Import OpenSSL-1.0.0f.
[dragonfly.git] / crypto / openssl / crypto / x509 / x509_vfy.c
1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3  * All rights reserved.
4  *
5  * This package is an SSL implementation written
6  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8  * 
9  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
11  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
13  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15  * 
16  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17  * the code are not to be removed.
18  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22  * 
23  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25  * are met:
26  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32  *    must display the following acknowledgement:
33  *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37  * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
38  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40  * 
41  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51  * SUCH DAMAGE.
52  * 
53  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
55  * copied and put under another distribution licence
56  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57  */
58
59 #include <stdio.h>
60 #include <time.h>
61 #include <errno.h>
62
63 #include "cryptlib.h"
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
72
73 /* CRL score values */
74
75 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
76
77 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL    0x100
78
79 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
80
81 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE         0x080
82
83 /* CRL times valid */
84
85 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME          0x040
86
87 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
88
89 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME   0x020
90
91 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
92
93 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
94
95 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
96
97 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT   0x018
98
99 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
100
101 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH     0x008
102
103 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
104
105 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID          0x004
106
107 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
108
109 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA    0x002
110
111 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
112 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
113 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
114 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
115 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
116 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120
121 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
122                         unsigned int *preasons,
123                         X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
124 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
125                                 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
126 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
127                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
128 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
129                                 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
130 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
131                                 unsigned int *preasons);
132 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
133 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
134                         STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
135                         STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
136
137 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
138 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
139
140
141 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
142         {
143         return ok;
144         }
145
146 #if 0
147 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
148         {
149         return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
150         }
151 #endif
152
153 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
154         {
155         X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
156         X509_NAME *xn;
157         int bad_chain = 0;
158         X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
159         int depth,i,ok=0;
160         int num;
161         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
162         STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
163         if (ctx->cert == NULL)
164                 {
165                 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
166                 return -1;
167                 }
168
169         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
170
171         /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
172          * present and that the first entry is in place */
173         if (ctx->chain == NULL)
174                 {
175                 if (    ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
176                         (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
177                         {
178                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
179                         goto end;
180                         }
181                 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
182                 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
183                 }
184
185         /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
186         if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
187             && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
188                 {
189                 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
190                 goto end;
191                 }
192
193         num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
194         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
195         depth=param->depth;
196
197
198         for (;;)
199                 {
200                 /* If we have enough, we break */
201                 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
202                                          * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
203                                          * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
204                                          * code later.
205                                          */
206
207                 /* If we are self signed, we break */
208                 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
209                 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
210
211                 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
212                 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
213                         {
214                         xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
215                         if (xtmp != NULL)
216                                 {
217                                 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
218                                         {
219                                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
220                                         goto end;
221                                         }
222                                 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
223                                 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
224                                 ctx->last_untrusted++;
225                                 x=xtmp;
226                                 num++;
227                                 /* reparse the full chain for
228                                  * the next one */
229                                 continue;
230                                 }
231                         }
232                 break;
233                 }
234
235         /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
236          * certificates.  We now need to add at least one trusted one,
237          * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
238
239         /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
240          * is self signed.
241          */
242
243         i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
244         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
245         xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
246         if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
247                 {
248                 /* we have a self signed certificate */
249                 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
250                         {
251                         /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
252                          * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
253                          * match to avoid possible impersonation.
254                          */
255                         ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
256                         if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) 
257                                 {
258                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
259                                 ctx->current_cert=x;
260                                 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
261                                 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
262                                 bad_chain = 1;
263                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
264                                 if (!ok) goto end;
265                                 }
266                         else 
267                                 {
268                                 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
269                                  * so we get any trust settings.
270                                  */
271                                 X509_free(x);
272                                 x = xtmp;
273                                 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
274                                 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
275                                 }
276                         }
277                 else
278                         {
279                         /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
280                         chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
281                         ctx->last_untrusted--;
282                         num--;
283                         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
284                         }
285                 }
286
287         /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
288         for (;;)
289                 {
290                 /* If we have enough, we break */
291                 if (depth < num) break;
292
293                 /* If we are self signed, we break */
294                 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
295                 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
296
297                 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
298
299                 if (ok < 0) return ok;
300                 if (ok == 0) break;
301
302                 x = xtmp;
303                 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
304                         {
305                         X509_free(xtmp);
306                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
307                         return 0;
308                         }
309                 num++;
310                 }
311
312         /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
313         xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
314
315         /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
316         if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
317                 {
318                 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
319                         {
320                         if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
321                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
322                         else
323                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
324                         ctx->current_cert=x;
325                         }
326                 else
327                         {
328
329                         sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
330                         num++;
331                         ctx->last_untrusted=num;
332                         ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
333                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
334                         chain_ss=NULL;
335                         }
336
337                 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
338                 bad_chain = 1;
339                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
340                 if (!ok) goto end;
341                 }
342
343         /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
344         ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
345
346         if (!ok) goto end;
347
348         /* Check name constraints */
349
350         ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
351         
352         if (!ok) goto end;
353
354         /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
355
356         if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
357
358         if (!ok) goto end;
359
360         /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
361         X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
362
363         /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
364          * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
365          */
366
367         ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
368         if(!ok) goto end;
369
370         /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
371         if (ctx->verify != NULL)
372                 ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
373         else
374                 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
375         if(!ok) goto end;
376
377 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
378         /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
379         ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
380         if (!ok) goto end;
381         ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
382         if (!ok) goto end;
383 #endif
384
385         /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
386         if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
387                 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
388         if(!ok) goto end;
389         if (0)
390                 {
391 end:
392                 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
393                 }
394         if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
395         if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
396         return ok;
397         }
398
399
400 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
401  */
402
403 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
404 {
405         int i;
406         X509 *issuer;
407         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
408                 {
409                 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
410                 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
411                         return issuer;
412                 }
413         return NULL;
414 }
415
416 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
417
418 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
419 {
420         int ret;
421         ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
422         if (ret == X509_V_OK)
423                 return 1;
424         /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
425         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
426                 return 0;
427
428         ctx->error = ret;
429         ctx->current_cert = x;
430         ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
431         return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
432         return 0;
433 }
434
435 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
436
437 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
438 {
439         *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
440         if (*issuer)
441                 {
442                 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
443                 return 1;
444                 }
445         else
446                 return 0;
447 }
448         
449
450 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
451  * with the supplied purpose
452  */
453
454 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
455 {
456 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
457         return 1;
458 #else
459         int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
460         X509 *x;
461         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
462         int proxy_path_length = 0;
463         int purpose;
464         int allow_proxy_certs;
465         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
466
467         /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
468            -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
469                use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
470            0:  we only accept non-CA certificates.  This is currently not
471                used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
472            1:  we only accept CA certificates.  This is currently used for
473                all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
474         */
475         must_be_ca = -1;
476
477         /* CRL path validation */
478         if (ctx->parent)
479                 {
480                 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
481                 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
482                 }
483         else
484                 {
485                 allow_proxy_certs =
486                         !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
487                 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
488                    software happy */
489                 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
490                         allow_proxy_certs = 1;
491                 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
492                 }
493
494         /* Check all untrusted certificates */
495         for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
496                 {
497                 int ret;
498                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
499                 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
500                         && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
501                         {
502                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
503                         ctx->error_depth = i;
504                         ctx->current_cert = x;
505                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
506                         if (!ok) goto end;
507                         }
508                 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
509                         {
510                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
511                         ctx->error_depth = i;
512                         ctx->current_cert = x;
513                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
514                         if (!ok) goto end;
515                         }
516                 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
517                 switch(must_be_ca)
518                         {
519                 case -1:
520                         if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
521                                 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
522                                 {
523                                 ret = 0;
524                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
525                                 }
526                         else
527                                 ret = 1;
528                         break;
529                 case 0:
530                         if (ret != 0)
531                                 {
532                                 ret = 0;
533                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
534                                 }
535                         else
536                                 ret = 1;
537                         break;
538                 default:
539                         if ((ret == 0)
540                                 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
541                                         && (ret != 1)))
542                                 {
543                                 ret = 0;
544                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
545                                 }
546                         else
547                                 ret = 1;
548                         break;
549                         }
550                 if (ret == 0)
551                         {
552                         ctx->error_depth = i;
553                         ctx->current_cert = x;
554                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
555                         if (!ok) goto end;
556                         }
557                 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
558                         {
559                         ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
560                         if ((ret == 0)
561                                 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
562                                         && (ret != 1)))
563                                 {
564                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
565                                 ctx->error_depth = i;
566                                 ctx->current_cert = x;
567                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
568                                 if (!ok) goto end;
569                                 }
570                         }
571                 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
572                 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
573                            && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
574                            && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
575                         {
576                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
577                         ctx->error_depth = i;
578                         ctx->current_cert = x;
579                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
580                         if (!ok) goto end;
581                         }
582                 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
583                 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
584                         plen++;
585                 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
586                    certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
587                    certificate.  If not, the next certificate must be a
588                    CA certificate.  */
589                 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
590                         {
591                         if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
592                                 {
593                                 ctx->error =
594                                         X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
595                                 ctx->error_depth = i;
596                                 ctx->current_cert = x;
597                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
598                                 if (!ok) goto end;
599                                 }
600                         proxy_path_length++;
601                         must_be_ca = 0;
602                         }
603                 else
604                         must_be_ca = 1;
605                 }
606         ok = 1;
607  end:
608         return ok;
609 #endif
610 }
611
612 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
613         {
614         X509 *x;
615         int i, j, rv;
616         /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
617         for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
618                 {
619                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
620                 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
621                 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
622                         continue;
623                 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
624                  * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
625                  * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
626                  * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
627                  */
628                 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
629                         {
630                         NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
631                         if (nc)
632                                 {
633                                 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
634                                 if (rv != X509_V_OK)
635                                         {
636                                         ctx->error = rv;
637                                         ctx->error_depth = i;
638                                         ctx->current_cert = x;
639                                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
640                                                 return 0;
641                                         }
642                                 }
643                         }
644                 }
645         return 1;
646         }
647
648 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
649 {
650 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
651         return 1;
652 #else
653         int i, ok;
654         X509 *x;
655         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
656         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
657 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
658         i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
659         x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
660         ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
661         if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
662                 return 1;
663         ctx->error_depth = i;
664         ctx->current_cert = x;
665         if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
666                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
667         else
668                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
669         ok = cb(0, ctx);
670         return ok;
671 #endif
672 }
673
674 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
675         {
676         int i, last, ok;
677         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
678                 return 1;
679         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
680                 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
681         else
682                 {
683                 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
684                 if (ctx->parent)
685                         return 1;
686                 last = 0;
687                 }
688         for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
689                 {
690                 ctx->error_depth = i;
691                 ok = check_cert(ctx);
692                 if (!ok) return ok;
693                 }
694         return 1;
695         }
696
697 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
698         {
699         X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
700         X509 *x;
701         int ok, cnum;
702         cnum = ctx->error_depth;
703         x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
704         ctx->current_cert = x;
705         ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
706         ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
707         ctx->current_reasons = 0;
708         while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
709                 {
710                 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
711                 if (ctx->get_crl)
712                         ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
713                 else
714                         ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
715                 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
716                  * notify callback
717                  */
718                 if(!ok)
719                         {
720                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
721                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
722                         goto err;
723                         }
724                 ctx->current_crl = crl;
725                 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
726                 if (!ok)
727                         goto err;
728
729                 if (dcrl)
730                         {
731                         ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
732                         if (!ok)
733                                 goto err;
734                         ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
735                         if (!ok)
736                                 goto err;
737                         }
738                 else
739                         ok = 1;
740
741                 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
742                 if (ok != 2)
743                         {
744                         ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
745                         if (!ok)
746                                 goto err;
747                         }
748
749                 X509_CRL_free(crl);
750                 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
751                 crl = NULL;
752                 dcrl = NULL;
753                 }
754         err:
755         X509_CRL_free(crl);
756         X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
757
758         ctx->current_crl = NULL;
759         return ok;
760
761         }
762
763 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
764
765 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
766         {
767         time_t *ptime;
768         int i;
769         if (notify)
770                 ctx->current_crl = crl;
771         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
772                 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
773         else
774                 ptime = NULL;
775
776         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
777         if (i == 0)
778                 {
779                 if (!notify)
780                         return 0;
781                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
782                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
783                         return 0;
784                 }
785
786         if (i > 0)
787                 {
788                 if (!notify)
789                         return 0;
790                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
791                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
792                         return 0;
793                 }
794
795         if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
796                 {
797                 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
798
799                 if (i == 0)
800                         {
801                         if (!notify)
802                                 return 0;
803                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
804                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
805                                 return 0;
806                         }
807                 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
808                 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
809                         {
810                         if (!notify)
811                                 return 0;
812                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
813                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
814                                 return 0;
815                         }
816                 }
817
818         if (notify)
819                 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
820
821         return 1;
822         }
823
824 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
825                         X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
826                         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
827         {
828         int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
829         unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
830         X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
831         X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
832         X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
833
834         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
835                 {
836                 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
837                 reasons = *preasons;
838                 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
839
840                 if (crl_score > best_score)
841                         {
842                         best_crl = crl;
843                         best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
844                         best_score = crl_score;
845                         best_reasons = reasons;
846                         }
847                 }
848
849         if (best_crl)
850                 {
851                 if (*pcrl)
852                         X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
853                 *pcrl = best_crl;
854                 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
855                 *pscore = best_score;
856                 *preasons = best_reasons;
857                 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
858                 if (*pdcrl)
859                         {
860                         X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
861                         *pdcrl = NULL;
862                         }
863                 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
864                 }
865
866         if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
867                 return 1;
868
869         return 0;
870         }
871
872 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
873  * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
874  */
875
876 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
877         {
878         ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
879         int i;
880         i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, 0);
881         if (i >= 0)
882                 {
883                 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
884                 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
885                         return 0;
886                 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
887                 }
888         else
889                 exta = NULL;
890
891         i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, 0);
892
893         if (i >= 0)
894                 {
895
896                 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
897                         return 0;
898                 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
899                 }
900         else
901                 extb = NULL;
902
903         if (!exta && !extb)
904                 return 1;
905
906         if (!exta || !extb)
907                 return 0;
908
909
910         if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
911                 return 0;
912
913         return 1;
914         }
915
916 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
917
918 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
919         {
920         /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
921         if (!delta->base_crl_number)
922                         return 0;
923         /* Base must have a CRL number */
924         if (!base->crl_number)
925                         return 0;
926         /* Issuer names must match */
927         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
928                                 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
929                 return 0;
930         /* AKID and IDP must match */
931         if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
932                         return 0;
933         if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
934                         return 0;
935         /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
936         if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
937                         return 0;
938         /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
939         if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
940                         return 1;
941         return 0;
942         }
943
944 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
945  * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
946  */
947
948 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
949                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
950         {
951         X509_CRL *delta;
952         int i;
953         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
954                 return;
955         if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
956                 return;
957         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
958                 {
959                 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
960                 if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
961                         {
962                         if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
963                                 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
964                         CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
965                         *dcrl = delta;
966                         return;
967                         }
968                 }
969         *dcrl = NULL;
970         }
971
972 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
973  * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
974  * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
975  * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
976  * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
977  */
978
979 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
980                         unsigned int *preasons,
981                         X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
982         {
983
984         int crl_score = 0;
985         unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
986
987         /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
988
989         /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
990         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
991                 return 0;
992         /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
993         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
994                 {
995                 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
996                         return 0;
997                 }
998         else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
999                 {
1000                 /* If no new reasons reject */
1001                 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1002                         return 0;
1003                 }
1004         /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1005         else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1006                 return 0;
1007         /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1008         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
1009                 {
1010                 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1011                         return 0;
1012                 }
1013         else
1014                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1015
1016         if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1017                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1018
1019         /* Check expiry */
1020         if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1021                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1022
1023         /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1024         crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1025
1026         /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1027
1028         if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1029                 return 0;
1030
1031         /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1032
1033         if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
1034                 {
1035                 /* If no new reasons reject */
1036                 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1037                         return 0;
1038                 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1039                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1040                 }
1041
1042         *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1043
1044         return crl_score;
1045
1046         }
1047
1048 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1049                                 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1050         {
1051         X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1052         X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1053         int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1054         int i;
1055
1056         if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1057                 cidx++;
1058
1059         crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1060
1061         if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1062                 {
1063                 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
1064                         {
1065                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1066                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1067                         return;
1068                         }
1069                 }
1070
1071         for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
1072                 {
1073                 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1074                 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1075                         continue;
1076                 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1077                         {
1078                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1079                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1080                         return;
1081                         }
1082                 }
1083
1084         /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1085
1086         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1087                 return;
1088
1089         /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
1090          * set of untrusted certificates.
1091          */
1092         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
1093                 {
1094                 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1095                 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1096                         continue;
1097                 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1098                         {
1099                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1100                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1101                         return;
1102                         }
1103                 }
1104         }
1105
1106 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1107  * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1108  * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
1109  * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in 
1110  * practice.
1111  */
1112
1113 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1114         {
1115         X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1116         int ret;
1117         /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1118         if (ctx->parent)
1119                 return 0;
1120         if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1121                 return -1;
1122
1123         crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1124         /* Copy verify params across */
1125         X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1126
1127         crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1128         crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1129
1130         /* Verify CRL issuer */
1131         ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1132
1133         if (ret <= 0)
1134                 goto err;
1135
1136         /* Check chain is acceptable */
1137
1138         ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1139         err:
1140         X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1141         return ret;
1142         }
1143
1144 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
1145  * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
1146  * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
1147  * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
1148  * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
1149  * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
1150  */
1151
1152 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1153                         STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1154                         STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1155         {
1156         X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1157         cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1158         crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1159         if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1160                 return 1;
1161         return 0;
1162         }
1163
1164 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1165  * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1166  * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1167  * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1168  * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1169  */
1170
1171
1172 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1173         {
1174         X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1175         GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1176         GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1177         int i, j;
1178         if (!a || !b)
1179                 return 1;
1180         if (a->type == 1)
1181                 {
1182                 if (!a->dpname)
1183                         return 0;
1184                 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1185                 if (b->type == 1)
1186                         {
1187                         if (!b->dpname)
1188                                 return 0;
1189                         if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1190                                 return 1;
1191                         else
1192                                 return 0;
1193                         }
1194                 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1195                 nm = a->dpname;
1196                 gens = b->name.fullname;
1197                 }
1198         else if (b->type == 1)
1199                 {
1200                 if (!b->dpname)
1201                         return 0;
1202                 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1203                 gens = a->name.fullname;
1204                 nm = b->dpname;
1205                 }
1206
1207         /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1208         if (nm)
1209                 {
1210                 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
1211                         {
1212                         gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);  
1213                         if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1214                                 continue;
1215                         if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1216                                 return 1;
1217                         }
1218                 return 0;
1219                 }
1220
1221         /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1222
1223         for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
1224                 {
1225                 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1226                 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
1227                         {
1228                         genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1229                         if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1230                                 return 1;
1231                         }
1232                 }
1233
1234         return 0;
1235
1236         }
1237
1238 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1239         {
1240         int i;
1241         X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1242         /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1243         if (!dp->CRLissuer)
1244                 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1245         for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
1246                 {
1247                 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1248                 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1249                         continue;
1250                 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1251                         return 1;
1252                 }
1253         return 0;
1254         }
1255
1256 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1257
1258 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1259                                 unsigned int *preasons)
1260         {
1261         int i;
1262         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1263                 return 0;
1264         if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
1265                 {
1266                 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1267                         return 0;
1268                 }
1269         else
1270                 {
1271                 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1272                         return 0;
1273                 }
1274         *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1275         for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
1276                 {
1277                 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1278                 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
1279                         {
1280                         if (!crl->idp ||
1281                              idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
1282                                 {
1283                                 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1284                                 return 1;
1285                                 }
1286                         }
1287                 }
1288         if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1289                 return 1;
1290         return 0;
1291         }
1292
1293 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
1294  * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
1295  */
1296         
1297 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1298                                 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1299         {
1300         int ok;
1301         X509 *issuer = NULL;
1302         int crl_score = 0;
1303         unsigned int reasons;
1304         X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1305         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1306         X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1307         reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1308         ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, 
1309                                 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1310
1311         if (ok)
1312                 goto done;
1313
1314         /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1315
1316         skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1317
1318         /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1319         if (!skcrl && crl)
1320                 goto done;
1321
1322         get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1323
1324         sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1325
1326         done:
1327
1328         /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1329         if (crl)
1330                 {
1331                 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1332                 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1333                 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1334                 *pcrl = crl;
1335                 *pdcrl = dcrl;
1336                 return 1;
1337                 }
1338
1339         return 0;
1340         }
1341
1342 /* Check CRL validity */
1343 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1344         {
1345         X509 *issuer = NULL;
1346         EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1347         int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1348         cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1349         chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1350         /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1351         if (ctx->current_issuer)
1352                 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1353
1354         /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
1355          * is next certificate in chain.
1356          */
1357         else if (cnum < chnum)
1358                 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1359         else
1360                 {
1361                 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1362                 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1363                 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
1364                         {
1365                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1366                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1367                         if(!ok) goto err;
1368                         }
1369                 }
1370
1371         if(issuer)
1372                 {
1373                 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
1374                  * been done
1375                  */
1376                 if (!crl->base_crl_number)
1377                         {
1378                         /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1379                         if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1380                                 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
1381                                 {
1382                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1383                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1384                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1385                                 }
1386
1387                         if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
1388                                 {
1389                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1390                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1391                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1392                                 }
1393
1394                         if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
1395                                 {
1396                                 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0)
1397                                         {
1398                                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1399                                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1400                                         if(!ok) goto err;
1401                                         }
1402                                 }
1403
1404                         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1405                                 {
1406                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1407                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1408                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1409                                 }
1410
1411
1412                         }
1413
1414                 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
1415                         {
1416                         ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1417                         if (!ok)
1418                                 goto err;
1419                         }
1420
1421                 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1422                 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1423
1424                 if(!ikey)
1425                         {
1426                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1427                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1428                         if (!ok) goto err;
1429                         }
1430                 else
1431                         {
1432                         /* Verify CRL signature */
1433                         if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
1434                                 {
1435                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1436                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1437                                 if (!ok) goto err;
1438                                 }
1439                         }
1440                 }
1441
1442         ok = 1;
1443
1444         err:
1445         EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1446         return ok;
1447         }
1448
1449 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1450 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1451         {
1452         int ok;
1453         X509_REVOKED *rev;
1454         /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
1455          * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
1456          * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since 
1457          * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
1458          */
1459         if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
1460                 {
1461                 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1462                         return 1;
1463                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1464                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1465                 if(!ok)
1466                         return 0;
1467                 }
1468         /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
1469          * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
1470          */
1471         if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
1472                 {
1473                 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1474                         return 2;
1475                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1476                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1477                 if (!ok)
1478                         return 0;
1479                 }
1480
1481         return 1;
1482         }
1483
1484 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1485         {
1486         int ret;
1487         if (ctx->parent)
1488                 return 1;
1489         ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1490                                 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1491         if (ret == 0)
1492                 {
1493                 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1494                 return 0;
1495                 }
1496         /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1497         if (ret == -1)
1498                 {
1499                 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
1500                  * callback.
1501                  */
1502                 X509 *x;
1503                 int i;
1504                 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
1505                         {
1506                         x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1507                         if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1508                                 continue;
1509                         ctx->current_cert = x;
1510                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1511                         if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1512                                 return 0;
1513                         }
1514                 return 1;
1515                 }
1516         if (ret == -2)
1517                 {
1518                 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1519                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1520                 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1521                 }
1522
1523         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
1524                 {
1525                 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1526                 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1527                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1528                         return 0;
1529                 }
1530
1531         return 1;
1532         }
1533
1534 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1535         {
1536         time_t *ptime;
1537         int i;
1538
1539         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1540                 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1541         else
1542                 ptime = NULL;
1543
1544         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1545         if (i == 0)
1546                 {
1547                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1548                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1549                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1550                         return 0;
1551                 }
1552
1553         if (i > 0)
1554                 {
1555                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1556                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1557                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1558                         return 0;
1559                 }
1560
1561         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1562         if (i == 0)
1563                 {
1564                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1565                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1566                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1567                         return 0;
1568                 }
1569
1570         if (i < 0)
1571                 {
1572                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1573                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1574                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1575                         return 0;
1576                 }
1577
1578         return 1;
1579         }
1580
1581 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1582         {
1583         int ok=0,n;
1584         X509 *xs,*xi;
1585         EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1586         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1587
1588         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
1589
1590         n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1591         ctx->error_depth=n-1;
1592         n--;
1593         xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1594
1595         if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1596                 xs=xi;
1597         else
1598                 {
1599                 if (n <= 0)
1600                         {
1601                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1602                         ctx->current_cert=xi;
1603                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
1604                         goto end;
1605                         }
1606                 else
1607                         {
1608                         n--;
1609                         ctx->error_depth=n;
1610                         xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1611                         }
1612                 }
1613
1614 /*      ctx->error=0;  not needed */
1615         while (n >= 0)
1616                 {
1617                 ctx->error_depth=n;
1618
1619                 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1620                  * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
1621                  * just wastes time.
1622                  */
1623                 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
1624                         {
1625                         if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
1626                                 {
1627                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1628                                 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1629                                 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1630                                 if (!ok) goto end;
1631                                 }
1632                         else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1633                                 {
1634                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1635                                 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1636                                 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1637                                 if (!ok)
1638                                         {
1639                                         EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1640                                         goto end;
1641                                         }
1642                                 }
1643                         EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1644                         pkey=NULL;
1645                         }
1646
1647                 xs->valid = 1;
1648
1649                 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1650                 if (!ok)
1651                         goto end;
1652
1653                 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1654                 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1655                 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1656                 ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
1657                 if (!ok) goto end;
1658
1659                 n--;
1660                 if (n >= 0)
1661                         {
1662                         xi=xs;
1663                         xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1664                         }
1665                 }
1666         ok=1;
1667 end:
1668         return ok;
1669         }
1670
1671 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1672 {
1673         return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1674 }
1675
1676 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1677         {
1678         char *str;
1679         ASN1_TIME atm;
1680         long offset;
1681         char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1682         int i,j;
1683
1684         p=buff1;
1685         i=ctm->length;
1686         str=(char *)ctm->data;
1687         if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1688                 {
1689                 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1690                 memcpy(p,str,10);
1691                 p+=10;
1692                 str+=10;
1693                 }
1694         else
1695                 {
1696                 if (i < 13) return 0;
1697                 memcpy(p,str,12);
1698                 p+=12;
1699                 str+=12;
1700                 }
1701
1702         if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1703                 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1704         else
1705                 { 
1706                 *(p++)= *(str++);
1707                 *(p++)= *(str++);
1708                 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1709                 if (*str == '.')
1710                         {
1711                         str++;
1712                         while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1713                         }
1714                 
1715                 }
1716         *(p++)='Z';
1717         *(p++)='\0';
1718
1719         if (*str == 'Z')
1720                 offset=0;
1721         else
1722                 {
1723                 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1724                         return 0;
1725                 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1726                 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1727                 if (*str == '-')
1728                         offset= -offset;
1729                 }
1730         atm.type=ctm->type;
1731         atm.flags = 0;
1732         atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1733         atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1734
1735         if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1736                 return 0;
1737
1738         if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1739                 {
1740                 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1741                 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1742                 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1743                 if (j < 50) j+=100;
1744
1745                 if (i < j) return -1;
1746                 if (i > j) return 1;
1747                 }
1748         i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1749         if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1750                 return -1;
1751         else
1752                 return i;
1753         }
1754
1755 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1756 {
1757         return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1758 }
1759
1760 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1761         {
1762         return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1763         }
1764
1765 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1766                                 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1767         {
1768         time_t t;
1769
1770         if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1771         else time(&t);
1772
1773         if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
1774                 {
1775                 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1776                         return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1777                 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1778                         return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
1779                                                                 offset_sec);
1780                 }
1781         return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1782         }
1783
1784 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1785         {
1786         EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1787         int i,j;
1788
1789         if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1790
1791         for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1792                 {
1793                 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1794                 if (ktmp == NULL)
1795                         {
1796                         X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1797                         return 0;
1798                         }
1799                 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1800                         break;
1801                 else
1802                         {
1803                         EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1804                         ktmp=NULL;
1805                         }
1806                 }
1807         if (ktmp == NULL)
1808                 {
1809                 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1810                 return 0;
1811                 }
1812
1813         /* first, populate the other certs */
1814         for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1815                 {
1816                 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1817                 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1818                 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1819                 }
1820         
1821         if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1822         EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1823         return 1;
1824         }
1825
1826 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
1827              CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
1828         {
1829         /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
1830          * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
1831         return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
1832                         new_func, dup_func, free_func);
1833         }
1834
1835 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
1836         {
1837         return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
1838         }
1839
1840 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
1841         {
1842         return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
1843         }
1844
1845 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1846         {
1847         return ctx->error;
1848         }
1849
1850 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
1851         {
1852         ctx->error=err;
1853         }
1854
1855 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1856         {
1857         return ctx->error_depth;
1858         }
1859
1860 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1861         {
1862         return ctx->current_cert;
1863         }
1864
1865 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1866         {
1867         return ctx->chain;
1868         }
1869
1870 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1871         {
1872         int i;
1873         X509 *x;
1874         STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
1875         if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
1876         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1877                 {
1878                 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1879                 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1880                 }
1881         return chain;
1882         }
1883
1884 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1885         {
1886         return ctx->current_issuer;
1887         }
1888
1889 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1890         {
1891         return ctx->current_crl;
1892         }
1893
1894 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1895         {
1896         return ctx->parent;
1897         }
1898
1899 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1900         {
1901         ctx->cert=x;
1902         }
1903
1904 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1905         {
1906         ctx->untrusted=sk;
1907         }
1908
1909 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
1910         {
1911         ctx->crls=sk;
1912         }
1913
1914 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
1915         {
1916         return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
1917         }
1918
1919 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
1920         {
1921         return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
1922         }
1923
1924 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
1925  * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
1926  * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
1927  * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
1928  * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
1929  * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
1930  * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
1931  * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
1932  */
1933
1934 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
1935                                 int purpose, int trust)
1936 {
1937         int idx;
1938         /* If purpose not set use default */
1939         if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
1940         /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
1941         if (purpose)
1942                 {
1943                 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
1944                 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
1945                 if (idx == -1)
1946                         {
1947                         X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1948                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1949                         return 0;
1950                         }
1951                 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1952                 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
1953                         {
1954                         idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
1955                         if (idx == -1)
1956                                 {
1957                                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1958                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1959                                 return 0;
1960                                 }
1961                         ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1962                         }
1963                 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
1964                 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
1965                 }
1966         if (trust)
1967                 {
1968                 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
1969                 if (idx == -1)
1970                         {
1971                         X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1972                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
1973                         return 0;
1974                         }
1975                 }
1976
1977         if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
1978         if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
1979         return 1;
1980 }
1981
1982 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
1983 {
1984         X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
1985         ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1986         if (!ctx)
1987                 {
1988                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1989                 return NULL;
1990                 }
1991         memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1992         return ctx;
1993 }
1994
1995 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1996 {
1997         X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
1998         OPENSSL_free(ctx);
1999 }
2000
2001 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2002              STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2003         {
2004         int ret = 1;
2005         ctx->ctx=store;
2006         ctx->current_method=0;
2007         ctx->cert=x509;
2008         ctx->untrusted=chain;
2009         ctx->crls = NULL;
2010         ctx->last_untrusted=0;
2011         ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
2012         ctx->valid=0;
2013         ctx->chain=NULL;
2014         ctx->error=0;
2015         ctx->explicit_policy=0;
2016         ctx->error_depth=0;
2017         ctx->current_cert=NULL;
2018         ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
2019         ctx->current_crl=NULL;
2020         ctx->current_crl_score=0;
2021         ctx->current_reasons=0;
2022         ctx->tree = NULL;
2023         ctx->parent = NULL;
2024
2025         ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2026
2027         if (!ctx->param)
2028                 {
2029                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2030                 return 0;
2031                 }
2032
2033         /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
2034          * use defaults.
2035          */
2036
2037
2038         if (store)
2039                 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2040         else
2041                 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2042
2043         if (store)
2044                 {
2045                 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2046                 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2047                 }
2048         else
2049                 ctx->cleanup = 0;
2050
2051         if (ret)
2052                 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2053                                         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2054
2055         if (ret == 0)
2056                 {
2057                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2058                 return 0;
2059                 }
2060
2061         if (store && store->check_issued)
2062                 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2063         else
2064                 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2065
2066         if (store && store->get_issuer)
2067                 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2068         else
2069                 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2070
2071         if (store && store->verify_cb)
2072                 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2073         else
2074                 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2075
2076         if (store && store->verify)
2077                 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2078         else
2079                 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2080
2081         if (store && store->check_revocation)
2082                 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2083         else
2084                 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2085
2086         if (store && store->get_crl)
2087                 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2088         else
2089                 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2090
2091         if (store && store->check_crl)
2092                 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2093         else
2094                 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2095
2096         if (store && store->cert_crl)
2097                 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2098         else
2099                 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2100
2101         if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2102                 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2103         else
2104                 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2105
2106         if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2107                 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2108         else
2109                 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2110
2111         ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2112
2113
2114         /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2115          * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2116          * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
2117         /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2118         if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2119                                 &(ctx->ex_data)))
2120                 {
2121                 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2122                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2123                 return 0;
2124                 }
2125         return 1;
2126         }
2127
2128 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
2129  * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2130  */
2131
2132 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2133 {
2134         ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2135         ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2136 }
2137
2138 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2139         {
2140         if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2141         if (ctx->param != NULL)
2142                 {
2143                 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2144                         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2145                 ctx->param=NULL;
2146                 }
2147         if (ctx->tree != NULL)
2148                 {
2149                 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2150                 ctx->tree=NULL;
2151                 }
2152         if (ctx->chain != NULL)
2153                 {
2154                 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
2155                 ctx->chain=NULL;
2156                 }
2157         CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2158         memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2159         }
2160
2161 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2162         {
2163         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2164         }
2165
2166 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2167         {
2168         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2169         }
2170
2171 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
2172         {
2173         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2174         }
2175
2176 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2177                                   int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2178         {
2179         ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
2180         }
2181
2182 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2183         {
2184         return ctx->tree;
2185         }
2186
2187 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2188         {
2189         return ctx->explicit_policy;
2190         }
2191
2192 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2193         {
2194         const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2195         param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2196         if (!param)
2197                 return 0;
2198         return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2199         }
2200
2201 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2202         {
2203         return ctx->param;
2204         }
2205
2206 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2207         {
2208         if (ctx->param)
2209                 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2210         ctx->param = param;
2211         }
2212
2213 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2214 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2215
2216 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2217
2218 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2219 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)