Import OpenSSL 0.9.8l
[dragonfly.git] / crypto / openssl / ssl / s3_pkt.c
CommitLineData
56276539
SS
1/* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58/* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112#include <stdio.h>
113#include <errno.h>
114#define USE_SOCKETS
115#include "ssl_locl.h"
116#include <openssl/evp.h>
117#include <openssl/buffer.h>
118
119static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
120 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
121static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
122
123int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
124 {
125 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
126 * packet by another n bytes.
127 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
128 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
129 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
130 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
131 */
132 int i,off,newb;
133
134 if (!extend)
135 {
136 /* start with empty packet ... */
137 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
138 s->s3->rbuf.offset = 0;
139 s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf + s->s3->rbuf.offset;
140 s->packet_length = 0;
141 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
142 }
143
144 /* extend reads should not span multiple packets for DTLS */
145 if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION &&
146 extend)
147 {
148 if ( s->s3->rbuf.left > 0 && n > s->s3->rbuf.left)
149 n = s->s3->rbuf.left;
150 }
151
152 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
153 if (s->s3->rbuf.left >= (int)n)
154 {
155 s->packet_length+=n;
156 s->s3->rbuf.left-=n;
157 s->s3->rbuf.offset+=n;
158 return(n);
159 }
160
161 /* else we need to read more data */
162 if (!s->read_ahead)
163 max=n;
164
165 {
166 /* avoid buffer overflow */
167 int max_max = s->s3->rbuf.len - s->packet_length;
168 if (max > max_max)
169 max = max_max;
170 }
171 if (n > max) /* does not happen */
172 {
173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
174 return -1;
175 }
176
177 off = s->packet_length;
178 newb = s->s3->rbuf.left;
179 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
180 * 'off' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
181 * 'newb' extra ones at the end */
182 if (s->packet != s->s3->rbuf.buf)
183 {
184 /* off > 0 */
185 memmove(s->s3->rbuf.buf, s->packet, off+newb);
186 s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf;
187 }
188
189 while (newb < n)
190 {
191 /* Now we have off+newb bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and need
192 * to read in more until we have off+n (up to off+max if possible) */
193
194 clear_sys_error();
195 if (s->rbio != NULL)
196 {
197 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
198 i=BIO_read(s->rbio, &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[off+newb]), max-newb);
199 }
200 else
201 {
202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
203 i = -1;
204 }
205
206 if (i <= 0)
207 {
208 s->s3->rbuf.left = newb;
209 return(i);
210 }
211 newb+=i;
212 }
213
214 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
215 s->s3->rbuf.offset = off + n;
216 s->s3->rbuf.left = newb - n;
217 s->packet_length += n;
218 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
219 return(n);
220 }
221
222/* Call this to get a new input record.
223 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
224 * or non-blocking IO.
225 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
226 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
227 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
228 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
229 */
230/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
231static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
232 {
233 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
234 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
235 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
236 SSL_SESSION *sess;
237 unsigned char *p;
238 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
239 short version;
240 unsigned int mac_size;
241 int clear=0;
242 size_t extra;
243 int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
244 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
245
246 rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
247 sess=s->session;
248
249 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
250 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
251 else
252 extra=0;
253 if (extra != s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
254 {
255 /* actually likely an application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
256 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
258 return -1;
259 }
260
261again:
262 /* check if we have the header */
263 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
264 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
265 {
266 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
267 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
268 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
269
270 p=s->packet;
271
272 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
273 rr->type= *(p++);
274 ssl_major= *(p++);
275 ssl_minor= *(p++);
276 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
277 n2s(p,rr->length);
278
279 /* Lets check version */
e40c9513 280 if (!s->first_packet)
56276539
SS
281 {
282 if (version != s->version)
283 {
284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
285 /* Send back error using their
286 * version number :-) */
287 s->version=version;
288 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
289 goto f_err;
290 }
291 }
292
293 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
294 {
295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
296 goto err;
297 }
298
299 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
300 {
301 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
303 goto f_err;
304 }
305
306 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
307 }
308
309 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
310
311 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
312 {
313 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
314 i=rr->length;
315 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
316 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
317 /* now n == rr->length,
318 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
319 }
320
321 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
322
323 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
324 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
325 */
326 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
327
328 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
329 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
330 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
331 * the decryption or by the decompression
332 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
333 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
334
335 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
336 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
337
338 /* check is not needed I believe */
339 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
340 {
341 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
343 goto f_err;
344 }
345
346 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
347 rr->data=rr->input;
348
349 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
350 if (enc_err <= 0)
351 {
352 if (enc_err == 0)
353 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
354 goto err;
355
356 /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
357 * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
358 * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
359 * the MAC computation anyway. */
360 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
361 }
362
363#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
364printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
365{ unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
366printf("\n");
367#endif
368
369 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
370 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
371 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
372 (s->read_hash == NULL))
373 clear=1;
374
375 if (!clear)
376 {
377 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
378
379 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
380 {
381#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
382 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
384 goto f_err;
385#else
386 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
387#endif
388 }
389 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
390 if (rr->length >= mac_size)
391 {
392 rr->length -= mac_size;
393 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
394 }
395 else
396 {
397 /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
398#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
399 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
401 goto f_err;
402#else
403 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
404 rr->length = 0;
405#endif
406 }
407 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
408 if (mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0)
409 {
410 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
411 }
412 }
413
414 if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
415 {
416 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
417 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
418 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
419 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
420 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
421 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
423 goto f_err;
424 }
425
426 /* r->length is now just compressed */
427 if (s->expand != NULL)
428 {
429 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
430 {
431 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
433 goto f_err;
434 }
435 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
436 {
437 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
438 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
439 goto f_err;
440 }
441 }
442
443 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
444 {
445 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
447 goto f_err;
448 }
449
450 rr->off=0;
451 /* So at this point the following is true
452 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
453 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
454 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
455 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
456 * after use :-).
457 */
458
459 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
460 s->packet_length=0;
461
462 /* just read a 0 length packet */
463 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
464
465 return(1);
466
467f_err:
468 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
469err:
470 return(ret);
471 }
472
473int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
474 {
5bd86ce5 475#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
56276539
SS
476 int i;
477 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
478
479 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
480 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
481 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
482 if (i < 0)
483 return(0);
484 else
485 rr->length=i;
486 rr->data=rr->comp;
5bd86ce5 487#endif
56276539
SS
488 return(1);
489 }
490
491int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
492 {
5bd86ce5 493#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
56276539
SS
494 int i;
495 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
496
497 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
498 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
499 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
500 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
501 if (i < 0)
502 return(0);
503 else
504 wr->length=i;
505
506 wr->input=wr->data;
5bd86ce5 507#endif
56276539
SS
508 return(1);
509 }
510
511/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
512 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
513 */
514int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
515 {
516 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
517 unsigned int tot,n,nw;
518 int i;
519
520 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
521 tot=s->s3->wnum;
522 s->s3->wnum=0;
523
524 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
525 {
526 i=s->handshake_func(s);
527 if (i < 0) return(i);
528 if (i == 0)
529 {
530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
531 return -1;
532 }
533 }
534
535 n=(len-tot);
536 for (;;)
537 {
538 if (n > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
539 nw=SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
540 else
541 nw=n;
542
543 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
544 if (i <= 0)
545 {
546 s->s3->wnum=tot;
547 return i;
548 }
549
550 if ((i == (int)n) ||
551 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
552 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
553 {
554 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
555 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
556 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
557
558 return tot+i;
559 }
560
561 n-=i;
562 tot+=i;
563 }
564 }
565
566static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
567 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
568 {
569 unsigned char *p,*plen;
570 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
571 int prefix_len = 0;
572 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
573 SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
574 SSL_SESSION *sess;
575
576 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
577 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
578 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
579 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
580
581 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
582 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
583 {
584 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
585 if (i <= 0)
586 return(i);
587 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
588 }
589
590 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
591 return 0;
592
593 wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
594 wb= &(s->s3->wbuf);
595 sess=s->session;
596
597 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
598 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
599 (s->write_hash == NULL))
600 clear=1;
601
602 if (clear)
603 mac_size=0;
604 else
605 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
606
607 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
608 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
609 {
610 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
611 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
612
613 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
614 {
615 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
616 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
617 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
618 * together with the actual payload) */
619 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
620 if (prefix_len <= 0)
621 goto err;
622
623 if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
624 {
625 /* insufficient space */
626 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
627 goto err;
628 }
629 }
630
631 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
632 }
633
634 p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
635
636 /* write the header */
637
638 *(p++)=type&0xff;
639 wr->type=type;
640
641 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
642 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
643
644 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
645 plen=p;
646 p+=2;
647
648 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
649 wr->data=p;
650 wr->length=(int)len;
651 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
652
653 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
654 * wr->data */
655
656 /* first we compress */
657 if (s->compress != NULL)
658 {
659 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
660 {
661 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
662 goto err;
663 }
664 }
665 else
666 {
667 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
668 wr->input=wr->data;
669 }
670
671 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
672 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
673 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
674
675 if (mac_size != 0)
676 {
677 s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1);
678 wr->length+=mac_size;
679 wr->input=p;
680 wr->data=p;
681 }
682
683 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
684 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
685
686 /* record length after mac and block padding */
687 s2n(wr->length,plen);
688
689 /* we should now have
690 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
691 * wr->length long */
692 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
693 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
694
695 if (create_empty_fragment)
696 {
697 /* we are in a recursive call;
698 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
699 */
700 return wr->length;
701 }
702
703 /* now let's set up wb */
704 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
705 wb->offset = 0;
706
707 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
708 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
709 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
710 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
711 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
712
713 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
714 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
715err:
716 return -1;
717 }
718
719/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
720int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
721 unsigned int len)
722 {
723 int i;
724
725/* XXXX */
726 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
727 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
728 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
729 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
730 {
731 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
732 return(-1);
733 }
734
735 for (;;)
736 {
737 clear_sys_error();
738 if (s->wbio != NULL)
739 {
740 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
741 i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
742 (char *)&(s->s3->wbuf.buf[s->s3->wbuf.offset]),
743 (unsigned int)s->s3->wbuf.left);
744 }
745 else
746 {
747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
748 i= -1;
749 }
750 if (i == s->s3->wbuf.left)
751 {
752 s->s3->wbuf.left=0;
753 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
754 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
755 }
730b1645
PA
756 else if (i <= 0) {
757 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
758 s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
759 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
760 point in using a datagram service */
761 s->s3->wbuf.left = 0;
762 }
56276539 763 return(i);
730b1645 764 }
56276539
SS
765 s->s3->wbuf.offset+=i;
766 s->s3->wbuf.left-=i;
767 }
768 }
769
770/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
771 * 'type' is one of the following:
772 *
773 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
774 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
775 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
776 *
777 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
778 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
779 *
780 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
781 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
782 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
783 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
784 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
785 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
786 * Change cipher spec protocol
787 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
788 * Alert protocol
789 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
790 * Handshake protocol
791 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
792 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
793 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
794 * Application data protocol
795 * none of our business
796 */
797int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
798 {
799 int al,i,j,ret;
800 unsigned int n;
801 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
802 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
803
804 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
805 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
806 return(-1);
807
808 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
809 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
810 {
811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
812 return -1;
813 }
814
815 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
816 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
817 {
818 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
819 unsigned char *dst = buf;
820 unsigned int k;
821
822 /* peek == 0 */
823 n = 0;
824 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
825 {
826 *dst++ = *src++;
827 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
828 n++;
829 }
830 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
831 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
832 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
833 return n;
834 }
835
836 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
837
838 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
839 {
840 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
841 i=s->handshake_func(s);
842 if (i < 0) return(i);
843 if (i == 0)
844 {
845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
846 return(-1);
847 }
848 }
849start:
850 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
851
852 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
853 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
854 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
855 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
856 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
857
858 /* get new packet if necessary */
859 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
860 {
861 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
862 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
863 }
864
865 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
866
867 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
868 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
869 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
870 {
871 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
872 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
873 goto f_err;
874 }
875
876 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
877 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
878 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
879 {
880 rr->length=0;
881 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
882 return(0);
883 }
884
885
886 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
887 {
888 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
889 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
890 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
891 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
892 {
893 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
894 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
895 goto f_err;
896 }
897
898 if (len <= 0) return(len);
899
900 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
901 n = rr->length;
902 else
903 n = (unsigned int)len;
904
905 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
906 if (!peek)
907 {
908 rr->length-=n;
909 rr->off+=n;
910 if (rr->length == 0)
911 {
912 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
913 rr->off=0;
914 }
915 }
916 return(n);
917 }
918
919
920 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
921 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
922
923 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
924 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
925 */
926 {
927 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
928 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
929 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
930
931 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
932 {
933 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
934 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
935 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
936 }
937 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
938 {
939 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
940 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
941 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
942 }
943
944 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
945 {
946 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
947 if (rr->length < n)
948 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
949
950 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
951 while (n-- > 0)
952 {
953 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
954 rr->length--;
955 }
956
957 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
958 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
959 }
960 }
961
962 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
963 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
964 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
965
966 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
967 if ((!s->server) &&
968 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
969 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
970 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
971 {
972 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
973
974 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
975 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
976 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
977 {
978 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
979 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
980 goto f_err;
981 }
982
983 if (s->msg_callback)
984 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
985
986 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
987 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
31da3cc6 988 (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) &&
56276539
SS
989 !s->s3->renegotiate)
990 {
991 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
992 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
993 {
994 i=s->handshake_func(s);
995 if (i < 0) return(i);
996 if (i == 0)
997 {
998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
999 return(-1);
1000 }
1001
1002 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1003 {
1004 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1005 {
1006 BIO *bio;
1007 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1008 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1009 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1010 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1011 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1012 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1013 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1014 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1015 return(-1);
1016 }
1017 }
1018 }
1019 }
1020 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1021 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1022 goto start;
1023 }
1024
1025 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1026 {
1027 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1028 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1029
1030 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1031
1032 if (s->msg_callback)
1033 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1034
1035 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1036 cb=s->info_callback;
1037 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1038 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1039
1040 if (cb != NULL)
1041 {
1042 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1043 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1044 }
1045
1046 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1047 {
1048 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1049 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1050 {
1051 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1052 return(0);
1053 }
1054 }
1055 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1056 {
1057 char tmp[16];
1058
1059 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1060 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1062 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1063 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1064 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1065 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1066 return(0);
1067 }
1068 else
1069 {
1070 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1071 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1072 goto f_err;
1073 }
1074
1075 goto start;
1076 }
1077
1078 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1079 {
1080 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1081 rr->length=0;
1082 return(0);
1083 }
1084
1085 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1086 {
1087 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1088 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1089 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1090 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1091 {
1092 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1094 goto f_err;
1095 }
1096
1097 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1098 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1099 {
1100 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1102 goto f_err;
1103 }
1104
1105 rr->length=0;
1106
1107 if (s->msg_callback)
1108 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1109
1110 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1111 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1112 goto err;
1113 else
1114 goto start;
1115 }
1116
1117 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1118 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1119 {
1120 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
31da3cc6
AE
1121 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1122 (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
56276539
SS
1123 {
1124#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1125 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1126 * protocol violations): */
1127 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1128 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
1129 :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1130#else
1131 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1132#endif
1133 s->new_session=1;
1134 }
1135 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1136 if (i < 0) return(i);
1137 if (i == 0)
1138 {
1139 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1140 return(-1);
1141 }
1142
1143 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1144 {
1145 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1146 {
1147 BIO *bio;
1148 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1149 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1150 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1151 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1152 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1153 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1154 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1155 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1156 return(-1);
1157 }
1158 }
1159 goto start;
1160 }
1161
1162 switch (rr->type)
1163 {
1164 default:
1165#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1166 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1167 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1168 {
1169 rr->length = 0;
1170 goto start;
1171 }
1172#endif
1173 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1175 goto f_err;
1176 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1177 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1178 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1179 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1180 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1181 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1182 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1184 goto f_err;
1185 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1186 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1187 * but have application data. If the library was
1188 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1189 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1190 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1191 * we will indulge it.
1192 */
1193 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1194 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1195 ((
1196 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1197 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1198 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1199 ) || (
1200 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1201 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1202 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1203 )
1204 ))
1205 {
1206 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1207 return(-1);
1208 }
1209 else
1210 {
1211 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1213 goto f_err;
1214 }
1215 }
1216 /* not reached */
1217
1218f_err:
1219 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1220err:
1221 return(-1);
1222 }
1223
1224int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1225 {
1226 int i;
1227 const char *sender;
1228 int slen;
1229
1230 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1231 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1232 else
1233 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1234
1235 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1236 {
683caddb
PA
1237 if (s->session == NULL)
1238 {
1239 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1241 return (0);
1242 }
1243
56276539
SS
1244 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1245 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1246 }
1247
1248 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1249 return(0);
1250
1251 /* we have to record the message digest at
1252 * this point so we can get it before we read
1253 * the finished message */
1254 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1255 {
1256 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1257 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1258 }
1259 else
1260 {
1261 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1262 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1263 }
1264
1265 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1266 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
1267 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
1268 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1269
1270 return(1);
1271 }
1272
1273void ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1274 {
1275 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1276 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1277 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1278 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1279 if (desc < 0) return;
1280 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1281 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1282 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1283
1284 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1285 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1286 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1287 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1288 s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1289 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1290 * some time in the future */
1291 }
1292
1293int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1294 {
1295 int i,j;
1296 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1297
1298 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1299 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1300 if (i <= 0)
1301 {
1302 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1303 }
1304 else
1305 {
1306 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1307 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1308 * we will not worry too much. */
1309 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1310 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1311
1312 if (s->msg_callback)
1313 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1314
1315 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1316 cb=s->info_callback;
1317 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1318 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1319
1320 if (cb != NULL)
1321 {
1322 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1323 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1324 }
1325 }
1326 return(i);
1327 }