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38 * @(#)kern_prot.c 8.6 (Berkeley) 1/21/94
39 * $FreeBSD: src/sys/kern/kern_prot.c,v 1.53.2.9 2002/03/09 05:20:26 dd Exp $
40 * $DragonFly: src/sys/kern/kern_prot.c,v 1.16 2004/05/03 16:06:26 joerg Exp $
44 * System calls related to processes and protection
47 #include "opt_compat.h"
49 #include <sys/param.h>
51 #include <sys/systm.h>
52 #include <sys/sysproto.h>
53 #include <sys/kernel.h>
55 #include <sys/malloc.h>
56 #include <sys/pioctl.h>
57 #include <sys/resourcevar.h>
58 #include <sys/thread2.h>
60 #include <sys/lockf.h>
62 static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_CRED, "cred", "credentials");
65 * NOT MP SAFE due to p_pptr access
69 getpid(struct getpid_args *uap)
71 struct proc *p = curproc;
73 uap->sysmsg_fds[0] = p->p_pid;
74 #if defined(COMPAT_43) || defined(COMPAT_SUNOS)
75 uap->sysmsg_fds[1] = p->p_pptr->p_pid;
82 getppid(struct getppid_args *uap)
84 struct proc *p = curproc;
86 uap->sysmsg_result = p->p_pptr->p_pid;
91 * Get process group ID; note that POSIX getpgrp takes no parameter
96 getpgrp(struct getpgrp_args *uap)
98 struct proc *p = curproc;
100 uap->sysmsg_result = p->p_pgrp->pg_id;
105 * Get an arbitary pid's process group id
108 getpgid(struct getpgid_args *uap)
110 struct proc *p = curproc;
117 if ((pt = pfind(uap->pid)) == 0)
120 uap->sysmsg_result = pt->p_pgrp->pg_id;
125 * Get an arbitary pid's session id.
128 getsid(struct getsid_args *uap)
130 struct proc *p = curproc;
137 if ((pt = pfind(uap->pid)) == 0)
140 uap->sysmsg_result = pt->p_session->s_sid;
150 getuid(struct getuid_args *uap)
152 struct proc *p = curproc;
154 uap->sysmsg_fds[0] = p->p_ucred->cr_ruid;
155 #if defined(COMPAT_43) || defined(COMPAT_SUNOS)
156 uap->sysmsg_fds[1] = p->p_ucred->cr_uid;
162 * geteuid() - MP SAFE
166 geteuid(struct geteuid_args *uap)
168 struct proc *p = curproc;
170 uap->sysmsg_result = p->p_ucred->cr_uid;
179 getgid(struct getgid_args *uap)
181 struct proc *p = curproc;
183 uap->sysmsg_fds[0] = p->p_ucred->cr_rgid;
184 #if defined(COMPAT_43) || defined(COMPAT_SUNOS)
185 uap->sysmsg_fds[1] = p->p_ucred->cr_groups[0];
191 * Get effective group ID. The "egid" is groups[0], and could be obtained
192 * via getgroups. This syscall exists because it is somewhat painful to do
193 * correctly in a library function.
197 getegid(struct getegid_args *uap)
199 struct proc *p = curproc;
201 uap->sysmsg_result = p->p_ucred->cr_groups[0];
206 getgroups(struct getgroups_args *uap)
208 struct proc *p = curproc;
213 if (p == NULL) /* API enforcement */
217 if ((ngrp = uap->gidsetsize) == 0) {
218 uap->sysmsg_result = cr->cr_ngroups;
221 if (ngrp < cr->cr_ngroups)
223 ngrp = cr->cr_ngroups;
224 if ((error = copyout((caddr_t)cr->cr_groups,
225 (caddr_t)uap->gidset, ngrp * sizeof(gid_t))))
227 uap->sysmsg_result = ngrp;
233 setsid(struct setsid_args *uap)
235 struct proc *p = curproc;
237 if (p->p_pgid == p->p_pid || pgfind(p->p_pid)) {
240 (void)enterpgrp(p, p->p_pid, 1);
241 uap->sysmsg_result = p->p_pid;
247 * set process group (setpgid/old setpgrp)
249 * caller does setpgid(targpid, targpgid)
251 * pid must be caller or child of caller (ESRCH)
253 * pid must be in same session (EPERM)
254 * pid can't have done an exec (EACCES)
256 * there must exist some pid in same session having pgid (EPERM)
257 * pid must not be session leader (EPERM)
261 setpgid(struct setpgid_args *uap)
263 struct proc *curp = curproc;
264 struct proc *targp; /* target process */
265 struct pgrp *pgrp; /* target pgrp */
269 if (uap->pid != 0 && uap->pid != curp->p_pid) {
270 if ((targp = pfind(uap->pid)) == 0 || !inferior(targp))
272 if (targp->p_pgrp == NULL || targp->p_session != curp->p_session)
274 if (targp->p_flag & P_EXEC)
278 if (SESS_LEADER(targp))
281 uap->pgid = targp->p_pid;
282 else if (uap->pgid != targp->p_pid)
283 if ((pgrp = pgfind(uap->pgid)) == 0 ||
284 pgrp->pg_session != curp->p_session)
286 return (enterpgrp(targp, uap->pgid, 0));
290 * Use the clause in B.4.2.2 that allows setuid/setgid to be 4.2/4.3BSD
291 * compatible. It says that setting the uid/gid to euid/egid is a special
292 * case of "appropriate privilege". Once the rules are expanded out, this
293 * basically means that setuid(nnn) sets all three id's, in all permitted
294 * cases unless _POSIX_SAVED_IDS is enabled. In that case, setuid(getuid())
295 * does not set the saved id - this is dangerous for traditional BSD
296 * programs. For this reason, we *really* do not want to set
297 * _POSIX_SAVED_IDS and do not want to clear POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2.
299 #define POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2
303 setuid(struct setuid_args *uap)
305 struct proc *p = curproc;
310 if (p == NULL) /* API enforcement */
315 * See if we have "permission" by POSIX 1003.1 rules.
317 * Note that setuid(geteuid()) is a special case of
318 * "appropriate privileges" in appendix B.4.2.2. We need
319 * to use this clause to be compatible with traditional BSD
320 * semantics. Basically, it means that "setuid(xx)" sets all
321 * three id's (assuming you have privs).
323 * Notes on the logic. We do things in three steps.
324 * 1: We determine if the euid is going to change, and do EPERM
325 * right away. We unconditionally change the euid later if this
326 * test is satisfied, simplifying that part of the logic.
327 * 2: We determine if the real and/or saved uid's are going to
328 * change. Determined by compile options.
329 * 3: Change euid last. (after tests in #2 for "appropriate privs")
332 if (uid != cr->cr_ruid && /* allow setuid(getuid()) */
333 #ifdef _POSIX_SAVED_IDS
334 uid != crc->cr_svuid && /* allow setuid(saved gid) */
336 #ifdef POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2 /* Use BSD-compat clause from B.4.2.2 */
337 uid != cr->cr_uid && /* allow setuid(geteuid()) */
339 (error = suser_cred(cr, PRISON_ROOT)))
342 #ifdef _POSIX_SAVED_IDS
344 * Do we have "appropriate privileges" (are we root or uid == euid)
345 * If so, we are changing the real uid and/or saved uid.
348 #ifdef POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2 /* Use the clause from B.4.2.2 */
351 suser_cred(cr, PRISON_ROOT) == 0) /* we are using privs */
355 * Set the real uid and transfer proc count to new user.
357 if (uid != cr->cr_ruid) {
364 * XXX always set saved uid even if not _POSIX_SAVED_IDS, as
365 * the security of seteuid() depends on it. B.4.2.2 says it
366 * is important that we should do this.
368 if (cr->cr_svuid != uid) {
369 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred);
376 * In all permitted cases, we are changing the euid.
377 * Copy credentials so other references do not see our changes.
379 if (cr->cr_uid != uid) {
388 seteuid(struct seteuid_args *uap)
390 struct proc *p = curproc;
395 if (p == NULL) /* API enforcement */
400 if (euid != cr->cr_ruid && /* allow seteuid(getuid()) */
401 euid != cr->cr_svuid && /* allow seteuid(saved uid) */
402 (error = suser_cred(cr, PRISON_ROOT)))
405 * Everything's okay, do it. Copy credentials so other references do
406 * not see our changes.
408 if (cr->cr_uid != euid) {
417 setgid(struct setgid_args *uap)
419 struct proc *p = curproc;
424 if (p == NULL) /* API enforcement */
429 * See if we have "permission" by POSIX 1003.1 rules.
431 * Note that setgid(getegid()) is a special case of
432 * "appropriate privileges" in appendix B.4.2.2. We need
433 * to use this clause to be compatible with traditional BSD
434 * semantics. Basically, it means that "setgid(xx)" sets all
435 * three id's (assuming you have privs).
437 * For notes on the logic here, see setuid() above.
440 if (gid != cr->cr_rgid && /* allow setgid(getgid()) */
441 #ifdef _POSIX_SAVED_IDS
442 gid != cr->cr_svgid && /* allow setgid(saved gid) */
444 #ifdef POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2 /* Use BSD-compat clause from B.4.2.2 */
445 gid != cr->cr_groups[0] && /* allow setgid(getegid()) */
447 (error = suser_cred(cr, PRISON_ROOT)))
450 #ifdef _POSIX_SAVED_IDS
452 * Do we have "appropriate privileges" (are we root or gid == egid)
453 * If so, we are changing the real uid and saved gid.
456 #ifdef POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2 /* use the clause from B.4.2.2 */
457 gid == cr->cr_groups[0] ||
459 suser_cred(cr, PRISON_ROOT) == 0) /* we are using privs */
465 if (cr->cr_rgid != gid) {
466 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred);
473 * XXX always set saved gid even if not _POSIX_SAVED_IDS, as
474 * the security of setegid() depends on it. B.4.2.2 says it
475 * is important that we should do this.
477 if (cr->cr_svgid != gid) {
478 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred);
484 * In all cases permitted cases, we are changing the egid.
485 * Copy credentials so other references do not see our changes.
487 if (cr->cr_groups[0] != gid) {
488 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred);
489 cr->cr_groups[0] = gid;
497 setegid(struct setegid_args *uap)
499 struct proc *p = curproc;
504 if (p == NULL) /* API enforcement */
509 if (egid != cr->cr_rgid && /* allow setegid(getgid()) */
510 egid != cr->cr_svgid && /* allow setegid(saved gid) */
511 (error = suser_cred(cr, PRISON_ROOT)))
513 if (cr->cr_groups[0] != egid) {
514 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred);
515 cr->cr_groups[0] = egid;
523 setgroups(struct setgroups_args *uap)
525 struct proc *p = curproc;
530 if (p == NULL) /* API enforcement */
534 if ((error = suser_cred(cr, PRISON_ROOT)))
536 ngrp = uap->gidsetsize;
540 * XXX A little bit lazy here. We could test if anything has
541 * changed before cratom() and setting P_SUGID.
543 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred);
546 * setgroups(0, NULL) is a legitimate way of clearing the
547 * groups vector on non-BSD systems (which generally do not
548 * have the egid in the groups[0]). We risk security holes
549 * when running non-BSD software if we do not do the same.
553 if ((error = copyin((caddr_t)uap->gidset,
554 (caddr_t)cr->cr_groups, ngrp * sizeof(gid_t))))
556 cr->cr_ngroups = ngrp;
564 setreuid(struct setreuid_args *uap)
566 struct proc *p = curproc;
571 if (p == NULL) /* API enforcement */
577 if (((ruid != (uid_t)-1 && ruid != cr->cr_ruid && ruid != cr->cr_svuid) ||
578 (euid != (uid_t)-1 && euid != cr->cr_uid &&
579 euid != cr->cr_ruid && euid != cr->cr_svuid)) &&
580 (error = suser_cred(cr, PRISON_ROOT)) != 0)
583 if (euid != (uid_t)-1 && cr->cr_uid != euid) {
587 if (ruid != (uid_t)-1 && cr->cr_ruid != ruid) {
591 if ((ruid != (uid_t)-1 || cr->cr_uid != cr->cr_ruid) &&
592 cr->cr_svuid != cr->cr_uid) {
593 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred);
594 cr->cr_svuid = cr->cr_uid;
602 setregid(struct setregid_args *uap)
604 struct proc *p = curproc;
609 if (p == NULL) /* API enforcement */
615 if (((rgid != (gid_t)-1 && rgid != cr->cr_rgid && rgid != cr->cr_svgid) ||
616 (egid != (gid_t)-1 && egid != cr->cr_groups[0] &&
617 egid != cr->cr_rgid && egid != cr->cr_svgid)) &&
618 (error = suser_cred(cr, PRISON_ROOT)) != 0)
621 if (egid != (gid_t)-1 && cr->cr_groups[0] != egid) {
622 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred);
623 cr->cr_groups[0] = egid;
626 if (rgid != (gid_t)-1 && cr->cr_rgid != rgid) {
627 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred);
631 if ((rgid != (gid_t)-1 || cr->cr_groups[0] != cr->cr_rgid) &&
632 cr->cr_svgid != cr->cr_groups[0]) {
633 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred);
634 cr->cr_svgid = cr->cr_groups[0];
641 * setresuid(ruid, euid, suid) is like setreuid except control over the
642 * saved uid is explicit.
647 setresuid(struct setresuid_args *uap)
649 struct proc *p = curproc;
651 uid_t ruid, euid, suid;
658 if (((ruid != (uid_t)-1 && ruid != cr->cr_ruid && ruid != cr->cr_svuid &&
659 ruid != cr->cr_uid) ||
660 (euid != (uid_t)-1 && euid != cr->cr_ruid && euid != cr->cr_svuid &&
661 euid != cr->cr_uid) ||
662 (suid != (uid_t)-1 && suid != cr->cr_ruid && suid != cr->cr_svuid &&
663 suid != cr->cr_uid)) &&
664 (error = suser_cred(cr, PRISON_ROOT)) != 0)
666 if (euid != (uid_t)-1 && cr->cr_uid != euid) {
670 if (ruid != (uid_t)-1 && cr->cr_ruid != ruid) {
674 if (suid != (uid_t)-1 && cr->cr_svuid != suid) {
675 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred);
683 * setresgid(rgid, egid, sgid) is like setregid except control over the
684 * saved gid is explicit.
689 setresgid(struct setresgid_args *uap)
691 struct proc *p = curproc;
693 gid_t rgid, egid, sgid;
700 if (((rgid != (gid_t)-1 && rgid != cr->cr_rgid && rgid != cr->cr_svgid &&
701 rgid != cr->cr_groups[0]) ||
702 (egid != (gid_t)-1 && egid != cr->cr_rgid && egid != cr->cr_svgid &&
703 egid != cr->cr_groups[0]) ||
704 (sgid != (gid_t)-1 && sgid != cr->cr_rgid && sgid != cr->cr_svgid &&
705 sgid != cr->cr_groups[0])) &&
706 (error = suser_cred(cr, PRISON_ROOT)) != 0)
709 if (egid != (gid_t)-1 && cr->cr_groups[0] != egid) {
710 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred);
711 cr->cr_groups[0] = egid;
714 if (rgid != (gid_t)-1 && cr->cr_rgid != rgid) {
715 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred);
719 if (sgid != (gid_t)-1 && cr->cr_svgid != sgid) {
720 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred);
729 getresuid(struct getresuid_args *uap)
731 struct proc *p = curproc;
732 struct ucred *cr = p->p_ucred;
733 int error1 = 0, error2 = 0, error3 = 0;
736 error1 = copyout((caddr_t)&cr->cr_ruid,
737 (caddr_t)uap->ruid, sizeof(cr->cr_ruid));
739 error2 = copyout((caddr_t)&cr->cr_uid,
740 (caddr_t)uap->euid, sizeof(cr->cr_uid));
742 error3 = copyout((caddr_t)&cr->cr_svuid,
743 (caddr_t)uap->suid, sizeof(cr->cr_svuid));
744 return error1 ? error1 : (error2 ? error2 : error3);
749 getresgid(struct getresgid_args *uap)
751 struct proc *p = curproc;
752 struct ucred *cr = p->p_ucred;
753 int error1 = 0, error2 = 0, error3 = 0;
756 error1 = copyout((caddr_t)&cr->cr_rgid,
757 (caddr_t)uap->rgid, sizeof(cr->cr_rgid));
759 error2 = copyout((caddr_t)&cr->cr_groups[0],
760 (caddr_t)uap->egid, sizeof(cr->cr_groups[0]));
762 error3 = copyout((caddr_t)&cr->cr_svgid,
763 (caddr_t)uap->sgid, sizeof(cr->cr_svgid));
764 return error1 ? error1 : (error2 ? error2 : error3);
770 issetugid(struct issetugid_args *uap)
772 struct proc *p = curproc;
774 * Note: OpenBSD sets a P_SUGIDEXEC flag set at execve() time,
775 * we use P_SUGID because we consider changing the owners as
776 * "tainting" as well.
777 * This is significant for procs that start as root and "become"
778 * a user without an exec - programs cannot know *everything*
779 * that libc *might* have put in their data segment.
781 uap->sysmsg_result = (p->p_flag & P_SUGID) ? 1 : 0;
786 * Check if gid is a member of the group set.
789 groupmember(gid_t gid, struct ucred *cred)
794 egp = &(cred->cr_groups[cred->cr_ngroups]);
795 for (gp = cred->cr_groups; gp < egp; gp++) {
803 * Test whether the specified credentials imply "super-user"
804 * privilege; if so, and we have accounting info, set the flag
805 * indicating use of super-powers. A kernel thread without a process
806 * context is assumed to have super user capabilities. In situations
807 * where the caller always expect a cred to exist, the cred should be
808 * passed separately and suser_cred()should be used instead of suser().
810 * Returns 0 or error.
813 suser(struct thread *td)
815 struct proc *p = td->td_proc;
818 return suser_cred(p->p_ucred, 0);
825 * A non-null credential is expected unless NULL_CRED_OKAY is set.
828 suser_cred(struct ucred *cred, int flag)
830 KASSERT(cred != NULL || flag & NULL_CRED_OKAY,
831 ("suser_cred: NULL cred!"));
834 if (flag & NULL_CRED_OKAY)
839 if (cred->cr_uid != 0)
841 if (cred->cr_prison && !(flag & PRISON_ROOT))
843 /* NOTE: accounting for suser access (p_acflag/ASU) removed */
848 * Return zero if p1 can fondle p2, return errno (EPERM/ESRCH) otherwise.
851 p_trespass(struct ucred *cr1, struct ucred *cr2)
855 if (!PRISON_CHECK(cr1, cr2))
857 if (cr1->cr_ruid == cr2->cr_ruid)
859 if (cr1->cr_uid == cr2->cr_ruid)
861 if (cr1->cr_ruid == cr2->cr_uid)
863 if (cr1->cr_uid == cr2->cr_uid)
865 if (suser_cred(cr1, PRISON_ROOT) == 0)
871 * Allocate a zeroed cred structure.
878 MALLOC(cr, struct ucred *, sizeof(*cr), M_CRED, M_WAITOK);
879 bzero((caddr_t)cr, sizeof(*cr));
885 * Claim another reference to a ucred structure. Can be used with special
889 crhold(struct ucred *cr)
891 if (cr != NOCRED && cr != FSCRED)
897 * Free a cred structure.
898 * Throws away space when ref count gets to 0.
902 crfree(struct ucred *cr)
904 /* Protect crfree() as a critical section as there
905 * appears to be a crfree race which can occur on
910 panic("Freeing already free credential! %p", cr);
912 if (--cr->cr_ref == 0) {
914 * Some callers of crget(), such as nfs_statfs(),
915 * allocate a temporary credential, but don't
916 * allocate a uidinfo structure.
918 if (cr->cr_uidinfo != NULL) {
919 uidrop(cr->cr_uidinfo);
920 cr->cr_uidinfo = NULL;
922 if (cr->cr_ruidinfo != NULL) {
923 uidrop(cr->cr_ruidinfo);
924 cr->cr_ruidinfo = NULL;
928 * Destroy empty prisons
930 if (cr->cr_prison && !--cr->cr_prison->pr_ref) {
931 if (cr->cr_prison->pr_linux != NULL)
932 FREE(cr->cr_prison->pr_linux, M_PRISON);
933 FREE(cr->cr_prison, M_PRISON);
935 cr->cr_prison = NULL; /* safety */
937 FREE((caddr_t)cr, M_CRED);
943 * Atomize a cred structure so it can be modified without polluting
944 * other references to it.
947 cratom(struct ucred **pcr)
953 if (oldcr->cr_ref == 1)
957 if (newcr->cr_uidinfo)
958 uihold(newcr->cr_uidinfo);
959 if (newcr->cr_ruidinfo)
960 uihold(newcr->cr_ruidinfo);
961 if (newcr->cr_prison)
962 ++newcr->cr_prison->pr_ref;
969 #if 0 /* no longer used but keep around for a little while */
971 * Copy cred structure to a new one and free the old one.
974 crcopy(struct ucred *cr)
982 if (newcr->cr_uidinfo)
983 uihold(newcr->cr_uidinfo);
984 if (newcr->cr_ruidinfo)
985 uihold(newcr->cr_ruidinfo);
986 if (newcr->cr_prison)
987 ++newcr->cr_prison->pr_ref;
995 * Dup cred struct to a new held one.
1001 struct ucred *newcr;
1005 if (newcr->cr_uidinfo)
1006 uihold(newcr->cr_uidinfo);
1007 if (newcr->cr_ruidinfo)
1008 uihold(newcr->cr_ruidinfo);
1009 if (newcr->cr_prison)
1010 ++newcr->cr_prison->pr_ref;
1016 * Fill in a struct xucred based on a struct ucred.
1024 bzero(xcr, sizeof(*xcr));
1025 xcr->cr_version = XUCRED_VERSION;
1026 xcr->cr_uid = cr->cr_uid;
1027 xcr->cr_ngroups = cr->cr_ngroups;
1028 bcopy(cr->cr_groups, xcr->cr_groups, sizeof(cr->cr_groups));
1032 * Get login name, if available.
1036 getlogin(struct getlogin_args *uap)
1038 struct proc *p = curproc;
1040 if (uap->namelen > MAXLOGNAME)
1041 uap->namelen = MAXLOGNAME;
1042 return (copyout((caddr_t) p->p_pgrp->pg_session->s_login,
1043 (caddr_t) uap->namebuf, uap->namelen));
1051 setlogin(struct setlogin_args *uap)
1053 struct proc *p = curproc;
1055 char logintmp[MAXLOGNAME];
1057 KKASSERT(p != NULL);
1058 if ((error = suser_cred(p->p_ucred, PRISON_ROOT)))
1060 error = copyinstr((caddr_t) uap->namebuf, (caddr_t) logintmp,
1061 sizeof(logintmp), (size_t *)0);
1062 if (error == ENAMETOOLONG)
1065 (void) memcpy(p->p_pgrp->pg_session->s_login, logintmp,
1073 struct proc *p = curproc;
1075 KKASSERT(p != NULL);
1076 p->p_flag |= P_SUGID;
1077 if (!(p->p_pfsflags & PF_ISUGID))
1082 * Helper function to change the effective uid of a process
1085 change_euid(uid_t euid)
1087 struct proc *p = curproc;
1090 KKASSERT(p != NULL);
1091 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred);
1093 uireplace(&cr->cr_uidinfo, uifind(euid));
1097 * Helper function to change the real uid of a process
1099 * The per-uid process count for this process is transfered from
1100 * the old uid to the new uid.
1103 change_ruid(uid_t ruid)
1105 struct proc *p = curproc;
1108 KKASSERT(p != NULL);
1110 cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred);
1111 (void)chgproccnt(cr->cr_ruidinfo, -1, 0);
1112 lf_count_adjust(p, uifind(ruid));
1113 /* It is assumed that pcred is not shared between processes */
1115 uireplace(&cr->cr_ruidinfo, uifind(ruid));
1116 (void)chgproccnt(cr->cr_ruidinfo, 1, 0);