1 /* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
60 #include <openssl/err.h>
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
63 #include <openssl/rand.h>
64 #include <openssl/fips.h>
66 #if !defined(RSA_NULL) && defined(OPENSSL_FIPS)
68 static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(FIPS_RSA_SIZE_T flen, const unsigned char *from,
69 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
70 static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(FIPS_RSA_SIZE_T flen, const unsigned char *from,
71 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
72 static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(FIPS_RSA_SIZE_T flen, const unsigned char *from,
73 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
74 static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(FIPS_RSA_SIZE_T flen, const unsigned char *from,
75 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
76 static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa);
77 static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
78 static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
79 static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
80 "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
81 RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
82 RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
83 RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
84 RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
86 BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */
95 const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
97 return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
100 static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(FIPS_RSA_SIZE_T flen, const unsigned char *from,
101 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
104 int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
105 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
111 if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
113 FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
117 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
118 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
119 if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
121 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
127 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
128 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
131 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
132 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
135 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
136 i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen);
139 i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
142 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
145 if (i <= 0) goto err;
147 if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
149 if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
151 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
152 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
156 if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
158 BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
159 if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
161 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->n,ctx))
163 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
166 if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
168 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
169 if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL)
171 rsa->_method_mod_n = bn_mont_ctx;
174 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
177 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
180 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
181 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
183 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
184 * length of the modulus */
185 j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
186 i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
187 for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
192 if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
197 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
203 static int rsa_eay_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
206 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
207 /* Check again inside the lock - the macro's check is racey */
208 if(rsa->blinding == NULL)
209 ret = RSA_blinding_on(rsa, ctx);
210 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
214 #define BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, err_instr) \
216 if((!((rsa)->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) && \
217 ((rsa)->blinding == NULL) && \
218 !rsa_eay_blinding(rsa, ctx)) \
222 static BN_BLINDING *setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
225 BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
227 /* added in OpenSSL 0.9.6j and 0.9.7b */
229 /* NB: similar code appears in RSA_blinding_on (rsa_lib.c);
230 * this should be placed in a new function of its own, but for reasons
231 * of binary compatibility can't */
235 if ((RAND_status() == 0) && rsa->d != NULL && rsa->d->d != NULL)
237 /* if PRNG is not properly seeded, resort to secret exponent as unpredictable seed */
238 RAND_add(rsa->d->d, rsa->d->dmax * sizeof rsa->d->d[0], 0);
239 if (!BN_pseudo_rand_range(A,rsa->n)) goto err;
243 if (!BN_rand_range(A,rsa->n)) goto err;
245 if ((Ai=BN_mod_inverse(NULL,A,rsa->n,ctx)) == NULL) goto err;
247 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(A,A,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n))
249 ret = BN_BLINDING_new(A,Ai,rsa->n);
257 static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(FIPS_RSA_SIZE_T flen, const unsigned char *from,
258 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
261 int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
262 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
264 int local_blinding = 0;
265 BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
270 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
271 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
272 if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
274 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
280 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
281 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen);
284 i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
286 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
288 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
291 if (i <= 0) goto err;
293 if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
295 if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
297 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
298 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
302 BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;);
303 blinding = rsa->blinding;
305 /* Now unless blinding is disabled, 'blinding' is non-NULL.
306 * But the BN_BLINDING object may be owned by some other thread
307 * (we don't want to keep it constant and we don't want to use
308 * lots of locking to avoid race conditions, so only a single
309 * thread can use it; other threads have to use local blinding
311 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
313 if (blinding == NULL)
315 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
320 if (blinding != NULL)
322 if (blinding->thread_id != CRYPTO_thread_id())
324 /* we need a local one-time blinding factor */
326 blinding = setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
327 if (blinding == NULL)
334 if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
336 if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
339 (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
340 (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
341 (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
342 { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
345 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
349 if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
351 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
352 * length of the modulus */
353 j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
354 i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
355 for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
360 if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
364 BN_BLINDING_free(blinding);
367 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
373 static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(FIPS_RSA_SIZE_T flen, const unsigned char *from,
374 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
379 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
381 int local_blinding = 0;
382 BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
387 if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
389 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
391 if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
393 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
397 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
398 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
401 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
405 /* make data into a big number */
406 if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
408 if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
410 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
414 BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;);
415 blinding = rsa->blinding;
417 /* Now unless blinding is disabled, 'blinding' is non-NULL.
418 * But the BN_BLINDING object may be owned by some other thread
419 * (we don't want to keep it constant and we don't want to use
420 * lots of locking to avoid race conditions, so only a single
421 * thread can use it; other threads have to use local blinding
423 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
425 if (blinding == NULL)
427 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
432 if (blinding != NULL)
434 if (blinding->thread_id != CRYPTO_thread_id())
436 /* we need a local one-time blinding factor */
438 blinding = setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
439 if (blinding == NULL)
446 if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
449 if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
452 (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
453 (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
454 (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
455 { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
458 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL))
463 if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
466 j=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
470 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
471 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
473 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
474 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
475 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
478 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
479 r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num);
482 r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num);
485 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
489 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
492 if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
496 BN_BLINDING_free(blinding);
499 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
505 /* signature verification */
506 static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(FIPS_RSA_SIZE_T flen, const unsigned char *from,
507 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
512 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
518 if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
520 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
521 buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
524 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
528 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
529 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
532 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
536 if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
538 if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
540 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
545 if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
547 BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
548 if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
550 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->n,ctx))
552 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
555 if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
557 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
558 if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL)
560 rsa->_method_mod_n = bn_mont_ctx;
563 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
566 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
569 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
570 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
577 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
578 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
581 r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num);
584 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
588 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
591 if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
596 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
602 static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
611 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
613 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
615 if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL)
617 BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
618 if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
620 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->p,ctx))
622 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
625 if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
627 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
628 if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL)
630 rsa->_method_mod_p = bn_mont_ctx;
633 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
636 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
639 if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL)
641 BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
642 if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
644 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->q,ctx))
646 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
649 if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
651 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
652 if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL)
654 rsa->_method_mod_q = bn_mont_ctx;
657 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
660 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
664 if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
665 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
666 rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
668 if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
669 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,&r1,rsa->dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
670 rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
672 if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,&m1)) goto err;
673 /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
674 * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
676 if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
678 if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
679 if (!BN_mod(r0,&r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
680 /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
681 * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
682 * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
683 * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
684 * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
685 * they ensure p > q [steve]
688 if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
689 if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
690 if (!BN_add(r0,&r1,&m1)) goto err;
692 if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
694 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
695 /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
696 * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
697 * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
698 * for absolute equality, just congruency. */
699 if (!BN_sub(&vrfy, &vrfy, I)) goto err;
700 if (!BN_mod(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
702 if (!BN_add(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
703 if (!BN_is_zero(&vrfy))
704 /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
705 * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
706 * mod_exp and return that instead. */
707 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
713 BN_clear_free(&vrfy);
718 static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa)
720 rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
724 static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa)
726 if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
727 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
728 if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
729 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
730 if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
731 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);