2 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
3 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
5 * This program is the ssh daemon. It listens for connections from clients,
6 * and performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards
7 * information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted
8 * connection. This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and
9 * authentication agent connections.
11 * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
12 * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
13 * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
14 * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
15 * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
17 * SSH2 implementation:
18 * Privilege Separation:
20 * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
21 * Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
32 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
33 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
34 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
35 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
36 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
37 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
38 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
39 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
40 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
41 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
45 RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.290 2004/03/11 10:21:17 markus Exp $");
47 #include <openssl/dh.h>
48 #include <openssl/bn.h>
49 #include <openssl/md5.h>
50 #include <openssl/rand.h>
51 #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
52 #include <sys/security.h>
73 #include "myproposal.h"
75 #include "pathnames.h"
83 #include "monitor_mm.h"
85 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
86 #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
91 int allow_severity = LOG_INFO;
92 int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING;
99 #ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME
100 extern char *__progname;
105 /* Server configuration options. */
106 ServerOptions options;
108 /* Name of the server configuration file. */
109 char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
112 * Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6. This can be set on the command line.
113 * Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6.
115 int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC;
118 * Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug
119 * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system
120 * log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing
121 * the first connection.
125 /* Flag indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys. */
128 /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
131 /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
132 int no_daemon_flag = 0;
134 /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
137 /* Saved arguments to main(). */
142 * The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP
145 #define MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS 16
146 int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS];
147 int num_listen_socks = 0;
150 * the client's version string, passed by sshd2 in compat mode. if != NULL,
151 * sshd will skip the version-number exchange
153 char *client_version_string = NULL;
154 char *server_version_string = NULL;
156 /* for rekeying XXX fixme */
160 * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this
161 * structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so
162 * that the pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some
163 * problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle)
164 * have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is
165 * not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented.
168 Key *server_key; /* ephemeral server key */
169 Key *ssh1_host_key; /* ssh1 host key */
170 Key **host_keys; /* all private host keys */
173 u_char ssh1_cookie[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
177 * Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated.
178 * Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated.
180 static volatile sig_atomic_t key_do_regen = 0;
182 /* This is set to true when a signal is received. */
183 static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0;
184 static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
186 /* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */
187 u_char session_id[16];
190 u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
191 u_int session_id2_len = 0;
193 /* record remote hostname or ip */
194 u_int utmp_len = MAXHOSTNAMELEN;
196 /* options.max_startup sized array of fd ints */
197 int *startup_pipes = NULL;
198 int startup_pipe; /* in child */
200 /* variables used for privilege separation */
202 struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL;
204 /* message to be displayed after login */
207 /* global authentication context */
208 Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL;
210 /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
211 void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
212 void demote_sensitive_data(void);
214 static void do_ssh1_kex(void);
215 static void do_ssh2_kex(void);
218 * Close all listening sockets
221 close_listen_socks(void)
225 for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
226 close(listen_socks[i]);
227 num_listen_socks = -1;
231 close_startup_pipes(void)
236 for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
237 if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
238 close(startup_pipes[i]);
242 * Signal handler for SIGHUP. Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP;
243 * the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate
247 sighup_handler(int sig)
249 int save_errno = errno;
252 signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
257 * Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP.
258 * Restarts the server.
263 logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting.");
264 close_listen_socks();
265 close_startup_pipes();
266 execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv);
267 logit("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0],
273 * Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon.
276 sigterm_handler(int sig)
278 received_sigterm = sig;
282 * SIGCHLD handler. This is called whenever a child dies. This will then
283 * reap any zombies left by exited children.
286 main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
288 int save_errno = errno;
292 while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
293 (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR))
296 signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
301 * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired.
304 grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
306 /* XXX no idea how fix this signal handler */
308 if (use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 0)
309 kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGALRM);
311 /* Log error and exit. */
312 fatal("Timeout before authentication for %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
316 * Signal handler for the key regeneration alarm. Note that this
317 * alarm only occurs in the daemon waiting for connections, and it does not
318 * do anything with the private key or random state before forking.
319 * Thus there should be no concurrency control/asynchronous execution
323 generate_ephemeral_server_key(void)
328 verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.",
329 sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "", options.server_key_bits);
330 if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL)
331 key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
332 sensitive_data.server_key = key_generate(KEY_RSA1,
333 options.server_key_bits);
334 verbose("RSA key generation complete.");
336 for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) {
339 sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie[i] = rnd & 0xff;
346 key_regeneration_alarm(int sig)
348 int save_errno = errno;
350 signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
356 sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
359 int remote_major, remote_minor;
362 char buf[256]; /* Must not be larger than remote_version. */
363 char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */
365 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
366 (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)) {
367 major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1;
369 } else if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
370 major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2;
371 minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_2;
373 major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1;
374 minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1;
376 snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n", major, minor, SSH_VERSION);
377 server_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
379 /* Send our protocol version identification. */
380 if (atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string,
381 strlen(server_version_string))
382 != strlen(server_version_string)) {
383 logit("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
387 /* Read other sides version identification. */
388 memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
389 for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
390 if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) {
391 logit("Did not receive identification string from %s",
392 get_remote_ipaddr());
395 if (buf[i] == '\r') {
397 /* Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2 */
399 strncmp(buf, "SSH-1.5-W1.0", 12) == 0)
403 if (buf[i] == '\n') {
408 buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
409 client_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
412 * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept
413 * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
415 if (sscanf(client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
416 &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) {
417 s = "Protocol mismatch.\n";
418 (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
421 logit("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' from %s",
422 client_version_string, get_remote_ipaddr());
425 debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version %.100s",
426 remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
428 compat_datafellows(remote_version);
430 if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PROBE) {
431 logit("probed from %s with %s. Don't panic.",
432 get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string);
436 if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) {
437 logit("scanned from %s with %s. Don't panic.",
438 get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string);
443 switch (remote_major) {
445 if (remote_minor == 99) {
446 if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)
452 if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) {
456 if (remote_minor < 3) {
457 packet_disconnect("Your ssh version is too old and "
458 "is no longer supported. Please install a newer version.");
459 } else if (remote_minor == 3) {
460 /* note that this disables agent-forwarding */
465 if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
474 chop(server_version_string);
475 debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string);
478 s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n";
479 (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
482 logit("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %.200s vs. %.200s",
484 server_version_string, client_version_string);
489 /* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */
491 destroy_sensitive_data(void)
495 if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
496 key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
497 sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
499 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
500 if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
501 key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
502 sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
505 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
506 memset(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, 0, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
509 /* Demote private to public keys for network child */
511 demote_sensitive_data(void)
516 if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
517 tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.server_key);
518 key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
519 sensitive_data.server_key = tmp;
522 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
523 if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
524 tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
525 key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
526 sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
527 if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1)
528 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp;
532 /* We do not clear ssh1_host key and cookie. XXX - Okay Niels? */
536 privsep_preauth_child(void)
543 /* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
544 privsep_challenge_enable();
546 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
547 rnd[i] = arc4random();
548 RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
550 /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
551 demote_sensitive_data();
553 if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL)
554 fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
556 memset(pw->pw_passwd, 0, strlen(pw->pw_passwd));
559 /* Change our root directory */
560 if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
561 fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
563 if (chdir("/") == -1)
564 fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
566 /* Drop our privileges */
567 debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
570 /* XXX not ready, too heavy after chroot */
571 do_setusercontext(pw);
573 gidset[0] = pw->pw_gid;
574 if (setgroups(1, gidset) < 0)
575 fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
576 permanently_set_uid(pw);
581 privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
586 /* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */
587 pmonitor = monitor_init();
588 /* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */
589 pmonitor->m_pkex = &xxx_kex;
593 fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
594 } else if (pid != 0) {
595 debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid);
597 close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
598 pmonitor->m_pid = pid;
599 monitor_child_preauth(authctxt, pmonitor);
600 close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
603 monitor_sync(pmonitor);
605 /* Wait for the child's exit status */
606 while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0)
613 close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
615 /* Demote the child */
616 if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
617 privsep_preauth_child();
618 setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
624 privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
626 #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
629 if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 || options.use_login) {
631 /* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */
632 monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
637 /* Authentication complete */
639 if (startup_pipe != -1) {
644 /* New socket pair */
645 monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
647 pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
648 if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
649 fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
650 else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
651 debug2("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
652 close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
653 monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor);
659 close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
661 /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
662 demote_sensitive_data();
664 /* Drop privileges */
665 do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
667 /* It is safe now to apply the key state */
668 monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
672 list_hostkey_types(void)
680 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
681 Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
687 if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
688 buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
689 p = key_ssh_name(key);
690 buffer_append(&b, p, strlen(p));
694 buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1);
695 ret = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b));
697 debug("list_hostkey_types: %s", ret);
702 get_hostkey_by_type(int type)
706 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
707 Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
708 if (key != NULL && key->type == type)
715 get_hostkey_by_index(int ind)
717 if (ind < 0 || ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
719 return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]);
723 get_hostkey_index(Key *key)
727 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
728 if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i])
735 * returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise.
736 * dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability
737 * of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until
738 * all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups
741 drop_connection(int startups)
745 if (startups < options.max_startups_begin)
747 if (startups >= options.max_startups)
749 if (options.max_startups_rate == 100)
752 p = 100 - options.max_startups_rate;
753 p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin;
754 p /= (double) (options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin);
755 p += options.max_startups_rate;
757 r = arc4random() / (double) UINT_MAX;
759 debug("drop_connection: p %g, r %g", p, r);
760 return (r < p) ? 1 : 0;
766 fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n",
767 SSH_VERSION, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
769 "usage: sshd [-46Ddeiqt] [-b bits] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n"
770 " [-h host_key_file] [-k key_gen_time] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]\n"
776 * Main program for the daemon.
779 main(int ac, char **av)
783 int opt, sock_in = 0, sock_out = 0, newsock, j, i, fdsetsz, on = 1;
787 struct sockaddr_storage from;
788 const char *remote_ip;
792 char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
794 int listen_sock, maxfd;
799 int ret, key_used = 0;
801 #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
802 (void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
804 __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
807 /* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
809 saved_argv = xmalloc(sizeof(*saved_argv) * (ac + 1));
810 for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
811 saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
812 saved_argv[i] = NULL;
814 #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
815 /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
816 compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av);
820 if (geteuid() == 0 && setgroups(0, NULL) == -1)
821 debug("setgroups(): %.200s", strerror(errno));
823 /* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */
824 initialize_server_options(&options);
826 /* Parse command-line arguments. */
827 while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:u:o:dDeiqtQ46")) != -1) {
836 config_file_name = optarg;
839 if (debug_flag == 0) {
841 options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
842 } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
858 options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
861 options.server_key_bits = atoi(optarg);
864 options.ports_from_cmdline = 1;
865 if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) {
866 fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n");
869 options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg);
870 if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] == 0) {
871 fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n");
876 if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
877 fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n");
882 if ((options.key_regeneration_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
883 fprintf(stderr, "Invalid key regeneration interval.\n");
888 if (options.num_host_key_files >= MAX_HOSTKEYS) {
889 fprintf(stderr, "too many host keys.\n");
892 options.host_key_files[options.num_host_key_files++] = optarg;
898 utmp_len = atoi(optarg);
899 if (utmp_len > MAXHOSTNAMELEN) {
900 fprintf(stderr, "Invalid utmp length.\n");
905 line = xstrdup(optarg);
906 if (process_server_config_line(&options, line,
907 "command-line", 0) != 0)
917 SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
918 channel_set_af(IPv4or6);
921 * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host
922 * key (unless started from inetd)
925 options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ?
926 SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
927 options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ?
928 SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
929 log_stderr || !inetd_flag);
933 * Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from
936 unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME");
939 /* Cray can define user privs drop all prives now!
940 * Not needed on PRIV_SU systems!
947 /* Read server configuration options from the configuration file. */
948 read_server_config(&options, config_file_name);
950 /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
951 fill_default_server_options(&options);
953 /* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */
955 fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]);
959 debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_VERSION);
961 /* load private host keys */
962 sensitive_data.host_keys = xmalloc(options.num_host_key_files *
964 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++)
965 sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
966 sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
967 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
968 sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 0;
969 sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0;
971 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
972 key = key_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", NULL);
973 sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
975 error("Could not load host key: %s",
976 options.host_key_files[i]);
977 sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
982 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = key;
983 sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 1;
987 sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1;
990 debug("private host key: #%d type %d %s", i, key->type,
993 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) {
994 logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
995 options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
997 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
998 logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
999 options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
1001 if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
1002 logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
1006 /* Check certain values for sanity. */
1007 if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) {
1008 if (options.server_key_bits < 512 ||
1009 options.server_key_bits > 32768) {
1010 fprintf(stderr, "Bad server key size.\n");
1014 * Check that server and host key lengths differ sufficiently. This
1015 * is necessary to make double encryption work with rsaref. Oh, I
1016 * hate software patents. I dont know if this can go? Niels
1018 if (options.server_key_bits >
1019 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) -
1020 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED && options.server_key_bits <
1021 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
1022 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
1023 options.server_key_bits =
1024 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
1025 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED;
1026 debug("Forcing server key to %d bits to make it differ from host key.",
1027 options.server_key_bits);
1035 if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL)
1036 fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
1038 if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, &st) == -1) ||
1039 (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) == 0))
1040 fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s",
1041 _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
1044 if (check_ntsec(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) &&
1045 (st.st_uid != getuid () ||
1046 (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0))
1048 if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)
1050 fatal("%s must be owned by root and not group or "
1051 "world-writable.", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
1054 /* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */
1059 * Clear out any supplemental groups we may have inherited. This
1060 * prevents inadvertent creation of files with bad modes (in the
1061 * portable version at least, it's certainly possible for PAM
1062 * to create a file, and we can't control the code in every
1063 * module which might be used).
1065 if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0)
1066 debug("setgroups() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
1068 /* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */
1069 if (debug_flag && !inetd_flag)
1071 log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
1074 * If not in debugging mode, and not started from inetd, disconnect
1075 * from the controlling terminal, and fork. The original process
1078 if (!(debug_flag || inetd_flag || no_daemon_flag)) {
1081 #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
1082 if (daemon(0, 0) < 0)
1083 fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
1085 /* Disconnect from the controlling tty. */
1087 fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
1089 (void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL);
1092 #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
1094 /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
1095 log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
1097 /* Initialize the random number generator. */
1100 /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
1101 unmounted if desired. */
1104 /* ignore SIGPIPE */
1105 signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
1107 /* Start listening for a socket, unless started from inetd. */
1110 s1 = dup(0); /* Make sure descriptors 0, 1, and 2 are in use. */
1116 * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2
1117 * as our code for setting the descriptors won\'t work if
1118 * ttyfd happens to be one of those.
1120 debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", sock_in, sock_out);
1121 if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
1122 generate_ephemeral_server_key();
1124 for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
1125 if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
1127 if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS)
1128 fatal("Too many listen sockets. "
1129 "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS");
1130 if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
1131 ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
1132 NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
1133 error("getnameinfo failed");
1136 /* Create socket for listening. */
1137 listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
1139 if (listen_sock < 0) {
1140 /* kernel may not support ipv6 */
1141 verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1144 if (fcntl(listen_sock, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0) {
1145 error("listen_sock O_NONBLOCK: %s", strerror(errno));
1150 * Set socket options.
1151 * Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT.
1153 if (setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
1154 &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
1155 error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR: %s", strerror(errno));
1157 debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop);
1159 /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */
1160 if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
1162 error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.",
1163 strport, ntop, strerror(errno));
1167 listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock;
1170 /* Start listening on the port. */
1171 logit("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport);
1172 if (listen(listen_sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0)
1173 fatal("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1176 freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs);
1178 if (!num_listen_socks)
1179 fatal("Cannot bind any address.");
1181 if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
1182 generate_ephemeral_server_key();
1185 * Arrange to restart on SIGHUP. The handler needs
1188 signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
1190 signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
1191 signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
1193 /* Arrange SIGCHLD to be caught. */
1194 signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
1196 /* Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler is setup */
1199 * Record our pid in /var/run/sshd.pid to make it
1200 * easier to kill the correct sshd. We don't want to
1201 * do this before the bind above because the bind will
1202 * fail if there already is a daemon, and this will
1203 * overwrite any old pid in the file.
1205 f = fopen(options.pid_file, "wb");
1207 error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s",
1208 options.pid_file, strerror(errno));
1210 fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid());
1215 /* setup fd set for listen */
1218 for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
1219 if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd)
1220 maxfd = listen_socks[i];
1221 /* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */
1222 startup_pipes = xmalloc(options.max_startups * sizeof(int));
1223 for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
1224 startup_pipes[i] = -1;
1227 * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or
1228 * the daemon is killed with a signal.
1231 if (received_sighup)
1235 fdsetsz = howmany(maxfd+1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
1236 fdset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(fdsetsz);
1237 memset(fdset, 0, fdsetsz);
1239 for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
1240 FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset);
1241 for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
1242 if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
1243 FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset);
1245 /* Wait in select until there is a connection. */
1246 ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL);
1247 if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR)
1248 error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1249 if (received_sigterm) {
1250 logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
1251 (int) received_sigterm);
1252 close_listen_socks();
1253 unlink(options.pid_file);
1256 if (key_used && key_do_regen) {
1257 generate_ephemeral_server_key();
1264 for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
1265 if (startup_pipes[i] != -1 &&
1266 FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset)) {
1268 * the read end of the pipe is ready
1269 * if the child has closed the pipe
1270 * after successful authentication
1271 * or if the child has died
1273 close(startup_pipes[i]);
1274 startup_pipes[i] = -1;
1277 for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) {
1278 if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset))
1280 fromlen = sizeof(from);
1281 newsock = accept(listen_socks[i], (struct sockaddr *)&from,
1284 if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
1285 error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1288 if (fcntl(newsock, F_SETFL, 0) < 0) {
1289 error("newsock del O_NONBLOCK: %s", strerror(errno));
1293 if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) {
1294 debug("drop connection #%d", startups);
1298 if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) {
1303 for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++)
1304 if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) {
1305 startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0];
1306 if (maxfd < startup_p[0])
1307 maxfd = startup_p[0];
1313 * Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless
1314 * we are in debugging mode.
1318 * In debugging mode. Close the listening
1319 * socket, and start processing the
1320 * connection without forking.
1322 debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode.");
1323 close_listen_socks();
1331 * Normal production daemon. Fork, and have
1332 * the child process the connection. The
1333 * parent continues listening.
1335 if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
1337 * Child. Close the listening and max_startup
1338 * sockets. Start using the accepted socket.
1339 * Reinitialize logging (since our pid has
1340 * changed). We break out of the loop to handle
1343 startup_pipe = startup_p[1];
1344 close_startup_pipes();
1345 close_listen_socks();
1348 log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
1353 /* Parent. Stay in the loop. */
1355 error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1357 debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid);
1359 close(startup_p[1]);
1361 /* Mark that the key has been used (it was "given" to the child). */
1362 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
1364 /* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */
1365 signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm);
1366 alarm(options.key_regeneration_time);
1372 /* Close the new socket (the child is now taking care of it). */
1375 /* child process check (or debug mode) */
1376 if (num_listen_socks < 0)
1381 /* This is the child processing a new connection. */
1382 setproctitle("%s", "[accepted]");
1385 * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
1386 * setlogin() affects the entire process group. We don't
1387 * want the child to be able to affect the parent.
1389 #if !defined(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY)
1391 * If setsid is called, on some platforms sshd will later acquire a
1392 * controlling terminal which will result in "could not set
1393 * controlling tty" errors.
1395 if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() < 0)
1396 error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1400 * Disable the key regeneration alarm. We will not regenerate the
1401 * key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone. We
1402 * will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense.
1405 signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
1406 signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
1407 signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
1408 signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
1409 signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
1410 signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
1412 /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
1413 if (options.tcp_keep_alive &&
1414 setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on,
1416 error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1419 * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do
1422 packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out);
1424 remote_port = get_remote_port();
1425 remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
1428 /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
1430 struct request_info req;
1432 request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0);
1435 if (!hosts_access(&req)) {
1436 debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper");
1439 fatal("libwrap refuse returns");
1442 #endif /* LIBWRAP */
1444 /* Log the connection. */
1445 verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
1448 * We don\'t want to listen forever unless the other side
1449 * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
1450 * cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero
1451 * indicates no limit. Note that we don\'t set the alarm in debugging
1452 * mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you
1453 * are about to discover the bug.
1455 signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler);
1457 alarm(options.login_grace_time);
1459 sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out);
1461 packet_set_nonblocking();
1463 /* prepare buffers to collect authentication messages */
1464 buffer_init(&loginmsg);
1466 /* allocate authentication context */
1467 authctxt = xmalloc(sizeof(*authctxt));
1468 memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
1470 /* XXX global for cleanup, access from other modules */
1471 the_authctxt = authctxt;
1474 if (privsep_preauth(authctxt) == 1)
1477 /* perform the key exchange */
1478 /* authenticate user and start session */
1481 do_authentication2(authctxt);
1484 do_authentication(authctxt);
1487 * If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers
1488 * the current keystate and exits
1491 mm_send_keystate(pmonitor);
1497 * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare
1498 * file descriptor passing.
1501 privsep_postauth(authctxt);
1502 /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */
1504 destroy_sensitive_data();
1507 /* Start session. */
1508 do_authenticated(authctxt);
1510 /* The connection has been terminated. */
1511 verbose("Closing connection to %.100s", remote_ip);
1514 if (options.use_pam)
1516 #endif /* USE_PAM */
1527 * Decrypt session_key_int using our private server key and private host key
1528 * (key with larger modulus first).
1531 ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *session_key_int)
1535 if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) {
1536 /* Server key has bigger modulus. */
1537 if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) <
1538 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
1539 fatal("do_connection: %s: server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
1540 get_remote_ipaddr(),
1541 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
1542 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
1543 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
1545 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
1546 sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) <= 0)
1548 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
1549 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) <= 0)
1552 /* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */
1553 if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) <
1554 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
1555 fatal("do_connection: %s: host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
1556 get_remote_ipaddr(),
1557 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
1558 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
1559 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
1561 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
1562 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) < 0)
1564 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
1565 sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) < 0)
1578 BIGNUM *session_key_int;
1579 u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
1581 u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags;
1585 * Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user
1586 * packet in order for it to be accepted; this is used to defy ip
1587 * spoofing attacks. Note that this only works against somebody
1588 * doing IP spoofing from a remote machine; any machine on the local
1589 * network can still see outgoing packets and catch the random
1590 * cookie. This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one
1591 * of the reasons why it is inherently insecure.
1593 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
1596 cookie[i] = rnd & 0xff;
1601 * Send our public key. We include in the packet 64 bits of random
1602 * data that must be matched in the reply in order to prevent IP
1605 packet_start(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
1606 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
1607 packet_put_char(cookie[i]);
1609 /* Store our public server RSA key. */
1610 packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n));
1611 packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
1612 packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
1614 /* Store our public host RSA key. */
1615 packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n));
1616 packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->e);
1617 packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n);
1619 /* Put protocol flags. */
1620 packet_put_int(SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN);
1622 /* Declare which ciphers we support. */
1623 packet_put_int(cipher_mask_ssh1(0));
1625 /* Declare supported authentication types. */
1627 if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication)
1628 auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA;
1629 if (options.rsa_authentication)
1630 auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA;
1631 if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1)
1632 auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS;
1633 if (options.password_authentication)
1634 auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD;
1635 packet_put_int(auth_mask);
1637 /* Send the packet and wait for it to be sent. */
1639 packet_write_wait();
1641 debug("Sent %d bit server key and %d bit host key.",
1642 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
1643 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n));
1645 /* Read clients reply (cipher type and session key). */
1646 packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
1648 /* Get cipher type and check whether we accept this. */
1649 cipher_type = packet_get_char();
1651 if (!(cipher_mask_ssh1(0) & (1 << cipher_type)))
1652 packet_disconnect("Warning: client selects unsupported cipher.");
1654 /* Get check bytes from the packet. These must match those we
1655 sent earlier with the public key packet. */
1656 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
1657 if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char())
1658 packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match.");
1660 debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type));
1662 /* Get the encrypted integer. */
1663 if ((session_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL)
1664 fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed");
1665 packet_get_bignum(session_key_int);
1667 protocol_flags = packet_get_int();
1668 packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags);
1671 /* Decrypt session_key_int using host/server keys */
1672 rsafail = PRIVSEP(ssh1_session_key(session_key_int));
1675 * Extract session key from the decrypted integer. The key is in the
1676 * least significant 256 bits of the integer; the first byte of the
1677 * key is in the highest bits.
1680 BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8);
1681 len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
1682 if (len < 0 || len > sizeof(session_key)) {
1683 error("do_connection: bad session key len from %s: "
1684 "session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu",
1685 get_remote_ipaddr(), len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key));
1688 memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
1689 BN_bn2bin(session_key_int,
1690 session_key + sizeof(session_key) - len);
1692 compute_session_id(session_id, cookie,
1693 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n,
1694 sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
1696 * Xor the first 16 bytes of the session key with the
1699 for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1700 session_key[i] ^= session_id[i];
1704 int bytes = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
1705 u_char *buf = xmalloc(bytes);
1708 logit("do_connection: generating a fake encryption key");
1709 BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, buf);
1711 MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes);
1712 MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
1713 MD5_Final(session_key, &md);
1715 MD5_Update(&md, session_key, 16);
1716 MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes);
1717 MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
1718 MD5_Final(session_key + 16, &md);
1719 memset(buf, 0, bytes);
1721 for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1722 session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16];
1724 /* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */
1725 destroy_sensitive_data();
1728 mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id);
1730 /* Destroy the decrypted integer. It is no longer needed. */
1731 BN_clear_free(session_key_int);
1733 /* Set the session key. From this on all communications will be encrypted. */
1734 packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, cipher_type);
1736 /* Destroy our copy of the session key. It is no longer needed. */
1737 memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
1739 debug("Received session key; encryption turned on.");
1741 /* Send an acknowledgment packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */
1742 packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
1744 packet_write_wait();
1748 * SSH2 key exchange: diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
1755 if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
1756 myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
1757 myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
1759 myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
1760 compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
1761 myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] =
1762 compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]);
1764 if (options.macs != NULL) {
1765 myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
1766 myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
1768 if (!options.compression) {
1769 myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
1770 myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
1772 myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
1774 /* start key exchange */
1775 kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
1776 kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1777 kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
1779 kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
1780 kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
1781 kex->load_host_key=&get_hostkey_by_type;
1782 kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
1786 dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
1788 session_id2 = kex->session_id;
1789 session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len;
1792 /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
1793 packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
1794 packet_put_cstring("markus");
1796 packet_write_wait();
1801 /* server specific fatal cleanup */
1806 do_cleanup(the_authctxt);