Import OpenSSL-1.0.1h.
[dragonfly.git] / crypto / openssl / ssl / s3_pkt.c
1 /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3  * All rights reserved.
4  *
5  * This package is an SSL implementation written
6  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8  * 
9  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
11  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
13  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15  * 
16  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17  * the code are not to be removed.
18  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22  * 
23  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25  * are met:
26  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32  *    must display the following acknowledgement:
33  *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37  * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
38  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40  * 
41  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51  * SUCH DAMAGE.
52  * 
53  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
55  * copied and put under another distribution licence
56  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57  */
58 /* ====================================================================
59  * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
60  *
61  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63  * are met:
64  *
65  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
67  *
68  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70  *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71  *    distribution.
72  *
73  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74  *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
75  *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76  *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77  *
78  * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79  *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80  *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81  *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
82  *
83  * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84  *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85  *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86  *
87  * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88  *    acknowledgment:
89  *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90  *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91  *
92  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93  * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95  * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96  * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97  * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98  * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99  * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101  * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102  * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103  * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104  * ====================================================================
105  *
106  * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107  * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
108  * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109  *
110  */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <limits.h>
114 #include <errno.h>
115 #define USE_SOCKETS
116 #include "ssl_locl.h"
117 #include <openssl/evp.h>
118 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 #include <openssl/rand.h>
120
121 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
122                          unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
123 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
124
125 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
126         {
127         /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
128          * packet by another n bytes.
129          * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
130          * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
131          * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
132          * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
133          */
134         int i,len,left;
135         long align=0;
136         unsigned char *pkt;
137         SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
138
139         if (n <= 0) return n;
140
141         rb    = &(s->s3->rbuf);
142         if (rb->buf == NULL)
143                 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
144                         return -1;
145
146         left  = rb->left;
147 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
148         align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
149         align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
150 #endif
151
152         if (!extend)
153                 {
154                 /* start with empty packet ... */
155                 if (left == 0)
156                         rb->offset = align;
157                 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
158                         {
159                         /* check if next packet length is large
160                          * enough to justify payload alignment... */
161                         pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
162                         if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
163                             && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
164                                 {
165                                 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
166                                  * and its length field is insane, we can
167                                  * only be led to wrong decision about
168                                  * whether memmove will occur or not.
169                                  * Header values has no effect on memmove
170                                  * arguments and therefore no buffer
171                                  * overrun can be triggered. */
172                                 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
173                                 rb->offset = align;
174                                 }
175                         }
176                 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
177                 s->packet_length = 0;
178                 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
179                 }
180
181         /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
182          * because the read operation returns the whole packet
183          * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
184         if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
185                 {
186                 if (left > 0 && n > left)
187                         n = left;
188                 }
189
190         /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
191         if (left >= n)
192                 {
193                 s->packet_length+=n;
194                 rb->left=left-n;
195                 rb->offset+=n;
196                 return(n);
197                 }
198
199         /* else we need to read more data */
200
201         len = s->packet_length;
202         pkt = rb->buf+align;
203         /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
204          * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
205          * 'left' extra ones at the end */
206         if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
207                 {
208                 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
209                 s->packet = pkt;
210                 rb->offset = len + align;
211                 }
212
213         if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
214                 {
215                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
216                 return -1;
217                 }
218
219         if (!s->read_ahead)
220                 /* ignore max parameter */
221                 max = n;
222         else
223                 {
224                 if (max < n)
225                         max = n;
226                 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
227                         max = rb->len - rb->offset;
228                 }
229
230         while (left < n)
231                 {
232                 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
233                  * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
234                  * len+max if possible) */
235
236                 clear_sys_error();
237                 if (s->rbio != NULL)
238                         {
239                         s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
240                         i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
241                         }
242                 else
243                         {
244                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
245                         i = -1;
246                         }
247
248                 if (i <= 0)
249                         {
250                         rb->left = left;
251                         if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
252                             SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
253                                 if (len+left == 0)
254                                         ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
255                         return(i);
256                         }
257                 left+=i;
258                 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
259                  * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
260                  * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
261                 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
262                         {
263                         if (n > left)
264                                 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
265                         }
266                 }
267
268         /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
269         rb->offset += n;
270         rb->left = left - n;
271         s->packet_length += n;
272         s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
273         return(n);
274         }
275
276 /* Call this to get a new input record.
277  * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
278  * or non-blocking IO.
279  * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
280  * ssl->s3->rrec.type    - is the type of record
281  * ssl->s3->rrec.data,   - data
282  * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
283  */
284 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
285 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
286         {
287         int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
288         int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
289         SSL3_RECORD *rr;
290         SSL_SESSION *sess;
291         unsigned char *p;
292         unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
293         short version;
294         unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
295         size_t extra;
296
297         rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
298         sess=s->session;
299
300         if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
301                 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
302         else
303                 extra=0;
304         if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
305                 {
306                 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
307                  * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
308                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
309                 return -1;
310                 }
311
312 again:
313         /* check if we have the header */
314         if (    (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
315                 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) 
316                 {
317                 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
318                 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
319                 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
320
321                 p=s->packet;
322
323                 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
324                 rr->type= *(p++);
325                 ssl_major= *(p++);
326                 ssl_minor= *(p++);
327                 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
328                 n2s(p,rr->length);
329 #if 0
330 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
331 #endif
332
333                 /* Lets check version */
334                 if (!s->first_packet)
335                         {
336                         if (version != s->version)
337                                 {
338                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
339                                 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
340                                         /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
341                                         s->version = (unsigned short)version;
342                                 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
343                                 goto f_err;
344                                 }
345                         }
346
347                 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
348                         {
349                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
350                         goto err;
351                         }
352
353                 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
354                         {
355                         al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
356                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
357                         goto f_err;
358                         }
359
360                 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
361                 }
362
363         /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
364
365         if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
366                 {
367                 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
368                 i=rr->length;
369                 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
370                 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
371                 /* now n == rr->length,
372                  * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
373                 }
374
375         s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
376
377         /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
378          * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
379          */
380         rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
381
382         /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
383          * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
384          * need to be copied into rr->data by either
385          * the decryption or by the decompression
386          * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
387          * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ 
388
389         /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
390          * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
391
392         /* check is not needed I believe */
393         if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
394                 {
395                 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
396                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
397                 goto f_err;
398                 }
399
400         /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
401         rr->data=rr->input;
402
403         enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
404         /* enc_err is:
405          *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
406          *    1: if the padding is valid
407          *    -1: if the padding is invalid */
408         if (enc_err == 0)
409                 {
410                 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
411                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
412                 goto f_err;
413                 }
414
415 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
416 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
417 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
418 printf("\n");
419 #endif
420
421         /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
422         if ((sess != NULL) &&
423             (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
424             (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
425                 {
426                 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
427                 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
428                 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
429                 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
430                 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
431
432                 /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
433                 orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8);
434
435                 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
436                  * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
437                  * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
438                  * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
439                  */
440                 if (orig_len < mac_size ||
441                     /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
442                     (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
443                      orig_len < mac_size+1))
444                         {
445                         al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
446                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
447                         goto f_err;
448                         }
449
450                 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
451                         {
452                         /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
453                          * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
454                          * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
455                          * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
456                          * */
457                         mac = mac_tmp;
458                         ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
459                         rr->length -= mac_size;
460                         }
461                 else
462                         {
463                         /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
464                          * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
465                          * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
466                         rr->length -= mac_size;
467                         mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
468                         }
469
470                 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
471                 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
472                         enc_err = -1;
473                 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
474                         enc_err = -1;
475                 }
476
477         if (enc_err < 0)
478                 {
479                 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
480                  * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'.  But unless a decryption
481                  * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
482                  * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
483                  * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
484                 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
485                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
486                 goto f_err;
487                 }
488
489         /* r->length is now just compressed */
490         if (s->expand != NULL)
491                 {
492                 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
493                         {
494                         al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
495                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
496                         goto f_err;
497                         }
498                 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
499                         {
500                         al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
501                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
502                         goto f_err;
503                         }
504                 }
505
506         if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
507                 {
508                 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
509                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
510                 goto f_err;
511                 }
512
513         rr->off=0;
514         /* So at this point the following is true
515          * ssl->s3->rrec.type   is the type of record
516          * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
517          * ssl->s3->rrec.off    == offset to first valid byte
518          * ssl->s3->rrec.data   == where to take bytes from, increment
519          *                         after use :-).
520          */
521
522         /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
523         s->packet_length=0;
524
525         /* just read a 0 length packet */
526         if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
527
528 #if 0
529 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
530 #endif
531
532         return(1);
533
534 f_err:
535         ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
536 err:
537         return(ret);
538         }
539
540 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
541         {
542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
543         int i;
544         SSL3_RECORD *rr;
545
546         rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
547         i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
548                 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
549         if (i < 0)
550                 return(0);
551         else
552                 rr->length=i;
553         rr->data=rr->comp;
554 #endif
555         return(1);
556         }
557
558 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
559         {
560 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
561         int i;
562         SSL3_RECORD *wr;
563
564         wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
565         i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
566                 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
567                 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
568         if (i < 0)
569                 return(0);
570         else
571                 wr->length=i;
572
573         wr->input=wr->data;
574 #endif
575         return(1);
576         }
577
578 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
579  * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
580  */
581 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
582         {
583         const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
584         unsigned int n,nw;
585         int i,tot;
586
587         s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
588         OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
589         tot=s->s3->wnum;
590         s->s3->wnum=0;
591
592         if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
593                 {
594                 i=s->handshake_func(s);
595                 if (i < 0) return(i);
596                 if (i == 0)
597                         {
598                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
599                         return -1;
600                         }
601                 }
602
603         /* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write 
604          * out than the the original len from a write which didn't complete 
605          * for non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding 
606          * the check for this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as
607          * it must never be possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large
608          * number that will then promptly send beyond the end of the users
609          * buffer ... so we trap and report the error in a way the user
610          * will notice
611          */
612         if (len < tot)
613                 {
614                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
615                 return(-1);
616                 }
617
618
619         n=(len-tot);
620         for (;;)
621                 {
622                 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
623                         nw=s->max_send_fragment;
624                 else
625                         nw=n;
626
627                 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
628                 if (i <= 0)
629                         {
630                         s->s3->wnum=tot;
631                         return i;
632                         }
633
634                 if ((i == (int)n) ||
635                         (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
636                          (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
637                         {
638                         /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
639                          * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
640                         s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
641                         
642                         return tot+i;
643                         }
644
645                 n-=i;
646                 tot+=i;
647                 }
648         }
649
650 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
651                          unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
652         {
653         unsigned char *p,*plen;
654         int i,mac_size,clear=0;
655         int prefix_len=0;
656         int eivlen;
657         long align=0;
658         SSL3_RECORD *wr;
659         SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
660         SSL_SESSION *sess;
661
662
663         /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
664          * out.  This will happen with non blocking IO */
665         if (wb->left != 0)
666                 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
667
668         /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
669         if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
670                 {
671                 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
672                 if (i <= 0)
673                         return(i);
674                 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
675                 }
676
677         if (wb->buf == NULL)
678                 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
679                         return -1;
680
681         if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
682                 return 0;
683
684         wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
685         sess=s->session;
686
687         if (    (sess == NULL) ||
688                 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
689                 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
690                 {
691 #if 1
692                 clear=s->enc_write_ctx?0:1;     /* must be AEAD cipher */
693 #else
694                 clear=1;
695 #endif
696                 mac_size=0;
697                 }
698         else
699                 {
700                 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
701                 if (mac_size < 0)
702                         goto err;
703                 }
704
705         /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
706         if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
707                 {
708                 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
709                  * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
710
711                 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
712                         {
713                         /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
714                          * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
715                          * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
716                          * together with the actual payload) */
717                         prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
718                         if (prefix_len <= 0)
719                                 goto err;
720
721                         if (prefix_len >
722                 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
723                                 {
724                                 /* insufficient space */
725                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
726                                 goto err;
727                                 }
728                         }
729                 
730                 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
731                 }
732
733         if (create_empty_fragment)
734                 {
735 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
736                 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
737                  * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
738                  * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
739                  * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
740                 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
741                 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
742 #endif
743                 p = wb->buf + align;
744                 wb->offset  = align;
745                 }
746         else if (prefix_len)
747                 {
748                 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
749                 }
750         else
751                 {
752 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
753                 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
754                 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
755 #endif
756                 p = wb->buf + align;
757                 wb->offset  = align;
758                 }
759
760         /* write the header */
761
762         *(p++)=type&0xff;
763         wr->type=type;
764
765         *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
766         /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256
767          * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
768          */
769         if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
770                                 && !s->renegotiate
771                                 && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
772                 *(p++) = 0x1;
773         else
774                 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
775
776         /* field where we are to write out packet length */
777         plen=p; 
778         p+=2;
779         /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers and TLS version 1.1 or later */
780         if (s->enc_write_ctx && s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION)
781                 {
782                 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
783                 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
784                         {
785                         eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
786                         if (eivlen <= 1)
787                                 eivlen = 0;
788                         }
789                 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
790                 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
791                         eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
792                 else
793                         eivlen = 0;
794                 }
795         else 
796                 eivlen = 0;
797
798         /* lets setup the record stuff. */
799         wr->data=p + eivlen;
800         wr->length=(int)len;
801         wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
802
803         /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
804          * wr->data */
805
806         /* first we compress */
807         if (s->compress != NULL)
808                 {
809                 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
810                         {
811                         SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
812                         goto err;
813                         }
814                 }
815         else
816                 {
817                 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
818                 wr->input=wr->data;
819                 }
820
821         /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
822          * from wr->input.  Length should be wr->length.
823          * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
824
825         if (mac_size != 0)
826                 {
827                 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)
828                         goto err;
829                 wr->length+=mac_size;
830                 }
831
832         wr->input=p;
833         wr->data=p;
834
835         if (eivlen)
836                 {
837         /*      if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
838                         goto err; */
839                 wr->length += eivlen;
840                 }
841
842         /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
843         s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
844
845         /* record length after mac and block padding */
846         s2n(wr->length,plen);
847
848         /* we should now have
849          * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
850          * wr->length long */
851         wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
852         wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
853
854         if (create_empty_fragment)
855                 {
856                 /* we are in a recursive call;
857                  * just return the length, don't write out anything here
858                  */
859                 return wr->length;
860                 }
861
862         /* now let's set up wb */
863         wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
864
865         /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
866         s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
867         s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
868         s->s3->wpend_type=type;
869         s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
870
871         /* we now just need to write the buffer */
872         return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
873 err:
874         return -1;
875         }
876
877 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
878 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
879         unsigned int len)
880         {
881         int i;
882         SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
883
884 /* XXXX */
885         if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
886                 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
887                         !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
888                 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
889                 {
890                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
891                 return(-1);
892                 }
893
894         for (;;)
895                 {
896                 clear_sys_error();
897                 if (s->wbio != NULL)
898                         {
899                         s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
900                         i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
901                                 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
902                                 (unsigned int)wb->left);
903                         }
904                 else
905                         {
906                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
907                         i= -1;
908                         }
909                 if (i == wb->left)
910                         {
911                         wb->left=0;
912                         wb->offset+=i;
913                         if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
914                             SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
915                                 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
916                         s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
917                         return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
918                         }
919                 else if (i <= 0) {
920                         if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
921                             s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
922                                 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
923                                    point in using a datagram service */
924                                 wb->left = 0;
925                         }
926                         return(i);
927                 }
928                 wb->offset+=i;
929                 wb->left-=i;
930                 }
931         }
932
933 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
934  * 'type' is one of the following:
935  *
936  *   -  SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
937  *   -  SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
938  *   -  0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
939  *
940  * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
941  * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
942  *
943  * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
944  * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
945  * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
946  * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
947  * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
948  * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
949  *     Change cipher spec protocol
950  *             just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
951  *     Alert protocol
952  *             2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
953  *     Handshake protocol
954  *             4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
955  *             to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
956  *             here, anything else is handled by higher layers
957  *     Application data protocol
958  *             none of our business
959  */
960 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
961         {
962         int al,i,j,ret;
963         unsigned int n;
964         SSL3_RECORD *rr;
965         void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
966
967         if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
968                 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
969                         return(-1);
970
971         if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
972             (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
973                 {
974                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
975                 return -1;
976                 }
977
978         if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
979                 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
980                 {
981                 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
982                 unsigned char *dst = buf;
983                 unsigned int k;
984
985                 /* peek == 0 */
986                 n = 0;
987                 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
988                         {
989                         *dst++ = *src++;
990                         len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
991                         n++;
992                         }
993                 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
994                 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
995                         s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
996                 return n;
997         }
998
999         /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
1000
1001         if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
1002                 {
1003                 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1004                 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1005                 if (i < 0) return(i);
1006                 if (i == 0)
1007                         {
1008                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1009                         return(-1);
1010                         }
1011                 }
1012 start:
1013         s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1014
1015         /* s->s3->rrec.type         - is the type of record
1016          * s->s3->rrec.data,    - data
1017          * s->s3->rrec.off,     - offset into 'data' for next read
1018          * s->s3->rrec.length,  - number of bytes. */
1019         rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
1020
1021         /* get new packet if necessary */
1022         if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
1023                 {
1024                 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
1025                 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
1026                 }
1027
1028         /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1029
1030         if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1031                                        * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1032                 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
1033                 {
1034                 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1035                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1036                 goto f_err;
1037                 }
1038
1039         /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
1040          * (even in 'peek' mode) */
1041         if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
1042                 {
1043                 rr->length=0;
1044                 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1045                 return(0);
1046                 }
1047
1048
1049         if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1050                 {
1051                 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
1052                  * are doing a handshake for the first time */
1053                 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1054                         (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
1055                         {
1056                         al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1057                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1058                         goto f_err;
1059                         }
1060
1061                 if (len <= 0) return(len);
1062
1063                 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1064                         n = rr->length;
1065                 else
1066                         n = (unsigned int)len;
1067
1068                 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
1069                 if (!peek)
1070                         {
1071                         rr->length-=n;
1072                         rr->off+=n;
1073                         if (rr->length == 0)
1074                                 {
1075                                 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1076                                 rr->off=0;
1077                                 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
1078                                         ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1079                                 }
1080                         }
1081                 return(n);
1082                 }
1083
1084
1085         /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1086          * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1087
1088         /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1089          * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1090          */
1091                 {
1092                 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1093                 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1094                 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1095
1096                 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1097                         {
1098                         dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1099                         dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1100                         dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1101                         }
1102                 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1103                         {
1104                         dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1105                         dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1106                         dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1107                         }
1108 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1109                 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT)
1110                         {
1111                         tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
1112
1113                         /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1114                         rr->length = 0;
1115                         s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1116                         BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1117                         BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1118                         return(-1);
1119                         }
1120 #endif
1121
1122                 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1123                         {
1124                         n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1125                         if (rr->length < n)
1126                                 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1127
1128                         /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1129                         while (n-- > 0)
1130                                 {
1131                                 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1132                                 rr->length--;
1133                                 }
1134
1135                         if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1136                                 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1137                         }
1138                 }
1139
1140         /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4  iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1141          * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2      iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1142          * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1143
1144         /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1145         if ((!s->server) &&
1146                 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1147                 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1148                 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1149                 {
1150                 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1151
1152                 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1153                         (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1154                         (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1155                         {
1156                         al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1157                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1158                         goto f_err;
1159                         }
1160
1161                 if (s->msg_callback)
1162                         s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1163
1164                 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1165                         !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1166                         !s->s3->renegotiate)
1167                         {
1168                         ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1169                         if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1170                                 {
1171                                 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1172                                 if (i < 0) return(i);
1173                                 if (i == 0)
1174                                         {
1175                                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1176                                         return(-1);
1177                                         }
1178
1179                                 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1180                                         {
1181                                         if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1182                                                 {
1183                                                 BIO *bio;
1184                                                 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1185                                                  * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1186                                                  * the retry option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may
1187                                                  * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1188                                                 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1189                                                 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1190                                                 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1191                                                 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1192                                                 return(-1);
1193                                                 }
1194                                         }
1195                                 }
1196                         }
1197                 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1198                  * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1199                 goto start;
1200                 }
1201         /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1202          * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1203          * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1204          */
1205         if (s->server &&
1206                 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1207                 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1208                 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1209                 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1210                 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1211                 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1212                 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1213                 
1214                 {
1215                 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1216                 rr->length = 0;
1217                 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1218                 goto start;
1219                 }
1220         if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1221                 {
1222                 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1223                 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1224
1225                 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1226
1227                 if (s->msg_callback)
1228                         s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1229
1230                 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1231                         cb=s->info_callback;
1232                 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1233                         cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1234
1235                 if (cb != NULL)
1236                         {
1237                         j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1238                         cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1239                         }
1240
1241                 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1242                         {
1243                         s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1244                         if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1245                                 {
1246                                 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1247                                 return(0);
1248                                 }
1249                         /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1250                          * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1251                          * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1252                          * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1253                          * expects it to succeed.
1254                          *
1255                          * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1256                          * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1257                          */
1258                         else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
1259                                 {
1260                                 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1261                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1262                                 goto f_err;
1263                                 }
1264 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1265                         else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1266                                 return(0);
1267 #endif
1268                         }
1269                 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1270                         {
1271                         char tmp[16];
1272
1273                         s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1274                         s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1275                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1276                         BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1277                         ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1278                         s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1279                         SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1280                         return(0);
1281                         }
1282                 else
1283                         {
1284                         al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1285                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1286                         goto f_err;
1287                         }
1288
1289                 goto start;
1290                 }
1291
1292         if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1293                 {
1294                 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1295                 rr->length=0;
1296                 return(0);
1297                 }
1298
1299         if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1300                 {
1301                 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1302                  * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1303                 if (    (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1304                         (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1305                         {
1306                         al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1307                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1308                         goto f_err;
1309                         }
1310
1311                 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1312                 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1313                         {
1314                         al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1315                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1316                         goto f_err;
1317                         }
1318
1319                 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK))
1320                         {
1321                         al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1322                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1323                         goto f_err;
1324                         }
1325
1326                 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
1327
1328                 rr->length=0;
1329
1330                 if (s->msg_callback)
1331                         s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1332
1333                 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1334                 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1335                         goto err;
1336                 else
1337                         goto start;
1338                 }
1339
1340         /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1341         if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&     !s->in_handshake)
1342                 {
1343                 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1344                         !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1345                         {
1346 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1347        * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1348        * protocol violations): */
1349                         s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1350                                 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
1351                                 :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1352 #else
1353                         s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1354 #endif
1355                         s->renegotiate=1;
1356                         s->new_session=1;
1357                         }
1358                 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1359                 if (i < 0) return(i);
1360                 if (i == 0)
1361                         {
1362                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1363                         return(-1);
1364                         }
1365
1366                 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1367                         {
1368                         if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1369                                 {
1370                                 BIO *bio;
1371                                 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1372                                  * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1373                                  * the retry option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may
1374                                  * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1375                                 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1376                                 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1377                                 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1378                                 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1379                                 return(-1);
1380                                 }
1381                         }
1382                 goto start;
1383                 }
1384
1385         switch (rr->type)
1386                 {
1387         default:
1388 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1389                 /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:
1390                  * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.
1391                  */
1392                 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION)
1393                         {
1394                         rr->length = 0;
1395                         goto start;
1396                         }
1397 #endif
1398                 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1399                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1400                 goto f_err;
1401         case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1402         case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1403         case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1404                 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1405                  * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1406                  * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1407                 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1408                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1409                 goto f_err;
1410         case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1411                 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1412                  * but have application data.  If the library was
1413                  * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1414                  * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1415                  * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1416                  * we will indulge it.
1417                  */
1418                 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1419                         (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1420                         ((
1421                                 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1422                                 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1423                                 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1424                                 ) || (
1425                                         (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1426                                         (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1427                                         (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1428                                         )
1429                                 ))
1430                         {
1431                         s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1432                         return(-1);
1433                         }
1434                 else
1435                         {
1436                         al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1437                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1438                         goto f_err;
1439                         }
1440                 }
1441         /* not reached */
1442
1443 f_err:
1444         ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1445 err:
1446         return(-1);
1447         }
1448
1449 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1450         {
1451         int i;
1452         const char *sender;
1453         int slen;
1454
1455         if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1456                 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1457         else
1458                 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1459
1460         if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1461                 {
1462                 if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0)
1463                         {
1464                         /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1465                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1466                         return (0);
1467                         }
1468
1469                 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1470                 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1471                 }
1472
1473         if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1474                 return(0);
1475
1476         /* we have to record the message digest at
1477          * this point so we can get it before we read
1478          * the finished message */
1479         if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1480                 {
1481                 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1482                 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1483                 }
1484         else
1485                 {
1486                 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1487                 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1488                 }
1489
1490         i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1491                 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1492         if (i == 0)
1493                 {
1494                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1495                 return 0;
1496                 }
1497         s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
1498
1499         return(1);
1500         }
1501
1502 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1503         {
1504         /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1505         desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1506         if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1507                 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1508         if (desc < 0) return -1;
1509         /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1510         if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1511                 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1512
1513         s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1514         s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1515         s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1516         if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1517                 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1518         /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1519          * some time in the future */
1520         return -1;
1521         }
1522
1523 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1524         {
1525         int i,j;
1526         void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1527
1528         s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1529         i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1530         if (i <= 0)
1531                 {
1532                 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1533                 }
1534         else
1535                 {
1536                 /* Alert sent to BIO.  If it is important, flush it now.
1537                  * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1538                  * we will not worry too much. */
1539                 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1540                         (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1541
1542                 if (s->msg_callback)
1543                         s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1544
1545                 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1546                         cb=s->info_callback;
1547                 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1548                         cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1549
1550                 if (cb != NULL)
1551                         {
1552                         j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1553                         cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1554                         }
1555                 }
1556         return(i);
1557         }