| 1 | /* ssl/t1_lib.c */ |
| 2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| 3 | * All rights reserved. |
| 4 | * |
| 5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| 6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| 7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| 8 | * |
| 9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| 10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| 11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| 12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| 13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| 14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| 15 | * |
| 16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| 17 | * the code are not to be removed. |
| 18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| 19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| 20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| 21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| 22 | * |
| 23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| 24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| 25 | * are met: |
| 26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| 27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| 28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| 29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| 30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| 31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| 32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| 33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| 34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| 35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| 36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| 37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| 38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| 39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| 40 | * |
| 41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| 42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| 43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| 44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| 45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| 46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| 47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| 48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| 49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| 50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| 51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| 52 | * |
| 53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| 54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| 55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| 56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| 57 | */ |
| 58 | /* ==================================================================== |
| 59 | * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| 60 | * |
| 61 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| 62 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| 63 | * are met: |
| 64 | * |
| 65 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| 66 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| 67 | * |
| 68 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| 69 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| 70 | * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| 71 | * distribution. |
| 72 | * |
| 73 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| 74 | * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| 75 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| 76 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| 77 | * |
| 78 | * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| 79 | * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| 80 | * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| 81 | * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
| 82 | * |
| 83 | * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| 84 | * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| 85 | * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| 86 | * |
| 87 | * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| 88 | * acknowledgment: |
| 89 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| 90 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| 91 | * |
| 92 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| 93 | * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| 94 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| 95 | * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| 96 | * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| 97 | * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| 98 | * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| 99 | * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| 100 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| 101 | * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| 102 | * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| 103 | * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| 104 | * ==================================================================== |
| 105 | * |
| 106 | * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| 107 | * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| 108 | * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| 109 | * |
| 110 | */ |
| 111 | |
| 112 | #include <stdio.h> |
| 113 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
| 114 | #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| 115 | #include <openssl/hmac.h> |
| 116 | #include <openssl/ocsp.h> |
| 117 | #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| 118 | #include "ssl_locl.h" |
| 119 | |
| 120 | const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; |
| 121 | |
| 122 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| 123 | static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, |
| 124 | const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, |
| 125 | SSL_SESSION **psess); |
| 126 | #endif |
| 127 | |
| 128 | SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={ |
| 129 | tls1_enc, |
| 130 | tls1_mac, |
| 131 | tls1_setup_key_block, |
| 132 | tls1_generate_master_secret, |
| 133 | tls1_change_cipher_state, |
| 134 | tls1_final_finish_mac, |
| 135 | TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, |
| 136 | tls1_cert_verify_mac, |
| 137 | TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, |
| 138 | TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, |
| 139 | tls1_alert_code, |
| 140 | tls1_export_keying_material, |
| 141 | }; |
| 142 | |
| 143 | long tls1_default_timeout(void) |
| 144 | { |
| 145 | /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec |
| 146 | * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */ |
| 147 | return(60*60*2); |
| 148 | } |
| 149 | |
| 150 | int tls1_new(SSL *s) |
| 151 | { |
| 152 | if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0); |
| 153 | s->method->ssl_clear(s); |
| 154 | return(1); |
| 155 | } |
| 156 | |
| 157 | void tls1_free(SSL *s) |
| 158 | { |
| 159 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| 160 | if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) |
| 161 | { |
| 162 | OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); |
| 163 | } |
| 164 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ |
| 165 | ssl3_free(s); |
| 166 | } |
| 167 | |
| 168 | void tls1_clear(SSL *s) |
| 169 | { |
| 170 | ssl3_clear(s); |
| 171 | s->version = s->method->version; |
| 172 | } |
| 173 | |
| 174 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| 175 | |
| 176 | static int nid_list[] = |
| 177 | { |
| 178 | NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ |
| 179 | NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ |
| 180 | NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ |
| 181 | NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ |
| 182 | NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ |
| 183 | NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ |
| 184 | NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ |
| 185 | NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ |
| 186 | NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ |
| 187 | NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ |
| 188 | NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ |
| 189 | NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ |
| 190 | NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ |
| 191 | NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ |
| 192 | NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ |
| 193 | NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ |
| 194 | NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ |
| 195 | NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ |
| 196 | NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ |
| 197 | NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ |
| 198 | NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ |
| 199 | NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ |
| 200 | NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ |
| 201 | NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ |
| 202 | NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */ |
| 203 | }; |
| 204 | |
| 205 | static int pref_list[] = |
| 206 | { |
| 207 | NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ |
| 208 | NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ |
| 209 | NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */ |
| 210 | NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ |
| 211 | NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ |
| 212 | NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ |
| 213 | NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ |
| 214 | NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ |
| 215 | NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ |
| 216 | NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ |
| 217 | NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ |
| 218 | NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ |
| 219 | NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ |
| 220 | NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ |
| 221 | NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ |
| 222 | NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ |
| 223 | NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ |
| 224 | NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ |
| 225 | NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ |
| 226 | NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ |
| 227 | NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ |
| 228 | NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ |
| 229 | NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ |
| 230 | NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ |
| 231 | NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ |
| 232 | }; |
| 233 | |
| 234 | int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) |
| 235 | { |
| 236 | /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ |
| 237 | if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > |
| 238 | sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]))) |
| 239 | return 0; |
| 240 | return nid_list[curve_id-1]; |
| 241 | } |
| 242 | |
| 243 | int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) |
| 244 | { |
| 245 | /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ |
| 246 | switch (nid) |
| 247 | { |
| 248 | case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ |
| 249 | return 1; |
| 250 | case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ |
| 251 | return 2; |
| 252 | case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ |
| 253 | return 3; |
| 254 | case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ |
| 255 | return 4; |
| 256 | case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ |
| 257 | return 5; |
| 258 | case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ |
| 259 | return 6; |
| 260 | case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ |
| 261 | return 7; |
| 262 | case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ |
| 263 | return 8; |
| 264 | case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ |
| 265 | return 9; |
| 266 | case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ |
| 267 | return 10; |
| 268 | case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ |
| 269 | return 11; |
| 270 | case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ |
| 271 | return 12; |
| 272 | case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ |
| 273 | return 13; |
| 274 | case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ |
| 275 | return 14; |
| 276 | case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ |
| 277 | return 15; |
| 278 | case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ |
| 279 | return 16; |
| 280 | case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ |
| 281 | return 17; |
| 282 | case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ |
| 283 | return 18; |
| 284 | case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ |
| 285 | return 19; |
| 286 | case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ |
| 287 | return 20; |
| 288 | case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ |
| 289 | return 21; |
| 290 | case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ |
| 291 | return 22; |
| 292 | case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ |
| 293 | return 23; |
| 294 | case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ |
| 295 | return 24; |
| 296 | case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ |
| 297 | return 25; |
| 298 | default: |
| 299 | return 0; |
| 300 | } |
| 301 | } |
| 302 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
| 303 | |
| 304 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| 305 | |
| 306 | /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this |
| 307 | * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. |
| 308 | */ |
| 309 | |
| 310 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
| 311 | #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */ |
| 312 | #else |
| 313 | #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, |
| 314 | #endif |
| 315 | |
| 316 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA |
| 317 | #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */ |
| 318 | #else |
| 319 | #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, |
| 320 | #endif |
| 321 | |
| 322 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA |
| 323 | #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */ |
| 324 | #else |
| 325 | #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, |
| 326 | #endif |
| 327 | |
| 328 | #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \ |
| 329 | tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \ |
| 330 | tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \ |
| 331 | tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) |
| 332 | |
| 333 | static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = { |
| 334 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 |
| 335 | tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512) |
| 336 | tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) |
| 337 | #endif |
| 338 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 |
| 339 | tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) |
| 340 | tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224) |
| 341 | #endif |
| 342 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA |
| 343 | tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1) |
| 344 | #endif |
| 345 | }; |
| 346 | |
| 347 | int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p) |
| 348 | { |
| 349 | size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); |
| 350 | if (p) |
| 351 | memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen); |
| 352 | return (int)slen; |
| 353 | } |
| 354 | |
| 355 | unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) |
| 356 | { |
| 357 | int extdatalen=0; |
| 358 | unsigned char *ret = p; |
| 359 | |
| 360 | /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ |
| 361 | if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION |
| 362 | && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) |
| 363 | return p; |
| 364 | |
| 365 | ret+=2; |
| 366 | |
| 367 | if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ |
| 368 | |
| 369 | if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) |
| 370 | { |
| 371 | /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ |
| 372 | unsigned long size_str; |
| 373 | long lenmax; |
| 374 | |
| 375 | /* check for enough space. |
| 376 | 4 for the servername type and entension length |
| 377 | 2 for servernamelist length |
| 378 | 1 for the hostname type |
| 379 | 2 for hostname length |
| 380 | + hostname length |
| 381 | */ |
| 382 | |
| 383 | if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 |
| 384 | || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) |
| 385 | return NULL; |
| 386 | |
| 387 | /* extension type and length */ |
| 388 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); |
| 389 | s2n(size_str+5,ret); |
| 390 | |
| 391 | /* length of servername list */ |
| 392 | s2n(size_str+3,ret); |
| 393 | |
| 394 | /* hostname type, length and hostname */ |
| 395 | *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; |
| 396 | s2n(size_str,ret); |
| 397 | memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); |
| 398 | ret+=size_str; |
| 399 | } |
| 400 | |
| 401 | /* Add RI if renegotiating */ |
| 402 | if (s->renegotiate) |
| 403 | { |
| 404 | int el; |
| 405 | |
| 406 | if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) |
| 407 | { |
| 408 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 409 | return NULL; |
| 410 | } |
| 411 | |
| 412 | if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; |
| 413 | |
| 414 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); |
| 415 | s2n(el,ret); |
| 416 | |
| 417 | if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) |
| 418 | { |
| 419 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 420 | return NULL; |
| 421 | } |
| 422 | |
| 423 | ret += el; |
| 424 | } |
| 425 | |
| 426 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
| 427 | /* Add SRP username if there is one */ |
| 428 | if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) |
| 429 | { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */ |
| 430 | |
| 431 | int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login); |
| 432 | if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) |
| 433 | { |
| 434 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 435 | return NULL; |
| 436 | } |
| 437 | |
| 438 | /* check for enough space. |
| 439 | 4 for the srp type type and entension length |
| 440 | 1 for the srp user identity |
| 441 | + srp user identity length |
| 442 | */ |
| 443 | if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL; |
| 444 | |
| 445 | /* fill in the extension */ |
| 446 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret); |
| 447 | s2n(login_len+1,ret); |
| 448 | (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len; |
| 449 | memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len); |
| 450 | ret+=login_len; |
| 451 | } |
| 452 | #endif |
| 453 | |
| 454 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| 455 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL && |
| 456 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
| 457 | { |
| 458 | /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */ |
| 459 | long lenmax; |
| 460 | |
| 461 | if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; |
| 462 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; |
| 463 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) |
| 464 | { |
| 465 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 466 | return NULL; |
| 467 | } |
| 468 | |
| 469 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); |
| 470 | s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret); |
| 471 | *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; |
| 472 | memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); |
| 473 | ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; |
| 474 | } |
| 475 | if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL && |
| 476 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
| 477 | { |
| 478 | /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */ |
| 479 | long lenmax; |
| 480 | |
| 481 | if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL; |
| 482 | if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; |
| 483 | if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532) |
| 484 | { |
| 485 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 486 | return NULL; |
| 487 | } |
| 488 | |
| 489 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret); |
| 490 | s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret); |
| 491 | |
| 492 | /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for |
| 493 | * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes. |
| 494 | * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html |
| 495 | * resolves this to two bytes. |
| 496 | */ |
| 497 | s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret); |
| 498 | memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); |
| 499 | ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; |
| 500 | } |
| 501 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
| 502 | |
| 503 | if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) |
| 504 | { |
| 505 | int ticklen; |
| 506 | if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) |
| 507 | ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; |
| 508 | else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && |
| 509 | s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) |
| 510 | { |
| 511 | ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; |
| 512 | s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); |
| 513 | if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) |
| 514 | return NULL; |
| 515 | memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, |
| 516 | s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, |
| 517 | ticklen); |
| 518 | s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; |
| 519 | } |
| 520 | else |
| 521 | ticklen = 0; |
| 522 | if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && |
| 523 | s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) |
| 524 | goto skip_ext; |
| 525 | /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len |
| 526 | * rest for ticket |
| 527 | */ |
| 528 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL; |
| 529 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); |
| 530 | s2n(ticklen,ret); |
| 531 | if (ticklen) |
| 532 | { |
| 533 | memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); |
| 534 | ret += ticklen; |
| 535 | } |
| 536 | } |
| 537 | skip_ext: |
| 538 | |
| 539 | if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) |
| 540 | { |
| 541 | if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6) |
| 542 | return NULL; |
| 543 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret); |
| 544 | s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret); |
| 545 | s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret); |
| 546 | memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs)); |
| 547 | ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); |
| 548 | } |
| 549 | |
| 550 | #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input |
| 551 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && |
| 552 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
| 553 | { |
| 554 | size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; |
| 555 | |
| 556 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0)) |
| 557 | return NULL; |
| 558 | if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ |
| 559 | return NULL; |
| 560 | |
| 561 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); |
| 562 | s2n(col + 2, ret); |
| 563 | s2n(col, ret); |
| 564 | memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col); |
| 565 | ret += col; |
| 566 | } |
| 567 | #endif |
| 568 | |
| 569 | if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp && |
| 570 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
| 571 | { |
| 572 | int i; |
| 573 | long extlen, idlen, itmp; |
| 574 | OCSP_RESPID *id; |
| 575 | |
| 576 | idlen = 0; |
| 577 | for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) |
| 578 | { |
| 579 | id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); |
| 580 | itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); |
| 581 | if (itmp <= 0) |
| 582 | return NULL; |
| 583 | idlen += itmp + 2; |
| 584 | } |
| 585 | |
| 586 | if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) |
| 587 | { |
| 588 | extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); |
| 589 | if (extlen < 0) |
| 590 | return NULL; |
| 591 | } |
| 592 | else |
| 593 | extlen = 0; |
| 594 | |
| 595 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL; |
| 596 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); |
| 597 | if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) |
| 598 | return NULL; |
| 599 | s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); |
| 600 | *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; |
| 601 | s2n(idlen, ret); |
| 602 | for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) |
| 603 | { |
| 604 | /* save position of id len */ |
| 605 | unsigned char *q = ret; |
| 606 | id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); |
| 607 | /* skip over id len */ |
| 608 | ret += 2; |
| 609 | itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); |
| 610 | /* write id len */ |
| 611 | s2n(itmp, q); |
| 612 | } |
| 613 | s2n(extlen, ret); |
| 614 | if (extlen > 0) |
| 615 | i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); |
| 616 | } |
| 617 | |
| 618 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
| 619 | /* Add Heartbeat extension */ |
| 620 | if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) |
| 621 | return NULL; |
| 622 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret); |
| 623 | s2n(1,ret); |
| 624 | /* Set mode: |
| 625 | * 1: peer may send requests |
| 626 | * 2: peer not allowed to send requests |
| 627 | */ |
| 628 | if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) |
| 629 | *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; |
| 630 | else |
| 631 | *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; |
| 632 | #endif |
| 633 | |
| 634 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
| 635 | if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) |
| 636 | { |
| 637 | /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its |
| 638 | * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */ |
| 639 | if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) |
| 640 | return NULL; |
| 641 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); |
| 642 | s2n(0,ret); |
| 643 | } |
| 644 | #endif |
| 645 | |
| 646 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP |
| 647 | if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) |
| 648 | { |
| 649 | int el; |
| 650 | |
| 651 | ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); |
| 652 | |
| 653 | if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; |
| 654 | |
| 655 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret); |
| 656 | s2n(el,ret); |
| 657 | |
| 658 | if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) |
| 659 | { |
| 660 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 661 | return NULL; |
| 662 | } |
| 663 | ret += el; |
| 664 | } |
| 665 | #endif |
| 666 | /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. |
| 667 | * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 |
| 668 | * |
| 669 | * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing |
| 670 | * extensions it MUST always appear last. |
| 671 | */ |
| 672 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) |
| 673 | { |
| 674 | int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; |
| 675 | /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages |
| 676 | * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while |
| 677 | * the code in s3_clnt.c does not. |
| 678 | */ |
| 679 | if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) |
| 680 | hlen -= 5; |
| 681 | if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) |
| 682 | { |
| 683 | hlen = 0x200 - hlen; |
| 684 | if (hlen >= 4) |
| 685 | hlen -= 4; |
| 686 | else |
| 687 | hlen = 0; |
| 688 | |
| 689 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret); |
| 690 | s2n(hlen, ret); |
| 691 | memset(ret, 0, hlen); |
| 692 | ret += hlen; |
| 693 | } |
| 694 | } |
| 695 | |
| 696 | if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) |
| 697 | return p; |
| 698 | |
| 699 | s2n(extdatalen,p); |
| 700 | return ret; |
| 701 | } |
| 702 | |
| 703 | unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) |
| 704 | { |
| 705 | int extdatalen=0; |
| 706 | unsigned char *ret = p; |
| 707 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
| 708 | int next_proto_neg_seen; |
| 709 | #endif |
| 710 | |
| 711 | /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */ |
| 712 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) |
| 713 | return p; |
| 714 | |
| 715 | ret+=2; |
| 716 | if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ |
| 717 | |
| 718 | if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) |
| 719 | { |
| 720 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; |
| 721 | |
| 722 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); |
| 723 | s2n(0,ret); |
| 724 | } |
| 725 | |
| 726 | if(s->s3->send_connection_binding) |
| 727 | { |
| 728 | int el; |
| 729 | |
| 730 | if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) |
| 731 | { |
| 732 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 733 | return NULL; |
| 734 | } |
| 735 | |
| 736 | if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; |
| 737 | |
| 738 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); |
| 739 | s2n(el,ret); |
| 740 | |
| 741 | if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) |
| 742 | { |
| 743 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 744 | return NULL; |
| 745 | } |
| 746 | |
| 747 | ret += el; |
| 748 | } |
| 749 | |
| 750 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| 751 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL && |
| 752 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
| 753 | { |
| 754 | /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */ |
| 755 | long lenmax; |
| 756 | |
| 757 | if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; |
| 758 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; |
| 759 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) |
| 760 | { |
| 761 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 762 | return NULL; |
| 763 | } |
| 764 | |
| 765 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); |
| 766 | s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret); |
| 767 | *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; |
| 768 | memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); |
| 769 | ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; |
| 770 | |
| 771 | } |
| 772 | /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */ |
| 773 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
| 774 | |
| 775 | if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected |
| 776 | && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) |
| 777 | { |
| 778 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; |
| 779 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); |
| 780 | s2n(0,ret); |
| 781 | } |
| 782 | |
| 783 | if (s->tlsext_status_expected) |
| 784 | { |
| 785 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; |
| 786 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret); |
| 787 | s2n(0,ret); |
| 788 | } |
| 789 | |
| 790 | #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input |
| 791 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL && |
| 792 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
| 793 | { |
| 794 | size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; |
| 795 | |
| 796 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0) |
| 797 | return NULL; |
| 798 | if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ |
| 799 | return NULL; |
| 800 | |
| 801 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); |
| 802 | s2n(sol + 2, ret); |
| 803 | s2n(sol, ret); |
| 804 | memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol); |
| 805 | ret += sol; |
| 806 | } |
| 807 | #endif |
| 808 | |
| 809 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP |
| 810 | if(s->srtp_profile) |
| 811 | { |
| 812 | int el; |
| 813 | |
| 814 | ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); |
| 815 | |
| 816 | if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; |
| 817 | |
| 818 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret); |
| 819 | s2n(el,ret); |
| 820 | |
| 821 | if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) |
| 822 | { |
| 823 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 824 | return NULL; |
| 825 | } |
| 826 | ret+=el; |
| 827 | } |
| 828 | #endif |
| 829 | |
| 830 | if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81) |
| 831 | && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) |
| 832 | { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { |
| 833 | 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/ |
| 834 | 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/ |
| 835 | 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, |
| 836 | 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, |
| 837 | 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, |
| 838 | 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17}; |
| 839 | if (limit-ret<36) return NULL; |
| 840 | memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36); |
| 841 | ret+=36; |
| 842 | |
| 843 | } |
| 844 | |
| 845 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
| 846 | /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */ |
| 847 | if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) |
| 848 | { |
| 849 | if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) |
| 850 | return NULL; |
| 851 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret); |
| 852 | s2n(1,ret); |
| 853 | /* Set mode: |
| 854 | * 1: peer may send requests |
| 855 | * 2: peer not allowed to send requests |
| 856 | */ |
| 857 | if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) |
| 858 | *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; |
| 859 | else |
| 860 | *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; |
| 861 | |
| 862 | } |
| 863 | #endif |
| 864 | |
| 865 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
| 866 | next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; |
| 867 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; |
| 868 | if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) |
| 869 | { |
| 870 | const unsigned char *npa; |
| 871 | unsigned int npalen; |
| 872 | int r; |
| 873 | |
| 874 | r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); |
| 875 | if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) |
| 876 | { |
| 877 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL; |
| 878 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); |
| 879 | s2n(npalen,ret); |
| 880 | memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); |
| 881 | ret += npalen; |
| 882 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; |
| 883 | } |
| 884 | } |
| 885 | #endif |
| 886 | |
| 887 | if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) |
| 888 | return p; |
| 889 | |
| 890 | s2n(extdatalen,p); |
| 891 | return ret; |
| 892 | } |
| 893 | |
| 894 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| 895 | /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X |
| 896 | * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|. |
| 897 | * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: |
| 898 | * SNI, |
| 899 | * elliptic_curves |
| 900 | * ec_point_formats |
| 901 | * |
| 902 | * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, |
| 903 | * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. |
| 904 | * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from |
| 905 | * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). |
| 906 | */ |
| 907 | static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) { |
| 908 | unsigned short type, size; |
| 909 | static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { |
| 910 | 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ |
| 911 | 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ |
| 912 | 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ |
| 913 | 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ |
| 914 | 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ |
| 915 | 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ |
| 916 | |
| 917 | 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ |
| 918 | 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ |
| 919 | 0x01, /* 1 point format */ |
| 920 | 0x00, /* uncompressed */ |
| 921 | }; |
| 922 | |
| 923 | /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ |
| 924 | static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = { |
| 925 | 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ |
| 926 | 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ |
| 927 | 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ |
| 928 | 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ |
| 929 | 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ |
| 930 | 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ |
| 931 | 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ |
| 932 | 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ |
| 933 | }; |
| 934 | |
| 935 | if (data >= (d+n-2)) |
| 936 | return; |
| 937 | data += 2; |
| 938 | |
| 939 | if (data > (d+n-4)) |
| 940 | return; |
| 941 | n2s(data,type); |
| 942 | n2s(data,size); |
| 943 | |
| 944 | if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) |
| 945 | return; |
| 946 | |
| 947 | if (data+size > d+n) |
| 948 | return; |
| 949 | data += size; |
| 950 | |
| 951 | if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) |
| 952 | { |
| 953 | const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); |
| 954 | const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); |
| 955 | |
| 956 | if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n) |
| 957 | return; |
| 958 | if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) |
| 959 | return; |
| 960 | if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0) |
| 961 | return; |
| 962 | } |
| 963 | else |
| 964 | { |
| 965 | const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); |
| 966 | |
| 967 | if (data + len != d+n) |
| 968 | return; |
| 969 | if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) |
| 970 | return; |
| 971 | } |
| 972 | |
| 973 | s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1; |
| 974 | } |
| 975 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
| 976 | |
| 977 | int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) |
| 978 | { |
| 979 | unsigned short type; |
| 980 | unsigned short size; |
| 981 | unsigned short len; |
| 982 | unsigned char *data = *p; |
| 983 | int renegotiate_seen = 0; |
| 984 | int sigalg_seen = 0; |
| 985 | |
| 986 | s->servername_done = 0; |
| 987 | s->tlsext_status_type = -1; |
| 988 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
| 989 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; |
| 990 | #endif |
| 991 | |
| 992 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
| 993 | s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | |
| 994 | SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); |
| 995 | #endif |
| 996 | |
| 997 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| 998 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) |
| 999 | ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n); |
| 1000 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
| 1001 | |
| 1002 | if (data >= (d+n-2)) |
| 1003 | goto ri_check; |
| 1004 | n2s(data,len); |
| 1005 | |
| 1006 | if (data > (d+n-len)) |
| 1007 | goto ri_check; |
| 1008 | |
| 1009 | while (data <= (d+n-4)) |
| 1010 | { |
| 1011 | n2s(data,type); |
| 1012 | n2s(data,size); |
| 1013 | |
| 1014 | if (data+size > (d+n)) |
| 1015 | goto ri_check; |
| 1016 | #if 0 |
| 1017 | fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size); |
| 1018 | #endif |
| 1019 | if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) |
| 1020 | s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, |
| 1021 | s->tlsext_debug_arg); |
| 1022 | /* The servername extension is treated as follows: |
| 1023 | |
| 1024 | - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. |
| 1025 | - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, |
| 1026 | in which case an fatal alert is generated. |
| 1027 | - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. |
| 1028 | - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order |
| 1029 | to allow the application to position itself to the right context. |
| 1030 | - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when |
| 1031 | it is identical to a previously used for the same session. |
| 1032 | Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time |
| 1033 | set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the |
| 1034 | case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and |
| 1035 | a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername |
| 1036 | presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches |
| 1037 | the value of the Host: field. |
| 1038 | - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION |
| 1039 | if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session, |
| 1040 | i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension. |
| 1041 | - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. |
| 1042 | |
| 1043 | */ |
| 1044 | |
| 1045 | if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) |
| 1046 | { |
| 1047 | unsigned char *sdata; |
| 1048 | int servname_type; |
| 1049 | int dsize; |
| 1050 | |
| 1051 | if (size < 2) |
| 1052 | { |
| 1053 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1054 | return 0; |
| 1055 | } |
| 1056 | n2s(data,dsize); |
| 1057 | size -= 2; |
| 1058 | if (dsize > size ) |
| 1059 | { |
| 1060 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1061 | return 0; |
| 1062 | } |
| 1063 | |
| 1064 | sdata = data; |
| 1065 | while (dsize > 3) |
| 1066 | { |
| 1067 | servname_type = *(sdata++); |
| 1068 | n2s(sdata,len); |
| 1069 | dsize -= 3; |
| 1070 | |
| 1071 | if (len > dsize) |
| 1072 | { |
| 1073 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1074 | return 0; |
| 1075 | } |
| 1076 | if (s->servername_done == 0) |
| 1077 | switch (servname_type) |
| 1078 | { |
| 1079 | case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: |
| 1080 | if (!s->hit) |
| 1081 | { |
| 1082 | if(s->session->tlsext_hostname) |
| 1083 | { |
| 1084 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1085 | return 0; |
| 1086 | } |
| 1087 | if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) |
| 1088 | { |
| 1089 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; |
| 1090 | return 0; |
| 1091 | } |
| 1092 | if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL) |
| 1093 | { |
| 1094 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1095 | return 0; |
| 1096 | } |
| 1097 | memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); |
| 1098 | s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0'; |
| 1099 | if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { |
| 1100 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); |
| 1101 | s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; |
| 1102 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; |
| 1103 | return 0; |
| 1104 | } |
| 1105 | s->servername_done = 1; |
| 1106 | |
| 1107 | } |
| 1108 | else |
| 1109 | s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname |
| 1110 | && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len |
| 1111 | && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0; |
| 1112 | |
| 1113 | break; |
| 1114 | |
| 1115 | default: |
| 1116 | break; |
| 1117 | } |
| 1118 | |
| 1119 | dsize -= len; |
| 1120 | } |
| 1121 | if (dsize != 0) |
| 1122 | { |
| 1123 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1124 | return 0; |
| 1125 | } |
| 1126 | |
| 1127 | } |
| 1128 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
| 1129 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) |
| 1130 | { |
| 1131 | if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1)) |
| 1132 | { |
| 1133 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1134 | return 0; |
| 1135 | } |
| 1136 | if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) |
| 1137 | { |
| 1138 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1139 | return 0; |
| 1140 | } |
| 1141 | if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL) |
| 1142 | return -1; |
| 1143 | memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len); |
| 1144 | s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0'; |
| 1145 | |
| 1146 | if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) |
| 1147 | { |
| 1148 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1149 | return 0; |
| 1150 | } |
| 1151 | } |
| 1152 | #endif |
| 1153 | |
| 1154 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| 1155 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats && |
| 1156 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
| 1157 | { |
| 1158 | unsigned char *sdata = data; |
| 1159 | int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); |
| 1160 | |
| 1161 | if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) |
| 1162 | { |
| 1163 | *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1164 | return 0; |
| 1165 | } |
| 1166 | if (!s->hit) |
| 1167 | { |
| 1168 | if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) |
| 1169 | { |
| 1170 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); |
| 1171 | s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; |
| 1172 | } |
| 1173 | s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; |
| 1174 | if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) |
| 1175 | { |
| 1176 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1177 | return 0; |
| 1178 | } |
| 1179 | s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; |
| 1180 | memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); |
| 1181 | } |
| 1182 | #if 0 |
| 1183 | fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); |
| 1184 | sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; |
| 1185 | for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) |
| 1186 | fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); |
| 1187 | fprintf(stderr,"\n"); |
| 1188 | #endif |
| 1189 | } |
| 1190 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves && |
| 1191 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
| 1192 | { |
| 1193 | unsigned char *sdata = data; |
| 1194 | int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8); |
| 1195 | ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++)); |
| 1196 | |
| 1197 | if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 || |
| 1198 | ellipticcurvelist_length < 1) |
| 1199 | { |
| 1200 | *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1201 | return 0; |
| 1202 | } |
| 1203 | if (!s->hit) |
| 1204 | { |
| 1205 | if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) |
| 1206 | { |
| 1207 | *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1208 | return 0; |
| 1209 | } |
| 1210 | s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; |
| 1211 | if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) |
| 1212 | { |
| 1213 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1214 | return 0; |
| 1215 | } |
| 1216 | s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length; |
| 1217 | memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length); |
| 1218 | } |
| 1219 | #if 0 |
| 1220 | fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); |
| 1221 | sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; |
| 1222 | for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++) |
| 1223 | fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); |
| 1224 | fprintf(stderr,"\n"); |
| 1225 | #endif |
| 1226 | } |
| 1227 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
| 1228 | #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input |
| 1229 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && |
| 1230 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
| 1231 | { |
| 1232 | unsigned char *sdata = data; |
| 1233 | |
| 1234 | if (size < 2) |
| 1235 | { |
| 1236 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1237 | return 0; |
| 1238 | } |
| 1239 | n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); |
| 1240 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) |
| 1241 | { |
| 1242 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1243 | return 0; |
| 1244 | } |
| 1245 | |
| 1246 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ |
| 1247 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); |
| 1248 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) |
| 1249 | s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ |
| 1250 | else |
| 1251 | s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); |
| 1252 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) |
| 1253 | { |
| 1254 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1255 | return 0; |
| 1256 | } |
| 1257 | } |
| 1258 | #endif |
| 1259 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) |
| 1260 | { |
| 1261 | if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && |
| 1262 | !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) |
| 1263 | { |
| 1264 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1265 | return 0; |
| 1266 | } |
| 1267 | } |
| 1268 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) |
| 1269 | { |
| 1270 | if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) |
| 1271 | return 0; |
| 1272 | renegotiate_seen = 1; |
| 1273 | } |
| 1274 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) |
| 1275 | { |
| 1276 | int dsize; |
| 1277 | if (sigalg_seen || size < 2) |
| 1278 | { |
| 1279 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1280 | return 0; |
| 1281 | } |
| 1282 | sigalg_seen = 1; |
| 1283 | n2s(data,dsize); |
| 1284 | size -= 2; |
| 1285 | if (dsize != size || dsize & 1) |
| 1286 | { |
| 1287 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1288 | return 0; |
| 1289 | } |
| 1290 | if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) |
| 1291 | { |
| 1292 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1293 | return 0; |
| 1294 | } |
| 1295 | } |
| 1296 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && |
| 1297 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
| 1298 | { |
| 1299 | |
| 1300 | if (size < 5) |
| 1301 | { |
| 1302 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1303 | return 0; |
| 1304 | } |
| 1305 | |
| 1306 | s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; |
| 1307 | size--; |
| 1308 | if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) |
| 1309 | { |
| 1310 | const unsigned char *sdata; |
| 1311 | int dsize; |
| 1312 | /* Read in responder_id_list */ |
| 1313 | n2s(data,dsize); |
| 1314 | size -= 2; |
| 1315 | if (dsize > size ) |
| 1316 | { |
| 1317 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1318 | return 0; |
| 1319 | } |
| 1320 | while (dsize > 0) |
| 1321 | { |
| 1322 | OCSP_RESPID *id; |
| 1323 | int idsize; |
| 1324 | if (dsize < 4) |
| 1325 | { |
| 1326 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1327 | return 0; |
| 1328 | } |
| 1329 | n2s(data, idsize); |
| 1330 | dsize -= 2 + idsize; |
| 1331 | size -= 2 + idsize; |
| 1332 | if (dsize < 0) |
| 1333 | { |
| 1334 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1335 | return 0; |
| 1336 | } |
| 1337 | sdata = data; |
| 1338 | data += idsize; |
| 1339 | id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, |
| 1340 | &sdata, idsize); |
| 1341 | if (!id) |
| 1342 | { |
| 1343 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1344 | return 0; |
| 1345 | } |
| 1346 | if (data != sdata) |
| 1347 | { |
| 1348 | OCSP_RESPID_free(id); |
| 1349 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1350 | return 0; |
| 1351 | } |
| 1352 | if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids |
| 1353 | && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = |
| 1354 | sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) |
| 1355 | { |
| 1356 | OCSP_RESPID_free(id); |
| 1357 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1358 | return 0; |
| 1359 | } |
| 1360 | if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push( |
| 1361 | s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) |
| 1362 | { |
| 1363 | OCSP_RESPID_free(id); |
| 1364 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1365 | return 0; |
| 1366 | } |
| 1367 | } |
| 1368 | |
| 1369 | /* Read in request_extensions */ |
| 1370 | if (size < 2) |
| 1371 | { |
| 1372 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1373 | return 0; |
| 1374 | } |
| 1375 | n2s(data,dsize); |
| 1376 | size -= 2; |
| 1377 | if (dsize != size) |
| 1378 | { |
| 1379 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1380 | return 0; |
| 1381 | } |
| 1382 | sdata = data; |
| 1383 | if (dsize > 0) |
| 1384 | { |
| 1385 | if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) |
| 1386 | { |
| 1387 | sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, |
| 1388 | X509_EXTENSION_free); |
| 1389 | } |
| 1390 | |
| 1391 | s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = |
| 1392 | d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, |
| 1393 | &sdata, dsize); |
| 1394 | if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts |
| 1395 | || (data + dsize != sdata)) |
| 1396 | { |
| 1397 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1398 | return 0; |
| 1399 | } |
| 1400 | } |
| 1401 | } |
| 1402 | /* We don't know what to do with any other type |
| 1403 | * so ignore it. |
| 1404 | */ |
| 1405 | else |
| 1406 | s->tlsext_status_type = -1; |
| 1407 | } |
| 1408 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
| 1409 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) |
| 1410 | { |
| 1411 | switch(data[0]) |
| 1412 | { |
| 1413 | case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */ |
| 1414 | s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; |
| 1415 | break; |
| 1416 | case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */ |
| 1417 | s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; |
| 1418 | s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; |
| 1419 | break; |
| 1420 | default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| 1421 | return 0; |
| 1422 | } |
| 1423 | } |
| 1424 | #endif |
| 1425 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
| 1426 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && |
| 1427 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) |
| 1428 | { |
| 1429 | /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a |
| 1430 | * renegotiation. |
| 1431 | * |
| 1432 | * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we |
| 1433 | * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on |
| 1434 | * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when |
| 1435 | * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an |
| 1436 | * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing |
| 1437 | * anything like that, but this might change). |
| 1438 | |
| 1439 | * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake |
| 1440 | * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > |
| 1441 | * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen |
| 1442 | * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new |
| 1443 | * Finished message could have been computed.) */ |
| 1444 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; |
| 1445 | } |
| 1446 | #endif |
| 1447 | |
| 1448 | /* session ticket processed earlier */ |
| 1449 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP |
| 1450 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) |
| 1451 | { |
| 1452 | if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, |
| 1453 | al)) |
| 1454 | return 0; |
| 1455 | } |
| 1456 | #endif |
| 1457 | |
| 1458 | data+=size; |
| 1459 | } |
| 1460 | |
| 1461 | *p = data; |
| 1462 | |
| 1463 | ri_check: |
| 1464 | |
| 1465 | /* Need RI if renegotiating */ |
| 1466 | |
| 1467 | if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate && |
| 1468 | !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) |
| 1469 | { |
| 1470 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 1471 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, |
| 1472 | SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); |
| 1473 | return 0; |
| 1474 | } |
| 1475 | |
| 1476 | return 1; |
| 1477 | } |
| 1478 | |
| 1479 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
| 1480 | /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No |
| 1481 | * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill |
| 1482 | * the length of the block. */ |
| 1483 | static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len) |
| 1484 | { |
| 1485 | unsigned int off = 0; |
| 1486 | |
| 1487 | while (off < len) |
| 1488 | { |
| 1489 | if (d[off] == 0) |
| 1490 | return 0; |
| 1491 | off += d[off]; |
| 1492 | off++; |
| 1493 | } |
| 1494 | |
| 1495 | return off == len; |
| 1496 | } |
| 1497 | #endif |
| 1498 | |
| 1499 | int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) |
| 1500 | { |
| 1501 | unsigned short length; |
| 1502 | unsigned short type; |
| 1503 | unsigned short size; |
| 1504 | unsigned char *data = *p; |
| 1505 | int tlsext_servername = 0; |
| 1506 | int renegotiate_seen = 0; |
| 1507 | |
| 1508 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
| 1509 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; |
| 1510 | #endif |
| 1511 | |
| 1512 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
| 1513 | s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | |
| 1514 | SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); |
| 1515 | #endif |
| 1516 | |
| 1517 | if (data >= (d+n-2)) |
| 1518 | goto ri_check; |
| 1519 | |
| 1520 | n2s(data,length); |
| 1521 | if (data+length != d+n) |
| 1522 | { |
| 1523 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1524 | return 0; |
| 1525 | } |
| 1526 | |
| 1527 | while(data <= (d+n-4)) |
| 1528 | { |
| 1529 | n2s(data,type); |
| 1530 | n2s(data,size); |
| 1531 | |
| 1532 | if (data+size > (d+n)) |
| 1533 | goto ri_check; |
| 1534 | |
| 1535 | if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) |
| 1536 | s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, |
| 1537 | s->tlsext_debug_arg); |
| 1538 | |
| 1539 | if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) |
| 1540 | { |
| 1541 | if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) |
| 1542 | { |
| 1543 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; |
| 1544 | return 0; |
| 1545 | } |
| 1546 | tlsext_servername = 1; |
| 1547 | } |
| 1548 | |
| 1549 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| 1550 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats && |
| 1551 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
| 1552 | { |
| 1553 | unsigned char *sdata = data; |
| 1554 | int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); |
| 1555 | |
| 1556 | if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 || |
| 1557 | ecpointformatlist_length < 1) |
| 1558 | { |
| 1559 | *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1560 | return 0; |
| 1561 | } |
| 1562 | s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; |
| 1563 | if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); |
| 1564 | if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) |
| 1565 | { |
| 1566 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1567 | return 0; |
| 1568 | } |
| 1569 | s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; |
| 1570 | memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); |
| 1571 | #if 0 |
| 1572 | fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist "); |
| 1573 | sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; |
| 1574 | for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) |
| 1575 | fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); |
| 1576 | fprintf(stderr,"\n"); |
| 1577 | #endif |
| 1578 | } |
| 1579 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
| 1580 | |
| 1581 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) |
| 1582 | { |
| 1583 | if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && |
| 1584 | !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) |
| 1585 | { |
| 1586 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1587 | return 0; |
| 1588 | } |
| 1589 | if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) |
| 1590 | || (size > 0)) |
| 1591 | { |
| 1592 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; |
| 1593 | return 0; |
| 1594 | } |
| 1595 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; |
| 1596 | } |
| 1597 | #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input |
| 1598 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && |
| 1599 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
| 1600 | { |
| 1601 | unsigned char *sdata = data; |
| 1602 | |
| 1603 | if (size < 2) |
| 1604 | { |
| 1605 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1606 | return 0; |
| 1607 | } |
| 1608 | n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); |
| 1609 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) |
| 1610 | { |
| 1611 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1612 | return 0; |
| 1613 | } |
| 1614 | |
| 1615 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ |
| 1616 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); |
| 1617 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) |
| 1618 | s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ |
| 1619 | else |
| 1620 | s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); |
| 1621 | |
| 1622 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) |
| 1623 | { |
| 1624 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1625 | return 0; |
| 1626 | } |
| 1627 | } |
| 1628 | #endif |
| 1629 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && |
| 1630 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
| 1631 | { |
| 1632 | /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested |
| 1633 | * a status request message. |
| 1634 | */ |
| 1635 | if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) |
| 1636 | { |
| 1637 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; |
| 1638 | return 0; |
| 1639 | } |
| 1640 | /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ |
| 1641 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; |
| 1642 | } |
| 1643 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
| 1644 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && |
| 1645 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) |
| 1646 | { |
| 1647 | unsigned char *selected; |
| 1648 | unsigned char selected_len; |
| 1649 | |
| 1650 | /* We must have requested it. */ |
| 1651 | if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) |
| 1652 | { |
| 1653 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; |
| 1654 | return 0; |
| 1655 | } |
| 1656 | /* The data must be valid */ |
| 1657 | if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) |
| 1658 | { |
| 1659 | *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1660 | return 0; |
| 1661 | } |
| 1662 | if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) |
| 1663 | { |
| 1664 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1665 | return 0; |
| 1666 | } |
| 1667 | s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); |
| 1668 | if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) |
| 1669 | { |
| 1670 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1671 | return 0; |
| 1672 | } |
| 1673 | memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); |
| 1674 | s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; |
| 1675 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; |
| 1676 | } |
| 1677 | #endif |
| 1678 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) |
| 1679 | { |
| 1680 | if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) |
| 1681 | return 0; |
| 1682 | renegotiate_seen = 1; |
| 1683 | } |
| 1684 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
| 1685 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) |
| 1686 | { |
| 1687 | switch(data[0]) |
| 1688 | { |
| 1689 | case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */ |
| 1690 | s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; |
| 1691 | break; |
| 1692 | case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */ |
| 1693 | s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; |
| 1694 | s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; |
| 1695 | break; |
| 1696 | default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| 1697 | return 0; |
| 1698 | } |
| 1699 | } |
| 1700 | #endif |
| 1701 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP |
| 1702 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) |
| 1703 | { |
| 1704 | if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, |
| 1705 | al)) |
| 1706 | return 0; |
| 1707 | } |
| 1708 | #endif |
| 1709 | |
| 1710 | data+=size; |
| 1711 | } |
| 1712 | |
| 1713 | if (data != d+n) |
| 1714 | { |
| 1715 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1716 | return 0; |
| 1717 | } |
| 1718 | |
| 1719 | if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) |
| 1720 | { |
| 1721 | if (s->tlsext_hostname) |
| 1722 | { |
| 1723 | if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) |
| 1724 | { |
| 1725 | s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); |
| 1726 | if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) |
| 1727 | { |
| 1728 | *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; |
| 1729 | return 0; |
| 1730 | } |
| 1731 | } |
| 1732 | else |
| 1733 | { |
| 1734 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1735 | return 0; |
| 1736 | } |
| 1737 | } |
| 1738 | } |
| 1739 | |
| 1740 | *p = data; |
| 1741 | |
| 1742 | ri_check: |
| 1743 | |
| 1744 | /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to |
| 1745 | * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server |
| 1746 | * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an |
| 1747 | * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server |
| 1748 | * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI |
| 1749 | * absence on initial connect only. |
| 1750 | */ |
| 1751 | if (!renegotiate_seen |
| 1752 | && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) |
| 1753 | && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) |
| 1754 | { |
| 1755 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 1756 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, |
| 1757 | SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); |
| 1758 | return 0; |
| 1759 | } |
| 1760 | |
| 1761 | return 1; |
| 1762 | } |
| 1763 | |
| 1764 | |
| 1765 | int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) |
| 1766 | { |
| 1767 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| 1768 | /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats |
| 1769 | * and elliptic curves we support. |
| 1770 | */ |
| 1771 | int using_ecc = 0; |
| 1772 | int i; |
| 1773 | unsigned char *j; |
| 1774 | unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; |
| 1775 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); |
| 1776 | |
| 1777 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) |
| 1778 | { |
| 1779 | SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); |
| 1780 | |
| 1781 | alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; |
| 1782 | alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; |
| 1783 | if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) |
| 1784 | { |
| 1785 | using_ecc = 1; |
| 1786 | break; |
| 1787 | } |
| 1788 | } |
| 1789 | using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION); |
| 1790 | if (using_ecc) |
| 1791 | { |
| 1792 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); |
| 1793 | if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) |
| 1794 | { |
| 1795 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 1796 | return -1; |
| 1797 | } |
| 1798 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; |
| 1799 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; |
| 1800 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; |
| 1801 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; |
| 1802 | |
| 1803 | /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */ |
| 1804 | if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); |
| 1805 | s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2; |
| 1806 | if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) |
| 1807 | { |
| 1808 | s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; |
| 1809 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 1810 | return -1; |
| 1811 | } |
| 1812 | for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i < |
| 1813 | sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++) |
| 1814 | { |
| 1815 | int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]); |
| 1816 | s2n(id,j); |
| 1817 | } |
| 1818 | } |
| 1819 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
| 1820 | |
| 1821 | #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input |
| 1822 | { |
| 1823 | int r = 1; |
| 1824 | |
| 1825 | if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) |
| 1826 | { |
| 1827 | r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); |
| 1828 | if (!r) |
| 1829 | return -1; |
| 1830 | } |
| 1831 | |
| 1832 | if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) |
| 1833 | { |
| 1834 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ |
| 1835 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); |
| 1836 | |
| 1837 | if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) |
| 1838 | s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ |
| 1839 | else |
| 1840 | s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); |
| 1841 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) |
| 1842 | { |
| 1843 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 1844 | return -1; |
| 1845 | } |
| 1846 | s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; |
| 1847 | } |
| 1848 | |
| 1849 | if (r == 2) |
| 1850 | /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */ |
| 1851 | s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; |
| 1852 | } |
| 1853 | #endif |
| 1854 | |
| 1855 | return 1; |
| 1856 | } |
| 1857 | |
| 1858 | int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) |
| 1859 | { |
| 1860 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| 1861 | /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support |
| 1862 | * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not |
| 1863 | * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension. |
| 1864 | */ |
| 1865 | |
| 1866 | unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
| 1867 | unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; |
| 1868 | int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); |
| 1869 | using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); |
| 1870 | |
| 1871 | if (using_ecc) |
| 1872 | { |
| 1873 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); |
| 1874 | if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) |
| 1875 | { |
| 1876 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 1877 | return -1; |
| 1878 | } |
| 1879 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; |
| 1880 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; |
| 1881 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; |
| 1882 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; |
| 1883 | } |
| 1884 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
| 1885 | |
| 1886 | return 1; |
| 1887 | } |
| 1888 | |
| 1889 | int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) |
| 1890 | { |
| 1891 | int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; |
| 1892 | int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; |
| 1893 | |
| 1894 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| 1895 | /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in |
| 1896 | * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. |
| 1897 | */ |
| 1898 | /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in |
| 1899 | * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. |
| 1900 | */ |
| 1901 | #endif |
| 1902 | |
| 1903 | if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) |
| 1904 | ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); |
| 1905 | else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) |
| 1906 | ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); |
| 1907 | |
| 1908 | #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input |
| 1909 | { |
| 1910 | /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), |
| 1911 | * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, |
| 1912 | * so this has to happen here in |
| 1913 | * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */ |
| 1914 | |
| 1915 | int r = 1; |
| 1916 | |
| 1917 | if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) |
| 1918 | { |
| 1919 | r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); |
| 1920 | if (!r) |
| 1921 | { |
| 1922 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
| 1923 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1924 | goto err; |
| 1925 | } |
| 1926 | } |
| 1927 | |
| 1928 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ |
| 1929 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); |
| 1930 | s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL; |
| 1931 | |
| 1932 | if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) |
| 1933 | { |
| 1934 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && |
| 1935 | s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) |
| 1936 | { |
| 1937 | /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input |
| 1938 | * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */ |
| 1939 | |
| 1940 | if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) |
| 1941 | s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ |
| 1942 | else |
| 1943 | s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); |
| 1944 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) |
| 1945 | { |
| 1946 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
| 1947 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1948 | goto err; |
| 1949 | } |
| 1950 | s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; |
| 1951 | } |
| 1952 | } |
| 1953 | |
| 1954 | if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) |
| 1955 | { |
| 1956 | /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, |
| 1957 | * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; |
| 1958 | * abort the handshake. |
| 1959 | */ |
| 1960 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
| 1961 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 1962 | } |
| 1963 | } |
| 1964 | |
| 1965 | err: |
| 1966 | #endif |
| 1967 | switch (ret) |
| 1968 | { |
| 1969 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: |
| 1970 | ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
| 1971 | return -1; |
| 1972 | |
| 1973 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: |
| 1974 | ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); |
| 1975 | return 1; |
| 1976 | |
| 1977 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: |
| 1978 | s->servername_done=0; |
| 1979 | default: |
| 1980 | return 1; |
| 1981 | } |
| 1982 | } |
| 1983 | |
| 1984 | int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s) |
| 1985 | { |
| 1986 | int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; |
| 1987 | int al; |
| 1988 | |
| 1989 | /* If status request then ask callback what to do. |
| 1990 | * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case |
| 1991 | * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher |
| 1992 | * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent |
| 1993 | */ |
| 1994 | if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) |
| 1995 | { |
| 1996 | int r; |
| 1997 | CERT_PKEY *certpkey; |
| 1998 | certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); |
| 1999 | /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ |
| 2000 | if (certpkey == NULL) |
| 2001 | { |
| 2002 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; |
| 2003 | return 1; |
| 2004 | } |
| 2005 | /* Set current certificate to one we will use so |
| 2006 | * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up. |
| 2007 | */ |
| 2008 | s->cert->key = certpkey; |
| 2009 | r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); |
| 2010 | switch (r) |
| 2011 | { |
| 2012 | /* We don't want to send a status request response */ |
| 2013 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: |
| 2014 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; |
| 2015 | break; |
| 2016 | /* status request response should be sent */ |
| 2017 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: |
| 2018 | if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) |
| 2019 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; |
| 2020 | else |
| 2021 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; |
| 2022 | break; |
| 2023 | /* something bad happened */ |
| 2024 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: |
| 2025 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
| 2026 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 2027 | goto err; |
| 2028 | } |
| 2029 | } |
| 2030 | else |
| 2031 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; |
| 2032 | |
| 2033 | err: |
| 2034 | switch (ret) |
| 2035 | { |
| 2036 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: |
| 2037 | ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
| 2038 | return -1; |
| 2039 | |
| 2040 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: |
| 2041 | ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); |
| 2042 | return 1; |
| 2043 | |
| 2044 | default: |
| 2045 | return 1; |
| 2046 | } |
| 2047 | } |
| 2048 | |
| 2049 | int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) |
| 2050 | { |
| 2051 | int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; |
| 2052 | int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; |
| 2053 | |
| 2054 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| 2055 | /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher |
| 2056 | * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension |
| 2057 | * it must contain uncompressed. |
| 2058 | */ |
| 2059 | unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
| 2060 | unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; |
| 2061 | if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && |
| 2062 | (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && |
| 2063 | ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) |
| 2064 | { |
| 2065 | /* we are using an ECC cipher */ |
| 2066 | size_t i; |
| 2067 | unsigned char *list; |
| 2068 | int found_uncompressed = 0; |
| 2069 | list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; |
| 2070 | for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) |
| 2071 | { |
| 2072 | if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) |
| 2073 | { |
| 2074 | found_uncompressed = 1; |
| 2075 | break; |
| 2076 | } |
| 2077 | } |
| 2078 | if (!found_uncompressed) |
| 2079 | { |
| 2080 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); |
| 2081 | return -1; |
| 2082 | } |
| 2083 | } |
| 2084 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; |
| 2085 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
| 2086 | |
| 2087 | if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) |
| 2088 | ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); |
| 2089 | else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) |
| 2090 | ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); |
| 2091 | |
| 2092 | #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input |
| 2093 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) |
| 2094 | { |
| 2095 | /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs. |
| 2096 | * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */ |
| 2097 | |
| 2098 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) |
| 2099 | { |
| 2100 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
| 2101 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 2102 | } |
| 2103 | |
| 2104 | /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check |
| 2105 | * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */ |
| 2106 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL || |
| 2107 | s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) |
| 2108 | { |
| 2109 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
| 2110 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| 2111 | } |
| 2112 | } |
| 2113 | #endif |
| 2114 | |
| 2115 | /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one |
| 2116 | * tell the callback |
| 2117 | */ |
| 2118 | if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) |
| 2119 | && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) |
| 2120 | { |
| 2121 | int r; |
| 2122 | /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows |
| 2123 | * there is no response. |
| 2124 | */ |
| 2125 | if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) |
| 2126 | { |
| 2127 | OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); |
| 2128 | s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; |
| 2129 | } |
| 2130 | s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; |
| 2131 | r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); |
| 2132 | if (r == 0) |
| 2133 | { |
| 2134 | al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; |
| 2135 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
| 2136 | } |
| 2137 | if (r < 0) |
| 2138 | { |
| 2139 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 2140 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
| 2141 | } |
| 2142 | } |
| 2143 | |
| 2144 | switch (ret) |
| 2145 | { |
| 2146 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: |
| 2147 | ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
| 2148 | return -1; |
| 2149 | |
| 2150 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: |
| 2151 | ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); |
| 2152 | return 1; |
| 2153 | |
| 2154 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: |
| 2155 | s->servername_done=0; |
| 2156 | default: |
| 2157 | return 1; |
| 2158 | } |
| 2159 | } |
| 2160 | |
| 2161 | /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the |
| 2162 | * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle |
| 2163 | * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time. |
| 2164 | * |
| 2165 | * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will |
| 2166 | * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket |
| 2167 | * extension, if any. |
| 2168 | * len: the length of the session ID. |
| 2169 | * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello. |
| 2170 | * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to |
| 2171 | * point to the resulting session. |
| 2172 | * |
| 2173 | * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key |
| 2174 | * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will |
| 2175 | * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1. |
| 2176 | * |
| 2177 | * Returns: |
| 2178 | * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. |
| 2179 | * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings). |
| 2180 | * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports |
| 2181 | * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer. |
| 2182 | * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but |
| 2183 | * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error. |
| 2184 | * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set. |
| 2185 | * |
| 2186 | * Side effects: |
| 2187 | * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue |
| 2188 | * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support |
| 2189 | * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have |
| 2190 | * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if |
| 2191 | * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket. |
| 2192 | * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0. |
| 2193 | */ |
| 2194 | int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, |
| 2195 | const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) |
| 2196 | { |
| 2197 | /* Point after session ID in client hello */ |
| 2198 | const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; |
| 2199 | unsigned short i; |
| 2200 | |
| 2201 | *ret = NULL; |
| 2202 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; |
| 2203 | |
| 2204 | /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present |
| 2205 | * to permit stateful resumption. |
| 2206 | */ |
| 2207 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) |
| 2208 | return 0; |
| 2209 | if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) |
| 2210 | return 0; |
| 2211 | if (p >= limit) |
| 2212 | return -1; |
| 2213 | /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ |
| 2214 | if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) |
| 2215 | { |
| 2216 | i = *(p++); |
| 2217 | p+= i; |
| 2218 | if (p >= limit) |
| 2219 | return -1; |
| 2220 | } |
| 2221 | /* Skip past cipher list */ |
| 2222 | n2s(p, i); |
| 2223 | p+= i; |
| 2224 | if (p >= limit) |
| 2225 | return -1; |
| 2226 | /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ |
| 2227 | i = *(p++); |
| 2228 | p += i; |
| 2229 | if (p > limit) |
| 2230 | return -1; |
| 2231 | /* Now at start of extensions */ |
| 2232 | if ((p + 2) >= limit) |
| 2233 | return 0; |
| 2234 | n2s(p, i); |
| 2235 | while ((p + 4) <= limit) |
| 2236 | { |
| 2237 | unsigned short type, size; |
| 2238 | n2s(p, type); |
| 2239 | n2s(p, size); |
| 2240 | if (p + size > limit) |
| 2241 | return 0; |
| 2242 | if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) |
| 2243 | { |
| 2244 | int r; |
| 2245 | if (size == 0) |
| 2246 | { |
| 2247 | /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't |
| 2248 | * currently have one. */ |
| 2249 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; |
| 2250 | return 1; |
| 2251 | } |
| 2252 | if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) |
| 2253 | { |
| 2254 | /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be |
| 2255 | * decrypted rather than generating the session |
| 2256 | * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated |
| 2257 | * handshake based on external mechanism to |
| 2258 | * calculate the master secret later. */ |
| 2259 | return 2; |
| 2260 | } |
| 2261 | r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret); |
| 2262 | switch (r) |
| 2263 | { |
| 2264 | case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */ |
| 2265 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; |
| 2266 | return 2; |
| 2267 | case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */ |
| 2268 | return r; |
| 2269 | case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */ |
| 2270 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; |
| 2271 | return 3; |
| 2272 | default: /* fatal error */ |
| 2273 | return -1; |
| 2274 | } |
| 2275 | } |
| 2276 | p += size; |
| 2277 | } |
| 2278 | return 0; |
| 2279 | } |
| 2280 | |
| 2281 | /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. |
| 2282 | * |
| 2283 | * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. |
| 2284 | * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion. |
| 2285 | * sess_id: points at the session ID. |
| 2286 | * sesslen: the length of the session ID. |
| 2287 | * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to |
| 2288 | * point to the resulting session. |
| 2289 | * |
| 2290 | * Returns: |
| 2291 | * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. |
| 2292 | * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted. |
| 2293 | * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set. |
| 2294 | * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed. |
| 2295 | */ |
| 2296 | static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen, |
| 2297 | const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, |
| 2298 | SSL_SESSION **psess) |
| 2299 | { |
| 2300 | SSL_SESSION *sess; |
| 2301 | unsigned char *sdec; |
| 2302 | const unsigned char *p; |
| 2303 | int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; |
| 2304 | unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| 2305 | HMAC_CTX hctx; |
| 2306 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; |
| 2307 | SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; |
| 2308 | /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ |
| 2309 | if (eticklen < 48) |
| 2310 | return 2; |
| 2311 | /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ |
| 2312 | HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); |
| 2313 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); |
| 2314 | if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) |
| 2315 | { |
| 2316 | unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; |
| 2317 | int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, |
| 2318 | &ctx, &hctx, 0); |
| 2319 | if (rv < 0) |
| 2320 | return -1; |
| 2321 | if (rv == 0) |
| 2322 | return 2; |
| 2323 | if (rv == 2) |
| 2324 | renew_ticket = 1; |
| 2325 | } |
| 2326 | else |
| 2327 | { |
| 2328 | /* Check key name matches */ |
| 2329 | if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) |
| 2330 | return 2; |
| 2331 | HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, |
| 2332 | tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); |
| 2333 | EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, |
| 2334 | tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16); |
| 2335 | } |
| 2336 | /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and |
| 2337 | * integrity checks on ticket. |
| 2338 | */ |
| 2339 | mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); |
| 2340 | if (mlen < 0) |
| 2341 | { |
| 2342 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
| 2343 | return -1; |
| 2344 | } |
| 2345 | eticklen -= mlen; |
| 2346 | /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ |
| 2347 | HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen); |
| 2348 | HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); |
| 2349 | HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); |
| 2350 | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) |
| 2351 | return 2; |
| 2352 | /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ |
| 2353 | /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ |
| 2354 | p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); |
| 2355 | eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); |
| 2356 | sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); |
| 2357 | if (!sdec) |
| 2358 | { |
| 2359 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
| 2360 | return -1; |
| 2361 | } |
| 2362 | EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen); |
| 2363 | if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) |
| 2364 | return 2; |
| 2365 | slen += mlen; |
| 2366 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
| 2367 | p = sdec; |
| 2368 | |
| 2369 | sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); |
| 2370 | OPENSSL_free(sdec); |
| 2371 | if (sess) |
| 2372 | { |
| 2373 | /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to |
| 2374 | * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to |
| 2375 | * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero |
| 2376 | * as required by standard. |
| 2377 | */ |
| 2378 | if (sesslen) |
| 2379 | memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); |
| 2380 | sess->session_id_length = sesslen; |
| 2381 | *psess = sess; |
| 2382 | if (renew_ticket) |
| 2383 | return 4; |
| 2384 | else |
| 2385 | return 3; |
| 2386 | } |
| 2387 | ERR_clear_error(); |
| 2388 | /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new |
| 2389 | * ticket. */ |
| 2390 | return 2; |
| 2391 | } |
| 2392 | |
| 2393 | /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ |
| 2394 | |
| 2395 | typedef struct |
| 2396 | { |
| 2397 | int nid; |
| 2398 | int id; |
| 2399 | } tls12_lookup; |
| 2400 | |
| 2401 | static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = { |
| 2402 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
| 2403 | {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, |
| 2404 | #endif |
| 2405 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA |
| 2406 | {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, |
| 2407 | #endif |
| 2408 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 |
| 2409 | {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, |
| 2410 | {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, |
| 2411 | #endif |
| 2412 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 |
| 2413 | {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, |
| 2414 | {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512} |
| 2415 | #endif |
| 2416 | }; |
| 2417 | |
| 2418 | static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = { |
| 2419 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
| 2420 | {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa}, |
| 2421 | #endif |
| 2422 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA |
| 2423 | {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa}, |
| 2424 | #endif |
| 2425 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA |
| 2426 | {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa} |
| 2427 | #endif |
| 2428 | }; |
| 2429 | |
| 2430 | static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) |
| 2431 | { |
| 2432 | size_t i; |
| 2433 | for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) |
| 2434 | { |
| 2435 | if (table[i].nid == nid) |
| 2436 | return table[i].id; |
| 2437 | } |
| 2438 | return -1; |
| 2439 | } |
| 2440 | #if 0 |
| 2441 | static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) |
| 2442 | { |
| 2443 | size_t i; |
| 2444 | for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) |
| 2445 | { |
| 2446 | if (table[i].id == id) |
| 2447 | return table[i].nid; |
| 2448 | } |
| 2449 | return -1; |
| 2450 | } |
| 2451 | #endif |
| 2452 | |
| 2453 | int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md) |
| 2454 | { |
| 2455 | int sig_id, md_id; |
| 2456 | if (!md) |
| 2457 | return 0; |
| 2458 | md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, |
| 2459 | sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup)); |
| 2460 | if (md_id == -1) |
| 2461 | return 0; |
| 2462 | sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk); |
| 2463 | if (sig_id == -1) |
| 2464 | return 0; |
| 2465 | p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id; |
| 2466 | p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id; |
| 2467 | return 1; |
| 2468 | } |
| 2469 | |
| 2470 | int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) |
| 2471 | { |
| 2472 | return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, |
| 2473 | sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup)); |
| 2474 | } |
| 2475 | |
| 2476 | const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg) |
| 2477 | { |
| 2478 | switch(hash_alg) |
| 2479 | { |
| 2480 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA |
| 2481 | case TLSEXT_hash_sha1: |
| 2482 | return EVP_sha1(); |
| 2483 | #endif |
| 2484 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 |
| 2485 | case TLSEXT_hash_sha224: |
| 2486 | return EVP_sha224(); |
| 2487 | |
| 2488 | case TLSEXT_hash_sha256: |
| 2489 | return EVP_sha256(); |
| 2490 | #endif |
| 2491 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 |
| 2492 | case TLSEXT_hash_sha384: |
| 2493 | return EVP_sha384(); |
| 2494 | |
| 2495 | case TLSEXT_hash_sha512: |
| 2496 | return EVP_sha512(); |
| 2497 | #endif |
| 2498 | default: |
| 2499 | return NULL; |
| 2500 | |
| 2501 | } |
| 2502 | } |
| 2503 | |
| 2504 | /* Set preferred digest for each key type */ |
| 2505 | |
| 2506 | int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize) |
| 2507 | { |
| 2508 | int i, idx; |
| 2509 | const EVP_MD *md; |
| 2510 | CERT *c = s->cert; |
| 2511 | /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */ |
| 2512 | if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) |
| 2513 | return 1; |
| 2514 | /* Should never happen */ |
| 2515 | if (!c) |
| 2516 | return 0; |
| 2517 | |
| 2518 | c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL; |
| 2519 | c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL; |
| 2520 | c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL; |
| 2521 | c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL; |
| 2522 | |
| 2523 | for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2) |
| 2524 | { |
| 2525 | unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1]; |
| 2526 | |
| 2527 | switch(sig_alg) |
| 2528 | { |
| 2529 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
| 2530 | case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: |
| 2531 | idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; |
| 2532 | break; |
| 2533 | #endif |
| 2534 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA |
| 2535 | case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: |
| 2536 | idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; |
| 2537 | break; |
| 2538 | #endif |
| 2539 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA |
| 2540 | case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: |
| 2541 | idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC; |
| 2542 | break; |
| 2543 | #endif |
| 2544 | default: |
| 2545 | continue; |
| 2546 | } |
| 2547 | |
| 2548 | if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) |
| 2549 | { |
| 2550 | md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg); |
| 2551 | if (md) |
| 2552 | { |
| 2553 | c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; |
| 2554 | if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) |
| 2555 | c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; |
| 2556 | } |
| 2557 | } |
| 2558 | |
| 2559 | } |
| 2560 | |
| 2561 | |
| 2562 | /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not |
| 2563 | * supported it stays as NULL. |
| 2564 | */ |
| 2565 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA |
| 2566 | if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest) |
| 2567 | c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); |
| 2568 | #endif |
| 2569 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
| 2570 | if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) |
| 2571 | { |
| 2572 | c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); |
| 2573 | c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1(); |
| 2574 | } |
| 2575 | #endif |
| 2576 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA |
| 2577 | if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest) |
| 2578 | c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1(); |
| 2579 | #endif |
| 2580 | return 1; |
| 2581 | } |
| 2582 | |
| 2583 | #endif |
| 2584 | |
| 2585 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
| 2586 | int |
| 2587 | tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) |
| 2588 | { |
| 2589 | unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl; |
| 2590 | unsigned short hbtype; |
| 2591 | unsigned int payload; |
| 2592 | unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ |
| 2593 | |
| 2594 | if (s->msg_callback) |
| 2595 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, |
| 2596 | &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length, |
| 2597 | s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
| 2598 | |
| 2599 | /* Read type and payload length first */ |
| 2600 | if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) |
| 2601 | return 0; /* silently discard */ |
| 2602 | hbtype = *p++; |
| 2603 | n2s(p, payload); |
| 2604 | if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) |
| 2605 | return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ |
| 2606 | pl = p; |
| 2607 | |
| 2608 | if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) |
| 2609 | { |
| 2610 | unsigned char *buffer, *bp; |
| 2611 | int r; |
| 2612 | |
| 2613 | /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes |
| 2614 | * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus |
| 2615 | * payload, plus padding |
| 2616 | */ |
| 2617 | buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); |
| 2618 | bp = buffer; |
| 2619 | |
| 2620 | /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */ |
| 2621 | *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE; |
| 2622 | s2n(payload, bp); |
| 2623 | memcpy(bp, pl, payload); |
| 2624 | bp += payload; |
| 2625 | /* Random padding */ |
| 2626 | RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding); |
| 2627 | |
| 2628 | r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding); |
| 2629 | |
| 2630 | if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback) |
| 2631 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, |
| 2632 | buffer, 3 + payload + padding, |
| 2633 | s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
| 2634 | |
| 2635 | OPENSSL_free(buffer); |
| 2636 | |
| 2637 | if (r < 0) |
| 2638 | return r; |
| 2639 | } |
| 2640 | else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) |
| 2641 | { |
| 2642 | unsigned int seq; |
| 2643 | |
| 2644 | /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), |
| 2645 | * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the |
| 2646 | * sequence number */ |
| 2647 | n2s(pl, seq); |
| 2648 | |
| 2649 | if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) |
| 2650 | { |
| 2651 | s->tlsext_hb_seq++; |
| 2652 | s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; |
| 2653 | } |
| 2654 | } |
| 2655 | |
| 2656 | return 0; |
| 2657 | } |
| 2658 | |
| 2659 | int |
| 2660 | tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) |
| 2661 | { |
| 2662 | unsigned char *buf, *p; |
| 2663 | int ret; |
| 2664 | unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */ |
| 2665 | unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ |
| 2666 | |
| 2667 | /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */ |
| 2668 | if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) || |
| 2669 | s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) |
| 2670 | { |
| 2671 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT); |
| 2672 | return -1; |
| 2673 | } |
| 2674 | |
| 2675 | /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */ |
| 2676 | if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) |
| 2677 | { |
| 2678 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING); |
| 2679 | return -1; |
| 2680 | } |
| 2681 | |
| 2682 | /* ...and no handshake in progress. */ |
| 2683 | if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) |
| 2684 | { |
| 2685 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| 2686 | return -1; |
| 2687 | } |
| 2688 | |
| 2689 | /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding |
| 2690 | * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total. |
| 2691 | */ |
| 2692 | OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381); |
| 2693 | |
| 2694 | /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number |
| 2695 | * as payload to distuingish different messages and add |
| 2696 | * some random stuff. |
| 2697 | * - Message Type, 1 byte |
| 2698 | * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int) |
| 2699 | * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint) |
| 2700 | * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint) |
| 2701 | * - Padding |
| 2702 | */ |
| 2703 | buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); |
| 2704 | p = buf; |
| 2705 | /* Message Type */ |
| 2706 | *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; |
| 2707 | /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */ |
| 2708 | s2n(payload, p); |
| 2709 | /* Sequence number */ |
| 2710 | s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); |
| 2711 | /* 16 random bytes */ |
| 2712 | RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16); |
| 2713 | p += 16; |
| 2714 | /* Random padding */ |
| 2715 | RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding); |
| 2716 | |
| 2717 | ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding); |
| 2718 | if (ret >= 0) |
| 2719 | { |
| 2720 | if (s->msg_callback) |
| 2721 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, |
| 2722 | buf, 3 + payload + padding, |
| 2723 | s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
| 2724 | |
| 2725 | s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; |
| 2726 | } |
| 2727 | |
| 2728 | OPENSSL_free(buf); |
| 2729 | |
| 2730 | return ret; |
| 2731 | } |
| 2732 | #endif |