1 /* $OpenBSD: ssl_srvr.c,v 1.85 2020/09/24 18:12:00 jsing Exp $ */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
153 #include "ssl_locl.h"
155 #include <openssl/bn.h>
156 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
157 #include <openssl/curve25519.h>
158 #include <openssl/evp.h>
159 #include <openssl/dh.h>
160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
161 #include <openssl/gost.h>
163 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
164 #include <openssl/md5.h>
165 #include <openssl/objects.h>
166 #include <openssl/x509.h>
168 #include "bytestring.h"
169 #include "ssl_sigalgs.h"
170 #include "ssl_tlsext.h"
175 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
178 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
184 if (s->internal->info_callback != NULL)
185 cb = s->internal->info_callback;
186 else if (s->ctx->internal->info_callback != NULL)
187 cb = s->ctx->internal->info_callback;
190 listen = D1I(s)->listen;
192 /* init things to blank */
193 s->internal->in_handshake++;
194 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
198 D1I(s)->listen = listen;
201 state = S3I(s)->hs.state;
203 switch (S3I(s)->hs.state) {
204 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
205 s->internal->renegotiate = 1;
206 /* S3I(s)->hs.state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
210 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
211 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
214 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
216 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
217 if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00)) {
218 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
223 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
224 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
229 s->internal->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
231 if (!ssl3_setup_init_buffer(s)) {
235 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
240 s->internal->init_num = 0;
242 if (S3I(s)->hs.state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
244 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO
245 * so that the output is sent in a way that
248 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
253 if (!tls1_transcript_init(s)) {
258 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
259 s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept++;
260 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !S3I(s)->send_connection_binding) {
262 * Server attempting to renegotiate with
263 * client that doesn't support secure
266 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
267 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
268 SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
273 * S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
274 * we will just send a HelloRequest.
276 s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
277 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
281 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
282 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
283 s->internal->shutdown = 0;
284 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
285 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
286 dtls1_start_timer(s);
288 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
292 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
294 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
295 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
296 s->internal->init_num = 0;
298 if (!tls1_transcript_init(s)) {
304 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
305 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL_ST_OK;
308 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
309 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
310 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
311 s->internal->shutdown = 0;
312 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
313 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
319 (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
320 S3I(s)->hs.state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A;
322 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
324 s->internal->init_num = 0;
327 * Reflect ClientHello sequence to remain
328 * stateless while listening.
331 memcpy(S3I(s)->write_sequence,
332 S3I(s)->read_sequence,
333 sizeof(S3I(s)->write_sequence));
336 /* If we're just listening, stop here */
337 if (listen && S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
341 * Set expected sequence numbers to
342 * continue the handshake.
344 D1I(s)->handshake_read_seq = 2;
345 D1I(s)->handshake_write_seq = 1;
346 D1I(s)->next_handshake_write_seq = 1;
350 if (s->internal->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
351 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
356 s->internal->renegotiate = 2;
357 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
358 s->internal->init_num = 0;
362 case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A:
363 case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B:
364 ret = dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(s);
367 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
368 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
370 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC. */
371 tls1_transcript_reset(s);
374 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
375 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
376 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
377 s->internal->renegotiate = 2;
378 dtls1_start_timer(s);
380 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
383 if (s->internal->hit) {
384 if (s->internal->tlsext_ticket_expected)
385 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
387 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
389 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
391 s->internal->init_num = 0;
394 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
395 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
396 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH. */
397 if (!(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
400 dtls1_start_timer(s);
401 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
404 if (s->internal->tlsext_status_expected)
405 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
407 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
410 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
412 s->internal->init_num = 0;
415 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
416 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
417 alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
420 * Only send if using a DH key exchange.
422 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a ServerKeyExchange
423 * message only if the cipher suite is ECDHE. In other
424 * cases, the server certificate contains the server's
425 * public key for key exchange.
427 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE)) {
429 dtls1_start_timer(s);
430 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
436 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
437 s->internal->init_num = 0;
440 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
441 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
443 * Determine whether or not we need to request a
446 * Do not request a certificate if:
448 * - We did not ask for it (SSL_VERIFY_PEER is unset).
450 * - SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set and we are
453 * - We are using an anonymous ciphersuites
454 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
455 * and in RFC 2246) ... except when the application
456 * insists on verification (against the specs, but
457 * s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3).
459 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
460 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
461 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
462 ((S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
463 SSL_aNULL) && !(s->verify_mode &
464 SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))) {
465 /* No cert request. */
467 S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request = 0;
468 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
471 tls1_transcript_free(s);
473 S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request = 1;
475 dtls1_start_timer(s);
476 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
479 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
480 s->internal->init_num = 0;
484 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
485 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
487 dtls1_start_timer(s);
488 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
491 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
492 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
493 s->internal->init_num = 0;
496 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
498 * This code originally checked to see if
499 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
500 * and then flushed. This caused problems
501 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
502 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
503 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
504 * still exist. So instead we just flush
507 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
508 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
509 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
510 /* If the write error was fatal, stop trying. */
511 if (!BIO_should_retry(s->wbio)) {
512 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
513 S3I(s)->hs.state = S3I(s)->hs.next_state;
519 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
520 S3I(s)->hs.state = S3I(s)->hs.next_state;
523 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
524 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
525 if (S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request) {
526 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
530 s->internal->init_num = 0;
531 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
534 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
535 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
536 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
540 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
541 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
542 s->internal->init_num = 0;
545 alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
548 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when
549 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
550 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
551 * message is not sent.
552 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
553 * the client uses its key from the certificate
556 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
557 s->internal->init_num = 0;
558 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)) {
559 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
560 s->internal->init_num = 0;
561 if (!s->session->peer)
564 * Freeze the transcript for use during client
565 * certificate verification.
567 tls1_transcript_freeze(s);
569 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
570 s->internal->init_num = 0;
572 tls1_transcript_free(s);
575 * We need to get hashes here so if there is
576 * a client cert, it can be verified.
578 if (!tls1_transcript_hash_value(s,
579 S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md,
580 sizeof(S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md),
588 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
589 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
591 D1I(s)->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
593 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
595 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
596 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
599 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
600 s->internal->init_num = 0;
603 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
604 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
606 D1I(s)->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
608 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
609 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
610 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
615 if (s->internal->hit)
616 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL_ST_OK;
617 else if (s->internal->tlsext_ticket_expected)
618 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
620 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
621 s->internal->init_num = 0;
624 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
625 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
626 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
629 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
630 s->internal->init_num = 0;
633 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
634 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
635 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
638 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
639 s->internal->init_num = 0;
642 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
643 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
644 s->session->cipher = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher;
645 if (!tls1_setup_key_block(s)) {
650 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
651 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A, SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
654 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
655 s->internal->init_num = 0;
657 if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(s,
658 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
664 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
667 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
668 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
669 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
670 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
671 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
672 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE);
675 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
676 if (s->internal->hit) {
677 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
678 tls1_transcript_free(s);
680 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
681 s->internal->init_num = 0;
685 /* clean a few things up */
686 tls1_cleanup_key_block(s);
688 if (S3I(s)->handshake_transcript != NULL) {
689 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
695 ssl3_release_init_buffer(s);
697 /* remove buffering on output */
698 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
700 s->internal->init_num = 0;
702 /* Skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest. */
703 if (s->internal->renegotiate == 2) {
704 s->internal->renegotiate = 0;
705 s->internal->new_session = 0;
707 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
709 s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept_good++;
711 s->internal->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
714 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
719 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
720 /* Done handshaking, next message is client hello. */
721 D1I(s)->handshake_read_seq = 0;
722 /* Next message is server hello. */
723 D1I(s)->handshake_write_seq = 0;
724 D1I(s)->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
730 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
736 if (!S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
737 if (s->internal->debug) {
738 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
743 if ((cb != NULL) && (S3I(s)->hs.state != state)) {
744 new_state = S3I(s)->hs.state;
745 S3I(s)->hs.state = state;
746 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
747 S3I(s)->hs.state = new_state;
753 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
754 s->internal->in_handshake--;
756 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
762 ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
766 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
768 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
769 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &hello,
770 SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST))
772 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
775 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
778 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
779 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
788 ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
790 CBS cbs, client_random, session_id, cookie, cipher_suites;
791 CBS compression_methods;
792 uint16_t client_version;
795 int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1, cookie_valid = 0;
799 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
801 const SSL_METHOD *method;
802 uint16_t max_version, shared_version;
805 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
806 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
807 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
808 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
811 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
812 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
815 s->internal->first_packet = 1;
816 n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
817 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
818 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
821 s->internal->first_packet = 0;
826 CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n);
828 /* Parse client hello up until the extensions (if any). */
829 if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &client_version))
831 if (!CBS_get_bytes(&cbs, &client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE))
833 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &session_id))
835 if (CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
836 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
837 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
840 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
841 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &cookie))
844 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &cipher_suites))
846 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &compression_methods))
850 * Use version from inside client hello, not from record header.
851 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
853 if (!ssl_downgrade_max_version(s, &max_version))
855 if (ssl_max_shared_version(s, client_version, &shared_version) != 1) {
856 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
857 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
858 !s->internal->enc_write_ctx && !s->internal->write_hash) {
860 * Similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote
863 s->version = s->client_version;
865 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
868 s->client_version = client_version;
869 s->version = shared_version;
871 if ((method = ssl_get_server_method(shared_version)) == NULL) {
872 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
878 * If we require cookies (DTLS) and this ClientHello does not contain
879 * one, just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
880 * So check cookie length...
882 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
883 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
884 if (CBS_len(&cookie) == 0)
889 if (!CBS_write_bytes(&client_random, s->s3->client_random,
890 sizeof(s->s3->client_random), NULL))
893 s->internal->hit = 0;
896 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
897 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
898 * ignore resumption requests with flag
899 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag
900 * rather than a change to default behavior so that applications
901 * relying on this for security won't even compile against older
904 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated()
905 * to request renegotiation but not a new session (s->internal->new_session
906 * remains unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
907 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
910 if ((s->internal->new_session && (s->internal->options &
911 SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
912 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
917 CBS_dup(&cbs, &ext_block);
919 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &session_id, &ext_block, &al);
920 if (i == 1) { /* previous session */
921 s->internal->hit = 1;
926 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
931 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
933 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the HelloVerify
934 * message has not been sent - make sure that it does not cause
937 if (CBS_len(&cookie) > sizeof(D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie)) {
938 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
939 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
943 /* Verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
944 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
945 CBS_len(&cookie) > 0) {
948 /* XXX - rcvd_cookie seems to only be used here... */
949 if (!CBS_write_bytes(&cookie, D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie,
950 sizeof(D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie), &cookie_len))
953 if (s->ctx->internal->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
954 if (s->ctx->internal->app_verify_cookie_cb(s,
955 D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie, cookie_len) == 0) {
956 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
957 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
960 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
961 /* XXX - can d1->cookie_len > sizeof(rcvd_cookie) ? */
962 } else if (timingsafe_memcmp(D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie,
963 D1I(s)->cookie, D1I(s)->cookie_len) != 0) {
964 /* default verification */
965 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
966 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
973 /* XXX - This logic seems wrong... */
974 if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) == 0 && CBS_len(&session_id) != 0) {
975 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
976 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
977 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
981 if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) {
982 if ((ciphers = ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,
983 &cipher_suites)) == NULL)
987 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
988 /* XXX - CBS_len(&cipher_suites) will always be zero here... */
989 if (s->internal->hit && CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) {
991 id = s->session->cipher->id;
993 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
994 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1002 * We need to have the cipher in the cipher
1003 * list if we are asked to reuse it
1005 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1006 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1012 while (CBS_len(&compression_methods) > 0) {
1013 if (!CBS_get_u8(&compression_methods, &comp_method))
1015 if (comp_method == 0)
1018 if (comp_null == 0) {
1019 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1020 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1024 if (!tlsext_server_parse(s, SSL_TLSEXT_MSG_CH, &cbs, &al)) {
1025 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1029 if (!S3I(s)->renegotiate_seen && s->internal->renegotiate) {
1030 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1031 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1035 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
1036 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1041 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1042 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1043 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1044 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation.
1046 arc4random_buf(s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1048 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && max_version >= TLS1_2_VERSION &&
1049 s->version < max_version) {
1051 * RFC 8446 section 4.1.3. If we are downgrading from TLS 1.3
1052 * we must set the last 8 bytes of the server random to magical
1053 * values to indicate we meant to downgrade. For TLS 1.2 it is
1054 * recommended that we do the same.
1056 size_t index = SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - sizeof(tls13_downgrade_12);
1057 uint8_t *magic = &s->s3->server_random[index];
1058 if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1059 /* Indicate we chose to downgrade to 1.2. */
1060 memcpy(magic, tls13_downgrade_12,
1061 sizeof(tls13_downgrade_12));
1063 /* Indicate we chose to downgrade to 1.1 or lower */
1064 memcpy(magic, tls13_downgrade_11,
1065 sizeof(tls13_downgrade_11));
1069 if (!s->internal->hit && s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1070 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1072 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1073 if (s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1074 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers, &pref_cipher,
1075 s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1076 s->internal->hit = 1;
1077 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1078 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1082 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1083 pref_cipher = pref_cipher ? pref_cipher :
1084 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
1085 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1086 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1087 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1088 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1092 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1094 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1095 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1100 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1104 if (!s->internal->hit) {
1105 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1106 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1107 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1108 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1109 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1113 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
1114 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1117 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1118 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1121 S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher = c;
1123 S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1126 if (!tls1_transcript_hash_init(s))
1129 alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1130 if (!(SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)) ||
1131 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1132 tls1_transcript_free(s);
1135 * We now have the following setup.
1137 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1138 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1139 * compression - basically ignored right now
1140 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1141 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1142 * s->internal->hit - session reuse flag
1143 * s->hs.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1146 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1147 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1148 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1152 ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1;
1156 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1157 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1159 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1162 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1168 ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1170 CBB cbb, server_hello, session_id;
1173 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
1175 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1176 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &server_hello,
1177 SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO))
1180 if (!CBB_add_u16(&server_hello, s->version))
1182 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&server_hello, s->s3->server_random,
1183 sizeof(s->s3->server_random)))
1187 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1188 * back in the server hello:
1190 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1191 * we send back the old session ID.
1192 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1193 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1194 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1195 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1197 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1198 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1200 * s->internal->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1201 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1204 if (!(s->ctx->internal->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1205 && !s->internal->hit)
1206 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1208 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1209 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1210 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1213 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&server_hello, &session_id))
1215 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&session_id, s->session->session_id, sl))
1219 if (!CBB_add_u16(&server_hello,
1220 ssl3_cipher_get_value(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher)))
1223 /* Compression method (null). */
1224 if (!CBB_add_u8(&server_hello, 0))
1227 /* TLS extensions */
1228 if (!tlsext_server_build(s, SSL_TLSEXT_MSG_SH, &server_hello)) {
1229 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
1237 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1238 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
1247 ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1251 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
1253 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1254 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &done,
1255 SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE))
1257 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
1260 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1263 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1264 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
1273 ssl3_send_server_kex_dhe(SSL *s, CBB *cbb)
1275 CBB dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys;
1276 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1277 unsigned char *data;
1280 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 0) {
1281 if ((dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s)) == NULL) {
1282 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1283 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1287 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp;
1289 if (dhp == NULL && s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)
1290 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0,
1291 SSL_C_PKEYLENGTH(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher));
1294 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1295 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1299 if (S3I(s)->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1300 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1304 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 0) {
1306 } else if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1307 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1310 S3I(s)->tmp.dh = dh;
1311 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1312 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1317 * Serialize the DH parameters and public key.
1319 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_p))
1321 if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_p, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh->p)))
1323 BN_bn2bin(dh->p, data);
1325 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_g))
1327 if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_g, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh->g)))
1329 BN_bn2bin(dh->g, data);
1331 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_Ys))
1333 if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_Ys, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh->pub_key)))
1335 BN_bn2bin(dh->pub_key, data);
1337 if (!CBB_flush(cbb))
1343 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1349 ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecp(SSL *s, int nid, CBB *cbb)
1357 * Only named curves are supported in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1358 * For supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1360 if ((curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid)) == 0) {
1361 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1365 if (S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1366 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1370 if ((S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
1371 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1372 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1375 S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh_nid = nid;
1376 ecdh = S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh;
1378 if (!ssl_kex_generate_ecdhe_ecp(ecdh, nid))
1382 * Encode the public key.
1384 * Only named curves are supported in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1385 * In this case the ServerKeyExchange message has:
1386 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1387 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1388 * the actual encoded point itself.
1390 if (!CBB_add_u8(cbb, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE))
1392 if (!CBB_add_u16(cbb, curve_id))
1394 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &ecpoint))
1396 if (!ssl_kex_public_ecdhe_ecp(ecdh, &ecpoint))
1398 if (!CBB_flush(cbb))
1404 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1410 ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecx(SSL *s, int nid, CBB *cbb)
1412 uint8_t *public_key = NULL, *private_key = NULL;
1417 /* Generate an X25519 key pair. */
1418 if (S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 != NULL) {
1419 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1422 if ((private_key = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1424 if ((public_key = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1426 X25519_keypair(public_key, private_key);
1428 /* Serialize public key. */
1429 if ((curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid)) == 0) {
1430 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1434 if (!CBB_add_u8(cbb, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE))
1436 if (!CBB_add_u16(cbb, curve_id))
1438 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &ecpoint))
1440 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ecpoint, public_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH))
1442 if (!CBB_flush(cbb))
1445 S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 = private_key;
1451 freezero(private_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH);
1457 ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, CBB *cbb)
1461 nid = tls1_get_shared_curve(s);
1463 if (nid == NID_X25519)
1464 return ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecx(s, nid, cbb);
1466 return ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecp(s, nid, cbb);
1470 ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1472 CBB cbb, cbb_params, cbb_signature, server_kex;
1473 const struct ssl_sigalg *sigalg = NULL;
1474 unsigned char *signature = NULL;
1475 size_t signature_len = 0;
1476 unsigned char *params = NULL;
1478 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1485 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
1486 memset(&cbb_params, 0, sizeof(cbb_params));
1488 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1490 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1492 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &server_kex,
1493 SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE))
1496 if (!CBB_init(&cbb_params, 0))
1499 type = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1500 if (type & SSL_kDHE) {
1501 if (ssl3_send_server_kex_dhe(s, &cbb_params) != 1)
1503 } else if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
1504 if (ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe(s, &cbb_params) != 1)
1507 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1508 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1512 if (!CBB_finish(&cbb_params, ¶ms, ¶ms_len))
1515 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&server_kex, params, params_len))
1518 /* Add signature unless anonymous. */
1519 if (!(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) {
1520 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher,
1521 &md, &sigalg)) == NULL) {
1522 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1526 /* Send signature algorithm. */
1527 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1528 if (!CBB_add_u16(&server_kex, sigalg->value)) {
1529 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1530 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1535 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey)) {
1536 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1539 if ((sigalg->flags & SIGALG_FLAG_RSA_PSS) &&
1540 (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx,
1541 RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) ||
1542 !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1))) {
1543 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1546 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->client_random,
1547 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1548 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1551 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->server_random,
1552 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1553 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1556 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, params, params_len)) {
1557 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1560 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, NULL, &signature_len) ||
1562 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1565 if ((signature = calloc(1, signature_len)) == NULL) {
1566 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1569 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, signature, &signature_len)) {
1570 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1574 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&server_kex,
1577 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb_signature, signature,
1582 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
1585 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1588 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1592 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
1595 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1597 CBB_cleanup(&cbb_params);
1599 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1607 ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1609 CBB cbb, cert_request, cert_types, sigalgs, cert_auth, dn;
1610 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
1615 * Certificate Request - RFC 5246 section 7.4.4.
1618 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
1620 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
1621 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &cert_request,
1622 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST))
1625 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &cert_types))
1627 if (!ssl3_get_req_cert_types(s, &cert_types))
1630 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1631 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &sigalgs))
1633 if (!ssl_sigalgs_build(&sigalgs, tls12_sigalgs, tls12_sigalgs_len))
1637 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &cert_auth))
1640 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1641 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
1642 unsigned char *name_data;
1645 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
1646 name_len = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
1648 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_auth, &dn))
1650 if (!CBB_add_space(&dn, &name_data, name_len))
1652 if (i2d_X509_NAME(name, &name_data) != name_len)
1656 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
1659 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1662 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1663 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
1672 ssl3_get_client_kex_rsa(SSL *s, CBS *cbs)
1674 unsigned char fakekey[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
1675 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
1678 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1684 arc4random_buf(fakekey, sizeof(fakekey));
1685 fakekey[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1686 fakekey[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1688 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey;
1689 if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1690 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
1691 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1692 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1695 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
1697 pms_len = RSA_size(rsa);
1698 if (pms_len < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1700 if ((pms = malloc(pms_len)) == NULL)
1704 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &enc_pms))
1706 if (CBS_len(cbs) != 0 || CBS_len(&enc_pms) != RSA_size(rsa)) {
1707 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1711 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(CBS_len(&enc_pms), CBS_data(&enc_pms),
1712 pms, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1716 if (decrypt_len != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
1717 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1718 /* SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1721 if ((al == -1) && !((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8)) &&
1722 (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
1724 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number
1725 * as the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
1726 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
1729 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1730 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1731 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1732 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1733 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except that
1734 * the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks, we should
1735 * treat this just like any other decryption error.
1737 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1738 /* SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1743 * Some decryption failure -- use random value instead
1744 * as countermeasure against Bleichenbacher's attack
1745 * on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
1751 s->session->master_key_length =
1752 tls1_generate_master_secret(s,
1753 s->session->master_key, p, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
1755 freezero(pms, pms_len);
1760 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1761 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1763 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1765 freezero(pms, pms_len);
1771 ssl3_get_client_kex_dhe(SSL *s, CBS *cbs)
1774 int key_is_invalid, key_len, al;
1775 unsigned char *key = NULL;
1780 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &dh_Yc))
1782 if (CBS_len(cbs) != 0)
1785 if (S3I(s)->tmp.dh == NULL) {
1786 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1787 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1790 dh = S3I(s)->tmp.dh;
1792 if ((bn = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_Yc), CBS_len(&dh_Yc), NULL)) == NULL) {
1793 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1797 if ((key_size = DH_size(dh)) <= 0) {
1798 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1801 if ((key = malloc(key_size)) == NULL) {
1802 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1805 if (!DH_check_pub_key(dh, bn, &key_is_invalid)) {
1806 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1807 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1810 if (key_is_invalid) {
1811 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1812 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1815 if ((key_len = DH_compute_key(key, bn, dh)) <= 0) {
1816 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1817 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1821 s->session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret(s,
1822 s->session->master_key, key, key_len);
1824 DH_free(S3I(s)->tmp.dh);
1825 S3I(s)->tmp.dh = NULL;
1827 freezero(key, key_size);
1833 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1834 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1836 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1838 freezero(key, key_size);
1845 ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecp(SSL *s, CBS *cbs)
1847 uint8_t *key = NULL;
1849 EC_KEY *ecdh_peer = NULL;
1855 * Use the ephemeral values we saved when generating the
1856 * ServerKeyExchange message.
1858 if ((ecdh = S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh) == NULL) {
1859 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1864 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the ClientKeyExchange
1867 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(cbs, &public))
1869 if (CBS_len(cbs) != 0)
1872 if ((ecdh_peer = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
1875 if (!ssl_kex_peer_public_ecdhe_ecp(ecdh_peer, S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh_nid,
1879 /* Derive the shared secret and compute master secret. */
1880 if (!ssl_kex_derive_ecdhe_ecp(ecdh, ecdh_peer, &key, &key_len))
1882 s->session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret(s,
1883 s->session->master_key, key, key_len);
1885 EC_KEY_free(S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh);
1886 S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
1887 S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh_nid = NID_undef;
1892 freezero(key, key_len);
1893 EC_KEY_free(ecdh_peer);
1899 ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecx(SSL *s, CBS *cbs)
1901 uint8_t *shared_key = NULL;
1905 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(cbs, &ecpoint))
1907 if (CBS_len(cbs) != 0)
1909 if (CBS_len(&ecpoint) != X25519_KEY_LENGTH)
1912 if ((shared_key = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1914 if (!X25519(shared_key, S3I(s)->tmp.x25519, CBS_data(&ecpoint)))
1917 freezero(S3I(s)->tmp.x25519, X25519_KEY_LENGTH);
1918 S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 = NULL;
1920 s->session->master_key_length =
1921 tls1_generate_master_secret(
1922 s, s->session->master_key, shared_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH);
1927 freezero(shared_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH);
1933 ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, CBS *cbs)
1935 if (S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 != NULL)
1936 return ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecx(s, cbs);
1938 return ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecp(s, cbs);
1942 ssl3_get_client_kex_gost(SSL *s, CBS *cbs)
1944 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
1945 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
1946 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
1947 unsigned long alg_a;
1953 /* Get our certificate private key*/
1954 alg_a = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1955 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
1956 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
1958 if ((pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL)) == NULL)
1960 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0)
1964 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type,
1965 * maybe use it for key exchange.
1966 * Don't mind errors from EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because
1967 * it is completely valid to use a client certificate for
1968 * authorization only.
1970 if ((client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) != NULL) {
1971 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx,
1972 client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
1976 /* Decrypt session key */
1977 if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &gostblob, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE))
1979 if (CBS_len(cbs) != 0)
1981 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen,
1982 CBS_data(&gostblob), CBS_len(&gostblob)) <= 0) {
1983 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
1987 /* Generate master secret */
1988 s->session->master_key_length =
1989 tls1_generate_master_secret(
1990 s, s->session->master_key, premaster_secret, 32);
1992 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
1993 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1,
1994 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
1999 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2000 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2007 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2008 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
2009 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2015 ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2017 unsigned long alg_k;
2022 /* 2048 maxlen is a guess. How long a key does that permit? */
2023 n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2024 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2031 CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n);
2033 alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2035 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2036 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_rsa(s, &cbs) != 1)
2038 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
2039 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_dhe(s, &cbs) != 1)
2041 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
2042 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe(s, &cbs) != 1)
2044 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2045 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_gost(s, &cbs) != 1)
2048 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2049 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2053 if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
2054 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2055 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
2062 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2068 ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2071 const struct ssl_sigalg *sigalg = NULL;
2072 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2073 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2077 const unsigned char *hdata;
2083 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2085 n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2086 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
2093 CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n);
2095 if (s->session->peer != NULL) {
2096 peer = s->session->peer;
2097 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2098 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2101 if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
2102 S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
2104 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2105 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2113 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2114 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2118 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2119 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2120 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2124 if (S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec) {
2125 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2126 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2130 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2131 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &signature))
2133 if (CBS_len(&signature) > EVP_PKEY_size(pkey)) {
2134 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2135 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2138 if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
2139 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2140 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2145 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2147 uint16_t sigalg_value;
2149 if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &sigalg_value))
2151 if ((sigalg = ssl_sigalg(sigalg_value, tls12_sigalgs,
2152 tls12_sigalgs_len)) == NULL ||
2153 (md = sigalg->md()) == NULL) {
2154 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
2155 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2158 if (!ssl_sigalg_pkey_ok(sigalg, pkey, 0)) {
2159 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2160 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2164 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &signature))
2166 if (CBS_len(&signature) > EVP_PKEY_size(pkey)) {
2167 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2168 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2171 if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
2172 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2173 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2177 if (!tls1_transcript_data(s, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
2178 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2179 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2182 if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey)) {
2183 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2184 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2187 if ((sigalg->flags & SIGALG_FLAG_RSA_PSS) &&
2188 (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding
2189 (pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) ||
2190 !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1))) {
2191 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2194 if (sigalg->key_type == EVP_PKEY_GOSTR01 &&
2195 EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY,
2196 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GOST_SIG_FORMAT, GOST_SIG_FORMAT_RS_LE,
2198 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2201 if (!EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
2202 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2203 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2206 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&mctx, CBS_data(&signature),
2207 CBS_len(&signature)) <= 0) {
2208 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2209 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2212 } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
2213 verify = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2214 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, CBS_data(&signature),
2215 CBS_len(&signature), pkey->pkey.rsa);
2217 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2218 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2222 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2223 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2226 } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2227 verify = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2228 &(S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2229 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, CBS_data(&signature),
2230 CBS_len(&signature), pkey->pkey.ec);
2232 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2233 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2236 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2237 } else if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2238 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2239 unsigned char sigbuf[128];
2240 unsigned int siglen = sizeof(sigbuf);
2244 if (!tls1_transcript_data(s, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
2245 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2246 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2249 if (!EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &nid) ||
2250 !(md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid))) {
2251 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2252 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2255 if ((pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL)) == NULL) {
2256 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2257 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2260 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) ||
2261 !EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen) ||
2262 !EVP_DigestFinal(&mctx, sigbuf, &siglen) ||
2263 (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) ||
2264 (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, md) <= 0) ||
2265 (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY,
2266 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GOST_SIG_FORMAT,
2267 GOST_SIG_FORMAT_RS_LE, NULL) <= 0)) {
2268 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2269 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2270 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2273 if (EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, CBS_data(&signature),
2274 CBS_len(&signature), sigbuf, siglen) <= 0) {
2275 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2276 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2277 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2281 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2284 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2285 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2292 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2293 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
2295 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2298 tls1_transcript_free(s);
2300 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
2301 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2306 ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2308 CBS cbs, client_certs;
2309 int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
2312 const unsigned char *q;
2313 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
2315 n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
2316 -1, s->internal->max_cert_list, &ok);
2320 if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
2321 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2322 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
2323 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2324 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2328 * If tls asked for a client cert,
2329 * the client must return a 0 list.
2331 if (S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request) {
2332 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
2334 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2337 S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
2341 if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
2342 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2343 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2350 CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n);
2352 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
2353 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2357 if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cbs, &client_certs) ||
2361 while (CBS_len(&client_certs) > 0) {
2364 if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&client_certs, &cert)) {
2365 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2366 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2370 q = CBS_data(&cert);
2371 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, CBS_len(&cert));
2373 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2376 if (q != CBS_data(&cert) + CBS_len(&cert)) {
2377 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2378 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2381 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
2382 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2388 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
2390 * TLS does not mind 0 certs returned.
2391 * Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate.
2393 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2394 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
2395 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2396 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2399 /* No client certificate so free transcript. */
2400 tls1_transcript_free(s);
2402 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
2404 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2405 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2410 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2411 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
2412 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2415 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2416 * when we arrive here
2418 if (SSI(s)->sess_cert == NULL) {
2419 SSI(s)->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2420 if (SSI(s)->sess_cert == NULL) {
2421 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2425 sk_X509_pop_free(SSI(s)->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2426 SSI(s)->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
2429 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2430 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
2438 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2439 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
2441 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2445 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
2451 ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2453 CBB cbb, server_cert;
2457 * Server Certificate - RFC 5246, section 7.4.2.
2460 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
2462 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
2463 if ((cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s)) == NULL) {
2464 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2468 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &server_cert,
2469 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE))
2471 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, &server_cert, cpk))
2473 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
2476 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2479 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2480 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
2488 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
2490 ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
2492 CBB cbb, session_ticket, ticket;
2493 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2494 size_t enc_session_len, enc_session_max_len, hmac_len;
2495 size_t session_len = 0;
2496 unsigned char *enc_session = NULL, *session = NULL;
2497 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2498 unsigned char key_name[16];
2499 unsigned char *hmac;
2506 * New Session Ticket - RFC 5077, section 3.3.
2509 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2510 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2512 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
2514 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
2515 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &session_ticket,
2516 SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET))
2519 if (!SSL_SESSION_ticket(s->session, &session, &session_len))
2521 if (session_len > 0xffff)
2525 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback is present
2526 * it does all the work, otherwise use generated values from
2529 if (tctx->internal->tlsext_ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
2530 if (tctx->internal->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s,
2531 key_name, iv, &ctx, &hctx, 1) < 0) {
2532 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2536 arc4random_buf(iv, 16);
2537 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2538 tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
2539 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
2540 16, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
2541 memcpy(key_name, tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
2544 /* Encrypt the session state. */
2545 enc_session_max_len = session_len + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH;
2546 if ((enc_session = calloc(1, enc_session_max_len)) == NULL)
2548 enc_session_len = 0;
2549 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, enc_session, &len, session,
2552 enc_session_len += len;
2553 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, enc_session + enc_session_len,
2556 enc_session_len += len;
2558 if (enc_session_len > enc_session_max_len)
2561 /* Generate the HMAC. */
2562 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, key_name, sizeof(key_name)))
2564 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)))
2566 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, enc_session, enc_session_len))
2569 if ((hmac_len = HMAC_size(&hctx)) <= 0)
2573 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
2574 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session
2575 * (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for new
2576 * sessions will live as long as their sessions.
2578 if (!CBB_add_u32(&session_ticket,
2579 s->internal->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout))
2582 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&session_ticket, &ticket))
2584 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ticket, key_name, sizeof(key_name)))
2586 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ticket, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)))
2588 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ticket, enc_session, enc_session_len))
2590 if (!CBB_add_space(&ticket, &hmac, hmac_len))
2593 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, hmac, &hlen))
2595 if (hlen != hmac_len)
2598 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
2601 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
2604 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2605 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2606 freezero(session, session_len);
2609 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
2610 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
2614 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2615 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2616 freezero(session, session_len);
2623 ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
2625 CBB cbb, certstatus, ocspresp;
2627 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
2629 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
2630 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &certstatus,
2631 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS))
2633 if (!CBB_add_u8(&certstatus, s->tlsext_status_type))
2635 if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&certstatus, &ocspresp))
2637 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ocspresp, s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resp,
2638 s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resp_len))
2640 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
2643 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
2646 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
2647 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));