1 /* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.292 2017/09/12 06:32:07 djm Exp $ */
3 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
6 * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
7 * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
8 * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
9 * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
10 * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
12 * SSH2 support by Markus Friedl.
13 * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
15 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
16 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
18 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
19 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
20 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
21 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
22 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
24 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
25 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
26 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
27 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
28 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
29 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
30 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
31 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
32 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
33 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
38 #include <sys/types.h>
39 #include <sys/param.h>
40 #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
41 # include <sys/stat.h>
43 #include <sys/socket.h>
47 #include <arpa/inet.h>
66 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
84 #include "auth-options.h"
86 #include "pathnames.h"
91 #include "serverloop.h"
95 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
99 #if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS)
104 #include <selinux/selinux.h>
107 #define IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(c) \
108 (!strncmp(c, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1) && \
109 (c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\0' || \
110 c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == ' ' || \
111 c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\t'))
115 Session *session_new(void);
116 void session_set_fds(struct ssh *, Session *, int, int, int, int, int);
117 void session_pty_cleanup(Session *);
118 void session_proctitle(Session *);
119 int session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *, Session *);
120 int do_exec_pty(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *);
121 int do_exec_no_pty(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *);
122 int do_exec(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *);
123 void do_login(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *);
124 void do_child(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *);
125 #ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
126 static void do_pre_login(Session *s);
129 int check_quietlogin(Session *, const char *);
131 static void do_authenticated2(struct ssh *, Authctxt *);
133 static int session_pty_req(struct ssh *, Session *);
136 extern ServerOptions options;
137 extern char *__progname;
138 extern int debug_flag;
139 extern u_int utmp_len;
140 extern int startup_pipe;
141 extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
142 extern Buffer loginmsg;
144 /* original command from peer. */
145 const char *original_command = NULL;
148 static int sessions_first_unused = -1;
149 static int sessions_nalloc = 0;
150 static Session *sessions = NULL;
152 #define SUBSYSTEM_NONE 0
153 #define SUBSYSTEM_EXT 1
154 #define SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP 2
155 #define SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR 3
157 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
161 static int is_child = 0;
162 static int in_chroot = 0;
164 /* File containing userauth info, if ExposeAuthInfo set */
165 static char *auth_info_file = NULL;
167 /* Name and directory of socket for authentication agent forwarding. */
168 static char *auth_sock_name = NULL;
169 static char *auth_sock_dir = NULL;
171 /* removes the agent forwarding socket */
174 auth_sock_cleanup_proc(struct passwd *pw)
176 if (auth_sock_name != NULL) {
177 temporarily_use_uid(pw);
178 unlink(auth_sock_name);
179 rmdir(auth_sock_dir);
180 auth_sock_name = NULL;
186 auth_input_request_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd * pw)
191 if (auth_sock_name != NULL) {
192 error("authentication forwarding requested twice.");
196 /* Temporarily drop privileged uid for mkdir/bind. */
197 temporarily_use_uid(pw);
199 /* Allocate a buffer for the socket name, and format the name. */
200 auth_sock_dir = xstrdup("/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX");
202 /* Create private directory for socket */
203 if (mkdtemp(auth_sock_dir) == NULL) {
204 packet_send_debug("Agent forwarding disabled: "
205 "mkdtemp() failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
208 auth_sock_dir = NULL;
212 xasprintf(&auth_sock_name, "%s/agent.%ld",
213 auth_sock_dir, (long) getpid());
215 /* Start a Unix listener on auth_sock_name. */
216 sock = unix_listener(auth_sock_name, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, 0);
218 /* Restore the privileged uid. */
221 /* Check for socket/bind/listen failure. */
225 /* Allocate a channel for the authentication agent socket. */
226 nc = channel_new(ssh, "auth socket",
227 SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET, sock, sock, -1,
228 CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
229 0, "auth socket", 1);
230 nc->path = xstrdup(auth_sock_name);
234 free(auth_sock_name);
235 if (auth_sock_dir != NULL) {
236 rmdir(auth_sock_dir);
241 auth_sock_name = NULL;
242 auth_sock_dir = NULL;
247 display_loginmsg(void)
249 if (buffer_len(&loginmsg) > 0) {
250 buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\0", 1);
251 printf("%s", (char *)buffer_ptr(&loginmsg));
252 buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
257 prepare_auth_info_file(struct passwd *pw, struct sshbuf *info)
259 int fd = -1, success = 0;
261 if (!options.expose_userauth_info || info == NULL)
264 temporarily_use_uid(pw);
265 auth_info_file = xstrdup("/tmp/sshauth.XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX");
266 if ((fd = mkstemp(auth_info_file)) == -1) {
267 error("%s: mkstemp: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
270 if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(info),
271 sshbuf_len(info)) != sshbuf_len(info)) {
272 error("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
275 if (close(fd) != 0) {
276 error("%s: close: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
284 free(auth_info_file);
285 auth_info_file = NULL;
291 do_authenticated(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
293 setproctitle("%s", authctxt->pw->pw_name);
295 /* setup the channel layer */
296 /* XXX - streamlocal? */
297 if (no_port_forwarding_flag || options.disable_forwarding ||
298 (options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) == 0)
299 channel_disable_adm_local_opens(ssh);
301 channel_permit_all_opens(ssh);
305 prepare_auth_info_file(authctxt->pw, authctxt->session_info);
307 do_authenticated2(ssh, authctxt);
309 do_cleanup(ssh, authctxt);
312 /* Check untrusted xauth strings for metacharacters */
314 xauth_valid_string(const char *s)
318 for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
319 if (!isalnum((u_char)s[i]) &&
320 s[i] != '.' && s[i] != ':' && s[i] != '/' &&
321 s[i] != '-' && s[i] != '_')
329 * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty. This
330 * will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after
331 * setting up file descriptors and such.
334 do_exec_no_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
339 int pin[2], pout[2], perr[2];
342 fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session");
344 /* Allocate pipes for communicating with the program. */
346 error("%s: pipe in: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
349 if (pipe(pout) < 0) {
350 error("%s: pipe out: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
355 if (pipe(perr) < 0) {
356 error("%s: pipe err: %.100s", __func__,
365 int inout[2], err[2];
368 fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session");
370 /* Uses socket pairs to communicate with the program. */
371 if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) < 0) {
372 error("%s: socketpair #1: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
375 if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, err) < 0) {
376 error("%s: socketpair #2: %.100s", __func__,
384 session_proctitle(s);
386 /* Fork the child. */
387 switch ((pid = fork())) {
389 error("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
408 * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
409 * setlogin() affects the entire process group.
412 error("setsid failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
416 * Redirect stdin. We close the parent side of the socket
417 * pair, and make the child side the standard input.
420 if (dup2(pin[0], 0) < 0)
421 perror("dup2 stdin");
424 /* Redirect stdout. */
426 if (dup2(pout[1], 1) < 0)
427 perror("dup2 stdout");
430 /* Redirect stderr. */
432 if (dup2(perr[1], 2) < 0)
433 perror("dup2 stderr");
437 * Redirect stdin, stdout, and stderr. Stdin and stdout will
438 * use the same socket, as some programs (particularly rdist)
439 * seem to depend on it.
443 if (dup2(inout[0], 0) < 0) /* stdin */
444 perror("dup2 stdin");
445 if (dup2(inout[0], 1) < 0) /* stdout (same as stdin) */
446 perror("dup2 stdout");
448 if (dup2(err[0], 2) < 0) /* stderr */
449 perror("dup2 stderr");
455 cray_init_job(s->pw); /* set up cray jid and tmpdir */
458 /* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */
459 do_child(ssh, s, command);
466 signal(WJSIGNAL, cray_job_termination_handler);
469 cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
473 /* Set interactive/non-interactive mode. */
474 packet_set_interactive(s->display != NULL,
475 options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
478 * Clear loginmsg, since it's the child's responsibility to display
479 * it to the user, otherwise multiple sessions may accumulate
480 * multiple copies of the login messages.
482 buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
485 /* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the pipes. */
490 session_set_fds(ssh, s, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0],
493 /* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the socket pairs. */
498 * Enter the interactive session. Note: server_loop must be able to
499 * handle the case that fdin and fdout are the same.
501 session_set_fds(s, inout[1], inout[1], err[1],
508 * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have a tty. This
509 * will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after
510 * setting up file descriptors, controlling tty, updating wtmp, utmp,
511 * lastlog, and other such operations.
514 do_exec_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
516 int fdout, ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster;
520 fatal("do_exec_pty: no session");
525 * Create another descriptor of the pty master side for use as the
526 * standard input. We could use the original descriptor, but this
527 * simplifies code in server_loop. The descriptor is bidirectional.
528 * Do this before forking (and cleanup in the child) so as to
529 * detect and gracefully fail out-of-fd conditions.
531 if ((fdout = dup(ptyfd)) < 0) {
532 error("%s: dup #1: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
537 /* we keep a reference to the pty master */
538 if ((ptymaster = dup(ptyfd)) < 0) {
539 error("%s: dup #2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
546 /* Fork the child. */
547 switch ((pid = fork())) {
549 error("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
561 /* Close the master side of the pseudo tty. */
564 /* Make the pseudo tty our controlling tty. */
565 pty_make_controlling_tty(&ttyfd, s->tty);
567 /* Redirect stdin/stdout/stderr from the pseudo tty. */
568 if (dup2(ttyfd, 0) < 0)
569 error("dup2 stdin: %s", strerror(errno));
570 if (dup2(ttyfd, 1) < 0)
571 error("dup2 stdout: %s", strerror(errno));
572 if (dup2(ttyfd, 2) < 0)
573 error("dup2 stderr: %s", strerror(errno));
575 /* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */
578 /* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */
580 cray_init_job(s->pw); /* set up cray jid and tmpdir */
583 do_login(ssh, s, command);
586 * Do common processing for the child, such as execing
589 do_child(ssh, s, command);
596 signal(WJSIGNAL, cray_job_termination_handler);
599 cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
604 /* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */
607 /* Enter interactive session. */
608 s->ptymaster = ptymaster;
609 packet_set_interactive(1,
610 options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
611 session_set_fds(ssh, s, ptyfd, fdout, -1, 1, 1);
615 #ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
617 do_pre_login(Session *s)
619 struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
621 struct sockaddr_storage from;
622 pid_t pid = getpid();
625 * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
626 * the address be 0.0.0.0.
628 memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
629 fromlen = sizeof(from);
630 if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
631 if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
632 (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
633 debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
638 record_utmp_only(pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name,
639 session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len, options.use_dns),
640 (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
645 * This is called to fork and execute a command. If another command is
646 * to be forced, execute that instead.
649 do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
652 const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL;
653 char session_type[1024];
655 if (options.adm_forced_command) {
656 original_command = command;
657 command = options.adm_forced_command;
659 } else if (forced_command) {
660 original_command = command;
661 command = forced_command;
662 forced = "(key-option)";
664 if (forced != NULL) {
665 if (IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(command)) {
666 s->is_subsystem = s->is_subsystem ?
667 SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP : SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR;
668 } else if (s->is_subsystem)
669 s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT;
670 snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type),
671 "forced-command %s '%.900s'", forced, command);
672 } else if (s->is_subsystem) {
673 snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type),
674 "subsystem '%.900s'", s->subsys);
675 } else if (command == NULL) {
676 snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "shell");
678 /* NB. we don't log unforced commands to preserve privacy */
679 snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "command");
682 if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
684 if (strncmp(tty, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
688 verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
690 tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
691 tty == NULL ? "" : tty,
693 ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
694 ssh_remote_port(ssh),
697 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
699 PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
700 else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
701 char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell;
703 if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */
705 PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
709 ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command);
711 ret = do_exec_no_pty(ssh, s, command);
713 original_command = NULL;
716 * Clear loginmsg: it's the child's responsibility to display
717 * it to the user, otherwise multiple sessions may accumulate
718 * multiple copies of the login messages.
720 buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
725 /* administrative, login(1)-like work */
727 do_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
730 struct sockaddr_storage from;
731 struct passwd * pw = s->pw;
732 pid_t pid = getpid();
735 * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
736 * the address be 0.0.0.0.
738 memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
739 fromlen = sizeof(from);
740 if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
741 if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
742 (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
743 debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
748 /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
750 record_login(pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
751 session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len,
753 (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
757 * If password change is needed, do it now.
758 * This needs to occur before the ~/.hushlogin check.
760 if (options.use_pam && !use_privsep && s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
763 s->authctxt->force_pwchange = 0;
764 /* XXX - signal [net] parent to enable forwardings */
768 if (check_quietlogin(s, command))
777 * Display the message of the day.
785 if (options.print_motd) {
786 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
787 f = fopen(login_getcapstr(lc, "welcome", "/etc/motd",
790 f = fopen("/etc/motd", "r");
793 while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
802 * Check for quiet login, either .hushlogin or command given.
805 check_quietlogin(Session *s, const char *command)
808 struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
811 /* Return 1 if .hushlogin exists or a command given. */
814 snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.200s/.hushlogin", pw->pw_dir);
815 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
816 if (login_getcapbool(lc, "hushlogin", 0) || stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
819 if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
826 * Reads environment variables from the given file and adds/overrides them
827 * into the environment. If the file does not exist, this does nothing.
828 * Otherwise, it must consist of empty lines, comments (line starts with '#')
829 * and assignments of the form name=value. No other forms are allowed.
832 read_environment_file(char ***env, u_int *envsize,
833 const char *filename)
840 f = fopen(filename, "r");
844 while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) {
846 fatal("Too many lines in environment file %s", filename);
847 for (cp = buf; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
849 if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n')
852 cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0';
854 value = strchr(cp, '=');
856 fprintf(stderr, "Bad line %u in %.100s\n", lineno,
861 * Replace the equals sign by nul, and advance value to
866 child_set_env(env, envsize, cp, value);
871 #ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN
873 * Return named variable from specified environment, or NULL if not present.
876 child_get_env(char **env, const char *name)
882 for (i=0; env[i] != NULL; i++)
883 if (strncmp(name, env[i], len) == 0 && env[i][len] == '=')
884 return(env[i] + len + 1);
889 * Read /etc/default/login.
890 * We pick up the PATH (or SUPATH for root) and UMASK.
893 read_etc_default_login(char ***env, u_int *envsize, uid_t uid)
895 char **tmpenv = NULL, *var;
896 u_int i, tmpenvsize = 0;
900 * We don't want to copy the whole file to the child's environment,
901 * so we use a temporary environment and copy the variables we're
904 read_environment_file(&tmpenv, &tmpenvsize, "/etc/default/login");
910 var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "SUPATH");
912 var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "PATH");
914 child_set_env(env, envsize, "PATH", var);
916 if ((var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "UMASK")) != NULL)
917 if (sscanf(var, "%5lo", &mask) == 1)
920 for (i = 0; tmpenv[i] != NULL; i++)
924 #endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */
927 copy_environment_blacklist(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize,
928 const char *blacklist)
930 char *var_name, *var_val;
936 for(i = 0; source[i] != NULL; i++) {
937 var_name = xstrdup(source[i]);
938 if ((var_val = strstr(var_name, "=")) == NULL) {
944 if (blacklist == NULL ||
945 match_pattern_list(var_name, blacklist, 0) != 1) {
946 debug3("Copy environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val);
947 child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val);
957 copy_environment(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize)
959 copy_environment_blacklist(source, env, envsize, NULL);
965 do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
970 struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
971 #if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN)
975 /* Initialize the environment. */
977 env = xcalloc(envsize, sizeof(char *));
982 * The Windows environment contains some setting which are
983 * important for a running system. They must not be dropped.
988 p = fetch_windows_environment();
989 copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);
990 free_windows_environment(p);
995 /* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter
996 * the childs environment as they see fit
998 ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
1001 /* Set basic environment. */
1002 for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++)
1003 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, s->env[i].name, s->env[i].val);
1005 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
1006 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
1008 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGIN", pw->pw_name);
1010 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
1011 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
1012 if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETPATH) < 0)
1013 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
1015 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", getenv("PATH"));
1016 #else /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
1017 # ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
1019 * There's no standard path on Windows. The path contains
1020 * important components pointing to the system directories,
1021 * needed for loading shared libraries. So the path better
1022 * remains intact here.
1024 # ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN
1025 read_etc_default_login(&env, &envsize, pw->pw_uid);
1026 path = child_get_env(env, "PATH");
1027 # endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */
1028 if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
1029 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH",
1030 s->pw->pw_uid == 0 ? SUPERUSER_PATH : _PATH_STDPATH);
1032 # endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
1033 #endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
1035 snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%.50s", _PATH_MAILDIR, pw->pw_name);
1036 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "MAIL", buf);
1038 /* Normal systems set SHELL by default. */
1039 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SHELL", shell);
1042 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TZ", getenv("TZ"));
1044 /* Set custom environment options from RSA authentication. */
1045 while (custom_environment) {
1046 struct envstring *ce = custom_environment;
1049 for (i = 0; str[i] != '=' && str[i]; i++)
1051 if (str[i] == '=') {
1053 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, str, str + i + 1);
1055 custom_environment = ce->next;
1060 /* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */
1061 snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %d",
1062 ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
1063 ssh_local_port(ssh));
1064 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CLIENT", buf);
1066 laddr = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in());
1067 snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %.50s %d",
1068 ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
1069 laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh));
1071 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CONNECTION", buf);
1073 if (auth_info_file != NULL)
1074 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_USER_AUTH", auth_info_file);
1076 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TTY", s->tty);
1078 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TERM", s->term);
1080 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "DISPLAY", s->display);
1081 if (original_command)
1082 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND",
1086 if (cray_tmpdir[0] != '\0')
1087 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TMPDIR", cray_tmpdir);
1088 #endif /* _UNICOS */
1091 * Since we clear KRB5CCNAME at startup, if it's set now then it
1092 * must have been set by a native authentication method (eg AIX or
1093 * SIA), so copy it to the child.
1098 if ((cp = getenv("KRB5CCNAME")) != NULL)
1099 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", cp);
1106 if ((cp = getenv("AUTHSTATE")) != NULL)
1107 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "AUTHSTATE", cp);
1108 read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, "/etc/environment");
1112 if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname)
1113 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
1114 s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
1118 * Pull in any environment variables that may have
1121 if (options.use_pam) {
1125 * Don't allow SSH_AUTH_INFO variables posted to PAM to leak
1126 * back into the environment.
1128 p = fetch_pam_child_environment();
1129 copy_environment_blacklist(p, &env, &envsize, "SSH_AUTH_INFO*");
1130 free_pam_environment(p);
1132 p = fetch_pam_environment();
1133 copy_environment_blacklist(p, &env, &envsize, "SSH_AUTH_INFO*");
1134 free_pam_environment(p);
1136 #endif /* USE_PAM */
1138 if (auth_sock_name != NULL)
1139 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME,
1142 /* read $HOME/.ssh/environment. */
1143 if (options.permit_user_env) {
1144 snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/.ssh/environment",
1145 strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? pw->pw_dir : "");
1146 read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf);
1149 /* dump the environment */
1150 fprintf(stderr, "Environment:\n");
1151 for (i = 0; env[i]; i++)
1152 fprintf(stderr, " %.200s\n", env[i]);
1158 * Run $HOME/.ssh/rc, /etc/ssh/sshrc, or xauth (whichever is found
1159 * first in this order).
1162 do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shell)
1170 s->display != NULL && s->auth_proto != NULL && s->auth_data != NULL;
1172 /* ignore _PATH_SSH_USER_RC for subsystems and admin forced commands */
1173 if (!s->is_subsystem && options.adm_forced_command == NULL &&
1174 !no_user_rc && options.permit_user_rc &&
1175 stat(_PATH_SSH_USER_RC, &st) >= 0) {
1176 snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -c '%s %s'",
1177 shell, _PATH_BSHELL, _PATH_SSH_USER_RC);
1179 fprintf(stderr, "Running %s\n", cmd);
1180 f = popen(cmd, "w");
1183 fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto,
1187 fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
1189 } else if (stat(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, &st) >= 0) {
1191 fprintf(stderr, "Running %s %s\n", _PATH_BSHELL,
1192 _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC);
1193 f = popen(_PATH_BSHELL " " _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, "w");
1196 fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto,
1200 fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
1201 _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC);
1202 } else if (do_xauth && options.xauth_location != NULL) {
1203 /* Add authority data to .Xauthority if appropriate. */
1206 "Running %.500s remove %.100s\n",
1207 options.xauth_location, s->auth_display);
1209 "%.500s add %.100s %.100s %.100s\n",
1210 options.xauth_location, s->auth_display,
1211 s->auth_proto, s->auth_data);
1213 snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -q -",
1214 options.xauth_location);
1215 f = popen(cmd, "w");
1217 fprintf(f, "remove %s\n",
1219 fprintf(f, "add %s %s %s\n",
1220 s->auth_display, s->auth_proto,
1224 fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
1231 do_nologin(struct passwd *pw)
1234 char buf[1024], *nl, *def_nl = _PATH_NOLOGIN;
1237 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
1238 if (login_getcapbool(lc, "ignorenologin", 0) || pw->pw_uid == 0)
1240 nl = strdup(login_getcapstr(lc, "nologin", def_nl, def_nl));
1242 if (pw->pw_uid == 0)
1246 if (stat(nl, &sb) == -1) {
1252 /* /etc/nologin exists. Print its contents if we can and exit. */
1253 logit("User %.100s not allowed because %s exists", pw->pw_name, nl);
1254 if ((f = fopen(nl, "r")) != NULL) {
1255 while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
1263 * Chroot into a directory after checking it for safety: all path components
1264 * must be root-owned directories with strict permissions.
1267 safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid)
1270 char component[PATH_MAX];
1274 fatal("chroot path does not begin at root");
1275 if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(component))
1276 fatal("chroot path too long");
1279 * Descend the path, checking that each component is a
1280 * root-owned directory with strict permissions.
1282 for (cp = path; cp != NULL;) {
1283 if ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL)
1284 strlcpy(component, path, sizeof(component));
1287 memcpy(component, path, cp - path);
1288 component[cp - path] = '\0';
1291 debug3("%s: checking '%s'", __func__, component);
1293 if (stat(component, &st) != 0)
1294 fatal("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,
1295 component, strerror(errno));
1296 if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)
1297 fatal("bad ownership or modes for chroot "
1298 "directory %s\"%s\"",
1299 cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
1300 if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
1301 fatal("chroot path %s\"%s\" is not a directory",
1302 cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
1306 if (chdir(path) == -1)
1307 fatal("Unable to chdir to chroot path \"%s\": "
1308 "%s", path, strerror(errno));
1309 if (chroot(path) == -1)
1310 fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", path, strerror(errno));
1311 if (chdir("/") == -1)
1312 fatal("%s: chdir(/) after chroot: %s",
1313 __func__, strerror(errno));
1314 verbose("Changed root directory to \"%s\"", path);
1317 /* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */
1319 do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
1321 char *chroot_path, *tmp;
1323 platform_setusercontext(pw);
1325 if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) {
1326 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
1327 if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
1328 (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) {
1329 perror("unable to set user context");
1333 if (setlogin(pw->pw_name) < 0)
1334 error("setlogin failed: %s", strerror(errno));
1335 if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) {
1339 /* Initialize the group list. */
1340 if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0) {
1341 perror("initgroups");
1347 platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw);
1349 if (!in_chroot && options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
1350 strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
1351 tmp = tilde_expand_filename(options.chroot_directory,
1353 chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
1354 "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
1355 safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
1358 /* Make sure we don't attempt to chroot again */
1359 free(options.chroot_directory);
1360 options.chroot_directory = NULL;
1364 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
1365 if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUSER) < 0) {
1366 perror("unable to set user context (setuser)");
1370 * FreeBSD's setusercontext() will not apply the user's
1371 * own umask setting unless running with the user's UID.
1373 (void) setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUMASK);
1377 * In a chroot environment, the set_id() will always fail;
1378 * typically because of the lack of necessary authentication
1379 * services and runtime such as ./usr/lib/libiaf.so,
1380 * ./usr/lib/libpam.so.1, and ./etc/passwd We skip it in the
1381 * internal sftp chroot case. We'll lose auditing and ACLs but
1382 * permanently_set_uid will take care of the rest.
1384 if (!in_chroot && set_id(pw->pw_name) != 0)
1385 fatal("set_id(%s) Failed", pw->pw_name);
1386 # endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
1387 /* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
1388 permanently_set_uid(pw);
1390 } else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
1391 strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
1392 fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory");
1395 if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid)
1396 fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid);
1400 do_pwchange(Session *s)
1403 fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: Your password has expired.\n");
1404 if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
1406 "You must change your password now and login again!\n");
1410 #ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME
1411 execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name,
1414 execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", (char *)NULL);
1419 "Password change required but no TTY available.\n");
1425 child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh)
1427 extern int auth_sock;
1429 if (auth_sock != -1) {
1434 if (packet_get_connection_in() == packet_get_connection_out())
1435 close(packet_get_connection_in());
1437 close(packet_get_connection_in());
1438 close(packet_get_connection_out());
1441 * Close all descriptors related to channels. They will still remain
1442 * open in the parent.
1444 /* XXX better use close-on-exec? -markus */
1445 channel_close_all(ssh);
1448 * Close any extra file descriptors. Note that there may still be
1449 * descriptors left by system functions. They will be closed later.
1454 * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
1455 * hanging around in clients. Note that we want to do this after
1456 * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
1459 closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
1463 * Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the
1464 * environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group
1465 * ids, and executing the command or shell.
1469 do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
1471 extern char **environ;
1473 char *argv[ARGV_MAX];
1474 const char *shell, *shell0;
1475 struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
1478 /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
1479 destroy_sensitive_data();
1480 packet_clear_keys();
1482 /* Force a password change */
1483 if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
1484 do_setusercontext(pw);
1485 child_close_fds(ssh);
1491 cray_setup(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_name, command);
1492 #endif /* _UNICOS */
1495 * Login(1) does this as well, and it needs uid 0 for the "-h"
1496 * switch, so we let login(1) to this for us.
1499 session_setup_sia(pw, s->ttyfd == -1 ? NULL : s->tty);
1500 if (!check_quietlogin(s, command))
1502 #else /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
1503 /* When PAM is enabled we rely on it to do the nologin check */
1504 if (!options.use_pam)
1506 do_setusercontext(pw);
1508 * PAM session modules in do_setusercontext may have
1509 * generated messages, so if this in an interactive
1510 * login then display them too.
1512 if (!check_quietlogin(s, command))
1514 #endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
1517 if (options.use_pam && !is_pam_session_open()) {
1518 debug3("PAM session not opened, exiting");
1525 * Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is
1526 * legal, and means /bin/sh.
1528 shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
1531 * Make sure $SHELL points to the shell from the password file,
1532 * even if shell is overridden from login.conf
1534 env = do_setup_env(ssh, s, shell);
1536 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
1537 shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell);
1541 * Close the connection descriptors; note that this is the child, and
1542 * the server will still have the socket open, and it is important
1543 * that we do not shutdown it. Note that the descriptors cannot be
1544 * closed before building the environment, as we call
1545 * ssh_remote_ipaddr there.
1547 child_close_fds(ssh);
1550 * Must take new environment into use so that .ssh/rc,
1551 * /etc/ssh/sshrc and xauth are run in the proper environment.
1555 #if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS)
1557 * At this point, we check to see if AFS is active and if we have
1558 * a valid Kerberos 5 TGT. If so, it seems like a good idea to see
1559 * if we can (and need to) extend the ticket into an AFS token. If
1560 * we don't do this, we run into potential problems if the user's
1561 * home directory is in AFS and it's not world-readable.
1564 if (options.kerberos_get_afs_token && k_hasafs() &&
1565 (s->authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL)) {
1568 debug("Getting AFS token");
1572 if (k_afs_cell_of_file(pw->pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0)
1573 krb5_afslog(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx,
1574 s->authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, cell, NULL);
1576 krb5_afslog_home(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx,
1577 s->authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, NULL, NULL, pw->pw_dir);
1581 /* Change current directory to the user's home directory. */
1582 if (chdir(pw->pw_dir) < 0) {
1583 /* Suppress missing homedir warning for chroot case */
1584 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
1585 r = login_getcapbool(lc, "requirehome", 0);
1587 if (r || !in_chroot) {
1588 fprintf(stderr, "Could not chdir to home "
1589 "directory %s: %s\n", pw->pw_dir,
1596 closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
1598 do_rc_files(s, shell);
1600 /* restore SIGPIPE for child */
1601 signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
1603 if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR) {
1604 printf("This service allows sftp connections only.\n");
1607 } else if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP) {
1608 extern int optind, optreset;
1612 setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME);
1613 args = xstrdup(command ? command : "sftp-server");
1614 for (i = 0, (p = strtok(args, " ")); p; (p = strtok(NULL, " ")))
1615 if (i < ARGV_MAX - 1)
1618 optind = optreset = 1;
1619 __progname = argv[0];
1621 ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
1623 exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
1628 /* Get the last component of the shell name. */
1629 if ((shell0 = strrchr(shell, '/')) != NULL)
1635 * If we have no command, execute the shell. In this case, the shell
1636 * name to be passed in argv[0] is preceded by '-' to indicate that
1637 * this is a login shell.
1642 /* Start the shell. Set initial character to '-'. */
1645 if (strlcpy(argv0 + 1, shell0, sizeof(argv0) - 1)
1646 >= sizeof(argv0) - 1) {
1652 /* Execute the shell. */
1655 execve(shell, argv, env);
1657 /* Executing the shell failed. */
1662 * Execute the command using the user's shell. This uses the -c
1663 * option to execute the command.
1665 argv[0] = (char *) shell0;
1667 argv[2] = (char *) command;
1669 execve(shell, argv, env);
1675 session_unused(int id)
1677 debug3("%s: session id %d unused", __func__, id);
1678 if (id >= options.max_sessions ||
1679 id >= sessions_nalloc) {
1680 fatal("%s: insane session id %d (max %d nalloc %d)",
1681 __func__, id, options.max_sessions, sessions_nalloc);
1683 memset(&sessions[id], 0, sizeof(*sessions));
1684 sessions[id].self = id;
1685 sessions[id].used = 0;
1686 sessions[id].chanid = -1;
1687 sessions[id].ptyfd = -1;
1688 sessions[id].ttyfd = -1;
1689 sessions[id].ptymaster = -1;
1690 sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL;
1691 sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused;
1692 sessions_first_unused = id;
1700 if (sessions_first_unused == -1) {
1701 if (sessions_nalloc >= options.max_sessions)
1703 debug2("%s: allocate (allocated %d max %d)",
1704 __func__, sessions_nalloc, options.max_sessions);
1705 tmp = xrecallocarray(sessions, sessions_nalloc,
1706 sessions_nalloc + 1, sizeof(*sessions));
1708 error("%s: cannot allocate %d sessions",
1709 __func__, sessions_nalloc + 1);
1713 session_unused(sessions_nalloc++);
1716 if (sessions_first_unused >= sessions_nalloc ||
1717 sessions_first_unused < 0) {
1718 fatal("%s: insane first_unused %d max %d nalloc %d",
1719 __func__, sessions_first_unused, options.max_sessions,
1723 s = &sessions[sessions_first_unused];
1725 fatal("%s: session %d already used",
1726 __func__, sessions_first_unused);
1728 sessions_first_unused = s->next_unused;
1730 s->next_unused = -1;
1731 debug("session_new: session %d", s->self);
1740 for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
1741 Session *s = &sessions[i];
1743 debug("dump: used %d next_unused %d session %d %p "
1744 "channel %d pid %ld",
1755 session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int chanid)
1757 Session *s = session_new();
1758 debug("session_open: channel %d", chanid);
1760 error("no more sessions");
1763 s->authctxt = authctxt;
1764 s->pw = authctxt->pw;
1765 if (s->pw == NULL || !authctxt->valid)
1766 fatal("no user for session %d", s->self);
1767 debug("session_open: session %d: link with channel %d", s->self, chanid);
1773 session_by_tty(char *tty)
1776 for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
1777 Session *s = &sessions[i];
1778 if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1 && strcmp(s->tty, tty) == 0) {
1779 debug("session_by_tty: session %d tty %s", i, tty);
1783 debug("session_by_tty: unknown tty %.100s", tty);
1789 session_by_channel(int id)
1792 for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
1793 Session *s = &sessions[i];
1794 if (s->used && s->chanid == id) {
1795 debug("session_by_channel: session %d channel %d",
1800 debug("session_by_channel: unknown channel %d", id);
1806 session_by_x11_channel(int id)
1810 for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
1811 Session *s = &sessions[i];
1813 if (s->x11_chanids == NULL || !s->used)
1815 for (j = 0; s->x11_chanids[j] != -1; j++) {
1816 if (s->x11_chanids[j] == id) {
1817 debug("session_by_x11_channel: session %d "
1818 "channel %d", s->self, id);
1823 debug("session_by_x11_channel: unknown channel %d", id);
1829 session_by_pid(pid_t pid)
1832 debug("session_by_pid: pid %ld", (long)pid);
1833 for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
1834 Session *s = &sessions[i];
1835 if (s->used && s->pid == pid)
1838 error("session_by_pid: unknown pid %ld", (long)pid);
1844 session_window_change_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
1846 s->col = packet_get_int();
1847 s->row = packet_get_int();
1848 s->xpixel = packet_get_int();
1849 s->ypixel = packet_get_int();
1851 pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
1856 session_pty_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
1861 if (no_pty_flag || !options.permit_tty) {
1862 debug("Allocating a pty not permitted for this authentication.");
1865 if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
1866 packet_disconnect("Protocol error: you already have a pty.");
1870 s->term = packet_get_string(&len);
1871 s->col = packet_get_int();
1872 s->row = packet_get_int();
1873 s->xpixel = packet_get_int();
1874 s->ypixel = packet_get_int();
1876 if (strcmp(s->term, "") == 0) {
1881 /* Allocate a pty and open it. */
1882 debug("Allocating pty.");
1883 if (!PRIVSEP(pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty,
1889 error("session_pty_req: session %d alloc failed", s->self);
1892 debug("session_pty_req: session %d alloc %s", s->self, s->tty);
1894 n_bytes = packet_remaining();
1895 tty_parse_modes(s->ttyfd, &n_bytes);
1898 pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty);
1900 /* Set window size from the packet. */
1901 pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
1904 session_proctitle(s);
1909 session_subsystem_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
1917 s->subsys = packet_get_string(&len);
1919 debug2("subsystem request for %.100s by user %s", s->subsys,
1922 for (i = 0; i < options.num_subsystems; i++) {
1923 if (strcmp(s->subsys, options.subsystem_name[i]) == 0) {
1924 prog = options.subsystem_command[i];
1925 cmd = options.subsystem_args[i];
1926 if (strcmp(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, prog) == 0) {
1927 s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP;
1928 debug("subsystem: %s", prog);
1930 if (stat(prog, &st) < 0)
1931 debug("subsystem: cannot stat %s: %s",
1932 prog, strerror(errno));
1933 s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT;
1934 debug("subsystem: exec() %s", cmd);
1936 success = do_exec(ssh, s, cmd) == 0;
1942 logit("subsystem request for %.100s by user %s failed, "
1943 "subsystem not found", s->subsys, s->pw->pw_name);
1949 session_x11_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
1953 if (s->auth_proto != NULL || s->auth_data != NULL) {
1954 error("session_x11_req: session %d: "
1955 "x11 forwarding already active", s->self);
1958 s->single_connection = packet_get_char();
1959 s->auth_proto = packet_get_string(NULL);
1960 s->auth_data = packet_get_string(NULL);
1961 s->screen = packet_get_int();
1964 if (xauth_valid_string(s->auth_proto) &&
1965 xauth_valid_string(s->auth_data))
1966 success = session_setup_x11fwd(ssh, s);
1969 error("Invalid X11 forwarding data");
1972 free(s->auth_proto);
1974 s->auth_proto = NULL;
1975 s->auth_data = NULL;
1981 session_shell_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
1984 return do_exec(ssh, s, NULL) == 0;
1988 session_exec_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
1992 char *command = packet_get_string(&len);
1994 success = do_exec(ssh, s, command) == 0;
2000 session_break_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
2003 packet_get_int(); /* ignored */
2006 if (s->ptymaster == -1 || tcsendbreak(s->ptymaster, 0) < 0)
2012 session_env_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
2015 u_int name_len, val_len, i;
2017 name = packet_get_cstring(&name_len);
2018 val = packet_get_cstring(&val_len);
2021 /* Don't set too many environment variables */
2022 if (s->num_env > 128) {
2023 debug2("Ignoring env request %s: too many env vars", name);
2027 for (i = 0; i < options.num_accept_env; i++) {
2028 if (match_pattern(name, options.accept_env[i])) {
2029 debug2("Setting env %d: %s=%s", s->num_env, name, val);
2030 s->env = xrecallocarray(s->env, s->num_env,
2031 s->num_env + 1, sizeof(*s->env));
2032 s->env[s->num_env].name = name;
2033 s->env[s->num_env].val = val;
2038 debug2("Ignoring env request %s: disallowed name", name);
2047 session_auth_agent_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
2049 static int called = 0;
2051 if (no_agent_forwarding_flag || !options.allow_agent_forwarding) {
2052 debug("session_auth_agent_req: no_agent_forwarding_flag");
2059 return auth_input_request_forwarding(ssh, s->pw);
2064 session_input_channel_req(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, const char *rtype)
2069 if ((s = session_by_channel(c->self)) == NULL) {
2070 logit("%s: no session %d req %.100s", __func__, c->self, rtype);
2073 debug("%s: session %d req %s", __func__, s->self, rtype);
2076 * a session is in LARVAL state until a shell, a command
2077 * or a subsystem is executed
2079 if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) {
2080 if (strcmp(rtype, "shell") == 0) {
2081 success = session_shell_req(ssh, s);
2082 } else if (strcmp(rtype, "exec") == 0) {
2083 success = session_exec_req(ssh, s);
2084 } else if (strcmp(rtype, "pty-req") == 0) {
2085 success = session_pty_req(ssh, s);
2086 } else if (strcmp(rtype, "x11-req") == 0) {
2087 success = session_x11_req(ssh, s);
2088 } else if (strcmp(rtype, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com") == 0) {
2089 success = session_auth_agent_req(ssh, s);
2090 } else if (strcmp(rtype, "subsystem") == 0) {
2091 success = session_subsystem_req(ssh, s);
2092 } else if (strcmp(rtype, "env") == 0) {
2093 success = session_env_req(ssh, s);
2096 if (strcmp(rtype, "window-change") == 0) {
2097 success = session_window_change_req(ssh, s);
2098 } else if (strcmp(rtype, "break") == 0) {
2099 success = session_break_req(ssh, s);
2106 session_set_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s,
2107 int fdin, int fdout, int fderr, int ignore_fderr, int is_tty)
2110 * now that have a child and a pipe to the child,
2111 * we can activate our channel and register the fd's
2113 if (s->chanid == -1)
2114 fatal("no channel for session %d", s->self);
2115 channel_set_fds(ssh, s->chanid,
2117 ignore_fderr ? CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE : CHAN_EXTENDED_READ,
2118 1, is_tty, CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT);
2122 * Function to perform pty cleanup. Also called if we get aborted abnormally
2123 * (e.g., due to a dropped connection).
2126 session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s)
2129 error("session_pty_cleanup: no session");
2135 debug("session_pty_cleanup: session %d release %s", s->self, s->tty);
2137 /* Record that the user has logged out. */
2139 record_logout(s->pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name);
2141 /* Release the pseudo-tty. */
2143 pty_release(s->tty);
2146 * Close the server side of the socket pairs. We must do this after
2147 * the pty cleanup, so that another process doesn't get this pty
2148 * while we're still cleaning up.
2150 if (s->ptymaster != -1 && close(s->ptymaster) < 0)
2151 error("close(s->ptymaster/%d): %s",
2152 s->ptymaster, strerror(errno));
2154 /* unlink pty from session */
2159 session_pty_cleanup(Session *s)
2161 PRIVSEP(session_pty_cleanup2(s));
2167 #define SSH_SIG(x) if (sig == SIG ## x) return #x
2182 return "SIG@openssh.com";
2186 session_close_x11(struct ssh *ssh, int id)
2190 if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL) {
2191 debug("%s: x11 channel %d missing", __func__, id);
2193 /* Detach X11 listener */
2194 debug("%s: detach x11 channel %d", __func__, id);
2195 channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, id);
2196 if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
2197 chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
2202 session_close_single_x11(struct ssh *ssh, int id, void *arg)
2207 debug3("%s: channel %d", __func__, id);
2208 channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, id);
2209 if ((s = session_by_x11_channel(id)) == NULL)
2210 fatal("%s: no x11 channel %d", __func__, id);
2211 for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
2212 debug("%s: session %d: closing channel %d",
2213 __func__, s->self, s->x11_chanids[i]);
2215 * The channel "id" is already closing, but make sure we
2216 * close all of its siblings.
2218 if (s->x11_chanids[i] != id)
2219 session_close_x11(ssh, s->x11_chanids[i]);
2221 free(s->x11_chanids);
2222 s->x11_chanids = NULL;
2225 free(s->auth_proto);
2226 s->auth_proto = NULL;
2228 s->auth_data = NULL;
2229 free(s->auth_display);
2230 s->auth_display = NULL;
2234 session_exit_message(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, int status)
2238 if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, s->chanid)) == NULL)
2239 fatal("%s: session %d: no channel %d",
2240 __func__, s->self, s->chanid);
2241 debug("%s: session %d channel %d pid %ld",
2242 __func__, s->self, s->chanid, (long)s->pid);
2244 if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
2245 channel_request_start(ssh, s->chanid, "exit-status", 0);
2246 packet_put_int(WEXITSTATUS(status));
2248 } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
2249 channel_request_start(ssh, s->chanid, "exit-signal", 0);
2250 packet_put_cstring(sig2name(WTERMSIG(status)));
2252 packet_put_char(WCOREDUMP(status)? 1 : 0);
2253 #else /* WCOREDUMP */
2255 #endif /* WCOREDUMP */
2256 packet_put_cstring("");
2257 packet_put_cstring("");
2260 /* Some weird exit cause. Just exit. */
2261 packet_disconnect("wait returned status %04x.", status);
2264 /* disconnect channel */
2265 debug("%s: release channel %d", __func__, s->chanid);
2268 * Adjust cleanup callback attachment to send close messages when
2269 * the channel gets EOF. The session will be then be closed
2270 * by session_close_by_channel when the childs close their fds.
2272 channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, session_close_by_channel, 1);
2275 * emulate a write failure with 'chan_write_failed', nobody will be
2276 * interested in data we write.
2277 * Note that we must not call 'chan_read_failed', since there could
2278 * be some more data waiting in the pipe.
2280 if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
2281 chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
2285 session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
2289 verbose("Close session: user %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
2291 ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
2292 ssh_remote_port(ssh),
2296 session_pty_cleanup(s);
2299 free(s->x11_chanids);
2300 free(s->auth_display);
2302 free(s->auth_proto);
2304 if (s->env != NULL) {
2305 for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++) {
2306 free(s->env[i].name);
2307 free(s->env[i].val);
2311 session_proctitle(s);
2312 session_unused(s->self);
2316 session_close_by_pid(struct ssh *ssh, pid_t pid, int status)
2318 Session *s = session_by_pid(pid);
2320 debug("%s: no session for pid %ld", __func__, (long)pid);
2323 if (s->chanid != -1)
2324 session_exit_message(ssh, s, status);
2326 session_pty_cleanup(s);
2331 * this is called when a channel dies before
2332 * the session 'child' itself dies
2335 session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *ssh, int id, void *arg)
2337 Session *s = session_by_channel(id);
2341 debug("%s: no session for id %d", __func__, id);
2344 debug("%s: channel %d child %ld", __func__, id, (long)s->pid);
2346 debug("%s: channel %d: has child", __func__, id);
2348 * delay detach of session, but release pty, since
2349 * the fd's to the child are already closed
2352 session_pty_cleanup(s);
2355 /* detach by removing callback */
2356 channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, s->chanid);
2358 /* Close any X11 listeners associated with this session */
2359 if (s->x11_chanids != NULL) {
2360 for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
2361 session_close_x11(ssh, s->x11_chanids[i]);
2362 s->x11_chanids[i] = -1;
2367 session_close(ssh, s);
2371 session_destroy_all(struct ssh *ssh, void (*closefunc)(Session *))
2374 for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
2375 Session *s = &sessions[i];
2377 if (closefunc != NULL)
2380 session_close(ssh, s);
2386 session_tty_list(void)
2388 static char buf[1024];
2393 for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
2394 Session *s = &sessions[i];
2395 if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1) {
2397 if (strncmp(s->tty, "/dev/", 5) != 0) {
2398 cp = strrchr(s->tty, '/');
2399 cp = (cp == NULL) ? s->tty : cp + 1;
2404 strlcat(buf, ",", sizeof buf);
2405 strlcat(buf, cp, sizeof buf);
2409 strlcpy(buf, "notty", sizeof buf);
2414 session_proctitle(Session *s)
2417 error("no user for session %d", s->self);
2419 setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, session_tty_list());
2423 session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
2426 char display[512], auth_display[512];
2427 char hostname[NI_MAXHOST];
2430 if (no_x11_forwarding_flag) {
2431 packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled in user configuration file.");
2434 if (!options.x11_forwarding) {
2435 debug("X11 forwarding disabled in server configuration file.");
2438 if (options.xauth_location == NULL ||
2439 (stat(options.xauth_location, &st) == -1)) {
2440 packet_send_debug("No xauth program; cannot forward with spoofing.");
2443 if (s->display != NULL) {
2444 debug("X11 display already set.");
2447 if (x11_create_display_inet(ssh, options.x11_display_offset,
2448 options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection,
2449 &s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
2450 debug("x11_create_display_inet failed.");
2453 for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
2454 channel_register_cleanup(ssh, s->x11_chanids[i],
2455 session_close_single_x11, 0);
2458 /* Set up a suitable value for the DISPLAY variable. */
2459 if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0)
2460 fatal("gethostname: %.100s", strerror(errno));
2462 * auth_display must be used as the displayname when the
2463 * authorization entry is added with xauth(1). This will be
2464 * different than the DISPLAY string for localhost displays.
2466 if (options.x11_use_localhost) {
2467 snprintf(display, sizeof display, "localhost:%u.%u",
2468 s->display_number, s->screen);
2469 snprintf(auth_display, sizeof auth_display, "unix:%u.%u",
2470 s->display_number, s->screen);
2471 s->display = xstrdup(display);
2472 s->auth_display = xstrdup(auth_display);
2474 #ifdef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY
2476 struct in_addr my_addr;
2478 he = gethostbyname(hostname);
2480 error("Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY.");
2481 packet_send_debug("Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY.");
2484 memcpy(&my_addr, he->h_addr_list[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
2485 snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.50s:%u.%u", inet_ntoa(my_addr),
2486 s->display_number, s->screen);
2488 snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.400s:%u.%u", hostname,
2489 s->display_number, s->screen);
2491 s->display = xstrdup(display);
2492 s->auth_display = xstrdup(display);
2499 do_authenticated2(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
2501 server_loop2(ssh, authctxt);
2505 do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
2507 static int called = 0;
2509 debug("do_cleanup");
2511 /* no cleanup if we're in the child for login shell */
2515 /* avoid double cleanup */
2520 if (authctxt == NULL)
2524 if (options.use_pam) {
2526 sshpam_thread_cleanup();
2530 if (!authctxt->authenticated)
2534 if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup &&
2536 krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
2540 if (options.gss_cleanup_creds)
2541 ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds();
2544 /* remove agent socket */
2545 auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw);
2547 /* remove userauth info */
2548 if (auth_info_file != NULL) {
2549 temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
2550 unlink(auth_info_file);
2552 free(auth_info_file);
2553 auth_info_file = NULL;
2557 * Cleanup ptys/utmp only if privsep is disabled,
2558 * or if running in monitor.
2560 if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
2561 session_destroy_all(ssh, session_pty_cleanup2);
2564 /* Return a name for the remote host that fits inside utmp_size */
2567 session_get_remote_name_or_ip(struct ssh *ssh, u_int utmp_size, int use_dns)
2569 const char *remote = "";
2572 remote = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, use_dns);
2573 if (utmp_size == 0 || strlen(remote) > utmp_size)
2574 remote = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);