1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
184 ssl_undefined_function,
185 ssl3_get_server_method)
187 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
190 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
191 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
193 int new_state,state,skip=0;
195 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
199 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
201 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
202 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
204 /* init things to blank */
206 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
220 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
222 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
226 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
227 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
230 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
232 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
237 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
239 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
241 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
246 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
254 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
261 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
263 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
265 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
266 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
268 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
271 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
272 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
274 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
275 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
277 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
278 * client that doesn't support secure
281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
282 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
288 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
289 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
290 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
291 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
295 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
296 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
299 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
300 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
301 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
302 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
305 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
308 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
312 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
313 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
314 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
317 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
318 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
321 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
325 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
326 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
327 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
328 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
332 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
333 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
335 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
339 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
342 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
346 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
347 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
348 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
349 /* normal PSK or KRB5 */
350 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
351 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
352 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
354 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
355 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
356 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
357 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
358 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
360 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
365 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
372 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
377 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
378 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
379 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
381 /* clear this, it may get reset by
382 * send_server_key_exchange */
383 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
385 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
386 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
388 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
389 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
390 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
391 * be able to handle this) */
392 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
394 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
397 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
398 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
400 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
402 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
403 * message only if the cipher suite is either
404 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
405 * server certificate contains the server's
406 * public key for key exchange.
408 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
409 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
410 * hint if provided */
411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
412 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
414 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
415 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
416 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
417 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
418 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
419 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
425 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
426 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
431 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
435 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
436 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
437 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
438 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
439 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
440 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
441 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
442 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
443 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
444 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
445 * and in RFC 2246): */
446 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
447 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
448 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
449 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
450 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
451 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
452 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
453 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
454 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
456 /* no cert request */
458 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
459 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
463 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
464 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
465 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
466 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
467 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
469 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
470 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
476 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
477 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
478 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
479 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
480 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
481 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
485 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
487 /* This code originally checked to see if
488 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
489 * and then flushed. This caused problems
490 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
491 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
492 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
493 * still exist. So instead we just flush
497 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
498 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
503 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
505 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
508 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
509 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
510 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
511 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
515 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
517 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
519 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
520 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
523 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
527 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
528 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
529 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
534 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
535 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
536 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
537 * message is not sent.
538 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
539 * the client uses its key from the certificate
542 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
550 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
553 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
554 * a client cert, it can be verified
555 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
556 * should be generalized. But it is next step
558 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
559 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
561 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
562 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
566 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
567 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
578 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
579 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
581 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
582 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
583 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
585 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
589 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
590 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
591 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
592 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
593 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
594 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
595 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
596 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
604 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
608 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
609 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
610 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
611 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
612 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
613 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
617 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
618 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
619 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
620 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
621 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
627 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
628 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
630 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
631 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
632 { ret= -1; goto end; }
634 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
635 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
637 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
638 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
641 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
642 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
650 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
651 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
652 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
653 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
654 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
655 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
656 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
657 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
659 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
661 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
666 /* clean a few things up */
667 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
669 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
672 /* remove buffering on output */
673 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
677 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
679 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
680 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
684 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
686 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
688 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
690 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
704 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
708 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
713 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
717 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
724 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
728 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
732 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
736 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
738 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
739 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
744 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
745 /* number of bytes to write */
750 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
751 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
754 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
759 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
761 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
767 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
768 * so permit appropriate message length */
769 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
775 if (!ok) return((int)n);
776 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
777 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
779 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
780 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
781 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
782 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
784 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
785 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
788 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
789 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
791 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
792 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
795 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
801 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
803 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
804 unsigned int cookie_len;
807 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
809 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
812 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
814 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
815 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
816 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
817 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
820 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
822 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
825 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
826 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
827 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
828 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
829 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
832 if (!ok) return((int)n);
834 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
836 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
837 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
838 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
841 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
842 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
844 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
845 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
847 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
848 s->version = s->client_version;
850 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
854 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
855 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
856 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
858 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
860 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
862 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
863 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
865 if (cookie_length == 0)
869 /* load the client random */
870 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
873 /* get the session-id */
877 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
878 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
879 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
880 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
881 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
882 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
883 * an earlier library version)
885 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
887 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
892 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
894 { /* previous session */
901 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
908 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
914 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
915 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
916 * does not cause an overflow.
918 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
921 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
922 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
926 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
927 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
930 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
932 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
934 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
937 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
938 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
939 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
942 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
944 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
945 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
947 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
948 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
949 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
960 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
962 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
963 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
964 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
969 /* not enough data */
970 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
971 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
974 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
981 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
982 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
985 id=s->session->cipher->id;
988 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
990 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
992 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
994 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
995 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1003 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1004 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1007 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1009 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1010 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1011 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1012 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1013 * enabled, though. */
1014 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1015 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1017 s->session->cipher = c;
1024 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1025 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1026 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1036 /* not enough data */
1037 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1038 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1044 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1051 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1052 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1056 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1058 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1060 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1062 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1067 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1068 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1072 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1073 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1074 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1075 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1079 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1080 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1082 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1084 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1089 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1091 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1093 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1094 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1095 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1098 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1099 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1103 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1104 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1105 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1107 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1112 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1115 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1117 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1118 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1120 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1121 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1126 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1127 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1128 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1129 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1131 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1132 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1134 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1135 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1136 /* Can't disable compression */
1137 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1139 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1143 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1144 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1146 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1147 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1149 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1153 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1155 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1159 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1160 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1162 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1167 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1174 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1175 { /* See if we have a match */
1176 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1178 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1179 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1181 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1194 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1199 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1200 * using compression.
1202 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1204 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1210 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1215 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1216 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1218 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1220 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1221 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1222 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1223 if (ciphers == NULL)
1225 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1230 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1231 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1235 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1239 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1243 /* Session-id reuse */
1244 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1245 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1246 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1247 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1249 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1251 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1252 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1254 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1255 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1257 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1261 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1262 else if (ec != NULL)
1263 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1265 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1269 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1272 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1275 /* we now have the following setup.
1277 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1278 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1279 * compression - basically ignored right now
1280 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1281 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1282 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1283 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1290 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1293 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1297 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1300 unsigned char *p,*d;
1303 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1307 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1309 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1310 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1311 p=s->s3->server_random;
1312 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1313 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1315 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1318 /* Do the message type and length last */
1321 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1322 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1325 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1326 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1328 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1329 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1330 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1331 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1332 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1333 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1334 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1336 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1337 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1338 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1339 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1340 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1343 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1345 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1347 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1348 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1350 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1354 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1357 /* put the cipher */
1358 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1361 /* put the compression method */
1362 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1365 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1368 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1370 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1371 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1376 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1385 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1388 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1389 /* number of bytes to write */
1394 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1395 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1398 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1402 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1404 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1407 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1412 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1413 /* number of bytes to write */
1418 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1419 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1422 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1428 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1435 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1436 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1439 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1442 unsigned char *p,*d;
1452 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1453 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1455 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1460 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1463 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1466 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1468 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1469 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1470 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1473 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1482 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1483 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1488 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1492 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1493 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1496 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1497 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1498 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1499 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1502 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1507 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1513 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1520 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1521 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1522 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1524 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1526 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1533 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1534 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1535 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1536 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1548 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1549 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1551 const EC_GROUP *group;
1553 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1554 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1556 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1557 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1558 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1562 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1563 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1567 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1573 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1576 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1579 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1585 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1586 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1587 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1588 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1590 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1597 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1598 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1599 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1601 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1605 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1606 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1612 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1613 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1614 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1617 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1620 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1624 /* Encode the public key.
1625 * First check the size of encoding and
1626 * allocate memory accordingly.
1628 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1629 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1630 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1633 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1634 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1635 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1636 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1643 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1644 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1645 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1646 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1648 if (encodedlen == 0)
1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1654 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1656 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1657 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1658 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1659 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1664 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1665 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1673 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1675 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1677 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1678 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1681 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1683 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1684 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1687 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1689 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1693 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1694 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1696 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1699 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1702 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1710 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1712 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1715 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1718 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1725 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1726 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1728 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1729 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1730 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1731 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1732 * the actual encoded point itself
1734 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1742 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1743 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1745 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1746 encodedPoint = NULL;
1751 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1752 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1754 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1755 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1756 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1757 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1764 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1765 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1766 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1767 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1771 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1773 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1774 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1775 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1776 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1777 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1778 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1779 (unsigned int *)&i);
1783 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1784 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1794 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1795 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1798 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1799 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1800 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1801 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1802 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1803 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1813 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1814 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1816 /* let's do ECDSA */
1817 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1818 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1819 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1820 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1821 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1822 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1824 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1833 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1834 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1840 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1843 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1849 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1850 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1851 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1853 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1855 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1856 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1857 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1859 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1863 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1865 unsigned char *p,*d;
1867 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1871 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1875 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1877 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1879 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1888 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1892 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1894 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1895 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1896 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1898 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1901 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1902 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1905 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1912 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1913 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1919 /* else no CA names */
1920 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1923 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1924 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1927 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1932 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1933 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1936 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1943 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1946 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1947 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1952 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1956 unsigned long alg_k;
1958 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1960 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1962 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1966 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1968 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1970 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1971 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1972 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1973 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1974 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1977 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1978 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1979 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1980 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1984 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1985 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1987 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1989 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1990 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
1992 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1993 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1995 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1996 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1997 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1998 * be sent already */
2001 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2009 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2010 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2011 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2012 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2014 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2015 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2021 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2022 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2027 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2029 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2039 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2043 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2045 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2046 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2049 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2051 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2052 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2053 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2054 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2055 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2057 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2058 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2059 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2061 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2062 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2064 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2065 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2066 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2067 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2068 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2069 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2070 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2076 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2077 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2078 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2080 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2081 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2082 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2083 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2087 s->session->master_key_length=
2088 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2089 s->session->master_key,
2091 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2095 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2096 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2101 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2113 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2115 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2121 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2123 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2128 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2131 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2138 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2147 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2152 s->session->master_key_length=
2153 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2154 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2155 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2160 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2162 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2163 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2164 krb5_data authenticator;
2166 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2167 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2168 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2169 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2170 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2171 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2173 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2174 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2176 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2178 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2181 enc_ticket.length = i;
2183 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2186 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2190 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2191 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2194 authenticator.length = i;
2196 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2199 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2203 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2204 p+=authenticator.length;
2208 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2211 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2214 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2217 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2221 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2222 enc_pms.length + 6))
2224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2225 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2229 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2233 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2234 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2236 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2237 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2243 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2244 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2246 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2247 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2250 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2251 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2253 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2254 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2260 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2267 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2268 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2270 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2274 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2276 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2279 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2282 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2283 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2286 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2289 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2292 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2295 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2298 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2302 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2304 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2305 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2308 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2310 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2311 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2312 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2313 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2314 * the protocol version.
2315 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2316 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2318 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2321 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2326 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2328 s->session->master_key_length=
2329 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2330 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2332 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2334 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2335 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2337 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2338 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2343 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2344 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2345 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2346 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2350 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2352 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2353 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2358 const EC_GROUP *group;
2359 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2361 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2362 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2365 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2369 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2370 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2372 /* use the certificate */
2373 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2377 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2378 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2380 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2383 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2384 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2386 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2387 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2394 /* Let's get client's public key */
2395 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2398 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2404 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2406 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2408 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2412 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2414 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2416 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2417 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2418 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2419 * never executed. When that support is
2420 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2421 * received in the certificate is
2422 * authorized for key agreement.
2423 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2424 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2427 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2428 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2429 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2433 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2434 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2440 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2444 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2445 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2447 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2450 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2454 /* Get encoded point length */
2459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2463 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2464 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2470 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2471 * currently, so set it to the start
2473 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2476 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2477 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2478 if (field_size <= 0)
2480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2484 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2492 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2493 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2494 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2495 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2496 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2497 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2499 /* Compute the master secret */
2500 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2501 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2503 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2508 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2509 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2511 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2512 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2513 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2515 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2517 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2523 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2526 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2529 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2532 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2535 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2539 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2540 * string for the callback */
2541 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2542 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2543 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2544 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2545 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2547 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2550 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2553 else if (psk_len == 0)
2555 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2557 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2558 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2562 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2563 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2565 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2567 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2571 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2572 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2573 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2574 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2576 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2577 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2581 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2582 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2583 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2584 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2585 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2588 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2592 s->session->master_key_length=
2593 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2594 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2597 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2603 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2606 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2607 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2608 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2609 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2610 unsigned long alg_a;
2612 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2613 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2614 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2615 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2616 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2617 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2619 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2620 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2621 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2622 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2623 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2624 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2625 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2626 if (client_pub_pkey)
2628 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2631 /* Decrypt session key */
2632 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2634 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2642 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2649 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2652 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2658 /* Generate master secret */
2659 s->session->master_key_length=
2660 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2661 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2662 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2663 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2668 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2669 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2677 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2679 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2685 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2686 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2689 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2690 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2691 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2692 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2693 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2694 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2699 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2701 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2708 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2709 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2710 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2715 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2717 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2719 peer=s->session->peer;
2720 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2721 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2729 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2731 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2732 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2734 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2735 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2744 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2745 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2749 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2751 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2752 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2756 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2759 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2763 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2764 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2765 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2766 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2767 * signature without length field */
2768 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2769 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
2779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2780 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2784 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2785 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2788 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2792 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2793 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2795 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2796 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2800 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2801 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2806 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2807 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2813 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2814 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2816 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2817 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2818 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2822 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2830 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2832 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2833 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2834 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2838 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2839 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2840 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2846 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
2847 { unsigned char signature[64];
2849 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
2850 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
2852 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
2854 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
2855 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
2857 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
2858 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2861 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2863 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2869 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2870 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2879 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2882 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2886 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2888 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2890 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2891 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2893 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2895 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2902 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2904 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2906 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2907 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2909 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2910 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2913 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2914 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2916 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2917 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2920 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2924 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2926 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2927 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2930 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2932 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2934 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2941 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2942 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2945 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2948 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2950 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2951 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2956 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2959 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2964 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2965 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2968 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2970 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2977 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2979 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2980 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2982 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2983 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2986 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2987 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2988 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2990 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2991 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2997 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3000 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3001 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3006 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3007 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3008 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3009 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3011 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3012 * when we arrive here. */
3013 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3015 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3016 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3022 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3023 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3024 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3025 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3026 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3034 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3037 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3038 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3042 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3047 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3049 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3052 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3053 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3054 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3061 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
3062 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3067 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3068 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3070 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3071 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3073 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3075 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3080 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3081 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3082 unsigned char key_name[16];
3084 /* get session encoding length */
3085 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3086 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3091 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3092 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3093 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3094 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3095 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3096 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3098 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3099 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3100 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3102 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
3106 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3108 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3110 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3111 /* Skip message length for now */
3113 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3114 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3115 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3116 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3119 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3121 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3130 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3131 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3132 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3133 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3134 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3135 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3137 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
3138 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3140 /* Output key name */
3142 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3145 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3146 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3147 /* Encrypt session data */
3148 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3150 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3152 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3154 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3155 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3156 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3159 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3161 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3162 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3163 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3165 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3167 /* number of bytes to write */
3169 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3174 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3175 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3178 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3180 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3183 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3184 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3185 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3188 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3191 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3194 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3195 /* message length */
3196 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3198 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3199 /* length of OCSP response */
3200 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3201 /* actual response */
3202 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3203 /* number of bytes to write */
3204 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3205 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3209 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3210 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));