1 /* $FreeBSD: src/sys/netinet6/ah_input.c,v 1.1.2.6 2002/04/28 05:40:26 suz Exp $ */
2 /* $DragonFly: src/sys/netinet6/ah_input.c,v 1.5 2003/09/15 23:38:14 hsu Exp $ */
3 /* $KAME: ah_input.c,v 1.67 2002/01/07 11:39:56 kjc Exp $ */
6 * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
12 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
13 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
14 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
15 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
16 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
17 * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors
18 * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
19 * without specific prior written permission.
21 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
22 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
23 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
24 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
25 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
26 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
27 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
28 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
29 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
30 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
35 * RFC1826/2402 authentication header.
39 #include "opt_inet6.h"
41 #include <sys/param.h>
42 #include <sys/systm.h>
43 #include <sys/malloc.h>
45 #include <sys/domain.h>
46 #include <sys/protosw.h>
47 #include <sys/socket.h>
48 #include <sys/errno.h>
50 #include <sys/syslog.h>
53 #include <net/route.h>
54 #include <net/netisr.h>
55 #include <machine/cpu.h>
57 #include <netinet/in.h>
58 #include <netinet/in_systm.h>
59 #include <netinet/in_var.h>
60 #include <netinet/ip.h>
61 #include <netinet/ip_var.h>
62 #include <netinet/ip_ecn.h>
64 #include <netinet6/ip6_ecn.h>
68 #include <netinet/ip6.h>
69 #include <netinet6/ip6_var.h>
70 #include <netinet6/in6_pcb.h>
71 #include <netinet/icmp6.h>
72 #include <netinet6/ip6protosw.h>
75 #include <netinet6/ipsec.h>
77 #include <netinet6/ipsec6.h>
79 #include <netinet6/ah.h>
81 #include <netinet6/ah6.h>
83 #include <netproto/key/key.h>
84 #include <netproto/key/keydb.h>
86 #include <netproto/key/key_debug.h>
88 #define KEYDEBUG(lev,arg)
91 #include <machine/stdarg.h>
93 #include <net/net_osdep.h>
98 #include <netinet/ipprotosw.h>
99 extern struct ipprotosw inetsw[];
102 ah4_input(struct mbuf *m, int off, int proto)
107 const struct ah_algorithm *algo;
111 struct secasvar *sav = NULL;
116 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST
117 if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(struct newah)) {
118 m = m_pullup(m, off + sizeof(struct newah));
120 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup;"
121 "dropping the packet for simplicity\n"));
122 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
127 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
128 ah = (struct ah *)(((caddr_t)ip) + off);
130 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
131 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct ah *, m, off, sizeof(struct newah));
133 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup;"
134 "dropping the packet for simplicity\n"));
135 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
141 hlen = IP_VHL_HL(ip->ip_vhl) << 2;
143 hlen = ip->ip_hl << 2;
146 /* find the sassoc. */
149 if ((sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET,
150 (caddr_t)&ip->ip_src, (caddr_t)&ip->ip_dst,
151 IPPROTO_AH, spi)) == 0) {
152 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
153 "IPv4 AH input: no key association found for spi %u\n",
154 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)));
158 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
159 printf("DP ah4_input called to allocate SA:%p\n", sav));
160 if (sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_MATURE
161 && sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_DYING) {
163 "IPv4 AH input: non-mature/dying SA found for spi %u\n",
164 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)));
165 ipsecstat.in_badspi++;
169 algo = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth);
171 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: "
172 "unsupported authentication algorithm for spi %u\n",
173 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)));
174 ipsecstat.in_badspi++;
178 siz = (*algo->sumsiz)(sav);
179 siz1 = ((siz + 3) & ~(4 - 1));
182 * sanity checks for header, 1.
187 sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4;
190 * Here, we do not do "siz1 == siz". This is because the way
191 * RFC240[34] section 2 is written. They do not require truncation
193 * For example, Microsoft IPsec stack attaches 160 bits of
194 * authentication data for both hmac-md5 and hmac-sha1. For hmac-sha1,
195 * 32 bits of padding is attached.
197 * There are two downsides to this specification.
198 * They have no real harm, however, they leave us fuzzy feeling.
199 * - if we attach more than 96 bits of authentication data onto AH,
200 * we will never notice about possible modification by rogue
201 * intermediate nodes.
202 * Since extra bits in AH checksum is never used, this constitutes
203 * no real issue, however, it is wacky.
204 * - even if the peer attaches big authentication data, we will never
205 * notice the difference, since longer authentication data will just
208 * We may need some clarification in the spec.
211 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length too short in IPv4 AH input "
212 "(%lu, should be at least %lu): %s\n",
213 (u_long)siz1, (u_long)siz,
214 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi)));
215 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
218 if ((ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff != siz1) {
219 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length mismatch in IPv4 AH input "
220 "(%d should be %lu): %s\n",
221 (ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff, (u_long)siz1,
222 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi)));
223 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
227 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST
228 if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1) {
229 m = m_pullup(m, off + sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1);
231 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup\n"));
232 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
236 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
237 ah = (struct ah *)(((caddr_t)ip) + off);
240 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct ah *, m, off,
241 sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1);
243 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup\n"));
244 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
251 * check for sequence number.
253 if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) {
254 if (ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav))
257 ipsecstat.in_ahreplay++;
258 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
259 "replay packet in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n",
260 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
266 * alright, it seems sane. now we are going to check the
267 * cryptographic checksum.
269 cksum = malloc(siz1, M_TEMP, M_NOWAIT);
271 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv4 AH input: "
272 "couldn't alloc temporary region for cksum\n"));
273 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
278 * some of IP header fields are flipped to the host endian.
279 * convert them back to network endian. VERY stupid.
281 ip->ip_len = htons(ip->ip_len + hlen);
282 ip->ip_off = htons(ip->ip_off);
283 if (ah4_calccksum(m, (caddr_t)cksum, siz1, algo, sav)) {
285 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
288 ipsecstat.in_ahhist[sav->alg_auth]++;
292 ip->ip_len = ntohs(ip->ip_len) - hlen;
293 ip->ip_off = ntohs(ip->ip_off);
296 caddr_t sumpos = NULL;
298 if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) {
300 sumpos = (caddr_t)(ah + 1);
303 sumpos = (caddr_t)(((struct newah *)ah) + 1);
306 if (bcmp(sumpos, cksum, siz) != 0) {
307 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
308 "checksum mismatch in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n",
309 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
311 ipsecstat.in_ahauthfail++;
318 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR;
319 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPDGM;
323 * looks okey, but we need more sanity check.
324 * XXX should elaborate.
326 if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPIP || ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IP) {
330 sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4;
332 if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1 + hlen) {
333 m = m_pullup(m, off + sizeof(struct ah)
334 + sizoff + siz1 + hlen);
337 "IPv4 AH input: can't pullup\n"));
338 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
343 nip = (struct ip *)((u_char *)(ah + 1) + sizoff + siz1);
344 if (nip->ip_src.s_addr != ip->ip_src.s_addr
345 || nip->ip_dst.s_addr != ip->ip_dst.s_addr) {
346 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
347 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
351 else if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPV6) {
352 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
353 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
358 if (m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPHDR
359 && m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPDGM) {
362 "IPv4 AH input: authentication succeess\n"));
364 ipsecstat.in_ahauthsucc++;
366 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
367 "authentication failed in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n",
368 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
369 ipsecstat.in_ahauthfail++;
374 * update sequence number.
376 if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) {
377 if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav)) {
378 ipsecstat.in_ahreplay++;
383 /* was it transmitted over the IPsec tunnel SA? */
384 if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) {
386 stripsiz = sizeof(struct ah) + siz1;
389 stripsiz = sizeof(struct newah) + siz1;
391 if (ipsec4_tunnel_validate(m, off + stripsiz, nxt, sav)) {
393 * strip off all the headers that precedes AH.
394 * IP xx AH IP' payload -> IP' payload
396 * XXX more sanity checks
397 * XXX relationship with gif?
402 m_adj(m, off + stripsiz);
403 if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip)) {
404 m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip));
406 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
410 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
411 /* ECN consideration. */
412 ip_ecn_egress(ip4_ipsec_ecn, &tos, &ip->ip_tos);
413 if (!key_checktunnelsanity(sav, AF_INET,
414 (caddr_t)&ip->ip_src, (caddr_t)&ip->ip_dst)) {
415 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "ipsec tunnel address mismatch "
416 "in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n",
417 ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
418 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
424 * Should the inner packet be considered authentic?
425 * My current answer is: NO.
427 * host1 -- gw1 === gw2 -- host2
428 * In this case, gw2 can trust the authenticity of the
429 * outer packet, but NOT inner. Packet may be altered
430 * between host1 and gw1.
432 * host1 -- gw1 === host2
433 * This case falls into the same scenario as above.
436 * This case is the only case when we may be able to leave
437 * M_AUTHIPHDR and M_AUTHIPDGM set.
438 * However, if host1 is wrongly configured, and allows
439 * attacker to inject some packet with src=host1 and
440 * dst=host2, you are in risk.
442 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
443 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
446 key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m);
447 if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0 ||
448 ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_IPV4, 0) != 0) {
449 ipsecstat.in_nomem++;
453 if (netisr_queue(NETISR_IP, m)) {
454 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
465 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
466 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST
468 * We do deep-copy since KAME requires that
469 * the packet is placed in a single external mbuf.
471 ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip, (caddr_t)(((u_char *)ip) + stripsiz), off);
472 m->m_data += stripsiz;
473 m->m_len -= stripsiz;
474 m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz;
477 * even in m_pulldown case, we need to strip off AH so that
478 * we can compute checksum for multiple AH correctly.
480 if (m->m_len >= stripsiz + off) {
481 ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip, ((caddr_t)ip) + stripsiz, off);
482 m->m_data += stripsiz;
483 m->m_len -= stripsiz;
484 m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz;
487 * this comes with no copy if the boundary is on
492 n = m_split(m, off, M_DONTWAIT);
494 /* m is retained by m_split */
499 /* m_cat does not update m_pkthdr.len */
500 m->m_pkthdr.len += n->m_pkthdr.len;
504 if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip)) {
505 m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip));
507 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
511 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
513 ip->ip_len = ip->ip_len - stripsiz;
515 ip->ip_len = htons(ntohs(ip->ip_len) - stripsiz);
518 /* forget about IP hdr checksum, the check has already been passed */
520 key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m);
521 if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0) {
522 ipsecstat.in_nomem++;
526 if (nxt != IPPROTO_DONE) {
527 if ((inetsw[ip_protox[nxt]].pr_flags & PR_LASTHDR) != 0 &&
528 ipsec4_in_reject(m, NULL)) {
529 ipsecstat.in_polvio++;
532 (*inetsw[ip_protox[nxt]].pr_input)(m, off, nxt);
539 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
540 printf("DP ah4_input call free SA:%p\n", sav));
543 ipsecstat.in_success++;
548 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
549 printf("DP ah4_input call free SA:%p\n", sav));
560 ah6_input(mp, offp, proto)
564 struct mbuf *m = *mp;
569 const struct ah_algorithm *algo;
573 struct secasvar *sav = NULL;
577 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST
578 IP6_EXTHDR_CHECK(m, off, sizeof(struct ah), IPPROTO_DONE);
579 ah = (struct ah *)(mtod(m, caddr_t) + off);
581 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct ah *, m, off, sizeof(struct newah));
583 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv6 AH input: can't pullup\n"));
584 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
588 ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
591 /* find the sassoc. */
594 if (ntohs(ip6->ip6_plen) == 0) {
595 ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "IPv6 AH input: "
596 "AH with IPv6 jumbogram is not supported.\n"));
597 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
601 if ((sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET6,
602 (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_src, (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_dst,
603 IPPROTO_AH, spi)) == 0) {
604 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
605 "IPv6 AH input: no key association found for spi %u\n",
606 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)));
607 ipsec6stat.in_nosa++;
610 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
611 printf("DP ah6_input called to allocate SA:%p\n", sav));
612 if (sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_MATURE
613 && sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_DYING) {
615 "IPv6 AH input: non-mature/dying SA found for spi %u; ",
616 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)));
617 ipsec6stat.in_badspi++;
621 algo = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth);
623 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv6 AH input: "
624 "unsupported authentication algorithm for spi %u\n",
625 (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi)));
626 ipsec6stat.in_badspi++;
630 siz = (*algo->sumsiz)(sav);
631 siz1 = ((siz + 3) & ~(4 - 1));
634 * sanity checks for header, 1.
639 sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4;
642 * Here, we do not do "siz1 == siz". See ah4_input() for complete
646 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length too short in IPv6 AH input "
647 "(%lu, should be at least %lu): %s\n",
648 (u_long)siz1, (u_long)siz,
649 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi)));
650 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
653 if ((ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff != siz1) {
654 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "sum length mismatch in IPv6 AH input "
655 "(%d should be %lu): %s\n",
656 (ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff, (u_long)siz1,
657 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi)));
658 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
661 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST
662 IP6_EXTHDR_CHECK(m, off, sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1, IPPROTO_DONE);
664 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct ah *, m, off,
665 sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1);
667 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "couldn't pullup gather IPv6 AH checksum part"));
668 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
676 * check for sequence number.
678 if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) {
679 if (ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav))
682 ipsec6stat.in_ahreplay++;
683 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
684 "replay packet in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n",
685 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi),
686 ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
692 * alright, it seems sane. now we are going to check the
693 * cryptographic checksum.
695 cksum = malloc(siz1, M_TEMP, M_NOWAIT);
697 ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "IPv6 AH input: "
698 "couldn't alloc temporary region for cksum\n"));
699 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
703 if (ah6_calccksum(m, (caddr_t)cksum, siz1, algo, sav)) {
705 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
708 ipsec6stat.in_ahhist[sav->alg_auth]++;
711 caddr_t sumpos = NULL;
713 if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) {
715 sumpos = (caddr_t)(ah + 1);
718 sumpos = (caddr_t)(((struct newah *)ah) + 1);
721 if (bcmp(sumpos, cksum, siz) != 0) {
722 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
723 "checksum mismatch in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n",
724 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
726 ipsec6stat.in_ahauthfail++;
733 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR;
734 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPDGM;
738 * looks okey, but we need more sanity check.
739 * XXX should elaborate.
741 if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPV6) {
742 struct ip6_hdr *nip6;
745 sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4;
747 IP6_EXTHDR_CHECK(m, off, sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1
748 + sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), IPPROTO_DONE);
750 nip6 = (struct ip6_hdr *)((u_char *)(ah + 1) + sizoff + siz1);
751 if (!IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&nip6->ip6_src, &ip6->ip6_src)
752 || !IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&nip6->ip6_dst, &ip6->ip6_dst)) {
753 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
754 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
756 } else if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IPIP) {
757 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
758 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
759 } else if (ah->ah_nxt == IPPROTO_IP) {
760 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
761 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
765 if (m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPHDR
766 && m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPDGM) {
769 "IPv6 AH input: authentication succeess\n"));
771 ipsec6stat.in_ahauthsucc++;
773 ipseclog((LOG_WARNING,
774 "authentication failed in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n",
775 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi), ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
776 ipsec6stat.in_ahauthfail++;
781 * update sequence number.
783 if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) {
784 if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav)) {
785 ipsec6stat.in_ahreplay++;
790 /* was it transmitted over the IPsec tunnel SA? */
791 if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) {
793 stripsiz = sizeof(struct ah) + siz1;
796 stripsiz = sizeof(struct newah) + siz1;
798 if (ipsec6_tunnel_validate(m, off + stripsiz, nxt, sav)) {
800 * strip off all the headers that precedes AH.
801 * IP6 xx AH IP6' payload -> IP6' payload
803 * XXX more sanity checks
804 * XXX relationship with gif?
806 u_int32_t flowinfo; /* net endian */
808 flowinfo = ip6->ip6_flow;
809 m_adj(m, off + stripsiz);
810 if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip6)) {
812 * m_pullup is prohibited in KAME IPv6 input processing
813 * but there's no other way!
815 m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip6));
817 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
821 ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
822 /* ECN consideration. */
823 ip6_ecn_egress(ip6_ipsec_ecn, &flowinfo, &ip6->ip6_flow);
824 if (!key_checktunnelsanity(sav, AF_INET6,
825 (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_src, (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_dst)) {
826 ipseclog((LOG_NOTICE, "ipsec tunnel address mismatch "
827 "in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n",
828 ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi),
829 ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
830 ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
836 * should the inner packet be considered authentic?
837 * see comment in ah4_input().
839 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
840 m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
843 key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m);
844 if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0 ||
845 ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_IPV6, 0) != 0) {
846 ipsec6stat.in_nomem++;
850 if (netisr_queue(NETISR_IPV6, m)) {
851 ipsecstat.in_inval++;
864 * Copy the value of the next header field of AH to the
865 * next header field of the previous header.
866 * This is necessary because AH will be stripped off below.
868 prvnxtp = ip6_get_prevhdr(m, off); /* XXX */
871 ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
872 #ifndef PULLDOWN_TEST
874 * We do deep-copy since KAME requires that
875 * the packet is placed in a single mbuf.
877 ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip6, ((caddr_t)ip6) + stripsiz, off);
878 m->m_data += stripsiz;
879 m->m_len -= stripsiz;
880 m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz;
883 * even in m_pulldown case, we need to strip off AH so that
884 * we can compute checksum for multiple AH correctly.
886 if (m->m_len >= stripsiz + off) {
887 ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip6, ((caddr_t)ip6) + stripsiz, off);
888 m->m_data += stripsiz;
889 m->m_len -= stripsiz;
890 m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz;
893 * this comes with no copy if the boundary is on
898 n = m_split(m, off, M_DONTWAIT);
900 /* m is retained by m_split */
905 /* m_cat does not update m_pkthdr.len */
906 m->m_pkthdr.len += n->m_pkthdr.len;
909 ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
911 ip6->ip6_plen = htons(ntohs(ip6->ip6_plen) - stripsiz);
913 key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m);
914 if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0) {
915 ipsec6stat.in_nomem++;
924 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
925 printf("DP ah6_input call free SA:%p\n", sav));
928 ipsec6stat.in_success++;
933 KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
934 printf("DP ah6_input call free SA:%p\n", sav));
943 ah6_ctlinput(cmd, sa, d)
948 const struct newah *ahp;
950 struct secasvar *sav;
953 struct ip6ctlparam *ip6cp = NULL;
955 struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6_src, *sa6_dst;
957 if (sa->sa_family != AF_INET6 ||
958 sa->sa_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
960 if ((unsigned)cmd >= PRC_NCMDS)
963 /* if the parameter is from icmp6, decode it. */
965 ip6cp = (struct ip6ctlparam *)d;
967 ip6 = ip6cp->ip6c_ip6;
968 off = ip6cp->ip6c_off;
972 off = 0; /* fix warning */
977 * XXX: We assume that when ip6 is non NULL,
978 * M and OFF are valid.
981 /* check if we can safely examine src and dst ports */
982 if (m->m_pkthdr.len < off + sizeof(ah))
985 if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(ah)) {
987 * this should be rare case,
988 * so we compromise on this copy...
990 m_copydata(m, off, sizeof(ah), (caddr_t)&ah);
993 ahp = (struct newah *)(mtod(m, caddr_t) + off);
995 if (cmd == PRC_MSGSIZE) {
999 * Check to see if we have a valid SA corresponding to
1000 * the address in the ICMP message payload.
1002 sa6_src = ip6cp->ip6c_src;
1003 sa6_dst = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
1004 sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET6,
1005 (caddr_t)&sa6_src->sin6_addr,
1006 (caddr_t)&sa6_dst->sin6_addr,
1007 IPPROTO_AH, ahp->ah_spi);
1009 if (sav->state == SADB_SASTATE_MATURE ||
1010 sav->state == SADB_SASTATE_DYING)
1015 /* XXX Further validation? */
1018 * Depending on the value of "valid" and routing table
1019 * size (mtudisc_{hi,lo}wat), we will:
1020 * - recalcurate the new MTU and create the
1021 * corresponding routing entry, or
1022 * - ignore the MTU change notification.
1024 icmp6_mtudisc_update((struct ip6ctlparam *)d, valid);
1027 /* we normally notify single pcb here */
1029 /* we normally notify any pcb here */