1 /* $FreeBSD: src/sys/netinet6/ah_input.c,v 1.1.2.6 2002/04/28 05:40:26 suz Exp $ */
2 /* $KAME: ah_input.c,v 1.67 2002/01/07 11:39:56 kjc Exp $ */
5 * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project.
8 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
9 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
11 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
12 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
13 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
15 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
16 * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors
17 * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
18 * without specific prior written permission.
20 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
21 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
22 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
23 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
24 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
25 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
26 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
27 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
28 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
29 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
34 * RFC1826/2402 authentication header.
38 #include "opt_inet6.h"
40 #include <sys/param.h>
41 #include <sys/systm.h>
42 #include <sys/malloc.h>
44 #include <sys/domain.h>
45 #include <sys/protosw.h>
46 #include <sys/socket.h>
47 #include <sys/errno.h>
49 #include <sys/syslog.h>
52 #include <net/route.h>
53 #include <net/netisr.h>
54 #include <machine/cpu.h>
55 #include <machine/stdarg.h>
57 #include <netinet/in.h>
58 #include <netinet/in_systm.h>
59 #include <netinet/in_var.h>
60 #include <netinet/ip.h>
61 #include <netinet/ip_var.h>
62 #include <netinet/ip_ecn.h>
64 #include <netinet6/ip6_ecn.h>
68 #include <netinet/ip6.h>
69 #include <netinet6/ip6_var.h>
70 #include <netinet6/in6_pcb.h>
71 #include <netinet/icmp6.h>
72 #include <netinet6/ip6protosw.h>
75 #include <netinet6/ipsec.h>
77 #include <netinet6/ipsec6.h>
79 #include <netinet6/ah.h>
81 #include <netinet6/ah6.h>
83 #include <netproto/key/key.h>
84 #include <netproto/key/keydb.h>
86 #include <netproto/key/key_debug.h>
88 #define KEYDEBUG(lev,arg)
91 #include <machine/stdarg.h>
93 #include <net/net_osdep.h>
98 extern struct protosw inetsw[];
101 ah4_input(struct mbuf **mp, int *offp, int proto)
108 const struct ah_algorithm *algo;
112 struct secasvar *sav = NULL;
121 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST
122 if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(struct newah)) {
123 m = m_pullup(m, off + sizeof(struct newah));
125 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup;"
126 "dropping the packet for simplicity\n"));
127 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
132 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
133 ah = (struct ah *)(((caddr_t)ip) + off);
135 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
136 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct ah *, m, off, sizeof(struct newah));
138 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup;"
139 "dropping the packet for simplicity\n"));
140 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
146 hlen = IP_VHL_HL(ip->ip_vhl) << 2;
148 hlen = ip->ip_hl << 2;
151 /* find the sassoc. */
154 if ((sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET,
155 (caddr_t)&ip->ip_src, (caddr_t)&ip->ip_dst,
156 IPPROTO_AH, spi)) == NULL) {
157 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
158 "IPv4 AH input: no key association found for spi %u\n",
159 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)));
163 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
164 kprintf("DP ah4_input called to allocate SA:%p\n", sav));
165 if (sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_MATURE
166 && sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_DYING) {
168 "IPv4 AH input: non-mature/dying SA found for spi %u\n",
169 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)));
170 ipsecstat.in_badspi++;
174 algo = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth);
176 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: "
177 "unsupported authentication algorithm for spi %u\n",
178 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)));
179 ipsecstat.in_badspi++;
183 siz = (*algo->sumsiz)(sav);
184 siz1 = ((siz + 3) & ~(4 - 1));
187 * sanity checks for header, 1.
192 sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4;
195 * Here, we do not do "siz1 == siz". This is because the way
196 * RFC240[34] section 2 is written. They do not require truncation
198 * For example, Microsoft IPsec stack attaches 160 bits of
199 * authentication data for both hmac-md5 and hmac-sha1. For hmac-sha1,
200 * 32 bits of padding is attached.
202 * There are two downsides to this specification.
203 * They have no real harm, however, they leave us fuzzy feeling.
204 * - if we attach more than 96 bits of authentication data onto AH,
205 * we will never notice about possible modification by rogue
206 * intermediate nodes.
207 * Since extra bits in AH checksum is never used, this constitutes
208 * no real issue, however, it is wacky.
209 * - even if the peer attaches big authentication data, we will never
210 * notice the difference, since longer authentication data will just
213 * We may need some clarification in the spec.
216 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length too short in IPv4 AH input "
217 "(%lu, should be at least %lu): %s\n",
218 (u_long)siz1, (u_long)siz,
219 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi)));
220 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
223 if ((ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff != siz1) {
224 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length mismatch in IPv4 AH input "
225 "(%d should be %lu): %s\n",
226 (ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff, (u_long)siz1,
227 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi)));
228 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
232 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST
233 if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1) {
234 m = m_pullup(m, off + sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1);
236 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup\n"));
237 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
241 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
242 ah = (struct ah *)(((caddr_t)ip) + off);
245 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct ah *, m, off,
246 sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1);
248 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup\n"));
249 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
256 * check for sequence number.
258 if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) {
259 if (ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav))
262 ipsecstat.in_ahreplay++;
263 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
264 "replay packet in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n",
265 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
271 * alright, it seems sane. now we are going to check the
272 * cryptographic checksum.
274 cksum = kmalloc(siz1, M_TEMP, M_NOWAIT);
276 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: "
277 "couldn't alloc temporary region for cksum\n"));
278 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
283 * some of IP header fields are flipped to the host endian.
284 * convert them back to network endian. VERY stupid.
286 ip->ip_len = htons(ip->ip_len + hlen);
287 ip->ip_off = htons(ip->ip_off);
288 if (ah4_calccksum(m, (caddr_t)cksum, siz1, algo, sav)) {
289 kfree(cksum, M_TEMP);
290 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
293 ipsecstat.in_ahhist[sav->alg_auth]++;
297 ip->ip_len = ntohs(ip->ip_len) - hlen;
298 ip->ip_off = ntohs(ip->ip_off);
301 caddr_t sumpos = NULL;
303 if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) {
305 sumpos = (caddr_t)(ah + 1);
308 sumpos = (caddr_t)(((struct newah *)ah) + 1);
311 if (bcmp(sumpos, cksum, siz) != 0) {
312 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
313 "checksum mismatch in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n",
314 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
315 kfree(cksum, M_TEMP);
316 ipsecstat.in_ahauthfail++;
321 kfree(cksum, M_TEMP);
323 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR;
324 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPDGM;
328 * looks okey, but we need more sanity check.
329 * XXX should elaborate.
331 if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPIP || ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IP) {
335 sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4;
337 if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1 + hlen) {
338 m = m_pullup(m, off + sizeof(struct ah)
339 + sizoff + siz1 + hlen);
342 "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup\n"));
343 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
348 nip = (struct ip *)((u_char *)(ah + 1) + sizoff + siz1);
349 if (nip->ip_src.s_addr != ip->ip_src.s_addr
350 || nip->ip_dst.s_addr != ip->ip_dst.s_addr) {
351 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
352 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
356 else if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPV6) {
357 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
358 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
363 if (m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPHDR
364 && m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPDGM) {
367 "IPv4 AH input: authentication succeess\n"));
369 ipsecstat.in_ahauthsucc++;
371 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
372 "authentication failed in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n",
373 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
374 ipsecstat.in_ahauthfail++;
379 * update sequence number.
381 if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) {
382 if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav)) {
383 ipsecstat.in_ahreplay++;
388 /* was it transmitted over the IPsec tunnel SA? */
389 if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) {
391 stripsiz = sizeof(struct ah) + siz1;
394 stripsiz = sizeof(struct newah) + siz1;
396 if (ipsec4_tunnel_validate(m, off + stripsiz, nxt, sav)) {
398 * strip off all the headers that precedes AH.
399 * IP xx AH IP' payload -> IP' payload
401 * XXX more sanity checks
402 * XXX relationship with gif?
407 m_adj(m, off + stripsiz);
408 if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip)) {
409 m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip));
411 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
415 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
416 /* ECN consideration. */
417 ip_ecn_egress(ip4_ipsec_ecn, &tos, &ip->ip_tos);
418 if (!key_checktunnelsanity(sav, AF_INET,
419 (caddr_t)&ip->ip_src, (caddr_t)&ip->ip_dst)) {
420 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "ipsec tunnel address mismatch "
421 "in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n",
422 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
423 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
429 * Should the inner packet be considered authentic?
430 * My current answer is: NO.
432 * host1 -- gw1 === gw2 -- host2
433 * In this case, gw2 can trust the authenticity of the
434 * outer packet, but NOT inner. Packet may be altered
435 * between host1 and gw1.
437 * host1 -- gw1 === host2
438 * This case falls into the same scenario as above.
441 * This case is the only case when we may be able to leave
442 * M_AUTHIPHDR and M_AUTHIPDGM set.
443 * However, if host1 is wrongly configured, and allows
444 * attacker to inject some packet with src=host1 and
445 * dst=host2, you are in risk.
447 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
448 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
451 key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m);
452 if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0 ||
453 ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_IPV4, 0) != 0) {
454 ipsecstat.in_nomem++;
458 if (netisr_queue(NETISR_IP, m)) {
459 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
470 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
471 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST
473 * We do deep-copy since KAME requires that
474 * the packet is placed in a single external mbuf.
476 ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip, (caddr_t)(((u_char *)ip) + stripsiz), off);
477 m->m_data += stripsiz;
478 m->m_len -= stripsiz;
479 m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz;
482 * even in m_pulldown case, we need to strip off AH so that
483 * we can compute checksum for multiple AH correctly.
485 if (m->m_len >= stripsiz + off) {
486 ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip, ((caddr_t)ip) + stripsiz, off);
487 m->m_data += stripsiz;
488 m->m_len -= stripsiz;
489 m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz;
492 * this comes with no copy if the boundary is on
497 n = m_split(m, off, MB_DONTWAIT);
499 /* m is retained by m_split */
503 /* m_cat does not update m_pkthdr.len */
504 m->m_pkthdr.len += n->m_pkthdr.len;
509 if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip)) {
510 m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip));
512 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
516 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
518 ip->ip_len = ip->ip_len - stripsiz;
520 ip->ip_len = htons(ntohs(ip->ip_len) - stripsiz);
523 /* forget about IP hdr checksum, the check has already been passed */
525 key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m);
526 if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0) {
527 ipsecstat.in_nomem++;
531 if (nxt != IPPROTO_DONE) {
532 if ((inetsw[ip_protox[nxt]].pr_flags & PR_LASTHDR) &&
533 ipsec4_in_reject(m, NULL)) {
534 ipsecstat.in_polvio++;
537 if (!ip_lengthcheck(&m, 0)) {
538 /* freed in ip_lengthcheck() */
543 (*inetsw[ip_protox[nxt]].pr_input)(mp, offp, nxt);
551 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
552 kprintf("DP ah4_input call free SA:%p\n", sav));
555 ipsecstat.in_success++;
556 return(IPPROTO_DONE);
560 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
561 kprintf("DP ah4_input call free SA:%p\n", sav));
566 return(IPPROTO_DONE);
572 ah6_input(struct mbuf **mp, int *offp, int proto)
574 struct mbuf *m = *mp;
579 const struct ah_algorithm *algo;
583 struct secasvar *sav = NULL;
587 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST
588 IP6_EXTHDR_CHECK(m, off, sizeof(struct ah), IPPROTO_DONE);
589 ah = (struct ah *)(mtod(m, caddr_t) + off);
591 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct ah *, m, off, sizeof(struct newah));
593 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv6 AH input: can't pullup\n"));
594 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
598 ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
601 /* find the sassoc. */
604 if (ntohs(ip6->ip6_plen) == 0) {
605 ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "IPv6 AH input: "
606 "AH with IPv6 jumbogram is not supported.\n"));
607 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
611 if ((sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET6,
612 (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_src, (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_dst,
613 IPPROTO_AH, spi)) == NULL) {
614 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
615 "IPv6 AH input: no key association found for spi %u\n",
616 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)));
617 ipsec6stat.in_nosa++;
620 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
621 kprintf("DP ah6_input called to allocate SA:%p\n", sav));
622 if (sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_MATURE
623 && sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_DYING) {
625 "IPv6 AH input: non-mature/dying SA found for spi %u; ",
626 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)));
627 ipsec6stat.in_badspi++;
631 algo = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth);
633 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv6 AH input: "
634 "unsupported authentication algorithm for spi %u\n",
635 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)));
636 ipsec6stat.in_badspi++;
640 siz = (*algo->sumsiz)(sav);
641 siz1 = ((siz + 3) & ~(4 - 1));
644 * sanity checks for header, 1.
649 sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4;
652 * Here, we do not do "siz1 == siz". See ah4_input() for complete
656 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length too short in IPv6 AH input "
657 "(%lu, should be at least %lu): %s\n",
658 (u_long)siz1, (u_long)siz,
659 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi)));
660 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
663 if ((ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff != siz1) {
664 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length mismatch in IPv6 AH input "
665 "(%d should be %lu): %s\n",
666 (ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff, (u_long)siz1,
667 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi)));
668 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
671 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST
672 IP6_EXTHDR_CHECK(m, off, sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1, IPPROTO_DONE);
674 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct ah *, m, off,
675 sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1);
677 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "couldn't pullup gather IPv6 AH checksum part"));
678 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
686 * check for sequence number.
688 if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) {
689 if (ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav))
692 ipsec6stat.in_ahreplay++;
693 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
694 "replay packet in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n",
695 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi),
696 ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
702 * alright, it seems sane. now we are going to check the
703 * cryptographic checksum.
705 cksum = kmalloc(siz1, M_TEMP, M_NOWAIT);
707 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv6 AH input: "
708 "couldn't alloc temporary region for cksum\n"));
709 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
713 if (ah6_calccksum(m, (caddr_t)cksum, siz1, algo, sav)) {
714 kfree(cksum, M_TEMP);
715 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
718 ipsec6stat.in_ahhist[sav->alg_auth]++;
721 caddr_t sumpos = NULL;
723 if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) {
725 sumpos = (caddr_t)(ah + 1);
728 sumpos = (caddr_t)(((struct newah *)ah) + 1);
731 if (bcmp(sumpos, cksum, siz) != 0) {
732 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
733 "checksum mismatch in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n",
734 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
735 kfree(cksum, M_TEMP);
736 ipsec6stat.in_ahauthfail++;
741 kfree(cksum, M_TEMP);
743 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR;
744 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPDGM;
748 * looks okey, but we need more sanity check.
749 * XXX should elaborate.
751 if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPV6) {
752 struct ip6_hdr *nip6;
755 sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4;
757 IP6_EXTHDR_CHECK(m, off, sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1
758 + sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), IPPROTO_DONE);
760 nip6 = (struct ip6_hdr *)((u_char *)(ah + 1) + sizoff + siz1);
761 if (!IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&nip6->ip6_src, &ip6->ip6_src)
762 || !IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&nip6->ip6_dst, &ip6->ip6_dst)) {
763 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
764 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
766 } else if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPIP) {
767 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
768 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
769 } else if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IP) {
770 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
771 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
775 if (m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPHDR
776 && m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPDGM) {
779 "IPv6 AH input: authentication succeess\n"));
781 ipsec6stat.in_ahauthsucc++;
783 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
784 "authentication failed in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n",
785 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
786 ipsec6stat.in_ahauthfail++;
791 * update sequence number.
793 if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) {
794 if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav)) {
795 ipsec6stat.in_ahreplay++;
800 /* was it transmitted over the IPsec tunnel SA? */
801 if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) {
803 stripsiz = sizeof(struct ah) + siz1;
806 stripsiz = sizeof(struct newah) + siz1;
808 if (ipsec6_tunnel_validate(m, off + stripsiz, nxt, sav)) {
810 * strip off all the headers that precedes AH.
811 * IP6 xx AH IP6' payload -> IP6' payload
813 * XXX more sanity checks
814 * XXX relationship with gif?
816 u_int32_t flowinfo; /* net endian */
818 flowinfo = ip6->ip6_flow;
819 m_adj(m, off + stripsiz);
820 if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip6)) {
822 * m_pullup is prohibited in KAME IPv6 input processing
823 * but there's no other way!
825 m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip6));
827 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
831 ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
832 /* ECN consideration. */
833 ip6_ecn_egress(ip6_ipsec_ecn, &flowinfo, &ip6->ip6_flow);
834 if (!key_checktunnelsanity(sav, AF_INET6,
835 (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_src, (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_dst)) {
836 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "ipsec tunnel address mismatch "
837 "in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n",
838 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi),
839 ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
840 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
846 * should the inner packet be considered authentic?
847 * see comment in ah4_input().
849 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
850 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
853 key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m);
854 if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0 ||
855 ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_IPV6, 0) != 0) {
856 ipsec6stat.in_nomem++;
860 if (netisr_queue(NETISR_IPV6, m)) {
861 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
874 * Copy the value of the next header field of AH to the
875 * next header field of the previous header.
876 * This is necessary because AH will be stripped off below.
878 prvnxtp = ip6_get_prevhdr(m, off); /* XXX */
881 ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
882 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST
884 * We do deep-copy since KAME requires that
885 * the packet is placed in a single mbuf.
887 ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip6, ((caddr_t)ip6) + stripsiz, off);
888 m->m_data += stripsiz;
889 m->m_len -= stripsiz;
890 m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz;
893 * even in m_pulldown case, we need to strip off AH so that
894 * we can compute checksum for multiple AH correctly.
896 if (m->m_len >= stripsiz + off) {
897 ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip6, ((caddr_t)ip6) + stripsiz, off);
898 m->m_data += stripsiz;
899 m->m_len -= stripsiz;
900 m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz;
903 * this comes with no copy if the boundary is on
908 n = m_split(m, off, MB_DONTWAIT);
910 /* m is retained by m_split */
914 /* m_cat does not update m_pkthdr.len */
915 m->m_pkthdr.len += n->m_pkthdr.len;
919 ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
921 ip6->ip6_plen = htons(ntohs(ip6->ip6_plen) - stripsiz);
923 key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m);
924 if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0) {
925 ipsec6stat.in_nomem++;
934 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
935 kprintf("DP ah6_input call free SA:%p\n", sav));
938 ipsec6stat.in_success++;
943 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
944 kprintf("DP ah6_input call free SA:%p\n", sav));
953 ah6_ctlinput(int cmd, struct sockaddr *sa, void *d)
955 const struct newah *ahp;
957 struct secasvar *sav;
960 struct ip6ctlparam *ip6cp = NULL;
962 struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6_src, *sa6_dst;
964 if (sa->sa_family != AF_INET6 ||
965 sa->sa_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
967 if ((unsigned)cmd >= PRC_NCMDS)
970 /* if the parameter is from icmp6, decode it. */
972 ip6cp = (struct ip6ctlparam *)d;
974 ip6 = ip6cp->ip6c_ip6;
975 off = ip6cp->ip6c_off;
979 off = 0; /* fix warning */
984 * XXX: We assume that when ip6 is non NULL,
985 * M and OFF are valid.
988 /* check if we can safely examine src and dst ports */
989 if (m->m_pkthdr.len < off + sizeof(ah))
992 if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(ah)) {
994 * this should be rare case,
995 * so we compromise on this copy...
997 m_copydata(m, off, sizeof(ah), (caddr_t)&ah);
1000 ahp = (struct newah *)(mtod(m, caddr_t) + off);
1002 if (cmd == PRC_MSGSIZE) {
1006 * Check to see if we have a valid SA corresponding to
1007 * the address in the ICMP message payload.
1009 sa6_src = ip6cp->ip6c_src;
1010 sa6_dst = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
1011 sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET6,
1012 (caddr_t)&sa6_src->sin6_addr,
1013 (caddr_t)&sa6_dst->sin6_addr,
1014 IPPROTO_AH, ahp->ah_spi);
1016 if (sav->state == SADB_SASTATE_MATURE ||
1017 sav->state == SADB_SASTATE_DYING)
1022 /* XXX Further validation? */
1025 * Depending on the value of "valid" and routing table
1026 * size (mtudisc_{hi,lo}wat), we will:
1027 * - recalcurate the new MTU and create the
1028 * corresponding routing entry, or
1029 * - ignore the MTU change notification.
1031 icmp6_mtudisc_update((struct ip6ctlparam *)d, valid);
1034 /* we normally notify single pcb here */
1036 /* we normally notify any pcb here */