1 /* $FreeBSD: src/sys/netinet6/ah_input.c,v 1.1.2.6 2002/04/28 05:40:26 suz Exp $ */
2 /* $DragonFly: src/sys/netinet6/ah_input.c,v 1.8 2004/06/03 18:30:04 joerg Exp $ */
3 /* $KAME: ah_input.c,v 1.67 2002/01/07 11:39:56 kjc Exp $ */
6 * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
12 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
13 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
14 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
15 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
16 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
17 * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors
18 * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
19 * without specific prior written permission.
21 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
22 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
23 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
24 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
25 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
26 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
27 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
28 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
29 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
30 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
35 * RFC1826/2402 authentication header.
39 #include "opt_inet6.h"
41 #include <sys/param.h>
42 #include <sys/systm.h>
43 #include <sys/malloc.h>
45 #include <sys/domain.h>
46 #include <sys/protosw.h>
47 #include <sys/socket.h>
48 #include <sys/errno.h>
50 #include <sys/syslog.h>
53 #include <net/route.h>
54 #include <net/netisr.h>
55 #include <machine/cpu.h>
56 #include <machine/stdarg.h>
58 #include <netinet/in.h>
59 #include <netinet/in_systm.h>
60 #include <netinet/in_var.h>
61 #include <netinet/ip.h>
62 #include <netinet/ip_var.h>
63 #include <netinet/ip_ecn.h>
65 #include <netinet6/ip6_ecn.h>
69 #include <netinet/ip6.h>
70 #include <netinet6/ip6_var.h>
71 #include <netinet6/in6_pcb.h>
72 #include <netinet/icmp6.h>
73 #include <netinet6/ip6protosw.h>
76 #include <netinet6/ipsec.h>
78 #include <netinet6/ipsec6.h>
80 #include <netinet6/ah.h>
82 #include <netinet6/ah6.h>
84 #include <netproto/key/key.h>
85 #include <netproto/key/keydb.h>
87 #include <netproto/key/key_debug.h>
89 #define KEYDEBUG(lev,arg)
92 #include <machine/stdarg.h>
94 #include <net/net_osdep.h>
99 #include <netinet/ipprotosw.h>
100 extern struct ipprotosw inetsw[];
103 ah4_input(struct mbuf *m, ...)
109 const struct ah_algorithm *algo;
113 struct secasvar *sav = NULL;
120 off = __va_arg(ap, int);
121 proto = __va_arg(ap, int);
124 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST
125 if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(struct newah)) {
126 m = m_pullup(m, off + sizeof(struct newah));
128 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup;"
129 "dropping the packet for simplicity\n"));
130 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
135 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
136 ah = (struct ah *)(((caddr_t)ip) + off);
138 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
139 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct ah *, m, off, sizeof(struct newah));
141 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup;"
142 "dropping the packet for simplicity\n"));
143 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
149 hlen = IP_VHL_HL(ip->ip_vhl) << 2;
151 hlen = ip->ip_hl << 2;
154 /* find the sassoc. */
157 if ((sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET,
158 (caddr_t)&ip->ip_src, (caddr_t)&ip->ip_dst,
159 IPPROTO_AH, spi)) == 0) {
160 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
161 "IPv4 AH input: no key association found for spi %u\n",
162 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)));
166 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
167 printf("DP ah4_input called to allocate SA:%p\n", sav));
168 if (sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_MATURE
169 && sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_DYING) {
171 "IPv4 AH input: non-mature/dying SA found for spi %u\n",
172 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)));
173 ipsecstat.in_badspi++;
177 algo = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth);
179 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: "
180 "unsupported authentication algorithm for spi %u\n",
181 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)));
182 ipsecstat.in_badspi++;
186 siz = (*algo->sumsiz)(sav);
187 siz1 = ((siz + 3) & ~(4 - 1));
190 * sanity checks for header, 1.
195 sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4;
198 * Here, we do not do "siz1 == siz". This is because the way
199 * RFC240[34] section 2 is written. They do not require truncation
201 * For example, Microsoft IPsec stack attaches 160 bits of
202 * authentication data for both hmac-md5 and hmac-sha1. For hmac-sha1,
203 * 32 bits of padding is attached.
205 * There are two downsides to this specification.
206 * They have no real harm, however, they leave us fuzzy feeling.
207 * - if we attach more than 96 bits of authentication data onto AH,
208 * we will never notice about possible modification by rogue
209 * intermediate nodes.
210 * Since extra bits in AH checksum is never used, this constitutes
211 * no real issue, however, it is wacky.
212 * - even if the peer attaches big authentication data, we will never
213 * notice the difference, since longer authentication data will just
216 * We may need some clarification in the spec.
219 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length too short in IPv4 AH input "
220 "(%lu, should be at least %lu): %s\n",
221 (u_long)siz1, (u_long)siz,
222 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi)));
223 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
226 if ((ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff != siz1) {
227 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length mismatch in IPv4 AH input "
228 "(%d should be %lu): %s\n",
229 (ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff, (u_long)siz1,
230 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi)));
231 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
235 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST
236 if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1) {
237 m = m_pullup(m, off + sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1);
239 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup\n"));
240 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
244 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
245 ah = (struct ah *)(((caddr_t)ip) + off);
248 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct ah *, m, off,
249 sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1);
251 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup\n"));
252 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
259 * check for sequence number.
261 if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) {
262 if (ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav))
265 ipsecstat.in_ahreplay++;
266 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
267 "replay packet in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n",
268 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
274 * alright, it seems sane. now we are going to check the
275 * cryptographic checksum.
277 cksum = malloc(siz1, M_TEMP, M_NOWAIT);
279 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: "
280 "couldn't alloc temporary region for cksum\n"));
281 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
286 * some of IP header fields are flipped to the host endian.
287 * convert them back to network endian. VERY stupid.
289 ip->ip_len = htons(ip->ip_len + hlen);
290 ip->ip_off = htons(ip->ip_off);
291 if (ah4_calccksum(m, (caddr_t)cksum, siz1, algo, sav)) {
293 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
296 ipsecstat.in_ahhist[sav->alg_auth]++;
300 ip->ip_len = ntohs(ip->ip_len) - hlen;
301 ip->ip_off = ntohs(ip->ip_off);
304 caddr_t sumpos = NULL;
306 if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) {
308 sumpos = (caddr_t)(ah + 1);
311 sumpos = (caddr_t)(((struct newah *)ah) + 1);
314 if (bcmp(sumpos, cksum, siz) != 0) {
315 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
316 "checksum mismatch in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n",
317 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
319 ipsecstat.in_ahauthfail++;
326 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR;
327 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPDGM;
331 * looks okey, but we need more sanity check.
332 * XXX should elaborate.
334 if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPIP || ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IP) {
338 sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4;
340 if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1 + hlen) {
341 m = m_pullup(m, off + sizeof(struct ah)
342 + sizoff + siz1 + hlen);
345 "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup\n"));
346 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
351 nip = (struct ip *)((u_char *)(ah + 1) + sizoff + siz1);
352 if (nip->ip_src.s_addr != ip->ip_src.s_addr
353 || nip->ip_dst.s_addr != ip->ip_dst.s_addr) {
354 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
355 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
359 else if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPV6) {
360 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
361 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
366 if (m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPHDR
367 && m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPDGM) {
370 "IPv4 AH input: authentication succeess\n"));
372 ipsecstat.in_ahauthsucc++;
374 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
375 "authentication failed in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n",
376 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
377 ipsecstat.in_ahauthfail++;
382 * update sequence number.
384 if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) {
385 if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav)) {
386 ipsecstat.in_ahreplay++;
391 /* was it transmitted over the IPsec tunnel SA? */
392 if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) {
394 stripsiz = sizeof(struct ah) + siz1;
397 stripsiz = sizeof(struct newah) + siz1;
399 if (ipsec4_tunnel_validate(m, off + stripsiz, nxt, sav)) {
401 * strip off all the headers that precedes AH.
402 * IP xx AH IP' payload -> IP' payload
404 * XXX more sanity checks
405 * XXX relationship with gif?
410 m_adj(m, off + stripsiz);
411 if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip)) {
412 m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip));
414 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
418 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
419 /* ECN consideration. */
420 ip_ecn_egress(ip4_ipsec_ecn, &tos, &ip->ip_tos);
421 if (!key_checktunnelsanity(sav, AF_INET,
422 (caddr_t)&ip->ip_src, (caddr_t)&ip->ip_dst)) {
423 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "ipsec tunnel address mismatch "
424 "in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n",
425 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
426 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
432 * Should the inner packet be considered authentic?
433 * My current answer is: NO.
435 * host1 -- gw1 === gw2 -- host2
436 * In this case, gw2 can trust the authenticity of the
437 * outer packet, but NOT inner. Packet may be altered
438 * between host1 and gw1.
440 * host1 -- gw1 === host2
441 * This case falls into the same scenario as above.
444 * This case is the only case when we may be able to leave
445 * M_AUTHIPHDR and M_AUTHIPDGM set.
446 * However, if host1 is wrongly configured, and allows
447 * attacker to inject some packet with src=host1 and
448 * dst=host2, you are in risk.
450 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
451 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
454 key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m);
455 if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0 ||
456 ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_IPV4, 0) != 0) {
457 ipsecstat.in_nomem++;
461 if (netisr_queue(NETISR_IP, m)) {
462 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
473 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
474 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST
476 * We do deep-copy since KAME requires that
477 * the packet is placed in a single external mbuf.
479 ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip, (caddr_t)(((u_char *)ip) + stripsiz), off);
480 m->m_data += stripsiz;
481 m->m_len -= stripsiz;
482 m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz;
485 * even in m_pulldown case, we need to strip off AH so that
486 * we can compute checksum for multiple AH correctly.
488 if (m->m_len >= stripsiz + off) {
489 ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip, ((caddr_t)ip) + stripsiz, off);
490 m->m_data += stripsiz;
491 m->m_len -= stripsiz;
492 m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz;
495 * this comes with no copy if the boundary is on
500 n = m_split(m, off, MB_DONTWAIT);
502 /* m is retained by m_split */
507 /* m_cat does not update m_pkthdr.len */
508 m->m_pkthdr.len += n->m_pkthdr.len;
512 if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip)) {
513 m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip));
515 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
519 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
521 ip->ip_len = ip->ip_len - stripsiz;
523 ip->ip_len = htons(ntohs(ip->ip_len) - stripsiz);
526 /* forget about IP hdr checksum, the check has already been passed */
528 key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m);
529 if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0) {
530 ipsecstat.in_nomem++;
534 if (nxt != IPPROTO_DONE) {
535 if ((inetsw[ip_protox[nxt]].pr_flags & PR_LASTHDR) != 0 &&
536 ipsec4_in_reject(m, NULL)) {
537 ipsecstat.in_polvio++;
540 (*inetsw[ip_protox[nxt]].pr_input)(m, off, nxt);
547 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
548 printf("DP ah4_input call free SA:%p\n", sav));
551 ipsecstat.in_success++;
556 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
557 printf("DP ah4_input call free SA:%p\n", sav));
568 ah6_input(struct mbuf **mp, int *offp, int proto)
570 struct mbuf *m = *mp;
575 const struct ah_algorithm *algo;
579 struct secasvar *sav = NULL;
583 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST
584 IP6_EXTHDR_CHECK(m, off, sizeof(struct ah), IPPROTO_DONE);
585 ah = (struct ah *)(mtod(m, caddr_t) + off);
587 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct ah *, m, off, sizeof(struct newah));
589 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv6 AH input: can't pullup\n"));
590 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
594 ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
597 /* find the sassoc. */
600 if (ntohs(ip6->ip6_plen) == 0) {
601 ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "IPv6 AH input: "
602 "AH with IPv6 jumbogram is not supported.\n"));
603 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
607 if ((sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET6,
608 (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_src, (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_dst,
609 IPPROTO_AH, spi)) == 0) {
610 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
611 "IPv6 AH input: no key association found for spi %u\n",
612 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)));
613 ipsec6stat.in_nosa++;
616 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
617 printf("DP ah6_input called to allocate SA:%p\n", sav));
618 if (sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_MATURE
619 && sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_DYING) {
621 "IPv6 AH input: non-mature/dying SA found for spi %u; ",
622 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)));
623 ipsec6stat.in_badspi++;
627 algo = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth);
629 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv6 AH input: "
630 "unsupported authentication algorithm for spi %u\n",
631 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)));
632 ipsec6stat.in_badspi++;
636 siz = (*algo->sumsiz)(sav);
637 siz1 = ((siz + 3) & ~(4 - 1));
640 * sanity checks for header, 1.
645 sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4;
648 * Here, we do not do "siz1 == siz". See ah4_input() for complete
652 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length too short in IPv6 AH input "
653 "(%lu, should be at least %lu): %s\n",
654 (u_long)siz1, (u_long)siz,
655 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi)));
656 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
659 if ((ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff != siz1) {
660 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length mismatch in IPv6 AH input "
661 "(%d should be %lu): %s\n",
662 (ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff, (u_long)siz1,
663 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi)));
664 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
667 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST
668 IP6_EXTHDR_CHECK(m, off, sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1, IPPROTO_DONE);
670 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct ah *, m, off,
671 sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1);
673 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "couldn't pullup gather IPv6 AH checksum part"));
674 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
682 * check for sequence number.
684 if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) {
685 if (ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav))
688 ipsec6stat.in_ahreplay++;
689 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
690 "replay packet in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n",
691 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi),
692 ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
698 * alright, it seems sane. now we are going to check the
699 * cryptographic checksum.
701 cksum = malloc(siz1, M_TEMP, M_NOWAIT);
703 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv6 AH input: "
704 "couldn't alloc temporary region for cksum\n"));
705 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
709 if (ah6_calccksum(m, (caddr_t)cksum, siz1, algo, sav)) {
711 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
714 ipsec6stat.in_ahhist[sav->alg_auth]++;
717 caddr_t sumpos = NULL;
719 if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) {
721 sumpos = (caddr_t)(ah + 1);
724 sumpos = (caddr_t)(((struct newah *)ah) + 1);
727 if (bcmp(sumpos, cksum, siz) != 0) {
728 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
729 "checksum mismatch in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n",
730 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
732 ipsec6stat.in_ahauthfail++;
739 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR;
740 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPDGM;
744 * looks okey, but we need more sanity check.
745 * XXX should elaborate.
747 if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPV6) {
748 struct ip6_hdr *nip6;
751 sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4;
753 IP6_EXTHDR_CHECK(m, off, sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1
754 + sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), IPPROTO_DONE);
756 nip6 = (struct ip6_hdr *)((u_char *)(ah + 1) + sizoff + siz1);
757 if (!IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&nip6->ip6_src, &ip6->ip6_src)
758 || !IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&nip6->ip6_dst, &ip6->ip6_dst)) {
759 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
760 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
762 } else if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPIP) {
763 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
764 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
765 } else if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IP) {
766 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
767 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
771 if (m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPHDR
772 && m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPDGM) {
775 "IPv6 AH input: authentication succeess\n"));
777 ipsec6stat.in_ahauthsucc++;
779 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
780 "authentication failed in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n",
781 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
782 ipsec6stat.in_ahauthfail++;
787 * update sequence number.
789 if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) {
790 if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav)) {
791 ipsec6stat.in_ahreplay++;
796 /* was it transmitted over the IPsec tunnel SA? */
797 if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) {
799 stripsiz = sizeof(struct ah) + siz1;
802 stripsiz = sizeof(struct newah) + siz1;
804 if (ipsec6_tunnel_validate(m, off + stripsiz, nxt, sav)) {
806 * strip off all the headers that precedes AH.
807 * IP6 xx AH IP6' payload -> IP6' payload
809 * XXX more sanity checks
810 * XXX relationship with gif?
812 u_int32_t flowinfo; /* net endian */
814 flowinfo = ip6->ip6_flow;
815 m_adj(m, off + stripsiz);
816 if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip6)) {
818 * m_pullup is prohibited in KAME IPv6 input processing
819 * but there's no other way!
821 m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip6));
823 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
827 ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
828 /* ECN consideration. */
829 ip6_ecn_egress(ip6_ipsec_ecn, &flowinfo, &ip6->ip6_flow);
830 if (!key_checktunnelsanity(sav, AF_INET6,
831 (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_src, (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_dst)) {
832 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "ipsec tunnel address mismatch "
833 "in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n",
834 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi),
835 ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
836 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
842 * should the inner packet be considered authentic?
843 * see comment in ah4_input().
845 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
846 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
849 key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m);
850 if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0 ||
851 ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_IPV6, 0) != 0) {
852 ipsec6stat.in_nomem++;
856 if (netisr_queue(NETISR_IPV6, m)) {
857 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
870 * Copy the value of the next header field of AH to the
871 * next header field of the previous header.
872 * This is necessary because AH will be stripped off below.
874 prvnxtp = ip6_get_prevhdr(m, off); /* XXX */
877 ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
878 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST
880 * We do deep-copy since KAME requires that
881 * the packet is placed in a single mbuf.
883 ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip6, ((caddr_t)ip6) + stripsiz, off);
884 m->m_data += stripsiz;
885 m->m_len -= stripsiz;
886 m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz;
889 * even in m_pulldown case, we need to strip off AH so that
890 * we can compute checksum for multiple AH correctly.
892 if (m->m_len >= stripsiz + off) {
893 ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip6, ((caddr_t)ip6) + stripsiz, off);
894 m->m_data += stripsiz;
895 m->m_len -= stripsiz;
896 m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz;
899 * this comes with no copy if the boundary is on
904 n = m_split(m, off, MB_DONTWAIT);
906 /* m is retained by m_split */
911 /* m_cat does not update m_pkthdr.len */
912 m->m_pkthdr.len += n->m_pkthdr.len;
915 ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
917 ip6->ip6_plen = htons(ntohs(ip6->ip6_plen) - stripsiz);
919 key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m);
920 if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0) {
921 ipsec6stat.in_nomem++;
930 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
931 printf("DP ah6_input call free SA:%p\n", sav));
934 ipsec6stat.in_success++;
939 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
940 printf("DP ah6_input call free SA:%p\n", sav));
949 ah6_ctlinput(int cmd, struct sockaddr *sa, void *d)
951 const struct newah *ahp;
953 struct secasvar *sav;
956 struct ip6ctlparam *ip6cp = NULL;
958 struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6_src, *sa6_dst;
960 if (sa->sa_family != AF_INET6 ||
961 sa->sa_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
963 if ((unsigned)cmd >= PRC_NCMDS)
966 /* if the parameter is from icmp6, decode it. */
968 ip6cp = (struct ip6ctlparam *)d;
970 ip6 = ip6cp->ip6c_ip6;
971 off = ip6cp->ip6c_off;
975 off = 0; /* fix warning */
980 * XXX: We assume that when ip6 is non NULL,
981 * M and OFF are valid.
984 /* check if we can safely examine src and dst ports */
985 if (m->m_pkthdr.len < off + sizeof(ah))
988 if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(ah)) {
990 * this should be rare case,
991 * so we compromise on this copy...
993 m_copydata(m, off, sizeof(ah), (caddr_t)&ah);
996 ahp = (struct newah *)(mtod(m, caddr_t) + off);
998 if (cmd == PRC_MSGSIZE) {
1002 * Check to see if we have a valid SA corresponding to
1003 * the address in the ICMP message payload.
1005 sa6_src = ip6cp->ip6c_src;
1006 sa6_dst = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
1007 sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET6,
1008 (caddr_t)&sa6_src->sin6_addr,
1009 (caddr_t)&sa6_dst->sin6_addr,
1010 IPPROTO_AH, ahp->ah_spi);
1012 if (sav->state == SADB_SASTATE_MATURE ||
1013 sav->state == SADB_SASTATE_DYING)
1018 /* XXX Further validation? */
1021 * Depending on the value of "valid" and routing table
1022 * size (mtudisc_{hi,lo}wat), we will:
1023 * - recalcurate the new MTU and create the
1024 * corresponding routing entry, or
1025 * - ignore the MTU change notification.
1027 icmp6_mtudisc_update((struct ip6ctlparam *)d, valid);
1030 /* we normally notify single pcb here */
1032 /* we normally notify any pcb here */