/* ssl/d1_clnt.c */ /* * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 # include "kssl_lcl.h" #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH # include #endif static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_client_method(int ver); static int dtls1_get_hello_verify(SSL *s); static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_client_method(int ver) { if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION || ver == DTLS1_BAD_VER) return (DTLSv1_client_method()); else return (NULL); } IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLSv1_client_method, ssl_undefined_function, dtls1_connect, dtls1_get_client_method) int dtls1_connect(SSL *s) { BUF_MEM *buf = NULL; unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; int ret = -1; int new_state, state, skip = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; #endif RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0); ERR_clear_error(); clear_sys_error(); if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->ctx->info_callback; s->in_handshake++; if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* * Notify SCTP BIO socket to enter handshake mode and prevent stream * identifier other than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used. */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE, s->in_handshake, NULL); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS /* * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during * handshakes anyway. */ if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { dtls1_stop_timer(s); s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; s->tlsext_hb_seq++; } #endif for (;;) { state = s->state; switch (s->state) { case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: s->renegotiate = 1; s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT; s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++; /* break */ case SSL_ST_BEFORE: case SSL_ST_CONNECT: case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_CONNECT: case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_CONNECT: s->server = 0; if (cb != NULL) cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00) && (s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ret = -1; s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */ s->type = SSL_ST_CONNECT; if (s->init_buf == NULL) { if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { ret = -1; s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { ret = -1; s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } s->init_buf = buf; buf = NULL; } if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret = -1; s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } /* setup buffing BIO */ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) { ret = -1; s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A; s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++; s->init_num = 0; /* mark client_random uninitialized */ memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)); s->d1->send_cookie = 0; s->hit = 0; s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0; /* * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */ s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP case DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK: if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; s->rwstate = SSL_READING; BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); ret = -1; goto end; } s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; break; case DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK: /* read app data until dry event */ ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s)); if (ret < 0) goto end; if (ret == 0) { s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; s->rwstate = SSL_READING; BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); ret = -1; goto end; } s->state = s->d1->next_state; break; #endif case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A: s->shutdown = 0; /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B: dtls1_start_timer(s); ret = dtls1_client_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (s->d1->send_cookie) { s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH; s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A; } else s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A; s->init_num = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* Disable buffering for SCTP */ if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { #endif /* * turn on buffering for the next lot of output */ if (s->bbio != s->wbio) s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP } #endif break; case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B: ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; else { if (s->hit) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if * no SCTP used. */ snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL), DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL); if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { ret = -1; s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); #endif s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { /* receive renewed session ticket */ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; } } else s->state = DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A; } s->init_num = 0; break; case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B: ret = dtls1_get_hello_verify(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; dtls1_stop_timer(s); if (s->d1->send_cookie) /* start again, with a cookie */ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A; else s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B: /* Check if it is anon DH or PSK */ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s->tlsext_status_expected) s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A; else s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; } else { skip = 1; s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; } #else } else skip = 1; s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; #endif s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B: ret = ssl3_get_key_exchange(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A; s->init_num = 0; /* * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from * the server */ if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { ret = -1; s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } break; case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B: ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B: ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; dtls1_stop_timer(s); if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req) s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A; else s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; s->init_num = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) && state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK; else #endif s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B: case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C: case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D: dtls1_start_timer(s); ret = dtls1_send_client_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B: dtls1_start_timer(s); ret = dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP * used. */ snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL), DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL); if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { ret = -1; s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); #endif /* * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back */ /* * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is * sent, but no verify packet is sent */ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) { s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A; } else { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { s->d1->next_state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK; } else #endif s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; } s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B: dtls1_start_timer(s); ret = dtls1_send_client_verify(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { s->d1->next_state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK; } else #endif s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B: if (!s->hit) dtls1_start_timer(s); ret = dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(s, SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A, SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; s->init_num = 0; s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP s->session->compress_meth = 0; #else if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) s->session->compress_meth = 0; else s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; #endif if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { ret = -1; s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { ret = -1; s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (s->hit) { /* * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if * no SCTP used. */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL); } #endif dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); break; case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B: if (!s->hit) dtls1_start_timer(s); ret = dtls1_send_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B, s->method-> ssl3_enc->client_finished_label, s->method-> ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH; /* clear flags */ s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER; if (s->hit) { s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { s->d1->next_state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; s->s3->tmp.next_state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK; } #endif if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED) { s->state = SSL_ST_OK; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { s->d1->next_state = SSL_ST_OK; s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK; } #endif s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER; s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = 0; } } else { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if * no SCTP used. */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* * Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; else #endif s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; } s->init_num = 0; break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B: ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B: ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; s->init_num = 0; break; #endif case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B: s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1; ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B); if (ret <= 0) goto end; dtls1_stop_timer(s); if (s->hit) s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; else s->state = SSL_ST_OK; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) && state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) { s->d1->next_state = s->state; s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK; } #endif s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH: s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { /* * If the write error was fatal, stop trying */ if (!BIO_should_retry(s->wbio)) { s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; } ret = -1; goto end; } s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; break; case SSL_ST_OK: /* clean a few things up */ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); #if 0 if (s->init_buf != NULL) { BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); s->init_buf = NULL; } #endif /* * If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the * buffering now */ if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER)) ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); /* else do it later in ssl3_write */ s->init_num = 0; s->renegotiate = 0; s->new_session = 0; ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; ret = 1; /* s->server=0; */ s->handshake_func = dtls1_connect; s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++; if (cb != NULL) cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); /* done with handshaking */ s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; goto end; /* break; */ case SSL_ST_ERR: default: SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); ret = -1; goto end; /* break; */ } /* did we do anything */ if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { if (s->debug) { if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) goto end; } if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) { new_state = s->state; s->state = state; cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1); s->state = new_state; } } skip = 0; } end: s->in_handshake--; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* * Notify SCTP BIO socket to leave handshake mode and allow stream * identifier other than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used. */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE, s->in_handshake, NULL); #endif if (buf != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(buf); if (cb != NULL) cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret); return (ret); } int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s) { unsigned char *buf; unsigned char *p, *d; unsigned int i, j; unsigned long l; SSL_COMP *comp; buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) { SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ssl_version != s->version) || #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT !sess->session_id_length || #else (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) || #endif (s->session->not_resumable)) { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) goto err; } /* else use the pre-loaded session */ p = s->s3->client_random; /* * if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are required to use * same upon reply to HelloVerify */ for (i = 0; p[i] == '\0' && i < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); i++) ; if (i == sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)); /* Do the message type and length last */ d = p = &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); *(p++) = s->version >> 8; *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; s->client_version = s->version; /* Random stuff */ memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; /* Session ID */ if (s->new_session) i = 0; else i = s->session->session_id_length; *(p++) = i; if (i != 0) { if (i > sizeof s->session->session_id) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i); p += i; } /* cookie stuff */ if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len; memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len); p += s->d1->cookie_len; /* Ciphers supported */ i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]), 0); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); goto err; } s2n(i, p); p += i; /* COMPRESSION */ if (s->ctx->comp_methods == NULL) j = 0; else j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); *(p++) = 1 + j; for (i = 0; i < j; i++) { comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i); *(p++) = comp->id; } *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* TLS extensions */ if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); goto err; } if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } #endif l = (p - d); d = buf; d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l, 0, l); s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B; /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num = p - buf; s->init_off = 0; /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); } /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */ return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); err: return (-1); } static int dtls1_get_hello_verify(SSL *s) { int n, al, ok = 0; unsigned char *data; unsigned int cookie_len; n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A, DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); if (!ok) return ((int)n); if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { s->d1->send_cookie = 0; s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; return (1); } data = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; if ((data[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (data[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | data[1]; al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } data += 2; cookie_len = *(data++); if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; goto f_err; } memcpy(s->d1->cookie, data, cookie_len); s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len; s->d1->send_cookie = 1; return 1; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; } int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p, *d; int n; unsigned long alg_k; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA unsigned char *q; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 KSSL_ERR kssl_err; #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL; const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL; unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; int encoded_pt_len = 0; BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; #endif if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) { d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; p = &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; /* Fool emacs indentation */ if (0) { } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { RSA *rsa; unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { /* * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp; else { pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]. x509); if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa; EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); } tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8; tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0) goto err; s->session->master_key_length = sizeof tmp_buf; q = p; /* Fix buf for TLS and [incidentally] DTLS */ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) p += 2; n = RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf, tmp_buf, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); # ifdef PKCS1_CHECK if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) p[1]++; if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2) tmp_buf[0] = 0x70; # endif if (n <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); goto err; } /* Fix buf for TLS and [incidentally] DTLS */ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) { s2n(n, q); n += 2; } s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s-> session->master_key, tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf); OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) { krb5_error_code krb5rc; KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */ krb5_data *enc_ticket; krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL; EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; int padl, outl = sizeof(epms); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); # ifdef KSSL_DEBUG printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n", alg_k, SSL_kKRB5); # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ authp = NULL; # ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH if (KRB5SENDAUTH) authp = &authenticator; # endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */ krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp, &kssl_err); enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); if (enc == NULL) goto err; # ifdef KSSL_DEBUG { printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc); if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text) printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text); } # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ if (krb5rc) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); goto err; } /*- * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ ** in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in: ** ** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length) ** n = krb5_ap_req.length; ** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length); ** if (krb5_ap_req.data) ** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req); ** ** Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper ** (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson ) ** Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced ** with a 2-byte length followed by the value. ** Example: ** KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms ** Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with ** optional authenticator omitted. */ /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */ s2n(enc_ticket->length, p); memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length); p += enc_ticket->length; n = enc_ticket->length + 2; /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */ if (authp && authp->length) { s2n(authp->length, p); memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length); p += authp->length; n += authp->length + 2; free(authp->data); authp->data = NULL; authp->length = 0; } else { s2n(0, p); /* null authenticator length */ n += 2; } if (RAND_bytes(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf) <= 0) goto err; /*- * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed. * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL); * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx, * kssl_ctx->length); * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv); */ memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv); EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf); EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(epms[outl]), &padl); outl += padl; if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */ s2n(outl, p); memcpy(p, epms, outl); p += outl; n += outl + 2; s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s-> session->master_key, tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf); OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf); OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) { DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt; if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto err; } if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL) dh_srvr = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp; else { /* we get them from the cert */ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS); goto err; } /* generate a new random key */ if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } /* * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to * clear it out afterwards */ n = DH_compute_key(p, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt); if (n <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } /* generate master key from the result */ s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s-> session->master_key, p, n); /* clean up */ memset(p, 0, n); /* send off the data */ n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key); s2n(n, p); BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p); n += 2; DH_free(dh_clnt); /* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY */ } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL; EC_KEY *tkey; int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0; int field_size = 0; if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto err; } /* * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1. */ if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) { /* * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication * using ECDH certificates. To add such support, one needs to * add code that checks for appropriate conditions and sets * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1. For example, the cert have an ECC key * on the same curve as the server's and the key should be * authorized for key agreement. One also needs to add code * in ssl3_connect to skip sending the certificate verify * message. if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) && * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...) * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1; */ } if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) { tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp; } else { /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */ srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509); if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL) || (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) || (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec; } srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey); if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (ecdh_clnt_cert) { /* * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our * private key to perform the ECDH computation. */ const BIGNUM *priv_key; tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec; priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); if (priv_key == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } else { /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */ if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } } /* * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to * clear it out afterwards */ field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group); if (field_size <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } n = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL); if (n <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } /* generate master key from the result */ s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s-> session->master_key, p, n); memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */ if (ecdh_clnt_cert) { /* Send empty client key exch message */ n = 0; } else { /* * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory * accordingly. */ encoded_pt_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL); encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(unsigned char)); bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* Encode the public key */ n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx); *p = n; /* length of encoded point */ /* Encoded point will be copied here */ p += 1; /* copy the point */ memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n); /* increment n to account for length field */ n += 1; } /* Free allocated memory */ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); if (clnt_ecdh != NULL) EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); } #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN]; unsigned char *t = NULL; unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4]; unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0; int psk_err = 1; n = 0; if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB); goto err; } psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN, psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto psk_err; } else if (psk_len == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); goto psk_err; } /* create PSK pre_master_secret */ pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len; t = psk_or_pre_ms; memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len); s2n(psk_len, t); memset(t, 0, psk_len); t += psk_len; s2n(psk_len, t); if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL && s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto psk_err; } if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity); if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto psk_err; } s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s-> session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len); n = strlen(identity); s2n(n, p); memcpy(p, identity, n); n += 2; psk_err = 0; psk_err: OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN); OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); if (psk_err != 0) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); goto err; } } #endif else { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n, 0, n); /*- *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; l2n3(n,d); l2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,d); s->d1->handshake_write_seq++; */ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B; /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num = n + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; s->init_off = 0; /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); } /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */ return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); err: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); if (clnt_ecdh != NULL) EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); #endif return (-1); } int dtls1_send_client_verify(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p, *d; unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; EVP_PKEY *pkey; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA unsigned u = 0; #endif unsigned long n; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA) int j; #endif if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) { d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; p = &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_sha1, &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH])); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(data[0])); if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); goto err; } s2n(u, p); n = u + 2; } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type, &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]), (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_DSA_LIB); goto err; } s2n(j, p); n = j + 2; } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type, &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]), (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB); goto err; } s2n(j, p); n = j + 2; } else #endif { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n, 0, n); s->init_num = (int)n + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; s->init_off = 0; /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B; } /* s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B */ return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); err: return (-1); } int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s) { X509 *x509 = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; int i; unsigned long l; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) { if ((s->cert == NULL) || (s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) || (s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL)) s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; else s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; } /* We need to get a client cert */ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) { /* * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; * return(-1); We then get retied later */ i = 0; i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey); if (i < 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return (-1); } s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) { s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey)) i = 0; } else if (i == 1) { i = 0; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK); } if (x509 != NULL) X509_free(x509); if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); if (i == 0) { if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE); return (1); } else { s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2; } } /* Ok, we have a cert */ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; } if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) { s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D; l = dtls1_output_cert_chain(s, (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key->x509); if (!l) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } s->init_num = (int)l; s->init_off = 0; /* set header called by dtls1_output_cert_chain() */ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); } /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */ return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); }