2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
128 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
131 tls1_setup_key_block,
132 tls1_generate_master_secret,
133 tls1_change_cipher_state,
134 tls1_final_finish_mac,
135 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
136 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 tls1_export_keying_material,
143 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
145 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
146 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
152 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
153 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
157 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
160 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
162 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
164 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
168 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
171 s->version = s->method->version;
174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
176 static int nid_list[] =
178 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
179 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
180 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
181 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
182 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
183 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
184 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
185 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
186 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
187 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
188 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
189 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
190 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
191 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
192 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
193 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
194 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
195 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
196 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
197 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
198 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
199 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
200 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
201 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
202 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
205 static int pref_list[] =
207 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
208 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
209 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
210 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
211 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
212 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
213 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
214 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
215 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
216 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
217 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
218 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
220 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
221 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
222 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
223 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
224 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
225 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
226 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
227 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
228 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
229 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
230 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
231 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
234 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
236 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
237 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
238 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
240 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
243 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
245 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
248 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
250 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
252 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
254 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
256 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
258 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
260 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
262 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
264 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
266 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
268 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
270 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
272 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
274 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
276 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
278 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
280 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
282 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
284 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
286 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
288 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
290 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
292 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
294 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
296 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
302 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
306 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
307 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
310 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
311 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
313 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
316 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
317 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
319 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
322 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
323 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
325 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
328 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
329 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
330 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
331 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
333 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
335 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
336 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
339 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
340 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
343 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
345 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
346 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
350 int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
352 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
354 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
359 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
363 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
366 unsigned char *ret = p;
368 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
369 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
370 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
375 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
377 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
379 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
380 unsigned long size_str;
383 /* check for enough space.
384 4 for the servername type and entension length
385 2 for servernamelist length
386 1 for the hostname type
387 2 for hostname length
391 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
392 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
395 /* extension type and length */
396 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
399 /* length of servername list */
402 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
403 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
405 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
409 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
414 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
420 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
422 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
425 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
435 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
436 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
437 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
439 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
440 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
446 /* check for enough space.
447 4 for the srp type type and entension length
448 1 for the srp user identity
449 + srp user identity length
451 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
453 /* fill in the extension */
454 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
455 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
456 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
457 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
463 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
464 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
466 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
469 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
470 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
471 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
477 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
478 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
479 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
480 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
481 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
483 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
484 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
486 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
489 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
490 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
491 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
497 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
498 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
500 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
501 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
502 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
503 * resolves this to two bytes.
505 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
506 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
507 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
509 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
511 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
514 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
515 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
516 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
517 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
519 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
520 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
521 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
523 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
524 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
526 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
530 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
531 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
533 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
536 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
537 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
541 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
547 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
549 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
551 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
552 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
553 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
554 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
555 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
558 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
559 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
560 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
562 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
564 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
566 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
569 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
572 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
577 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
578 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
581 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
585 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
587 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
588 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
594 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
596 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
603 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
604 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
605 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
607 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
608 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
610 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
612 /* save position of id len */
613 unsigned char *q = ret;
614 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
615 /* skip over id len */
617 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
623 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
626 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
627 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
628 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
631 * 1: peer may send requests
632 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
634 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
635 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
637 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
640 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
641 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
643 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
644 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
645 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
647 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
652 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
653 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
657 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
659 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
661 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
664 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
673 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
680 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
683 unsigned char *ret = p;
684 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
685 int next_proto_neg_seen;
688 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
689 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
693 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
695 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
697 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
699 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
703 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
707 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
713 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
715 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
718 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
727 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
728 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
729 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
731 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
734 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
735 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
736 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
738 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
742 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
743 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
744 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
745 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
746 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
749 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
750 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
752 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
753 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
755 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
756 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
760 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
762 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
763 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
767 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
768 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
769 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
771 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
773 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
775 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
778 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
781 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
786 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
791 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
793 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
795 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
798 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
800 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
807 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
808 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
809 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
810 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
811 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
812 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
813 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
814 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
815 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
816 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
817 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
822 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
823 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
824 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
826 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
829 * 1: peer may send requests
830 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
832 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
833 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
835 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
840 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
841 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
842 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
843 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
845 const unsigned char *npa;
849 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
850 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
852 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
853 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
855 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
857 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
862 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
869 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
874 unsigned char *data = *p;
875 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
878 s->servername_done = 0;
879 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
880 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
881 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
884 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
885 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
886 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
893 if (data > (d+n-len))
896 while (data <= (d+n-4))
901 if (data+size > (d+n))
904 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
906 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
907 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
908 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
909 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
911 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
912 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
913 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
914 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
915 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
916 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
917 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
918 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
919 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
920 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
921 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
922 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
923 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
924 the value of the Host: field.
925 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
926 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
927 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
928 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
932 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
934 unsigned char *sdata;
940 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
947 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
954 servname_type = *(sdata++);
960 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
963 if (s->servername_done == 0)
964 switch (servname_type)
966 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
969 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
971 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
974 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
976 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
979 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
981 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
984 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
985 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
986 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
987 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
988 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
989 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
992 s->servername_done = 1;
996 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
997 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
998 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1010 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1015 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1016 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1018 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1020 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1023 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1025 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1028 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1030 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1031 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1033 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1035 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1041 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1042 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1043 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1045 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1046 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1048 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1050 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1055 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1057 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1058 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1060 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1061 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1063 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1066 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1067 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1070 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1071 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1072 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1073 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1074 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1077 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1078 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1080 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1081 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1082 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1084 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1085 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
1087 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1092 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1094 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1097 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1098 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1100 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1103 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1104 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1107 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1108 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1109 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1110 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1111 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1114 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1115 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1116 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1117 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1119 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1123 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1126 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1127 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1129 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1133 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1134 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1135 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1136 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1138 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1139 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1141 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1146 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1148 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1149 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1151 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1155 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1157 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1159 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1161 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1164 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
1166 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1172 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
1174 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1177 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1179 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1183 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1184 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1189 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1193 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1195 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1197 const unsigned char *sdata;
1199 /* Read in responder_id_list */
1204 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1213 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1217 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
1221 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1226 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
1230 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1235 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1236 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1239 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
1240 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
1241 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
1243 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1244 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1247 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
1248 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
1250 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1251 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1256 /* Read in request_extensions */
1259 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1266 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1272 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1274 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
1275 X509_EXTENSION_free);
1278 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1279 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
1281 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
1282 || (data + dsize != sdata))
1284 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1289 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
1293 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1295 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1296 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1300 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
1301 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1303 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
1304 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1305 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1307 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1312 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1313 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1314 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1316 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1319 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1320 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1321 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1322 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1323 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1324 * anything like that, but this might change).
1326 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1327 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1328 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1329 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1330 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
1331 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1335 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1336 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1337 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1339 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1352 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1354 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1355 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1357 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1359 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1366 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1367 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1368 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1369 * the length of the block. */
1370 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1372 unsigned int off = 0;
1386 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1388 unsigned short length;
1389 unsigned short type;
1390 unsigned short size;
1391 unsigned char *data = *p;
1392 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1393 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1396 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1400 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1401 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1404 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1408 if (data+length != d+n)
1410 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1414 while(data <= (d+n-4))
1419 if (data+size > (d+n))
1422 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1423 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1424 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1426 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1428 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
1430 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1433 tlsext_servername = 1;
1436 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1437 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1438 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1440 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1441 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1443 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1444 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
1446 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1449 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1450 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1451 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1453 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1456 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1457 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1459 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1460 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1461 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1462 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1463 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1466 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1468 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1470 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1471 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1473 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1476 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1479 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1482 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1484 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1485 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1486 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1488 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1492 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1495 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1496 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1498 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1502 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1503 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1504 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1505 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1507 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1509 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1511 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1516 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1517 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1519 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
1520 * a status request message.
1522 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
1524 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1527 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1528 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1531 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1532 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1534 unsigned char *selected;
1535 unsigned char selected_len;
1537 /* We must have requested it. */
1538 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
1540 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1543 /* The data must be valid */
1544 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
1546 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1549 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1551 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1554 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1555 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
1557 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1560 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1561 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1562 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1565 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1567 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1569 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1571 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1572 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1576 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
1577 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1579 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
1580 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1581 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1583 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1588 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1589 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1591 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1602 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1606 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
1608 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
1610 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
1612 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1613 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1615 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1621 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1631 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
1632 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
1633 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
1634 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
1635 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
1636 * absence on initial connect only.
1638 if (!renegotiate_seen
1639 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1640 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1642 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1644 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1652 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1654 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1655 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
1656 * and elliptic curves we support.
1661 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1662 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1664 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1666 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1668 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1669 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1670 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1676 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
1679 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1680 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1685 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1686 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1687 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1688 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1690 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
1691 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
1692 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2;
1693 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1695 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1699 for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <
1700 sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++)
1702 int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]);
1706 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1708 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1712 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1714 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1719 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1721 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1722 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1724 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1725 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1727 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1728 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1730 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1733 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1737 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
1738 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1745 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1747 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1748 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
1749 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
1750 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
1753 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1754 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1755 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1756 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1760 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1761 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1766 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1767 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1768 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1769 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1771 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1776 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
1778 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1779 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1781 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1782 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1783 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1785 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1786 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1790 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1791 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1792 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1793 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1795 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1797 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
1798 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
1799 * so this has to happen here in
1800 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
1804 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1806 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1809 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1810 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1815 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1816 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1817 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
1819 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1821 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1822 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
1824 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
1825 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
1827 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1828 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1830 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1831 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1833 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1834 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1837 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1841 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1843 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
1844 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
1845 * abort the handshake.
1847 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1848 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1856 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1857 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1860 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1861 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1864 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1865 s->servername_done=0;
1871 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
1873 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1876 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
1877 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
1878 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
1879 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
1881 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1884 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
1885 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
1886 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1887 if (certpkey == NULL)
1889 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1892 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
1893 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
1895 s->cert->key = certpkey;
1896 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1899 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1900 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1901 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1903 /* status request response should be sent */
1904 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1905 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1906 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1908 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1910 /* something bad happened */
1911 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1912 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1913 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1918 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1923 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1924 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1927 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1928 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1936 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1938 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1939 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1941 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1942 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
1943 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
1944 * it must contain uncompressed.
1946 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1947 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1948 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1949 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1950 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1952 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
1954 unsigned char *list;
1955 int found_uncompressed = 0;
1956 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1957 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1959 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
1961 found_uncompressed = 1;
1965 if (!found_uncompressed)
1967 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
1971 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1972 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1974 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1975 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1976 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1977 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1979 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1980 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
1982 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
1983 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
1985 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1987 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1988 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1991 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
1992 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
1993 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
1994 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
1996 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1997 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2002 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2005 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2006 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2009 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2010 * there is no response.
2012 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2014 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2015 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2017 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2018 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2021 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2022 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2026 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2027 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2033 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2034 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2037 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2038 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2041 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2042 s->servername_done=0;
2048 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2049 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2050 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2052 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2053 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2054 * extension, if any.
2055 * len: the length of the session ID.
2056 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2057 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2058 * point to the resulting session.
2060 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2061 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2062 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2065 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2066 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2067 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2068 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2069 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2070 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2071 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2074 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2075 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2076 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2077 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2078 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2079 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2081 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2082 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2084 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2085 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2089 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2091 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2092 * to permit stateful resumption.
2094 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2096 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2100 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2101 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2108 /* Skip past cipher list */
2113 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2118 /* Now at start of extensions */
2119 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2122 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
2124 unsigned short type, size;
2127 if (p + size > limit)
2129 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2134 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
2135 * currently have one. */
2136 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2139 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
2141 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
2142 * decrypted rather than generating the session
2143 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
2144 * handshake based on external mechanism to
2145 * calculate the master secret later. */
2148 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2151 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2152 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2154 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2156 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2157 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2159 default: /* fatal error */
2168 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2170 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2171 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
2172 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2173 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2174 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2175 * point to the resulting session.
2178 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2179 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2180 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2181 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2183 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
2184 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
2185 SSL_SESSION **psess)
2188 unsigned char *sdec;
2189 const unsigned char *p;
2190 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
2191 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2194 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2195 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2198 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2199 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2200 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2201 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2203 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2204 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2215 /* Check key name matches */
2216 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
2218 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2219 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2220 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2221 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
2223 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
2224 * integrity checks on ticket.
2226 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
2229 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2233 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2234 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
2235 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
2236 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2237 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
2239 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2240 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2241 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2242 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2243 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
2246 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2249 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
2250 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
2253 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2256 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
2260 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
2261 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
2262 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
2263 * as required by standard.
2266 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2267 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2275 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
2280 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
2288 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
2289 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2290 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
2292 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2293 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
2295 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2296 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
2297 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
2299 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2300 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
2301 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
2305 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2306 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2307 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2309 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2310 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2312 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2313 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
2317 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2320 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2322 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2328 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2331 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2333 if (table[i].id == id)
2334 return table[i].nid;
2340 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
2345 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
2346 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2349 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
2352 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
2353 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
2357 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
2359 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
2360 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2363 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
2367 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2368 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
2375 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2376 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
2379 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2380 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
2381 return EVP_sha224();
2383 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
2384 return EVP_sha256();
2386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2387 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
2388 return EVP_sha384();
2390 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
2391 return EVP_sha512();
2399 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2401 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
2406 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
2407 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
2409 /* Should never happen */
2413 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2414 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2415 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
2416 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
2418 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2)
2420 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1];
2424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2425 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
2426 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
2429 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2430 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
2431 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
2434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2435 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
2443 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
2445 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
2448 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
2449 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
2450 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
2457 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
2458 * supported it stays as NULL.
2460 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2461 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
2462 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2464 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2465 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
2467 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2468 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2471 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2472 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
2473 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2482 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2484 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
2485 unsigned short hbtype;
2486 unsigned int payload;
2487 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2489 /* Read type and payload length first */
2494 if (s->msg_callback)
2495 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2496 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
2497 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2499 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
2501 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
2504 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
2505 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
2506 * payload, plus padding
2508 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2511 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
2512 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
2514 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
2516 /* Random padding */
2517 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
2519 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
2521 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
2522 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2523 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
2524 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2526 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
2531 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
2535 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
2536 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
2537 * sequence number */
2540 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
2543 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
2551 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2553 unsigned char *buf, *p;
2555 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
2556 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2558 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
2559 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
2560 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
2562 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
2566 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
2567 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
2569 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
2573 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
2574 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
2576 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2580 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
2581 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
2583 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
2585 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
2586 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
2587 * some random stuff.
2588 * - Message Type, 1 byte
2589 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
2590 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
2591 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
2594 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2597 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
2598 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
2600 /* Sequence number */
2601 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
2602 /* 16 random bytes */
2603 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
2605 /* Random padding */
2606 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
2608 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
2611 if (s->msg_callback)
2612 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2613 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
2614 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2616 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;