
5bd86ce5 128SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
56276539
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129 tls1_enc,
130 tls1_mac,
131 tls1_setup_key_block,
132 tls1_generate_master_secret,
133 tls1_change_cipher_state,
134 tls1_final_finish_mac,
135 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
136 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
139 tls1_alert_code,
672590bc 140 tls1_export_keying_material,
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141 };
142
5bd86ce5 143long tls1_default_timeout(void)
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144 {
145 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
146 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
147 return(60*60*2);
148 }
149
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150int tls1_new(SSL *s)
151 {
152 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
153 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
154 return(1);
155 }
156
157void tls1_free(SSL *s)
158 {
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159#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
160 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
161 {
162 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
163 }
164#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
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165 ssl3_free(s);
166 }
167
168void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
169 {
170 ssl3_clear(s);
672590bc 171 s->version = s->method->version;
56276539
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172 }
173
919b01cc 174#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
672590bc 175
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176static int nid_list[] =
177 {
178 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
179 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
180 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
181 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
182 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
183 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
184 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
185 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
186 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
187 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
188 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
189 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
190 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
191 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
192 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
193 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
194 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
195 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
196 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
197 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
198 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
199 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
200 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
201 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
202 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
203 };
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204
205static int pref_list[] =
206 {
207 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
208 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
209 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
210 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
211 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
212 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
213 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
214 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
215 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
216 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
217 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
218 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
220 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
221 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
222 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
223 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
224 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
225 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
226 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
227 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
228 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
229 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
230 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
231 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
232 };
233
919b01cc 234int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
56276539 235 {
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PA
236 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
237 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
238 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
239 return 0;
240 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
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SS
241 }
242
919b01cc 243int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
56276539 244 {
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245 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
246 switch (nid)
247 {
248 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
249 return 1;
250 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
251 return 2;
252 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
253 return 3;
254 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
255 return 4;
256 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
257 return 5;
258 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
259 return 6;
260 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
261 return 7;
262 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
263 return 8;
264 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
265 return 9;
266 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
267 return 10;
268 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
269 return 11;
270 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
271 return 12;
272 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
273 return 13;
274 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
275 return 14;
276 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
277 return 15;
278 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
279 return 16;
280 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
281 return 17;
282 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
283 return 18;
284 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
285 return 19;
286 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
287 return 20;
288 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
289 return 21;
290 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
291 return 22;
292 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
293 return 23;
294 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
295 return 24;
296 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
297 return 25;
298 default:
299 return 0;
300 }
56276539 301 }
919b01cc 302#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
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303
304#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
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305
306/* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
307 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
308 */
309
310#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
311#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
312#else
313#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
314#endif
315
316#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
317#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
318#else
319#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
320#endif
321
322#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
323#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
324#else
325#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
326#endif
327
328#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
329 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
330 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
331 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
332
333static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
334#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
335 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
336 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
337#endif
338#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
339 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
340 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
341#endif
342#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
343 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
344#endif
672590bc
PA
345};
346
347int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
348 {
349 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
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PA
350 if (p)
351 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
352 return (int)slen;
353 }
354
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PA
355unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
356 {
357 int extdatalen=0;
358 unsigned char *ret = p;
359
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PA
360 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
361 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
362 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
363 return p;
364
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PA
365 ret+=2;
366
367 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
368
369 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
370 {
371 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
372 unsigned long size_str;
373 long lenmax;
374
375 /* check for enough space.
376 4 for the servername type and entension length
377 2 for servernamelist length
378 1 for the hostname type
379 2 for hostname length
380 + hostname length
381 */
382
383 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
919b01cc 384 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
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PA
385 return NULL;
386
387 /* extension type and length */
388 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
389 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
390
391 /* length of servername list */
392 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
393
394 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
395 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
396 s2n(size_str,ret);
397 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
398 ret+=size_str;
e6bc27f5 399 }
919b01cc 400
5f042374 401 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
672590bc 402 if (s->renegotiate)
5f042374
PA
403 {
404 int el;
405
406 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
407 {
408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
409 return NULL;
410 }
411
412 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
413
414 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
415 s2n(el,ret);
416
417 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
418 {
419 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
420 return NULL;
421 }
422
423 ret += el;
424 }
425
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426#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
427 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
428 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
429 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
430
431 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
432 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
433 {
434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
435 return NULL;
436 }
437
438 /* check for enough space.
439 4 for the srp type type and entension length
440 1 for the srp user identity
441 + srp user identity length
442 */
443 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
444
445 /* fill in the extension */
446 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
447 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
448 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
449 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
450 ret+=login_len;
451 }
452#endif
453
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PA
454#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
455 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
456 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
457 {
458 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
459 long lenmax;
460
461 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
462 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
463 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
464 {
465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
466 return NULL;
467 }
468
469 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
470 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
471 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
472 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
473 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
474 }
475 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
476 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
477 {
478 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
479 long lenmax;
480
481 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
482 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
483 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
484 {
485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
486 return NULL;
487 }
488
489 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
490 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
491
492 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
493 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
494 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
495 * resolves this to two bytes.
496 */
497 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
498 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
499 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
500 }
501#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
502
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PA
503 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
504 {
505 int ticklen;
5f042374 506 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
e6bc27f5 507 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
919b01cc
PA
508 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
509 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
510 {
511 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
512 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
513 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
514 return NULL;
515 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
516 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
517 ticklen);
518 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
519 }
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PA
520 else
521 ticklen = 0;
919b01cc
PA
522 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
523 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
524 goto skip_ext;
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PA
525 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
526 * rest for ticket
527 */
919b01cc 528 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
e6bc27f5
PA
529 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
530 s2n(ticklen,ret);
531 if (ticklen)
532 {
533 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
534 ret += ticklen;
535 }
536 }
919b01cc
PA
537 skip_ext:
538
503f6d4b 539 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
672590bc
PA
540 {
541 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
542 return NULL;
543 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
544 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
545 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
546 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
547 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
548 }
549
919b01cc
PA
550#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
551 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
552 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
553 {
554 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
555
556 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
557 return NULL;
558 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
559 return NULL;
560
561 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
562 s2n(col + 2, ret);
563 s2n(col, ret);
564 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
565 ret += col;
566 }
567#endif
e6bc27f5 568
5f042374
PA
569 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
570 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2e6ca3d0
PA
571 {
572 int i;
573 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
574 OCSP_RESPID *id;
575
576 idlen = 0;
577 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
578 {
579 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
580 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
581 if (itmp <= 0)
582 return NULL;
583 idlen += itmp + 2;
584 }
585
586 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
587 {
588 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
589 if (extlen < 0)
590 return NULL;
591 }
592 else
593 extlen = 0;
594
595 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
596 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
597 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
598 return NULL;
599 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
600 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
601 s2n(idlen, ret);
602 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
603 {
604 /* save position of id len */
605 unsigned char *q = ret;
606 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
607 /* skip over id len */
608 ret += 2;
609 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
610 /* write id len */
611 s2n(itmp, q);
612 }
613 s2n(extlen, ret);
614 if (extlen > 0)
615 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
616 }
617
672590bc
PA
618#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
619 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
4bb195ec
SW
620 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
621 return NULL;
672590bc
PA
622 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
623 s2n(1,ret);
624 /* Set mode:
625 * 1: peer may send requests
626 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
627 */
628 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
629 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
630 else
631 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
632#endif
633
634#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
635 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
636 {
637 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
638 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
639 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
640 return NULL;
641 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
642 s2n(0,ret);
643 }
644#endif
645
ec1df3a8 646#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
672590bc
PA
647 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
648 {
649 int el;
650
651 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
652
653 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
654
655 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
656 s2n(el,ret);
657
658 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
659 {
660 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
661 return NULL;
662 }
663 ret += el;
664 }
ec1df3a8 665#endif
8b433ce3
PA
666 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
667 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
668 *
669 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
670 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
671 */
4bb195ec 672 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
8b433ce3 673 {
4bb195ec
SW
674 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
675 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
676 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
677 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
678 */
679 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
680 hlen -= 5;
681 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
682 {
683 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
684 if (hlen >= 4)
685 hlen -= 4;
686 else
687 hlen = 0;
688
689 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
690 s2n(hlen, ret);
691 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
692 ret += hlen;
693 }
8b433ce3 694 }
8b433ce3 695
e6bc27f5
PA
696 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
697 return p;
698
699 s2n(extdatalen,p);
700 return ret;
701 }
702
703unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
704 {
705 int extdatalen=0;
706 unsigned char *ret = p;
672590bc
PA
707#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
708 int next_proto_neg_seen;
709#endif
e6bc27f5 710
5f042374
PA
711 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
712 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
713 return p;
714
e6bc27f5
PA
715 ret+=2;
716 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
717
718 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
719 {
919b01cc 720 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
e6bc27f5
PA
721
722 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
723 s2n(0,ret);
724 }
5f042374
PA
725
726 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
727 {
728 int el;
729
730 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
731 {
732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
733 return NULL;
734 }
735
736 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
737
738 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
739 s2n(el,ret);
740
741 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
742 {
743 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
744 return NULL;
745 }
746
747 ret += el;
748 }
919b01cc
PA
749
750#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
751 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
752 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
753 {
754 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
755 long lenmax;
756
757 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
758 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
759 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
760 {
761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
762 return NULL;
763 }
764
765 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
766 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
767 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
768 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
769 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
770
771 }
772 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
773#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
774
e6bc27f5
PA
775 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
776 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
777 {
919b01cc 778 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
e6bc27f5
PA
779 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
780 s2n(0,ret);
781 }
2e6ca3d0
PA
782
783 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
784 {
785 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
786 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
787 s2n(0,ret);
788 }
789
919b01cc
PA
790#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
791 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
792 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
793 {
794 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
795
796 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
797 return NULL;
798 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
799 return NULL;
800
801 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
802 s2n(sol + 2, ret);
803 s2n(sol, ret);
804 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
805 ret += sol;
806 }
807#endif
672590bc 808
ec1df3a8 809#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
672590bc
PA
810 if(s->srtp_profile)
811 {
812 int el;
813
814 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
815
816 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
817
818 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
819 s2n(el,ret);
820
821 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
822 {
823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
824 return NULL;
825 }
826 ret+=el;
827 }
ec1df3a8 828#endif
672590bc 829
919b01cc
PA
830 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
831 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
832 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
833 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
834 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
835 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
836 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
837 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
838 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
839 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
840 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
841 ret+=36;
842
843 }
844
672590bc
PA
845#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
846 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
847 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
848 {
4bb195ec
SW
849 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
850 return NULL;
672590bc
PA
851 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
852 s2n(1,ret);
853 /* Set mode:
854 * 1: peer may send requests
855 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
856 */
857 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
858 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
859 else
860 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
861
862 }
863#endif
864
865#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
866 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
867 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
868 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
869 {
870 const unsigned char *npa;
871 unsigned int npalen;
872 int r;
873
874 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
875 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
876 {
877 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
878 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
879 s2n(npalen,ret);
880 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
881 ret += npalen;
882 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
883 }
884 }
885#endif
886
e6bc27f5
PA
887 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
888 return p;
889
890 s2n(extdatalen,p);
891 return ret;
892 }
893
8b433ce3
PA
894#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
895/* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
896 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
897 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
898 * SNI,
899 * elliptic_curves
900 * ec_point_formats
901 *
902 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
903 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
904 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
905 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
906 */
907static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
908 unsigned short type, size;
909 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
910 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
911 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
912 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
913 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
914 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
915 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
916
917 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
918 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
919 0x01, /* 1 point format */
920 0x00, /* uncompressed */
921 };
922
923 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
924 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
925 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
926 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
927 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
928 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
929 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
930 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
931 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
932 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
933 };
934
935 if (data >= (d+n-2))
936 return;
937 data += 2;
938
939 if (data > (d+n-4))
940 return;
941 n2s(data,type);
942 n2s(data,size);
943
944 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
945 return;
946
947 if (data+size > d+n)
948 return;
949 data += size;
950
951 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
952 {
953 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
954 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
955
956 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
957 return;
958 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
959 return;
960 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
961 return;
962 }
963 else
964 {
965 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
966
967 if (data + len != d+n)
968 return;
969 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
970 return;
971 }
972
973 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
974}
975#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
976
e6bc27f5
PA
977int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
978 {
979 unsigned short type;
980 unsigned short size;
981 unsigned short len;
982 unsigned char *data = *p;
5f042374 983 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
672590bc 984 int sigalg_seen = 0;
5f042374 985
e6bc27f5 986 s->servername_done = 0;
2e6ca3d0 987 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
672590bc
PA
988#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
989 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
990#endif
991
992#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
993 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
994 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
995#endif
e6bc27f5 996
8b433ce3
PA
997#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
998 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
999 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1000#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1001
e6bc27f5 1002 if (data >= (d+n-2))
5f042374 1003 goto ri_check;
e6bc27f5
PA
1004 n2s(data,len);
1005
1006 if (data > (d+n-len))
5f042374 1007 goto ri_check;
e6bc27f5
PA
1008
1009 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1010 {
1011 n2s(data,type);
1012 n2s(data,size);
1013
1014 if (data+size > (d+n))
5f042374 1015 goto ri_check;
919b01cc
PA
1016#if 0
1017 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1018#endif
e6bc27f5
PA
1019 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1020 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1021 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1022/* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1023
1024 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1025 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1026 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1027 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1028 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1029 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1030 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1031 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1032 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1033 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1034 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1035 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1036 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1037 the value of the Host: field.
1038 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1039 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1040 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1041 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1042
1043*/
1044
1045 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1046 {
1047 unsigned char *sdata;
1048 int servname_type;
1049 int dsize;
1050
1051 if (size < 2)
1052 {
1053 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1054 return 0;
1055 }
1056 n2s(data,dsize);
1057 size -= 2;
1058 if (dsize > size )
1059 {
1060 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1061 return 0;
1062 }
1063
1064 sdata = data;
1065 while (dsize > 3)
1066 {
1067 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1068 n2s(sdata,len);
1069 dsize -= 3;
1070
1071 if (len > dsize)
1072 {
1073 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1074 return 0;
1075 }
1076 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1077 switch (servname_type)
1078 {
1079 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
9f1859dd 1080 if (!s->hit)
e6bc27f5 1081 {
9f1859dd
PA
1082 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1083 {
1084 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1085 return 0;
1086 }
1087 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
e6bc27f5
PA
1088 {
1089 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1090 return 0;
1091 }
9f1859dd
PA
1092 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1093 {
1094 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1095 return 0;
1096 }
e6bc27f5
PA
1097 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1098 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1099 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1100 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2e6ca3d0 1101 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
e6bc27f5
PA
1102 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1103 return 0;
1104 }
1105 s->servername_done = 1;
1106
1107 }
1108 else
9f1859dd
PA
1109 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1110 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
e6bc27f5
PA
1111 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1112
1113 break;
1114
1115 default:
1116 break;
1117 }
1118
1119 dsize -= len;
1120 }
1121 if (dsize != 0)
1122 {
1123 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1124 return 0;
1125 }
1126
1127 }
672590bc
PA
1128#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1129 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1130 {
1131 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1132 {
1133 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1134 return 0;
1135 }
1136 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1137 {
1138 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1139 return 0;
1140 }
1141 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1142 return -1;
1143 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1144 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1145
1146 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1147 {
1148 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1149 return 0;
1150 }
1151 }
1152#endif
919b01cc
PA
1153
1154#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1155 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1156 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1157 {
1158 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1159 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1160
1161 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1162 {
1163 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1164 return 0;
1165 }
9f1859dd 1166 if (!s->hit)
919b01cc 1167 {
9f1859dd
PA
1168 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1169 {
ea552218
PA
1170 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1171 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
9f1859dd
PA
1172 }
1173 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1174 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1175 {
1176 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1177 return 0;
1178 }
1179 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1180 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
919b01cc 1181 }
919b01cc
PA
1182#if 0
1183 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1184 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1185 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1186 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1187 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1188#endif
1189 }
1190 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1191 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1192 {
1193 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1194 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1195 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1196
9bb344e0
PA
1197 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1198 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
919b01cc
PA
1199 {
1200 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1201 return 0;
1202 }
9f1859dd 1203 if (!s->hit)
919b01cc 1204 {
9f1859dd
PA
1205 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1206 {
1207 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1208 return 0;
1209 }
1210 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1211 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1212 {
1213 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1214 return 0;
1215 }
1216 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1217 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
919b01cc 1218 }
919b01cc
PA
1219#if 0
1220 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1221 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1222 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1223 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1224 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1225#endif
1226 }
1227#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1228#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1229 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1230 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1231 {
1232 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1233
1234 if (size < 2)
1235 {
1236 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1237 return 0;
1238 }
1239 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1240 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1241 {
1242 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1243 return 0;
1244 }
1245
1246 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1247 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1248 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1249 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1250 else
1251 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1252 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1253 {
1254 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1255 return 0;
1256 }
1257 }
1258#endif
1259 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1260 {
1261 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1262 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1263 {
1264 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1265 return 0;
1266 }
1267 }
5f042374
PA
1268 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1269 {
1270 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1271 return 0;
1272 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1273 }
672590bc
PA
1274 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1275 {
1276 int dsize;
1277 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
1278 {
1279 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1280 return 0;
1281 }
1282 sigalg_seen = 1;
1283 n2s(data,dsize);
1284 size -= 2;
1285 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
1286 {
1287 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1288 return 0;
1289 }
1290 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1291 {
1292 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1293 return 0;
1294 }
1295 }
5f042374 1296 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
8b433ce3 1297 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2e6ca3d0
PA
1298 {
1299
1300 if (size < 5)
1301 {
1302 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1303 return 0;
1304 }
1305
1306 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1307 size--;
1308 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1309 {
1310 const unsigned char *sdata;
1311 int dsize;
1312 /* Read in responder_id_list */
1313 n2s(data,dsize);
1314 size -= 2;
1315 if (dsize > size )
1316 {
1317 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1318 return 0;
1319 }
1320 while (dsize > 0)
1321 {
1322 OCSP_RESPID *id;
1323 int idsize;
1324 if (dsize < 4)
1325 {
1326 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1327 return 0;
1328 }
1329 n2s(data, idsize);
1330 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
8e8cd841 1331 size -= 2 + idsize;
2e6ca3d0
PA
1332 if (dsize < 0)
1333 {
1334 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1335 return 0;
1336 }
1337 sdata = data;
1338 data += idsize;
1339 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
1340 &sdata, idsize);
1341 if (!id)
1342 {
1343 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1344 return 0;
1345 }
1346 if (data != sdata)
1347 {
1348 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1349 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1350 return 0;
1351 }
1352 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
1353 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
1354 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
1355 {
1356 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1357 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1358 return 0;
1359 }
1360 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
1361 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
1362 {
1363 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1364 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1365 return 0;
1366 }
1367 }
1368
1369 /* Read in request_extensions */
8e8cd841
PA
1370 if (size < 2)
1371 {
1372 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1373 return 0;
1374 }
2e6ca3d0
PA
1375 n2s(data,dsize);
1376 size -= 2;
8e8cd841 1377 if (dsize != size)
2e6ca3d0
PA
1378 {
1379 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1380 return 0;
1381 }
1382 sdata = data;
1383 if (dsize > 0)
1384 {
9e80567f
PA
1385 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1386 {
1387 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
1388 X509_EXTENSION_free);
1389 }
1390
2e6ca3d0
PA
1391 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1392 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
1393 &sdata, dsize);
1394 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
1395 || (data + dsize != sdata))
1396 {
1397 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1398 return 0;
1399 }
1400 }
1401 }
1402 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
1403 * so ignore it.
1404 */
1405 else
1406 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1407 }
672590bc
PA
1408#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1409 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1410 {
1411 switch(data[0])
1412 {
1413 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
1414 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1415 break;
1416 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
1417 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1418 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1419 break;
1420 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1421 return 0;
1422 }
1423 }
1424#endif
1425#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1426 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1427 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1428 {
1429 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1430 * renegotiation.
1431 *
1432 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1433 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1434 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1435 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1436 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1437 * anything like that, but this might change).
1438
1439 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1440 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1441 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1442 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1443 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
1444 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1445 }
1446#endif
5f042374 1447
e6bc27f5 1448 /* session ticket processed earlier */
ec1df3a8 1449#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
672590bc 1450 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
ec1df3a8 1451 {
672590bc
PA
1452 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1453 al))
1454 return 0;
ec1df3a8
PA
1455 }
1456#endif
672590bc 1457
919b01cc 1458 data+=size;
e6bc27f5 1459 }
919b01cc 1460
e6bc27f5 1461 *p = data;
5f042374
PA
1462
1463 ri_check:
1464
1465 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1466
672590bc 1467 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
5f042374
PA
1468 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1469 {
1470 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1472 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1473 return 0;
1474 }
1475
e6bc27f5
PA
1476 return 1;
1477 }
1478
672590bc
PA
1479#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1480/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1481 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1482 * the length of the block. */
1483static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1484 {
1485 unsigned int off = 0;
1486
1487 while (off < len)
1488 {
1489 if (d[off] == 0)
1490 return 0;
1491 off += d[off];
1492 off++;
1493 }
1494
1495 return off == len;
1496 }
1497#endif
1498
e6bc27f5
PA
1499int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1500 {
9f1859dd 1501 unsigned short length;
e6bc27f5
PA
1502 unsigned short type;
1503 unsigned short size;
e6bc27f5 1504 unsigned char *data = *p;
e6bc27f5 1505 int tlsext_servername = 0;
5f042374 1506 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
e6bc27f5 1507
672590bc
PA
1508#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1509 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1510#endif
1511
1512#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1513 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1514 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1515#endif
1516
e6bc27f5 1517 if (data >= (d+n-2))
5f042374 1518 goto ri_check;
e6bc27f5 1519
9f1859dd
PA
1520 n2s(data,length);
1521 if (data+length != d+n)
1522 {
1523 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1524 return 0;
1525 }
e6bc27f5
PA
1526
1527 while(data <= (d+n-4))
1528 {
1529 n2s(data,type);
1530 n2s(data,size);
1531
1532 if (data+size > (d+n))
5f042374 1533 goto ri_check;
e6bc27f5
PA
1534
1535 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1536 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1537 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1538
1539 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1540 {
1541 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
1542 {
1543 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1544 return 0;
1545 }
1546 tlsext_servername = 1;
1547 }
919b01cc
PA
1548
1549#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1550 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1551 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1552 {
1553 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1554 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1555
9bb344e0
PA
1556 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1557 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
919b01cc
PA
1558 {
1559 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1560 return 0;
1561 }
1562 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1563 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1564 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1565 {
1566 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1567 return 0;
1568 }
1569 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1570 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1571#if 0
1572 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1573 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1574 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1575 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1576 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1577#endif
1578 }
1579#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1580
e6bc27f5
PA
1581 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1582 {
919b01cc
PA
1583 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1584 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1585 {
1586 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1587 return 0;
1588 }
e6bc27f5
PA
1589 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1590 || (size > 0))
1591 {
1592 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1593 return 0;
1594 }
1595 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1596 }
919b01cc
PA
1597#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1598 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1599 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1600 {
1601 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1602
1603 if (size < 2)
1604 {
1605 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1606 return 0;
1607 }
1608 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1609 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1610 {
1611 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1612 return 0;
1613 }
1614
1615 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1616 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1617 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1618 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1619 else
1620 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1621
1622 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1623 {
1624 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1625 return 0;
1626 }
1627 }
1628#endif
5f042374
PA
1629 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1630 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2e6ca3d0
PA
1631 {
1632 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
1633 * a status request message.
1634 */
1635 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
1636 {
1637 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1638 return 0;
1639 }
1640 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1641 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1642 }
672590bc
PA
1643#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1644 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1645 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1646 {
1647 unsigned char *selected;
1648 unsigned char selected_len;
1649
1650 /* We must have requested it. */
ec1df3a8 1651 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
672590bc
PA
1652 {
1653 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1654 return 0;
1655 }
1656 /* The data must be valid */
1657 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
1658 {
1659 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1660 return 0;
1661 }
1662 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1663 {
1664 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1665 return 0;
1666 }
1667 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1668 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
1669 {
1670 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1671 return 0;
1672 }
1673 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1674 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1675 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1676 }
1677#endif
5f042374
PA
1678 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1679 {
1680 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1681 return 0;
1682 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1683 }
672590bc
PA
1684#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1685 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1686 {
1687 switch(data[0])
1688 {
1689 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
1690 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1691 break;
1692 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
1693 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1694 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1695 break;
1696 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1697 return 0;
1698 }
1699 }
1700#endif
ec1df3a8 1701#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
672590bc 1702 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
ec1df3a8 1703 {
672590bc
PA
1704 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1705 al))
1706 return 0;
ec1df3a8
PA
1707 }
1708#endif
672590bc 1709
e6bc27f5
PA
1710 data+=size;
1711 }
1712
1713 if (data != d+n)
1714 {
1715 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1716 return 0;
1717 }
1718
1719 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
1720 {
1721 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
1722 {
1723 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
1724 {
1725 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1726 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1727 {
1728 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1729 return 0;
1730 }
1731 }
1732 else
1733 {
1734 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1735 return 0;
1736 }
1737 }
1738 }
1739
1740 *p = data;
5f042374
PA
1741
1742 ri_check:
1743
1744 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
1745 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
1746 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
1747 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
1748 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
1749 * absence on initial connect only.
1750 */
1751 if (!renegotiate_seen
1752 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1753 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1754 {
1755 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1756 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1757 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1758 return 0;
1759 }
1760
e6bc27f5
PA
1761 return 1;
1762 }
1763
919b01cc
PA
1764
1765int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1766 {
1767#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1768 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
1769 * and elliptic curves we support.
1770 */
1771 int using_ecc = 0;
1772 int i;
1773 unsigned char *j;
1774 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1775 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1776
1777 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1778 {
1779 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1780
1781 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1782 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1783 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1784 {
1785 using_ecc = 1;
1786 break;
1787 }
1788 }
672590bc 1789 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
919b01cc
PA
1790 if (using_ecc)
1791 {
1792 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1793 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1794 {
1795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1796 return -1;
1797 }
1798 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1799 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1800 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1801 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1802
1803 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
1804 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
672590bc 1805 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2;
919b01cc
PA
1806 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1807 {
1808 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1810 return -1;
1811 }
672590bc
PA
1812 for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <
1813 sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++)
1814 {
1815 int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]);
1816 s2n(id,j);
1817 }
919b01cc
PA
1818 }
1819#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1820
1821#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1822 {
1823 int r = 1;
1824
1825 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1826 {
1827 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1828 if (!r)
1829 return -1;
1830 }
1831
1832 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1833 {
1834 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1835 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1836
1837 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1838 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1839 else
1840 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1841 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1842 {
1843 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1844 return -1;
1845 }
1846 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1847 }
1848
1849 if (r == 2)
1850 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
1851 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1852 }
1853#endif
1854
1855 return 1;
1856 }
1857
1858int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1859 {
1860#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1861 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
1862 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
1863 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
1864 */
1865
1866 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1867 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1868 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1869 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1870
1871 if (using_ecc)
1872 {
1873 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1874 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1875 {
1876 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1877 return -1;
1878 }
1879 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1880 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1881 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1882 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1883 }
1884#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1885
1886 return 1;
1887 }
1888
9bb344e0 1889int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
e6bc27f5
PA
1890 {
1891 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1892 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1893
919b01cc
PA
1894#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1895 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1896 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1897 */
1898 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1899 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1900 */
1901#endif
1902
e6bc27f5
PA
1903 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1904 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1905 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1906 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1907
919b01cc
PA
1908#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1909 {
1910 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
1911 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
9bb344e0
PA
1912 * so this has to happen here in
1913 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
919b01cc
PA
1914
1915 int r = 1;
1916
1917 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1918 {
1919 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1920 if (!r)
1921 {
1922 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1923 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1924 goto err;
1925 }
1926 }
1927
1928 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1929 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1930 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
1931
1932 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1933 {
1934 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1935 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
1936 {
1937 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
1938 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
1939
1940 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1941 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1942 else
1943 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1944 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1945 {
1946 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1947 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1948 goto err;
1949 }
1950 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1951 }
1952 }
1953
1954 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1955 {
1956 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
1957 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
1958 * abort the handshake.
1959 */
1960 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1961 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1962 }
1963 }
1964
919b01cc 1965 err:
9bb344e0 1966#endif
e6bc27f5
PA
1967 switch (ret)
1968 {
1969 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1970 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1971 return -1;
1972
1973 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1974 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1975 return 1;
1976
1977 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1978 s->servername_done=0;
1979 default:
1980 return 1;
1981 }
1982 }
1983
9bb344e0
PA
1984int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
1985 {
1986 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1987 int al;
1988
1989 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
1990 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
1991 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
1992 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
1993 */
1994 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1995 {
1996 int r;
1997 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
1998 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
1999 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2000 if (certpkey == NULL)
2001 {
2002 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2003 return 1;
2004 }
2005 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2006 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2007 */
2008 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2009 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2010 switch (r)
2011 {
2012 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2013 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2014 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2015 break;
2016 /* status request response should be sent */
2017 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2018 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2019 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2020 else
2021 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2022 break;
2023 /* something bad happened */
2024 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2025 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2026 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2027 goto err;
2028 }
2029 }
2030 else
2031 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2032
2033 err:
2034 switch (ret)
2035 {
2036 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2037 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2038 return -1;
2039
2040 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2041 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2042 return 1;
2043
2044 default:
2045 return 1;
2046 }
2047 }
2048
e6bc27f5
PA
2049int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2050 {
2051 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2052 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2053
919b01cc 2054#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
ea552218
PA
2055 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2056 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2057 * it must contain uncompressed.
919b01cc
PA
2058 */
2059 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2060 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2061 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
ea552218 2062 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
919b01cc
PA
2063 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2064 {
2065 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2066 size_t i;
2067 unsigned char *list;
2068 int found_uncompressed = 0;
919b01cc
PA
2069 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2070 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2071 {
2072 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2073 {
2074 found_uncompressed = 1;
2075 break;
2076 }
2077 }
2078 if (!found_uncompressed)
2079 {
2080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2081 return -1;
2082 }
2083 }
2084 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2085#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2086
e6bc27f5
PA
2087 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2088 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2089 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2090 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2091
919b01cc
PA
2092#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2093 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2094 {
2095 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2096 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2097
2098 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2099 {
2100 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2101 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2102 }
2103
2104 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
2105 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
2106 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2107 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
2108 {
2109 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2110 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2111 }
2112 }
2113#endif
2114
2e6ca3d0
PA
2115 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2116 * tell the callback
2117 */
2118 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
919b01cc 2119 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2e6ca3d0
PA
2120 {
2121 int r;
2122 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2123 * there is no response.
2124 */
2125 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2126 {
2127 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2128 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2129 }
2130 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2131 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2132 if (r == 0)
2133 {
2134 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2135 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2136 }
2137 if (r < 0)
2138 {
2139 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2140 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2141 }
2142 }
2143
e6bc27f5
PA
2144 switch (ret)
2145 {
2146 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2147 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2148 return -1;
2149
2150 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2151 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2152 return 1;
2153
2154 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2155 s->servername_done=0;
2156 default:
2157 return 1;
2158 }
2159 }
2160
672590bc
PA
2161/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2162 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2163 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2164 *
2165 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2166 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2167 * extension, if any.
2168 * len: the length of the session ID.
2169 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2170 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2171 * point to the resulting session.
2172 *
2173 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2174 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2175 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2176 *
2177 * Returns:
2178 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2179 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2180 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2181 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2182 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2183 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2184 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2185 *
2186 * Side effects:
2187 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2188 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2189 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2190 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2191 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2192 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
e6bc27f5 2193 */
e6bc27f5 2194int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
672590bc 2195 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
e6bc27f5
PA
2196 {
2197 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2198 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2199 unsigned short i;
683caddb 2200
672590bc
PA
2201 *ret = NULL;
2202 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2203
683caddb 2204 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
672590bc
PA
2205 * to permit stateful resumption.
2206 */
683caddb 2207 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
672590bc 2208 return 0;
e6bc27f5 2209 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
672590bc 2210 return 0;
e6bc27f5
PA
2211 if (p >= limit)
2212 return -1;
5f042374
PA
2213 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2214 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2215 {
2216 i = *(p++);
2217 p+= i;
2218 if (p >= limit)
2219 return -1;
2220 }
e6bc27f5
PA
2221 /* Skip past cipher list */
2222 n2s(p, i);
2223 p+= i;
2224 if (p >= limit)
2225 return -1;
2226 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2227 i = *(p++);
2228 p += i;
2229 if (p > limit)
2230 return -1;
2231 /* Now at start of extensions */
2232 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
672590bc 2233 return 0;
e6bc27f5
PA
2234 n2s(p, i);
2235 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
2236 {
2237 unsigned short type, size;
2238 n2s(p, type);
2239 n2s(p, size);
2240 if (p + size > limit)
672590bc 2241 return 0;
e6bc27f5
PA
2242 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2243 {
672590bc 2244 int r;
e6bc27f5
PA
2245 if (size == 0)
2246 {
672590bc
PA
2247 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
2248 * currently have one. */
e6bc27f5 2249 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
672590bc 2250 return 1;
e6bc27f5 2251 }
919b01cc
PA
2252 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
2253 {
672590bc
PA
2254 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
2255 * decrypted rather than generating the session
2256 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
2257 * handshake based on external mechanism to
2258 * calculate the master secret later. */
2259 return 2;
2260 }
2261 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2262 switch (r)
2263 {
2264 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2265 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2266 return 2;
2267 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2268 return r;
2269 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2270 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2271 return 3;
2272 default: /* fatal error */
2273 return -1;
919b01cc 2274 }
e6bc27f5
PA
2275 }
2276 p += size;
2277 }
672590bc 2278 return 0;
e6bc27f5
PA
2279 }
2280
672590bc
PA
2281/* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2282 *
2283 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2284 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
2285 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2286 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2287 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2288 * point to the resulting session.
2289 *
2290 * Returns:
2291 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2292 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2293 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2294 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2295 */
e6bc27f5
PA
2296static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
2297 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
2298 SSL_SESSION **psess)
2299 {
2300 SSL_SESSION *sess;
2301 unsigned char *sdec;
2302 const unsigned char *p;
2e6ca3d0 2303 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
e6bc27f5
PA
2304 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2305 HMAC_CTX hctx;
2306 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
5f042374 2307 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2e6ca3d0
PA
2308 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2309 if (eticklen < 48)
672590bc 2310 return 2;
2e6ca3d0
PA
2311 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2312 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2313 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
5f042374 2314 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2e6ca3d0
PA
2315 {
2316 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
5f042374 2317 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2e6ca3d0
PA
2318 &ctx, &hctx, 0);
2319 if (rv < 0)
2320 return -1;
2321 if (rv == 0)
672590bc 2322 return 2;
2e6ca3d0
PA
2323 if (rv == 2)
2324 renew_ticket = 1;
2325 }
2326 else
2327 {
2328 /* Check key name matches */
5f042374 2329 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
672590bc 2330 return 2;
5f042374 2331 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2e6ca3d0
PA
2332 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2333 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
5f042374 2334 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
2e6ca3d0 2335 }
e6bc27f5 2336 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
672590bc
PA
2337 * integrity checks on ticket.
2338 */
2e6ca3d0 2339 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
919b01cc
PA
2340 if (mlen < 0)
2341 {
2342 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2343 return -1;
2344 }
e6bc27f5 2345 eticklen -= mlen;
e6bc27f5 2346 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
e6bc27f5
PA
2347 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
2348 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
2349 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
9bb344e0 2350 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
672590bc 2351 return 2;
e6bc27f5 2352 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
e6bc27f5 2353 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2e6ca3d0
PA
2354 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2355 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
e6bc27f5
PA
2356 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
2357 if (!sdec)
2358 {
2359 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2360 return -1;
2361 }
2362 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
2363 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
672590bc 2364 return 2;
e6bc27f5
PA
2365 slen += mlen;
2366 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2367 p = sdec;
672590bc 2368
e6bc27f5
PA
2369 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
2370 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
2371 if (sess)
2372 {
672590bc
PA
2373 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
2374 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
2375 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
2376 * as required by standard.
2377 */
e6bc27f5
PA
2378 if (sesslen)
2379 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2380 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2381 *psess = sess;
672590bc
PA
2382 if (renew_ticket)
2383 return 4;
2384 else
2385 return 3;
2386 }
2387 ERR_clear_error();
2388 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
2389 * ticket. */
2390 return 2;
2391 }
2392
2393/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
2394
2395typedef struct
2396 {
2397 int nid;
2398 int id;
2399 } tls12_lookup;
2400
2401static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
2402#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2403 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
2404#endif
2405#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2406 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
2407#endif
2408#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2409 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
2410 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
2411#endif
2412#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2413 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
2414 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
2415#endif
2416};
2417
2418static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2419#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2420 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2421#endif
2422#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2423 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2424#endif
2425#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2426 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
2427#endif
2428};
2429
2430static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2431 {
2432 size_t i;
2433 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2434 {
2435 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2436 return table[i].id;
2437 }
2438 return -1;
2439 }
2440#if 0
2441static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2442 {
2443 size_t i;
2444 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2445 {
2446 if (table[i].id == id)
2447 return table[i].nid;
2448 }
2449 return -1;
2450 }
2451#endif
2452
2453int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
2454 {
2455 int sig_id, md_id;
2456 if (!md)
2457 return 0;
2458 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
2459 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2460 if (md_id == -1)
2461 return 0;
2462 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
2463 if (sig_id == -1)
2464 return 0;
2465 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
2466 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
2467 return 1;
2468 }
2469
2470int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
2471 {
2472 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
2473 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2474 }
2475
2476const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
2477 {
2478 switch(hash_alg)
2479 {
672590bc
PA
2480#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2481 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
2482 return EVP_sha1();
2483#endif
2484#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2485 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
2486 return EVP_sha224();
2487
2488 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
2489 return EVP_sha256();
2490#endif
2491#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2492 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
2493 return EVP_sha384();
2494
2495 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
2496 return EVP_sha512();
2497#endif
2498 default:
2499 return NULL;
2500
2501 }
2502 }
2503
2504/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2505
2506int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
2507 {
2508 int i, idx;
2509 const EVP_MD *md;
2510 CERT *c = s->cert;
2511 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
2512 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
e6bc27f5 2513 return 1;
672590bc
PA
2514 /* Should never happen */
2515 if (!c)
2516 return 0;
2517
2518 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2519 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2520 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
2521 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
2522
2523 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2)
2524 {
2525 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1];
2526
2527 switch(sig_alg)
2528 {
2529#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2530 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
2531 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
2532 break;
2533#endif
2534#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2535 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
2536 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
2537 break;
2538#endif
2539#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2540 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
2541 idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
2542 break;
2543#endif
2544 default:
2545 continue;
2546 }
2547
2548 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
2549 {
2550 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
2551 if (md)
2552 {
2553 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
2554 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
2555 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
2556 }
2557 }
2558
e6bc27f5 2559 }
672590bc
PA
2560
2561
2562 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
2563 * supported it stays as NULL.
2564 */
2565#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2566 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
9bb344e0 2567 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
672590bc
PA
2568#endif
2569#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2570 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
2571 {
2572 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2573 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2574 }
2575#endif
2576#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2577 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
9bb344e0 2578 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
672590bc
PA
2579#endif
2580 return 1;
2581 }
2582
2583#endif
2584
2585#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2586int
2587tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2588 {
2589 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
2590 unsigned short hbtype;
2591 unsigned int payload;
2592 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2593
672590bc
PA
2594 if (s->msg_callback)
2595 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2596 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
2597 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2598
8b433ce3
PA
2599 /* Read type and payload length first */
2600 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
2601 return 0; /* silently discard */
2602 hbtype = *p++;
2603 n2s(p, payload);
2604 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
2605 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
2606 pl = p;
2607
672590bc
PA
2608 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
2609 {
2610 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
2611 int r;
2612
2613 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
2614 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
2615 * payload, plus padding
2616 */
2617 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2618 bp = buffer;
2619
2620 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
2621 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
2622 s2n(payload, bp);
2623 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
2624 bp += payload;
2625 /* Random padding */
2626 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
2627
2628 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
2629
2630 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
2631 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2632 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
2633 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2634
2635 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
2636
2637 if (r < 0)
2638 return r;
2639 }
2640 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
2641 {
2642 unsigned int seq;
2643
2644 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
2645 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
2646 * sequence number */
2647 n2s(pl, seq);
2648
2649 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
2650 {
2651 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
2652 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
2653 }
2654 }
2655
e6bc27f5
PA
2656 return 0;
2657 }
2658
672590bc
PA
2659int
2660tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2661 {
2662 unsigned char *buf, *p;
2663 int ret;
2664 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
2665 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2666
2667 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
2668 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
2669 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
2670 {
2671 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
2672 return -1;
2673 }
2674
2675 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
2676 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
2677 {
2678 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
2679 return -1;
2680 }
2681
2682 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
2683 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
2684 {
2685 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2686 return -1;
2687 }
2688
2689 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
2690 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
2691 */
2692 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
2693
2694 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
2695 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
2696 * some random stuff.
2697 * - Message Type, 1 byte
2698 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
2699 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
2700 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
2701 * - Padding
2702 */
2703 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2704 p = buf;
2705 /* Message Type */
2706 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
2707 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
2708 s2n(payload, p);
2709 /* Sequence number */
2710 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
2711 /* 16 random bytes */
2712 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
2713 p += 16;
2714 /* Random padding */
2715 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
2716
2717 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
2718 if (ret >= 0)
2719 {
2720 if (s->msg_callback)
2721 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2722 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
2723 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2724
2725 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
2726 }
2727
2728 OPENSSL_free(buf);
2729
2730 return ret;
2731 }
e6bc27f5 2732#endif