Merge from vendor branch LESS:
[dragonfly.git] / contrib / wpa_supplicant-0.5.8 / eap_sake_common.c
1 /*
2  * EAP server/peer: EAP-SAKE shared routines
3  * Copyright (c) 2006, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
4  *
5  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
7  * published by the Free Software Foundation.
8  *
9  * Alternatively, this software may be distributed under the terms of BSD
10  * license.
11  *
12  * See README and COPYING for more details.
13  */
14
15 #include "includes.h"
16
17 #include "common.h"
18 #include "sha1.h"
19 #include "eap_defs.h"
20 #include "eap_sake_common.h"
21
22
23 static int eap_sake_parse_add_attr(struct eap_sake_parse_attr *attr,
24                                    const u8 *pos)
25 {
26         size_t i;
27
28         switch (pos[0]) {
29         case EAP_SAKE_AT_RAND_S:
30                 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_RAND_S");
31                 if (pos[1] != 2 + EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN) {
32                         wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: AT_RAND_S with "
33                                    "invalid length %d", pos[1]);
34                         return -1;
35                 }
36                 attr->rand_s = pos + 2;
37                 break;
38         case EAP_SAKE_AT_RAND_P:
39                 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_RAND_P");
40                 if (pos[1] != 2 + EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN) {
41                         wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: AT_RAND_P with "
42                                    "invalid length %d", pos[1]);
43                         return -1;
44                 }
45                 attr->rand_p = pos + 2;
46                 break;
47         case EAP_SAKE_AT_MIC_S:
48                 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_MIC_S");
49                 if (pos[1] != 2 + EAP_SAKE_MIC_LEN) {
50                         wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: AT_MIC_S with "
51                                    "invalid length %d", pos[1]);
52                         return -1;
53                 }
54                 attr->mic_s = pos + 2;
55                 break;
56         case EAP_SAKE_AT_MIC_P:
57                 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_MIC_P");
58                 if (pos[1] != 2 + EAP_SAKE_MIC_LEN) {
59                         wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: AT_MIC_P with "
60                                    "invalid length %d", pos[1]);
61                         return -1;
62                 }
63                 attr->mic_p = pos + 2;
64                 break;
65         case EAP_SAKE_AT_SERVERID:
66                 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_SERVERID");
67                 attr->serverid = pos + 2;
68                 attr->serverid_len = pos[1] - 2;
69                 break;
70         case EAP_SAKE_AT_PEERID:
71                 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_PEERID");
72                 attr->peerid = pos + 2;
73                 attr->peerid_len = pos[1] - 2;
74                 break;
75         case EAP_SAKE_AT_SPI_S:
76                 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_SPI_S");
77                 attr->spi_s = pos + 2;
78                 attr->spi_s_len = pos[1] - 2;
79                 break;
80         case EAP_SAKE_AT_SPI_P:
81                 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_SPI_P");
82                 attr->spi_p = pos + 2;
83                 attr->spi_p_len = pos[1] - 2;
84                 break;
85         case EAP_SAKE_AT_ANY_ID_REQ:
86                 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_ANY_ID_REQ");
87                 if (pos[1] != 4) {
88                         wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Invalid AT_ANY_ID_REQ"
89                                    " length %d", pos[1]);
90                         return -1;
91                 }
92                 attr->any_id_req = pos + 2;
93                 break;
94         case EAP_SAKE_AT_PERM_ID_REQ:
95                 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_PERM_ID_REQ");
96                 if (pos[1] != 4) {
97                         wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Invalid "
98                                    "AT_PERM_ID_REQ length %d", pos[1]);
99                         return -1;
100                 }
101                 attr->perm_id_req = pos + 2;
102                 break;
103         case EAP_SAKE_AT_ENCR_DATA:
104                 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_ENCR_DATA");
105                 attr->encr_data = pos + 2;
106                 attr->encr_data_len = pos[1] - 2;
107                 break;
108         case EAP_SAKE_AT_IV:
109                 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_IV");
110                 attr->iv = pos + 2;
111                 attr->iv_len = pos[1] - 2;
112                 break;
113         case EAP_SAKE_AT_PADDING:
114                 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_PADDING");
115                 for (i = 2; i < pos[1]; i++) {
116                         if (pos[i]) {
117                                 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: AT_PADDING "
118                                            "with non-zero pad byte");
119                                 return -1;
120                         }
121                 }
122                 break;
123         case EAP_SAKE_AT_NEXT_TMPID:
124                 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_NEXT_TMPID");
125                 attr->next_tmpid = pos + 2;
126                 attr->next_tmpid_len = pos[1] - 2;
127                 break;
128         case EAP_SAKE_AT_MSK_LIFE:
129                 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_IV");
130                 if (pos[1] != 6) {
131                         wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Invalid "
132                                    "AT_MSK_LIFE length %d", pos[1]);
133                         return -1;
134                 }
135                 attr->msk_life = pos + 2;
136                 break;
137         default:
138                 if (pos[0] < 128) {
139                         wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Unknown non-skippable"
140                                    " attribute %d", pos[0]);
141                         return -1;
142                 }
143                 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Ignoring unknown skippable "
144                            "attribute %d", pos[0]);
145                 break;
146         }
147
148         if (attr->iv && !attr->encr_data) {
149                 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: AT_IV included without "
150                            "AT_ENCR_DATA");
151                 return -1;
152         }
153
154         return 0;
155 }
156
157
158 /**
159  * eap_sake_parse_attributes - Parse EAP-SAKE attributes
160  * @buf: Packet payload (starting with the first attribute)
161  * @len: Payload length
162  * @attr: Structure to be filled with found attributes
163  * Returns: 0 on success or -1 on failure
164  */
165 int eap_sake_parse_attributes(const u8 *buf, size_t len,
166                               struct eap_sake_parse_attr *attr)
167 {
168         const u8 *pos = buf, *end = buf + len;
169
170         os_memset(attr, 0, sizeof(*attr));
171         while (pos < end) {
172                 if (end - pos < 2) {
173                         wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Too short attribute");
174                         return -1;
175                 }
176
177                 if (pos[1] < 2) {
178                         wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Invalid attribute "
179                                    "length (%d)", pos[1]);
180                         return -1;
181                 }
182
183                 if (pos + pos[1] > end) {
184                         wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Attribute underflow");
185                         return -1;
186                 }
187
188                 if (eap_sake_parse_add_attr(attr, pos))
189                         return -1;
190
191                 pos += pos[1];
192         }
193
194         return 0;
195 }
196
197
198 /**
199  * eap_sake_kdf - EAP-SAKE Key Derivation Function (KDF)
200  * @key: Key for KDF
201  * @key_len: Length of the key in bytes
202  * @label: A unique label for each purpose of the KDF
203  * @data: Extra data (start) to bind into the key
204  * @data_len: Length of the data
205  * @data2: Extra data (end) to bind into the key
206  * @data2_len: Length of the data2
207  * @buf: Buffer for the generated pseudo-random key
208  * @buf_len: Number of bytes of key to generate
209  *
210  * This function is used to derive new, cryptographically separate keys from a
211  * given key (e.g., SMS). This is identical to the PRF used in IEEE 802.11i.
212  */
213 static void eap_sake_kdf(const u8 *key, size_t key_len, const char *label,
214                          const u8 *data, size_t data_len,
215                          const u8 *data2, size_t data2_len,
216                          u8 *buf, size_t buf_len)
217 {
218         u8 counter = 0;
219         size_t pos, plen;
220         u8 hash[SHA1_MAC_LEN];
221         size_t label_len = os_strlen(label) + 1;
222         const unsigned char *addr[4];
223         size_t len[4];
224
225         addr[0] = (u8 *) label; /* Label | Y */
226         len[0] = label_len;
227         addr[1] = data; /* Msg[start] */
228         len[1] = data_len;
229         addr[2] = data2; /* Msg[end] */
230         len[2] = data2_len;
231         addr[3] = &counter; /* Length */
232         len[3] = 1;
233
234         pos = 0;
235         while (pos < buf_len) {
236                 plen = buf_len - pos;
237                 if (plen >= SHA1_MAC_LEN) {
238                         hmac_sha1_vector(key, key_len, 4, addr, len,
239                                          &buf[pos]);
240                         pos += SHA1_MAC_LEN;
241                 } else {
242                         hmac_sha1_vector(key, key_len, 4, addr, len,
243                                          hash);
244                         os_memcpy(&buf[pos], hash, plen);
245                         break;
246                 }
247                 counter++;
248         }
249 }
250
251
252 /**
253  * eap_sake_derive_keys - Derive EAP-SAKE keys
254  * @root_secret_a: 16-byte Root-Secret-A
255  * @root_secret_b: 16-byte Root-Secret-B
256  * @rand_s: 16-byte RAND_S
257  * @rand_p: 16-byte RAND_P
258  * @tek: Buffer for Temporary EAK Keys (TEK-Auth[16] | TEK-Cipher[16])
259  * @msk: Buffer for 64-byte MSK
260  * @emsk: Buffer for 64-byte EMSK
261  *
262  * This function derives EAP-SAKE keys as defined in RFC 4763, section 3.2.6.
263  */
264 void eap_sake_derive_keys(const u8 *root_secret_a, const u8 *root_secret_b,
265                           const u8 *rand_s, const u8 *rand_p, u8 *tek, u8 *msk,
266                           u8 *emsk)
267 {
268         u8 sms_a[EAP_SAKE_SMS_LEN];
269         u8 sms_b[EAP_SAKE_SMS_LEN];
270         u8 key_buf[EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN];
271
272         wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Deriving keys");
273
274         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Root-Secret-A",
275                         root_secret_a, EAP_SAKE_ROOT_SECRET_LEN);
276         eap_sake_kdf(root_secret_a, EAP_SAKE_ROOT_SECRET_LEN,
277                      "SAKE Master Secret A",
278                      rand_p, EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN, rand_s, EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN,
279                      sms_a, EAP_SAKE_SMS_LEN);
280         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: SMS-A", sms_a, EAP_SAKE_SMS_LEN);
281         eap_sake_kdf(sms_a, EAP_SAKE_SMS_LEN, "Transient EAP Key",
282                      rand_s, EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN, rand_p, EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN,
283                      tek, EAP_SAKE_TEK_LEN);
284         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: TEK-Auth",
285                         tek, EAP_SAKE_TEK_AUTH_LEN);
286         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: TEK-Cipher",
287                         tek + EAP_SAKE_TEK_AUTH_LEN, EAP_SAKE_TEK_CIPHER_LEN);
288
289         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Root-Secret-B",
290                         root_secret_b, EAP_SAKE_ROOT_SECRET_LEN);
291         eap_sake_kdf(root_secret_b, EAP_SAKE_ROOT_SECRET_LEN,
292                      "SAKE Master Secret B",
293                      rand_p, EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN, rand_s, EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN,
294                      sms_b, EAP_SAKE_SMS_LEN);
295         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: SMS-B", sms_b, EAP_SAKE_SMS_LEN);
296         eap_sake_kdf(sms_b, EAP_SAKE_SMS_LEN, "Master Session Key",
297                      rand_s, EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN, rand_p, EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN,
298                      key_buf, sizeof(key_buf));
299         os_memcpy(msk, key_buf, EAP_MSK_LEN);
300         os_memcpy(emsk, key_buf + EAP_MSK_LEN, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
301         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: MSK", msk, EAP_MSK_LEN);
302         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: EMSK", emsk, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
303 }
304
305
306 /**
307  * eap_sake_compute_mic - Compute EAP-SAKE MIC for an EAP packet
308  * @tek_auth: 16-byte TEK-Auth
309  * @rand_s: 16-byte RAND_S
310  * @rand_p: 16-byte RAND_P
311  * @serverid: SERVERID
312  * @serverid_len: SERVERID length
313  * @peerid: PEERID
314  * @peerid_len: PEERID length
315  * @peer: MIC calculation for 0 = Server, 1 = Peer message
316  * @eap: EAP packet
317  * @eap_len: EAP packet length
318  * @mic_pos: MIC position in the EAP packet (must be [eap .. eap + eap_len])
319  * @mic: Buffer for the computed 16-byte MIC
320  */
321 int eap_sake_compute_mic(const u8 *tek_auth,
322                          const u8 *rand_s, const u8 *rand_p,
323                          const u8 *serverid, size_t serverid_len,
324                          const u8 *peerid, size_t peerid_len,
325                          int peer, const u8 *eap, size_t eap_len,
326                          const u8 *mic_pos, u8 *mic)
327 {
328         u8 _rand[2 * EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN];
329         u8 *tmp, *pos;
330         size_t tmplen;
331
332         tmplen = serverid_len + 1 + peerid_len + 1 + eap_len;
333         tmp = os_malloc(tmplen);
334         if (tmp == NULL)
335                 return -1;
336         pos = tmp;
337         if (peer) {
338                 if (peerid) {
339                         os_memcpy(pos, peerid, peerid_len);
340                         pos += peerid_len;
341                 }
342                 *pos++ = 0x00;
343                 if (serverid) {
344                         os_memcpy(pos, serverid, serverid_len);
345                         pos += serverid_len;
346                 }
347                 *pos++ = 0x00;
348
349                 os_memcpy(_rand, rand_s, EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN);
350                 os_memcpy(_rand + EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN, rand_p,
351                           EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN);
352         } else {
353                 if (serverid) {
354                         os_memcpy(pos, serverid, serverid_len);
355                         pos += serverid_len;
356                 }
357                 *pos++ = 0x00;
358                 if (peerid) {
359                         os_memcpy(pos, peerid, peerid_len);
360                         pos += peerid_len;
361                 }
362                 *pos++ = 0x00;
363
364                 os_memcpy(_rand, rand_p, EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN);
365                 os_memcpy(_rand + EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN, rand_s,
366                           EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN);
367         }
368
369         os_memcpy(pos, eap, eap_len);
370         os_memset(pos + (mic_pos - eap), 0, EAP_SAKE_MIC_LEN);
371
372         eap_sake_kdf(tek_auth, EAP_SAKE_TEK_AUTH_LEN,
373                      peer ? "Peer MIC" : "Server MIC",
374                      _rand, 2 * EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN, tmp, tmplen,
375                      mic, EAP_SAKE_MIC_LEN);
376
377         os_free(tmp);
378
379         return 0;
380 }